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ABSTRACT 
 
Firm Failure Processes and Determinants of Failure in EU Countries and 
UK Regions: A Quantitative Analysis of SMEs. 
 
By  
 
Alexios Makropoulos 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements of the Robert Gordon University 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
This thesis is motivated by the fact that small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are of vital importance to most European countries collectively and to each 
country individually. For these reasons, understanding SME failure is an integral 
part of decision and policy making. Firm failure can be regarded as a multi-year 
process that develops over time. Yet, there has been limited work in the area of 
quantitatively identifying and analysing SME failure processes. In particular, 
despite evidence from the qualitative firm failure process literature on the 
importance that non-financial, firm-specific characteristics have on firm failure 
processes, the quantitative firm failure process literature has largely ignored this 
aspect. Likewise, the determinants of firms’ transition to failure within potential 
alternative firm failure processes and the importance of geographical location are 
often overlooked in the firm failure process literature, despite evidence in the wider 
firm failure literature for the contrary. For these reasons, the current evidence in 
the quantitative firm failure process literature is quite isolated from wider firm 
failure studies. This thesis aims to investigate alternative SME failure processes, 
the determinants of firms’ transition towards failure and the importance of firms’ 
geographical location by bringing evidence from other parts of the firm failure 
literature in the quantitative study of firm failure processes. The sample analysed 
consists of SMEs in eight EU countries covering the period from 2004-2013. In 
addition to analysing the whole sample, the failure processes and failure 
determinants of UK failed SMEs are also investigated.  
 
The dataset of this study covers firm-specific characteristics such as financial ratios 
and directors’ characteristics, and information about the macroeconomic and 
business environment. In addition, the impact of geographical location is 
considered.  
 12 | P a g e  
 
 
The key results of the analysis identify the existence of 4 alternative firm failure 
processes (new firms with inexperience boards, high growth firms, old firms, firms 
without board diversity) which apply across EU countries and UK regions. A number 
of other characteristics are also present in the alternative firm failure processes: 
directors characteristics are of primary importance for firm failure processes as 
well as firms’ transition to failure. So are the age of the firm, the legal tradition of 
the country, the levels of business growth and the intensity of competition due to 
new business entrants in an area and the geographical location of firms.  
 
There are a number of contributions that this thesis makes to the quantitative firm 
failure process literature. First, given that the different failure processes were 
found to have differing determinants, the results show the importance of looking 
at individual firm failure processes rather than simply analysing all failed firms 
together. Second, this thesis is the first to quantitatively analyse the impact of 
directors’ characteristics in the identification of the alternative firm failure 
processes in EU and UK firms. Third, it is the first study to investigate the 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure within the alternative firm failure 
processes context where both financial distress and liquidations are considered in 
the definition of failure. Fourth, this thesis identifies the importance of geographical 
location and the existence of spatial interactions in some parts of firms’ transition 
to failure. As such, this thesis consolidates and analyses evidence from qualitative 
firm failure process studies and from wider firm failure studies in the context of 
quantitative firm failure process.  In doing so, it applies spatial panel data analysis 
for first time in a firm failure process study. A number of policy implications result 
from these findings. Given the differences in firm-specific characteristics, the 
differences in the determinants of transition to failure and the geographic 
sensitivities that the alternative firm failure processes have, policies and decisions 
designed to support SMEs to avoid failure should be more targeted according to 
the characteristics of the firm and the process towards failure it is mostly 
associated with. 
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Keywords: SMEs, Firm failure, Firm failure process, Firms’ transition to failure, 
spatial analysis, directors’ characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
1.1. Outline of the Chapter 
 
This chapter presents an introductory overview of the purpose and scope of the 
thesis. Section 2 outlines the background of the study. It introduces the 
approaches that have been taken to firm failure and highlights areas that require 
further analysis. Section 3 sets out the motivations behind the study: first, whether 
or not firm failure processes are present in a sample of failed EU SMEs and second 
to investigate the extent to which different factors affect the different failure 
processes. Section 4 sets out the specific research questions in terms of the thesis’ 
aim and objectives. Section 5 defines a number of key concepts. Finally, the 
structure of the thesis is outlined in Section 6.  
 
1.2. Background of the Study  
 
1.2.1 Business Failure  
 
Entrepreneurs, investors, employees and business suppliers and stakeholders 
incur significant costs when a business fails. For this reason, business failure1 has 
been a particularly active research area over the last fifty years and particularly 
since the seminal works of Beaver (1967) and Altman (1968). However, most of 
the research in the wider area of business’ failure has focused on failure prediction 
(see for example Altman, 1968; Edmister, 1972; Altman, 1984; Dimitras et al., 
1999; Wu et al., 2014). This literature has concentrated almost solely on the use 
of financial information. However, as Argenti (1976) notes, business failure 
becomes evident in financial information at the penultimate stage of failure and 
therefore utilizing only financial information ignores the question of what were the 
underlying conditions that put the firm into  a failure trajectory in the first place 
(Zavgren 1985; Argenti, 1985; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006).  One can define the 
failure process as a number of pre-existing, firm-specific characteristics that 
develop over time and result in firm failure (Argenti, 1976; Laitinen, 1991). 
 
 
                                                          
1 The generic term “failure” has been used, by different authors, to describe company liquidations/bankruptcies, 
insolvencies or financial distress. 
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1.2.2 Business Failure Process 
 
On the other hand, there has been a parallel stream of research that has observed 
that business failure is not an isolated or sudden event that is necessarily similar 
between different businesses. Instead, business failure may be regarded as a 
multi-year process that evolves over a period of time prior to the final failure of 
the firm as defined by liquidation or a bankruptcy filing (see for example Platt, 
1989; Hall, 1992; Ooghe and De Prijcker 2008; Argenti, 1976; Laitinen, 1991).  In 
other words, there is a failure process (or trajectory) that businesses follow over 
a number of years prior to them actually failing. 
 
Within the area of business failure process, a significant part of research has taken 
a qualitative approach, using observations on the qualitative characteristics of 
predominantly large failed businesses over a period of years prior to their eventual 
failure. These studies (see for example Argenti, 1976; Richardson et al., 1994; 
Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008) have focused on firm-specific characteristics as the 
underlying causes of business failure. Qualitative firm failure studies identified 
firm-specific characteristics such as the firms’ director characteristics, the growth 
strategy of the firm as well as the firms’ financials as significant factors in the 
alternative firm failure processes.  
 
1.2.3 Financial Ratios and Research Approach 
 
A number of researchers (see for example Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen et al., 2014; 
Lukason et al., 2016) have taken a different research approach when considering 
the business failure process. Using quantitative analytical techniques, the 
identification of alternative business failure processes has been investigated by 
using solely financial ratios, similar to the original approaches of failure prediction 
studies. This research stream may have been motivated by both Argenti’s (1976) 
work which found that financial ratios, the “symptoms of failure”, captured the 
underlying causes of firms’ failure, as well as from the extensive firm failure 
prediction literature (see for example, Altman, 1968, Altman et al., 2010). The 
latter, used financial ratios as predictors of the failure event. The failure prediction 
literature has developed to include studies analysing different countries, industries, 
firm sizes and quantitative techniques in addition to the financial ratios.  
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The wider business failure literature has employed a number of research 
methodologies. On the qualitative side, case studies and observations have been 
mostly used in the context of the failure process. On the quantitative side, the 
wider business failure literature has used a number of statistical techniques, from 
multivariate discriminant analysis, logistic regression and panel logistic 
regressions, as well as survival analysis with the main motivation being the 
identification of determinants that discriminate between failed and non-failed 
firms. On the other hand, the failure process area has traditionally considered only 
failed firms in the research, given that the main aim was to identify alternative 
processes of failure. However, the quantitative failure process literature has limited 
itself to a combination of factor and cluster analysis in the attempt to identify key 
characteristics that differentiate the alternative failure processes. This literature, 
however, has limited evidence on the determinants of businesses’ transition to 
failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
Regardless of the methodological approach undertaken, the business failure 
process literature has identified a number of failure processes. Such findings have 
come from a number of single country studies (see for example Argenti, 1976; 
Laitinen, 1991) as well as from some multi-country studies (see for example 
Laitinen et al., 2014; Laitinen and Lukason, 2014) which looked to see whether 
failure processes differ between countries. Typically, such studies suggest that, 
depending on the country and on the type of the firm that every study considers, 
there are typically between 3-6 distinct firm failure processes. 
 
1.2.4 The Introduction of Non-Financial Characteristics 
 
Whilst business failure process studies have been looking at samples of liquidated 
firms to understand the pre-existing conditions that the alternative firm failure 
processes could have in common, a wider firm failure literature has also developed. 
Financial ratios as predictors of business’ failure have been well established as an 
important source of information, despite the fact that there has been no common 
agreement on which particular financial ratios should be used in order to better 
identify businesses that are about to fail (Charitou et al., 2004). This has led to 
the criticism that financial ratio-only driven studies have limited theoretical 
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foundations and therefore their results may be inherently unstable if not used in 
specific timeframes prior to the failure event (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Laitinen, 
1993).  
 
Nevertheless, within the wider business failure prediction literature, there has been 
increasing evidence that the management of the businesses can also be used as a 
predictive indicator or can, in general, be a determinant of failure (Franco and 
Haase, 2010; Ropega, 2011; Wilson et al., 2014). The foundations of this 
argument were based on the wider corporate governance literature as well as from 
empirical evidence showing that certain characteristics of businesses’ directors and 
board structures may contribute to business’ performance as a consequence of 
increased social and human capital and to improved group dynamics at board level 
(Wilson et al., 2013; Shehata et al., 2017).  
 
Other studies have showed the importance of sectoral impacts on firm failure. In 
addition, macroeconomic conditions, the availability of finance and the legal 
environment, particularly when comparing business failures in different countries, 
have included in studies looking at business failure. This has been particularly true 
since the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the associated credit crunch that led 
businesses to fail (see for example, Carling et al., 2007; La Porta et al., 1997; La 
Porta et al., 1998; Wang 2012). These characteristics have been also identified as 
significant determinants of firm failure in aggregate business failure studies, which, 
however, are primarily limited to the corporate sector (see for example, Liu, 2006; 
Jones, 2013) rather than SMEs.  
 
A number of the above firm-specific characteristics have been used in qualitative 
firm failure process studies together with environment-specific characteristics (see 
for example Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2007; Richardson et al., 1994) as 
differentiators of alternative failure processes.  However, these elements have 
been ignored by quantitative firm failure process studies. 
 
1.2.5 Conclusion  
 
Overall, wider firm failure studies focus on a number of determinants that assist 
the prediction, or explanation, of business failures. These include firm-specific 
characteristics that emphasise on financial ratios and the business’ management. 
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Factors external to the business are also frequently considered as determinants of 
business failure. These studies focus on failure as a time-specific event. On the 
other hand there is a view that firm failure is a process that evolves over a number 
of years. The qualitative business failure literature included non-financial 
characteristics into the identification of the alternative firm failure processes but 
has not considered SMEs; instead most of the research focus has been on large 
corporates. On the other hand, the quantitative firm failure process literature has 
occasionally considered SMEs but has neglected any non-financial information 
when identifying the alternative firm failure processes. In both cases, the firm 
failure process literature identifies alternative failure processes but stops short of 
investigating whether any of the factors included in the identification of the 
alternative failure processes are also determinants of the businesses’ transition to 
the ultimate failure stage that is liquidation. Moreover, despite the existence of 
studies including firms from a number of countries, little attention has been given 
to the role of geographic/ spatial effects on businesses’ transition towards failure.  
 
1.3. Motivation of the Study and Framework 
 
This study is motivated by three main factors. The first is based on the fact that 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are of vital importance to most 
European countries. The second relates to the importance of identifying the 
alternative business failure processes, and their determinants, in order to inform 
better decision-making and better, more relevant polices that will support them 
and help them to thrive. The third is related to the importance of geographical 
location and potential interactions that may occur between firms in nearby areas. 
 
First, the EU has introduced many policies designed to support and encourage 
SMEs.  The aim of these policies is to promote business success and avoid business 
failure. For example, policies to support SME growth such has the “Think Small 
First”, the “Small Business Act” (Commission of the European Communities, 2008), 
the “Entrepreneurship 2020 Action plan”, and the “Competitiveness of Enterprises 
and small and medium-sized Enterprises” program (2013) have all been designed 
to support SME growth and to avoid SME failure. Policies that support SMEs are 
important because SMEs represent the majority of the business population in the 
European Union. In addition, they are also a major source for peoples’ 
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employment. In the U.K., SMEs accounted for 59.3% of the private sector 
employment (Federation of Small Businesses, 2013). In the EU, SMEs account for 
c.66% of the private sector employment (European Commission, 2018). 
 
Second, in relation to the failure process research on SMEs, one can observe that 
whilst the wider business failure literature has evolved with alternative 
methodologies and consideration of non-financial characteristics as determinants 
of failure. However, there has been no such progress in the failure process 
literature where alternative failure processes have been identified solely in terms 
of financial ratios. Further, no analysis has been undertaken to understand which 
of these are actually determinants of the firms’ transition to failure. Yet, the 
identification of failure processes is important because failure is a situation that 
evolves over a number of years and needs to be understood before any avoidance 
actions can be taken. Such knowledge can then inform policy and decision-making. 
 
Third, in a business environment where business interact with each other via their 
business networks, aggregate firm failures in one location can affect firm failures 
in other locations. Such information is also important for policy making at country 
and regional levels. 
 
Overall, despite the European Union’s (EU) efforts to avoid business failures by 
supporting and giving alternative opportunities to entrepreneurs with failed firms, 
SME bankruptcies in the EU show clear signs of differences between some key 
European countries (Figure 1.1). One can see that, for example, liquidations in the 
U.K. and Germany on the one hand and Sweden and Netherlands, on the other 
hand are having quite different levels which are not just simply correlated with 
their country level economic conditions. The former two (UK and Germany) have 
higher bankruptcy rates in 2011 compared to 2013, while the latter two 
(Netherlands and Sweden) have the opposite trend. Therefore this raises the 
question of whether SME support policies could be better managed if a better 
understanding of the underlying reasons of SMEs’ failure was available. This has 
to be considered in the context of the current research that, particularly on the 
quantitative side, treats the business failure as a sudden event. Likewise, the 
failure process literature neither considers non-financial characteristics in the 
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alternative failure processes nor considers the determinants of the firms’ transition 
towards failure between the failure processes. 
 
 Figure 1.1: Business liquidations in some European countries 
 
Source: Company Insolvencies in Europe, (Coface, 2015; p.1) 
 
Likewise, there is limited evidence on whether the geographical location within one 
country has any significance in firms’ failure. The wider business failure research 
provides evidence that the spatial location of the firm does matter if one has to 
distinguish between (for example) different regions as the business environment  
(such as the competition from new firms) may differ in each region (Lane and 
Schary, 1991; Keeble and Walker, 1994). In that sense, there is evidence that 
within the United Kingdom (UK), the percentage of failed businesses may differ 
substantially (figure 1.2) between different regions (within England and Wales in 
this case). There also appears to be some correlation with the percentage of new 
business in these areas, in line with the literature observations (Lane and Schary, 
1991; Keeble and Walker, 1994). This can be observed in figure 1.2 which shows 
that the percentage of business failures (in 2010-2011) differed between different 
regions in England. London was the region with the most failures. Additionally it 
was the region with the most start-ups. 
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Figure 1.2: Changes in business failures (deaths) and births in England 2010-2011.  
 
  
Source: Business births, deaths and survival rates, ONS (2012) 
 
Despite the evidence, the aspect of location, expressed by different countries or 
by different areas (for example regions) within a country has been largely 
neglected, especially when the determinants of businesses’ transition to failure are 
considered. Yet, such findings could help entrepreneurs, investors and decision 
makers to better allocate resources and improve policy design accordingly. 
Additionally, the identification of failure processes and their determinants could 
assist further in the wider failure literature as failure prediction applications could 
be more targeted to certain firm failure processes.  
 
To conclude, the key motivator is understanding SMEs failures processes in 
different locations: within EU countries and within a country - the UK. This is 
because failure is not a sudden event, identical for each business and therefore 
should not be treated as such.  The importance of location, be it between countries 
or within a country (at regional level) has received little attention in the context of 
SME failure processes. In this context there appears to be some neglect of 
alternative quantitative techniques that could provide further insights in the 
current quantitative firm failure process literature.  
 
There are two additional issues that motivate the analysis. First, the current 
literature relating to business failure processes has somewhat neglected the 
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importance of not only identifying the alternative failure processes but also of 
identifying the determinants of the transition towards failure – within the 
population of businesses that belong to the alternative failure processes. This is 
crucial because, having identified different failure processes, it may be that the 
determinants of the transition to failure differ across different processes. 
 
Second, aside from financial ratios, the quantitative failure process literature has 
neglected key firm-specific characteristics and their role in firm failure. This is in 
spite of the findings in the qualitative failure process literature that they 
significantly affect failure. Further, there is no evidence of how, or if, non-financial 
ratio determinants are significant contributors to businesses’ transition to failure 
between EU countries and within different areas of one country - the UK. 
 
1.4. The Research Problem and the research plan 
 
As described in the previous section, a number of salient areas remain under-
developed in the current literature. First, the majority of the qualitative work on 
firm failure processes considers large corporations rather than small and medium 
sized- businesses (hereafter called “firms” or SMEs). 
 
Second, the quantitative literature has focused solely on financial ratios when 
investigating firm failure processes for both large corporations and for SMEs. As 
such, the current quantitative research on firm failure processes ignores findings 
from qualitative studies in the same area, that suggest that non-financial 
characteristics, especially related to the management of the business, are 
important when one wants to identify the alternative failure processes. In addition, 
evidence from the wider business failure literature is also ignored. 
 
Third, whilst the wider business failure research considers the determinants of 
business failure, quantitative firm failure process studies have so far identified a 
number of firm failure processes in different countries but there has been limited 
analysis of the extent to which the characteristics that differ between alternative 
firm failure processes are actually statistically significant determinants of the firms’ 
failure when firms are transitioning towards their terminal failure (liquidation) 
state. 
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Fourth, whilst firm failure process studies have taken place in a number of different 
countries (including a number of multi-country studies), the geographic element 
has received relatively limited attention, and then only from a firm-specific 
perspective. The geographical location is associated with observed and unobserved 
characteristics. For the former, there is limited evidence on whether firm failure 
processes differ between countries or within different regions of a country. In 
addition the current failure process literature does not explain what role, if any, 
country-specific characteristics (such as the legal environment) or region-specific 
characteristics (such as the competition from newly established firms) play in the 
firms’ transition towards failure within these failure processes.   
 
Fifth, the methodologies that have been used so far in firm failure process studies 
are restricted to the identification of the alternative failure processes by using 
factor and cluster analysis. Therefore, further insights may be gained by employing 
additional techniques, for example, panel data regression analysis and by 
assessing the importance of spatial location, using spatial data analysis. This may 
provide a better understanding of the factors that determine the path of firm 
failure. 
 
The study aims to address the above issues by using a sample of failed firms from 
8 European countries, covering the period 2004-2013. This period (the maximum 
number of years available in the Amadeus database) covers the financial crisis that 
resulted in a number of failed firms in the subsequent years. Moreover, it allows 
each firm in the sample to have a substantial number of observation years prior 
to failure. The countries were selected so as for each country represented in the 
sample to have a substantial number of failed businesses. The selected sample of 
countries ensures that a diverse business economic and legal tradition background 
is represented in the sample. As such the sample represents 8 countries with 
different economic environments during the period under investigation. These 
countries are also representative of the key legal traditions that exist in EU. The 
sample size in terms of firms’ numbers and number of countries presents an 
improvement and an extention of the current quantitative firm failure process 
literature. Further details on the sample are given in Chapter 4. This thesis seeks 
to address the following aims and objectives: 
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Main Aim: 
To enhance the quantitative firm failure process literature on SMEs, by 
incorporating elements from the qualitative failure process and the wider firm 
failure literature. 
 
Objectives: 
1) To investigate the alternative firm failure processes between EU countries 
and within one country’s regions - the UK, by considering financial ratios 
and the age of the firm. 
2) To investigate the impact of firms’ management characteristics, in addition 
to the financial ratios and the age of the firm, in the identification of failure 
processes and their transition to failure between EU countries and within 
one country’s regions - the UK. 
3) To investigate the influence of business environment factors, management 
characteristics and excessive growth, in firms’ transition towards failure in 
the alternative failure processes in EU countries and within one country’s 
regions - the UK. 
4) To investigate the influence of location at firm level and aggregate firm 
transitions towards failure in the alternative failure processes between EU 
countries and within the UK. 
 
In order to achieve the aim and objectives, the thesis is structured around a 
number of hypotheses. The hypotheses associated with the alternative firm failure 
processes and with firms’ transition to failure are developed in the literature review 
section. Once the alternative firm failure processes are identified (from the 
financial ratios and the age of the firm) these hypotheses consider wider 
comparisons both for the firm specific characteristics that were used to identify the 
alternative processes and for characteristics associated with the economic and 
business environment of the firms in the alternative processes.  The hypotheses 
associated with the influence of the geographical (spatial) location and firms’ 
aggregate transition towards failure are developed in the methodology chapter. 
Subsequently, these hypotheses are analyzed in three empirical chapters; one 
analyses the firm failure process and determinants of transition to failure in EU 
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countries; the second analyses the firm failure process and determinants of the 
transition towards failure in the UK regions; the third uses aggregated failures 
across the EU countries and the UK regions, to investigate the influence of 
geographic (spatial) effects in firms’ failure.  
 
As a result, the thesis makes a number of contributions. The first is to extend the 
quantitative firm failure process literature by incorporating and quantifying 
elements from the wider firm failure process and firm failure literature. It does so 
by looking for evidence across a number of EU countries and also within the regions 
of the UK. The second contribution is to consider the determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure, for first time in a quantitative firm failure process study. The 
third is to investigate the importance of geographical location in firms’ failures 
between EU countries and within the UK is investigated for first time in the firm 
failure process context.  The findings of this study should provide contributions 
and implications for policy and decision makers. The identification of the firm 
failure process that firms belong to and the identification of its determinants of 
transition to failure can provide a valuable insight  to initiate failure avoidance 
actions and policies. 
 
1.5. Definitions 
 
In business failure studies, authors have used a number of different definitions for 
similar things. In order to avoid confusion, this section provides definitions for all 
the terms that are used in this thesis. 
 
1.5.1 Defining Small and Medium Sized Firms and Businesses 
 
There is a wide variety of definitions in the literature for the SMEs. This study uses 
the EU definition for micro, small and medium sized firms as presented in Table 
1.1.  
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Table 1.1: Upper limits to be considered as a micro, small or medium sized firm  
 
Source: Official Journal of the European Union L 124, p. 36 
 
Both EU and UK firms in the sample are using the same criteria (see for details 
Chapter 4 - Data). The terms “SME” and “firm” are used interchangeably in this 
study. 
 
1.5.2 Defining Bankruptcy, Liquidation and Failure  
 
The definition of failure has been used in many alternative ways in business failure 
studies. On occasion the term “failure” has been used to denote financial distress 
(see below). On other occasions “failure” has been used as synonymous with 
business exits from the industry, including business mergers and acquisitions as 
well as simply the ceasation of trading. Finally, the term “failure” has been used 
to denote bankruptcy or liquidation of a business2.  
 
Therefore, in this thesis the term failure is used to denote bankruptcy/liquidation. 
This is regarded as the terminal stage of a firm’s operation. In this thesis, there is 
no direct distinction between compulsory and voluntary liquidations because such 
procedures differ between countries and as such this type of information is of 
limited use. In any case this study is interested in identifying the processes and 
determinants of failure (liquidation) and as such the initiator of the procedure is 
not the point of interest. However, the study does control for the interim status of 
financial distress (see below) to control for the firms’ whose transition to failure 
was due or partly due to financial distress. 
 
                                                          
2 The term bankruptcy and the term liquidation are broadly similar and are used 
interchangeably in this thesis. Some countries use the term liquidation and others the term 
bankruptcy. Whilst this study makes no distinction between them, the term failure is used 
instead. 
 
Category Employees Turnover Total Bal. Sheet
Medium <250 ≤ € 50 million ≤ € 43 million 
Small <50 ≤ € 10 million ≤ € 10 million 
Micro <10 ≤ € 2 million ≤ € 2 million 
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1.5.3 Defining Financial Distress 
 
Financial distress is a situation that precedes bankruptcy in many cases (Platt and 
Platt, 2002). However, there is not a consistent definition of financial distress in 
the literature. For example, negative equity may be defined as the situation where 
a firm has negative net operating income over a number of years (Hofer, 1980)  
or major restructuring and layoffs (Hill, 1996).  In the context of this thesis the 
term financial distress is used to denote firms with negative equity positions. In 
such firms the liabilities are greater than their total assets and as such their owners 
are in negative equity and therefore financially distressed. Altman (2000) has used 
also the same definition for a failure prediction study. Financial distress is used as 
an interim status in the transition towards failure; a number of firms first go into 
negative equity and then fail. However, some firms fail without being in financial 
distress first. 
 
1.5.4 Defining the Failure Process and the Transition to Failure 
 
The term “Failure Process”, was first introduced by Argenti (1976) and has 
subsequently been adopted by much of the literature in this area (see for example 
Laitinen, 1991; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008; Lukason et al., 2016). As mentioned 
above, a firm’s failure process is defined as a number of pre-existing, firm-specific 
characteristics that develop over time and result in failure. For example, the 
existence of a board of directors with little experience in a firm with weak returns 
on investment (ROI) is a combination of existing firm-specific characteristics that 
evolve over time. These characteristics may interact with the firm’s external 
environment and lead to failure. The term “Failure Trajectory” is sometimes used 
sometimes in the literature (see Argenti 1976) interchangeably with the Failure 
Process. This study however will use the term failure process. 
 
In this thesis, the term “transition to failure” is used to denote the interim stages 
that a firm may encounter across time as it moves towards its eventual failure. 
The transition to failure describes the firm’s journey under two conditions: first, 
from being active and under no financial distress to becoming bankrupt and 
second, being potentially financially distressed prior to becoming bankrupt. The 
term is used in this study when consideration is given not in the characteristics of 
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the alternative firm failure processes but to the determinants of failure; that is the 
characteristics that are statistically significant determinants of the firms’ transition 
from commercially active to failure. 
1.5.5 Defining Management 
 
This thesis examines the firms’ directors’ characteristics and gender diversity as 
proxies of a firm’s management knowledge, experience and social and human 
capital. The definition of directors for the EU countries implies ownership to the 
firm and is related to people that are on a firm’s board. The UK firms, however, 
include a wider definition of directors in the main section of the analysis that 
includes managers in senior positions (such as chief accountant) but not 
necessarily ownership or board presence. However, a strict definition (that implies 
ownership), of directors in UK firms has also been used in an additional robustness 
analysis with no material differences in the results. 
 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is outlined below. Chapter 2 provides a literature review. The 
chapter first considers the characteristics and the determinants that have been 
associated with firm failure. The chapter provides a synthesis and critical analysis 
of the determinants of firms’ failure from the wider failure literature and then 
proceeds with looking at cross country comparisons. Subsequently, the chapter 
presents and evaluates the current literature on firm failure process.  Finally the 
chapter summarises evidence on the same characteristics but for studies that 
cover intra-country comparisons. 
 
In doing so, chapter 2 covers the areas that firm failure studies have historically 
identified as important determinants of firm failure. As such, the chapter starts 
with the external environment, looking at the legal aspects of firm failure in the 
countries that the sample of this study covers. Then, the chapter proceeds with a 
section dealing with the external environment of the firms and then considers the 
firm-specific characteristics such as the firms’ financials, the management 
characteristics and the presence of excessive growth that has been frequently 
mentioned in firm failure process studies. This chapter also sets the hypotheses in 
relation to the alternative firm failure processes and the determinants of firms’ 
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transition to failure. These are to be tested in Chapters 5 and 6 and are used to 
enable the thesis to reach its aim and objectives. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology that this thesis has adopted. The 
research philosophy and the design of the study are presented. The techniques 
that are used are discussed together with a brief historical review on the 
techniques that have been previously used in the area of firm failure and firm 
failure process. This chapter also sets the hypotheses in relation to the existence 
of geographical (spatial) effects in aggregate firm failures in the failure processes 
of the EU countries and the UK regions. These hypotheses are to be tested in 
Chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the data used in the study. It presents the data sources and 
some basic descriptive statistics. The chapter also defines the dependent and 
independent variables used in the study. 
 
Chapter 5 is the first empirical chapter. It presents the analysis and the discussion 
of the results associated with the country-level firm failure process and the 
determinants of transition to failure of the EU firms of the sample. The relevant 
hypothesis are also discussed.  
 
Chapter 6 is the second empirical chapter. It presents the analysis and the 
discussion of the results associated with the regional-level firm failure process and 
the determinants of transition to failure for the UK firms in the sample. The 
relevant hypothesis are also discussed.  
 
Chapter 7 is the third empirical chapter. The chapter presents the analysis and the 
discussion of the existence of spatial effects in firms’ transition towards failure. 
This is undertaken both for the firms in the EU countries and for firms in the UK 
regions. The relevant hypothesis are also discussed.  
 
Chapter 8 concludes the Thesis. It provides a summary, evaluation and critical 
analysis of the findings and discusses their policy implications. The chapter also 
acknowledges the limitations of the research and proposes possible areas for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  FIRM FAILURE AND PROCESS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The main aim of this study is to enhance the quantitative firm failure process 
literature on SMEs, by incorporating elements from the qualitative failure process 
and the wider firm failure literature. This aim is to be achieved within the context 
of a number of different EU countries and within the regions of one country, the 
United Kingdom. The key objective of this chapter is to introduce the key aspects 
of the wider firm failure literature that are involved in a cross-country and in a 
within-country context. In addition, emphasis will be given to the literature on firm 
failure process. Hypotheses in relation to firm failure process and the determinants 
of firms’ transition to failure are also introduced in this chapter, aligning it with the 
aim of the study. The hypotheses related to the spatial and geographical location 
of the firm are introduced in Chapter 3 as they are more technical in nature. 
 
Comparing the failure processes of firms across European countries and within one 
European country (the U.K.) requires a compilation of different literature sources 
around the topic of firm failure. This is because there appear to be three key 
parallel frameworks in the wider firm failure literature: the firm failure process 
literature, the failure prediction literature and the wider failure literature. The 
failure process literature includes qualitative and quantitative studies and 
considers firms’ failure as a multi-year process that evolves due to a number of 
underlying reasons within a firm. The failure prediction literature mainly considers 
failure as an event and usually employs quantitative techniques. The failure 
prediction literature is particularly important in terms of the selection of financial 
variables. The wider failure literature may consider both the failure event and the 
process and usually analyzes one particular characteristic that may be associated 
with firms’ failure, for example, the association of firms’ failure with the origins of 
a country’s legal framework. 
 
The perspective this chapter discusses is a blend of the literature coming from the 
failure prediction studies as well as from the failure process and wider firm failure 
studies.  In particular, the qualitative firm failure process framework that considers 
the firm’s management, the firm’s age, the firm’s financials and the economic and 
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business environment is used as the basic framework on which evidence from 
wider failure studies are adding evidence.  Whilst there is evidence of firm failure 
and firm failure process studies that consider different countries, the spatial impact 
of location has not received much attention in the literature. In particular, there is 
no evidence of spatial analysis within the context of firm failure process studies. 
On that end, the methodology chapter (Chapter 3) offers some technical guidance 
on spatial analysis and proposes the hypotheses for that part of the thesis. 
 
A major distinction in firm failure studies lies on the size of the firms. Corporate 
failure studies tend to be distinctive to SME failure studies. This is because of the 
different characteristics that SMEs have compared to large corporates. In fact, 
SMEs tend to be more owner-centric and more opaque than their bigger (and 
possibly listed) counterparts. SMEs are also riskier with much higher population 
and higher probabilities of default (Dietsch and Petey, 2004) and therefore failure. 
In line with the aim and objectives of this study, the emphasis of this chapter is 
on the SMEs. However, references are made to the large corporate literature in 
cases where there is a lack of evidence from the SMEs. Such references are 
therefore made in order to assist hypothesis formulation and the drawing of 
inferences. In terms of defining the SMEs, Ooghe and DePrijcker (2008) classified 
SMEs as firms those with less than 100 employees while Richardson et al. (1994) 
did not give a clear definition on “small firm”. In any case, given the nature of the 
research that compares European SMEs, the European definition of SMEs is 
adopted and presented in Chapter 1.  
 
The legal entity of the firms is generally ignored in both aspects of the literature 
while the distinction between listed and non-listed firms is rarely the case, 
especially in the SMEs’ literature where the vast majority of firms are assumed to 
be non-listed. However, the legal aspects of the failure definition may be of interest 
as they are related with the definition of the liquidation status. 
 
The literature of the firm failure process has shaped the framework of this study. 
The qualitative firm failure process literature suggests that a firm’s failure is caused 
by management issues, combined with weak financial performance, often 
unsustainable growth and greater adversity of sector and business environment 
characteristics. From the above, only the weak financial performance has been 
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empirically used in quantitative firm failure process studies (see for example 
Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen et al., 2015).   
 
On the other hand, the wider firm failure literature that investigates single 
determinants that are linked to firm failures is much wider than the literature for 
the failure process. For this reason, each of the literature sections provides 
evidence from the wider stream of firm failure literature. For example, the concept 
of rapid growth is fundamental in the failure process literature while at the same 
time the closely related concept of unsustainable growth is also related to firm 
failure without considering the wider failure process concept. One should be careful 
with the literature’s definition of the firms’ failure process (described in section 
2.2) and with its stages. The latter describes the transition between a firm being 
“healthy”, a firm being in financial distress and a firm becoming bankrupt and 
being liquidated. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the 
distinction between failure event and failure process and discusses and evaluates 
the literature on the firm failure process. Section 2.3 provides evidence on the 
legal origins of the legal legislation that shapes different kinds of firms failure 
across countries; section 2.4 presents the financial and economic drivers of firms’ 
failure; section 2.5 presents the management of small firms and its connection 
with failure whereas section 2.6 presents the concept of sustainable growth and 
its connection with failure. Finally section 2.7 presents the reasons why intra-
country failure comparisons may be of interest to the academic literature and 
extends the discussion of the previous sections but in an intra-country context. 
Section 2.8 concludes the chapter. In each section, research hypothesis are 
formed, where relevant. These are analysed in the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
 
2.2 Firm Failure and Firm Failure Processes 
 
2.2.1 Introduction to Firm Failure 
 
The research perspective around firm failures can be categorized in two different 
types. The first presents firm failure as an event that “happens” and it is a matter 
of research to find the appropriate predictors of the failure event which are 
effectively the symptoms of the failure. Therefore, this body of research aims to 
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identify failure factors. That research has been greatly influenced by the seminal 
works of Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), it is largely quantitative in nature and 
has been most effectively expressed in the failure prediction literature.  
 
In failure prediction studies, the failure is an event that happens at a specific time 
and the research focuses on the effort to identify financial ratios, and later other 
variables, that predict firm failure. In this view, the failure event (that is the 
liquidation or the financial distress) of the firm was defined as a specific point in 
time and therefore the research focuses on the years just before the event in order 
to identify the best determinants of the firm failure. Traditionally statistical analysis 
has been used in order for the determinants of the failure event to be identified.   
 
Naturally, the selection of financial ratios that measure the basic financial 
dimensions of a firm (such as the total liabilities to total assets ratio, the sales to 
total assets ratio and the quick ratio) are particularly important in that respect. In 
other words, researchers strived to select the most appropriate financial ratios for 
input into an econometric model that would in turn give a score according to which 
a firm could be classified as risky/ not risky to fail. Gradually, this type of research 
evolved into the inclusion of variables other than financial ratios in the econometric 
model. Consequently, macroeconomic, industry-related and management-related 
variables were included in the econometric models alongside the traditional 
financial ratios. Likewise, researchers started using alternative econometric 
techniques to achieve the most accurate model. Such techniques included multiple 
discriminant analysis, logistic regression with pooled data where data from few 
years before the failure event were analyzed so as to identify the most important 
determinants of failure. Later approaches, still very much viewing the failure as a 
defined event, applied survival analysis (also referred as event history analysis)  
and failure events across wider periods of time were researched (see for example 
Gupta et al., 2015) that allowed for time-varying determinants of failure. Within 
this context, panel regressions as well as computational techniques based on 
neural networks (see for example Tsakonas et al., 2006; Ciampi and Gordini, 
2013) have been used. Financial ratios are identified as key determinants of failure 
prediction but there is no conclusive evidence on which particular combination of 
financial ratios is preferred (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). 
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2.2.2 The Firm Failure Process 
 
The second type or research stems from the qualitative work of Argenti (1976) 
which considered firm failure as a result of a combination of underlying reasons 
that have been part of a firm for a long time, including the management of the 
firm and its financial characteristics (using financial ratios as symptoms of failure), 
leading to its failure. The firm failure process literature suggests that firms 
generally do not fail instantaneously but they are experiencing a failure path (the 
failure process) that can be very lengthy for corporates and quicker in SMEs 
(Laitinen, 1991). Generally, literature suggests that a firm’s failure is rarely caused 
by a single reason (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004) but in extreme cases failure can 
be the result of a severe management mistake (Lukason, 2013).  Within the failure 
process, liquidation is seen as the final stage of the declining process (Lukason 
and Hoffman, 2014). Often, failure processes are attached to this type of study in 
order to categorize a number of firm failure processes to a small number of failure 
processes.  
 
All in all, few researchers have been involved in the explicit analysis of failure as a 
process (Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008) and most of them focused their analysis on 
large companies. In many respects, the failure process type of research can be 
described as a more “holistic” approach in assessing firm failure as it largely 
emphasizes the underlying causes of failure and the financial effects (Ooghe and 
DePrijcker, 2008). The general view in all failure process studies is that a firm’s 
failure is the result of management issues combined with external factors. In other 
words, there is a variety of underlying reasons that may lead a firm to fail and 
therefore any firm failures are not simple events that happened at some point in 
time (Argenti 1976; Argenti 1976b). However, in contrast to failure prediction and 
generally failure event studies, this research area is often characterized by 
qualitative studies (see for example Argenti, 1976; Ooghe and Prijcker, 2008) and 
fewer quantitative studies (see for example Laitinen et al., 2014). Within the firm 
failure process literature there can be a further distinction of researchers that 
propose a specific set of failure paths (or failure processes) (Argenti, 1976; 
Laitinen, 1991; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008) and of researchers that represent 
the failure process in a general way (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004; Hambrick and 
D’Aveni, 1988). 
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The early studies within the firm failure process literature were mainly qualitative 
in nature, focusing on lager corporates and a number of characteristics were 
considered as being distinct between the alternative firm failure processes. In 
addition, in these studies there was no distinction between the characteristics of 
the alternative firm failure processes and the determinants of firms’ failure (see 
for example Argenti, 1976, Argenti 1976b, Richardson et al., 1994). Later studies 
focused on the quantitative identification of the alternative firm failure processes 
(see for example Laitinen, 1991). However, there has been little discussion on 
which (if any) of the characteristics of the alternative firm failure processes were 
also determinants of firms’ failure. Therefore there is scope to try to quantify this 
research area’s observations within a cross-country and intra-country context and 
additionally investigate the determinants of firms’ transition to failure within the 
alternative firm failure processes. 
 
The first and most widely known evidence of research into the firm failure process 
was provided by Argenti (1976).  This type of research, which views firm failure 
as a process, tends to categorise firms into several categories (the firm failure 
processes), depending on their characteristics. In Argenti’s (1976) view, the three 
elements in the firm failure sequel are: managements’ deficiency and inability to 
adapt to change; potential overtrading; and the financial ratios as symptoms of 
failure. Despite the fact that there has been surprisingly limited research that 
followed Argenti’s rationale, several parts of his failure categories have been 
researched independently outside the context of the firm failure process. This 
supports the conceptual importance of his contribution which is centered on the 
idea that by studying the financial ratios alone, only the symptoms of failure are 
examined. The underlying conditions of failure though are not directly identified in 
a ratio analysis as the latter only capture the financial outcomes of management 
actions.   
 
Argenti (1976; 1976b) identified three different failure processes that cover the 
vast majority of firms’ failures: 
i) The first failure process is the relatively new, low profile and low 
performance firm that did not become successful and failed (Argenti,1976); 
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ii) The second failure process is the rapid growth firm before it fails (Argenti, 
1976; Argenti, 1976b); 
iii) The third failure process is the case of an old firm that performed well for a 
period before its performance deteriorated and it eventually failed (Argenti, 
1976a).  
 
Failure processes have been further supported by Ooghe and DePrijcker (2008) 
who argued that the essence of the failure process is the existence of management 
issues combined with external factors that lead to four distinct failure processes, 
including: 
i) The unsuccessful start-ups; 
ii) The rapid growth companies; 
iii) The dazzling growth companies; 
iv) The apathetic but well-established companies.   
 
Critical evaluation of the above failure process frameworks shows that by 
effectively revising the failure process framework, Ooghe and DePrijcker (2008) 
added the dazzling growth companies as a separate failure process where the 
firm’s growth path is a key aspect of the failure. However, the key elements of a 
few firm failure processes where management and external factors decide the 
firm’s failure process persist. In addition, growth can be described as an outcome 
of management actions and external environment conditions. Essentially the same 
can be argued for the financial ratios.  In fact, each of these failure elements has 
more complicated underlying dimensions. One can critically suggest that financial 
ratios and excessive growth are symptoms of failure. Whilst they may be useful 
characteristics for identifying a number of alternative firm failure processes, the 
underlying causes of them are usually related to the management of the firms and 
the business and economic environment. In addition, the evaluation of the above 
propositions for the firm failure processes shows that there is a relatively weak link 
between characteristics of alternative firm failure processes and determinants of 
firms’ transition to failure within these processes.  
 
 
Although the key elements of the failure process have been the same, other 
authors have used slightly different definitions of the failure processes. One 
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criticism of Argenti’s (1976) work is that his discussion of the financial health of 
the company and its management deficiencies is quite vague. Another is that there 
are no specific financial indicators used in the definition of the “financial health” of 
the company. Ooghe and DePrijcker (2008) provided a clearer definition by 
arguing that profitability and debt/equity figures together with a relationship 
between the turnover of the firm and its expenses are important indicators that 
have been (qualitatively) used in the 4 processes of the failure process while the 
capitalization structure is also important for new/young firms.  Laitinen (1991), on 
the other hand, identified the existence of three alternative firm failure processes 
in Finland, namely the “chronic failure firm”, the “revenue financing failure firm” 
and the “acute failure firm” by using largely financial information-related evidence, 
in a quantitative methods approach. According to Laitinen (1991) the three 
alternative firm failure processes have the following characteristics:  
i) the first failure process is the firm which underperforms for at least 4 years 
before its failure;  
ii) the second failure process is the firm with very average financial 
performance but revenues that were too weak to support finance the firm’s 
debt and to accumulate earnings; 
iii)  the third failure process is where the firm shows no signs of financial 
distress in any year but the last one before failure. 
 
One could therefore argue that Laitinen’s (1991) approach has been largely 
influenced by the early developments of the failure prediction literature where the 
usage of financial ratios was dominant. This is in fact one of the few attempts to 
bridge the gap between the two types of firm failure research and to use a financial 
ratio-driven evidence to derive conclusions on the failure processes. Despite that, 
Laitinen’s (1991) failure process, and especially the last process, can be  linked to 
Argenti’s (1976) three concepts of a firm’s failure where it was suggested that 
“creative accounting” may be a factor that influences financial ratios and makes 
the failure seem impossible when it is actually the case. In defining more 
specifically management problems in the failure process, Ooghe and DePrijcker 
(2008) gave also some specific evidence that managerial inexperience is a key 
driver of management errors and problems especially in the process that involves 
the failure of new firms.  
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Nevertheless, within the firm failure process literature, examples that focus only 
on small firms have been few (see for example, Laitinen, 1991; Ropega, 2011) 
and with a varied definition of what a small firm is and what is defined as failure. 
Laitinen (1991), for example, defined failure as the situation where a firm cannot 
pay its financial obligations, a definition most closely related to financial distress 
as opposed to bankruptcy. Later studies have defined failure as a firm’s bankruptcy 
(see for example, Lukason et al., 2015). 
 
In the case of SMEs, in particular, the owner seems to be the most important 
person whose relationship with the company may be too close such that he causes 
functional problems in the firm (Ropega, 2011). Deficient management was also 
linked to neglected financial information (Argenti, 1976). Naturally, financial ratios 
can capture parts of the deteriorating performance of a firm as it slides down the 
path to failure but they may occasionally be the last to be affected as “creative 
accounting” and “window dressing” techniques that involve a superficial 
improvement of the financial results, may have been employed at some stage.   
 
Although most of the evidence around the failure process has been related to large 
corporations, Richardson et al., (1994) considered firms of different sizes and 
categorised them in the following processes: 
i) Those that are old and with a gradually deteriorating performance;  
ii) Those that experience rapid growth, leading to failure;  
iii) Those that have an autocratic entrepreneur who set-up the company that 
he no longer can manage.  
iv) For the smaller firms, there is the case of firms that underperform 
permanently without ever achieving acceptable performance to survive 
(Richardson et al., 1994). 
One particular characteristic of the firm failure process is the exclusion of SMEs or 
their inclusion within a larger sample (see for example Richardson et al., 1994; 
Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008). Ropega (2011) linked the failure process literature 
with the wider literature of SME failures but the definition of SME is also absent, 
probably because it varies significantly between authors. Laitinen et al., (2014) 
and Ropega, (2011) proposed their own views of the failure process, but they all 
contain broadly similar underlying characteristics. The key characteristics of the 
alternative failure processes are: 
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i) the young firm that never really performed; 
ii)  the unsustainable/extreme growth firm; 
iii)  the apathetic old established company with deteriorating performance.  
 
Similar evidence exists in more recent quantitative firm failure process studies 
where SMEs are considered in a multi-country assessment. For example Laitinen 
et al., (2014) quantitatively analysed SME failure processes in six European 
countries (Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Russia, United Kingdom) 
using firms’ financial ratios. It identified four firm failure processes that shared 
similar characteristics with those identified in earlier studies: 
i) The first process was characterized by firms with high revenues to total 
assets. These firms were identified as normal growth firms. 
ii) The second process was characterized by firms whose cash flows to 
operating revenues were high but return on investment becomes negative 
in the year prior to failure. These firms were identified as high growth firms 
with a sudden failure occurring. Similar high growth processes were 
identified in Argenti (1976), Richardson et al., (1994) and Ooghe and De 
Prijcker (2008). 
iii) The third process was characterized by firms whose all financial ratios were 
gradually deteriorating. This trajectory was identified by Argenti (1976) and 
Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) as the trajectory of an apathetic firm. 
iv) The fourth process was characterized by firms whose performance was weak 
across all the years of study. Similar processes have been identified by 
Richardson et al., (1994) for young firms, an element that Laitinen’s et al., 
(2014) work does not control for. 
 
Similar results were identified in other single or multi-country quantitative firm 
failure process studies including SMEs (see for example Laitinen et al., 2015; 
Lukason and Laitinen, 2016; Lukason and Laitinen, 2018). In all cases, a critical 
evaluation of the quantitative firm failure process literature and some synthesis 
with the qualitative firm failure process literature implies that there are 
management issues that lead to problematic financial performance. These 
underlying factors are connected to external factors and lead to firm failure. Yet, 
whilst there is some evidence of identifying alternative firm failure processes in 
the quantitative literature, there is still a gap between linking the characteristics 
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of the alternative firm failure processes with characteristics that are critical into 
making a firm fail. 
 
2.2.3 Evaluation Overview   
 
From the above, one can conclude that firm failure has been a particularly active 
area of research. It appears to be separate streams of research in the firm failure 
literature, and it is frequently the case that one approach uses evidence from the 
other. The failure event studies and especially the failure prediction studies only 
focused on identifying failure determinants. 
 
On the other hand, the firm failure process literature assesses the failure path and 
the underlying characteristics either on generic terms or by specifying distinct 
failure processes. Despite the fact that the literature presents a variety of failure 
processes with small differences between them, evidence suggests that the early 
stages of the failure process is characterized by organizational and managerial 
deficiencies whereas the later stages of the firm failure process are characterized 
by the symptoms of failure (the financial ratios) (Crutzen and Van Caillie, 2008). 
Regardless of the size of the firm, the qualitative firm failure process literature 
(see for example Argenti, 1976, Argenti, 1976b, Richardson et al., 1994, Ooghe 
and De Prijcker, 2008) takes a more holistic view, arguing that management errors 
are the main determinants of firms’ transition to failure. These are portrayed via a 
number of deficient strategies where firms have, for example, unsustainably high 
growth levels, or deteriorating performance. On the other hand, the quantitative 
literature mainly assesses the symptoms of failure. These are the results of the 
deficient strategies, usually portrayed via financial ratios. The latter are therefore 
used to identify the alternative firm failure processes. However, despite the focus 
of the qualitative firm failure process literature on the management characteristics 
as key elements of the alternative firm failure processes, the quantitative firm 
failure process literature has not yet included them in the identification of the 
alternative firm failure processes. In addition, there seems to be a disconnect 
between the characteristics of the alternative firm failure processes and the 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure. This link has been implied in the 
qualitative firm failure process literature. Management decisions and 
characteristics are portrayed in a number of alternative strategies. These are then 
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sufficient to identify alternative firm failure processes. Likewise these 
characteristics and their associated strategies are implied as being the 
determinants of firms’ failure. However, that link is less clear in the quantitative 
firm failure literature where the symptoms of the management actions (usually the 
financial ratios) are used to identify the alternative firm failure processes. Yet, 
there is little empirical investigation on whether these (or any other) 
characteristics are also (statistically significant) determinants of firms failure.  
  
Therefore, in order to identify and analyse the presence of alternative firm failure 
processes between different European SMEs and those in different regions of a 
country, it is essential that the elements that characterize the firm failure process 
should be addressed. In line with the quantitative and qualitative firm failure 
literature, these are firm-specific characteristics, the management of the firm and 
the effects of the managements’ decisions, usually portrayed in financial ratios. In 
addition, the determinants of firms’ transition to failure can include the wider 
economic and business environment. The following sections elaborate to each of 
these elements by drawing references from the wider body of firm failure research. 
 
 
2.3 Definition and Legal Aspects of Failure 
 
2.3.1 Definition of Failure 
 
 “Failure” is a term that has been dominant in the literature and has been used to 
describe both financial distress3 and any status of liquidation4 of a firm. In the 
literature, different authors use different definitions of “failure”. A large part of the 
literature (see for example Peel, 1989; Amendola et al., 2013; Pindado et al., 
2008) actually classifies financial distress as “failure”. Financial distress is itself a 
financial condition that doesn’t have a clear definition. Generally though, financial 
distress is considered the situation where the firm has negative equity, that is, its 
total liabilities exceed its total assets. 
 
Other definitions of “failure” include the formal legal procedure of liquidation and 
bankruptcy (also known as insolvency procedure) that can be either voluntary 
                                                          
3 Financial distress is defined as Total Liabilities >Total Assets 
4 This can be for example an active firm undergoing liquidation procedures or a finally liquidated firm. 
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(decision of a firm’s management) or compulsory (creditor or state initiated) (see 
for example Argenti, 1976; Richardson, 1994, Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008). 
Amongst the definitions of “failure”, one should be careful with the classification of 
business exits or closures as “failures”. In some cases firm closures for any reason 
other than financial distress and liquidation problems have been branded as 
“failure”. However, firm closure may happen due to withdrawal of capital from the 
firm’s owners or shareholders.   For example, Silviano et al (2010), analyse the 
determinants of alternative business exits in a Spain. One business exit route was 
by liquidation/bankruptcy; the other was by acquisition/merger. Clearly, a merger 
with another firm is not a status where the firm was under financial distress 
necessarily. As Watson and Everett (1996) mentioned, the closure of a firm may 
have happened for reasons unrelated to any financial difficulty and therefore firm 
closures or exits should not be related to failure, at least for the purposes of this 
study. 
 
The “bankruptcy” definition of failure has been particularly popular in the failure 
process research but also in failure prediction studies (see for example Altman et 
al., 2010) but Lin et al., (2012) showed that at least some key financial 
determinants of firm failure (such as profitability and growth variables) can be 
common drivers of both financial distress and bankruptcy types of “failure”.  
 
Although financial distress is a firm-specific financial situation with no particular 
legal attributes, the liquidation (or bankruptcy or insolvency)5 state has a legal 
aspect which is related to laws and rules of a firm’s country of operation. There is 
limited evidence on the links between alternative definitions of failure. In this 
thesis, financial distress (defined as negative equity in the financial statements) is 
a distinct stage of “failure” (the financial distress-related failure) and does not 
preclude any further deterioration of a firm’s financial performance that may lead 
to the next stage of “failure” that is the liquidation/bankruptcy and includes legal 
procedures. Liquidation/bankruptcy is therefore a separate and distinct stage of 
“failure” (the bankruptcy failure) in which the firm is not simply in a potentially 
temporary financial distress but legal liquidation procedures have begun.   
 
                                                          
5  “Bankruptcy” and “Liquidation” are used interchangeably together with “Insolvency” as different countries are 
using these terminologies to denote the same outcome. 
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As it is explained in the following section, some countries may have more than one 
insolvency procedure. However, the dataset for the European countries classifies 
any bankruptcy-related failures under the same (bankruptcy) failure classification, 
possibly in order to simplify facts and to make the data across countries more 
easily comparable. Therefore, in this study there are two states of “failure”, namely 
financial distress (defined as total liabilities being greater than total assets) and 
the bankruptcy/liquidation. It is worth noting that the financial distress-related 
failure is a state that does not necessarily lead to the bankruptcy-related failure 
as the firm under financial distress may overcome the financial distress through 
increasing its assets or decreasing its liabilities in subsequent years and become 
financially healthy again. Additionally the failure process research has not 
considered the financial distress as a stage of failure despite parts of the failure 
events literature doing so. It is therefore, important to establish the link between 
failure process and the alternative stages of failure defined as the financial distress 
and the bankruptcy/liquidation. 
 
Although the bankruptcy/liquidation state of failure will effectively have the same 
treatment across all countries, it is worth considering the legislation that applies 
in the countries under consideration.  
 
2.3.2 Insolvency Procedures of Countries 
 
Firm failure includes an element of legal procedure when we are discussing the 
liquidation/bankruptcies in different countries. This is known as the insolvency 
procedure.  In fact, each country has different insolvency procedures and stages 
so as to finally liquidate a firm. Generally, liquidations in many countries can be 
debtor initiated (when the company’s directors are initiating the liquidation 
procedures) or compulsory (when creditors are initiating the liquidation 
procedure).  Liquidation of any sort (voluntary or compulsory) can all be part of a 
country’s insolvency procedures and legislation. Therefore, the legal context in 
different countries may be linked with the failure process. In fact, Balcaen et al., 
(2012) provided evidence that 41% of financially distressed firms faced exit from 
doing business through court-driven procedures whereas Daskalakis and Psillaki 
(2008) stressed the relevance of bankruptcy and insolvency procedures to the risk-
taking of behavior when researching a sample of French and Greek SMEs. Every 
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country has different insolvency procedures and legislation that may change 
periodically. The current legislation for each of the sample’s countries is presented 
below.  
 
i) Spain  
The Spanish bankruptcy system was based on the 22/2003 insolvency act (Ley 
Concursal) where both the creditors and the debtors can initiate the insolvency 
proceedings and there was one insolvency system for both individuals and firms 
until 2013. Therefore, this is the period that covers the vast majority of the data 
sample which has entries, until December 2013. In 2013 8,934 Spanish companies 
went bankrupt, up from 14% in 2012.  
 
Until 2013 there is evidence suggesting that bankruptcy costs were high and 
complex as well as uncertain (Garcia-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014). Data 
from the Doing Business (2015) index reveal that these costs may account for up 
to 15% of the firm’s total assets while the median duration of the bankruptcy 
procedure lasted for up to 23 months before the financial crisis (Van Hemmen, 
2008) and up to 48 months in 2011 (Ven Hemmen, 2012). In addition the law 
does not provide any debt relief for any individuals who are self-employed or small 
limited-liability firm owners that have given personal guarantees for loans to their 
firms in order to obtain funding for their businesses. Therefore, there is little 
incentive for small firm owners to file for bankruptcy.  In late 2013 there has been 
a legislative change that came into effect with the 11/2014 law which introduces 
some limitations on the liability of the entrepreneur or the self-employed 
individual. According to this change up to 300m Euros invested in the primary 
property of home residence of the firm owner could be exempted in the case of 
insolvency. Moreover, the entrepreneur may be discharged from any previous 
debts that belong to a pre-bankruptcy era until the new legislation established a 
new insolvency procedure coordinated by a public administrator. If this process 
fails then judicial procedure will follow.   
 
Additionally, according to Garcia-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, (2014) the limited 
liability principle, meaning that the debtor is legally partially or fully released from 
his debts, is generally not applicable to Spain. Finally, post-2013 there have been 
some legislative changes that extends from one to three the minimum number of 
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loan repayments that should be missed before the foreclosure procedure can start 
and allows a two year suspension of the evictions of the debtors when they are 
considered vulnerable (Garcia-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014 The data of the 
study include only one category of “bankruptcy” failed firms (apart from the 
financial distress state of failure).  
 
ii) France  
French law states that in order for insolvency proceedings to begin, it should be 
impossible for a debtor to meet the current liabilities with the available assets of 
the firm (European Commission. European Judicial Network, 2004). French 
legislation has effectively two treatments for insolvency situations. The first 
(redressement judiciaire) relates to the business and all the legal parties. For this 
category, the proceedings involve a judicial settlement and a winding-up 
procedure. The second insolvency situation is for natural persons only. However, 
according to (Garcia-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014) small business owners 
and self-employed may have incentives to file for bankruptcy due to the discharge 
of a firm’s debt that they may have as owner. Before any judicial settlement for 
businesses, French law provides an informal restructuring procedure where, if a 
business enters a period of financial distress in which it can still meet its obligations 
to the creditors, it can ask for the initiation of an amicable settlement procedure 
which may not last more than three months subject to agreement with the 
president of the court (European Commission. European Judicial Network, 2004). 
During this period a conciliator is appointed by the court to try to reach settlement 
with the creditors. For the formal proceedings, the French systems has two options 
of a judicial settlement and a winding up. The judicial settlement is aiming at 
maintaining the business and jobs and clearing the liabilities (European 
Commission. European Judicial Network, 2004).  
 
According to the European Commission, European Judicial Network (2004, online), 
“the proceedings consist of the adoption by the court of a judicial settlement plan 
either involving the continuation of the undertaking (creditors are obliged to accept 
certain deadlines) or the transfer of the business (the undertaking and its main 
contracts are sold to a third party who accepts certain commitments)”. When 
judicial settlement is impossible then a winding-up is declared and “the company’s 
business is halted or sold to a third party in line with more flexible arrangements 
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than in the judicial settlement procedure” (European Commission. European 
Judicial Network, 2004, online). The insolvency law of France was amended in 
March 2014. However, this falls beyond the period that this study covers. 
 
French proceedings have been characterized as relatively cost effective (direct 
costs of around 9% of total assets) and the average duration has been estimated 
at 14 months (Garcia-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014). There were 60,787 
business bankruptcies in 2013 in France, 2.1% above the 2012 numbers. 
 
iii) Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the three different types of insolvency proceedings are 
bankruptcy, moratorium and debt restructuring, all of which are judicial 
proceedings. The Dutch Bankruptcy Act has its roots in the Bankruptcy Code 
(Faillissementswet) of 1896 and changed in 2014. In the case of bankruptcy, the 
debtor (which can be a company or an individual) should be unable to service its 
debts. In the case of a moratorium, the firms’ directors should foresee that there 
will be a problem in meeting their financial obligations and the scope of this 
procedure is to allow the debtor a temporary debt relief in order to achieve a 
reorganization of the business.  In Dutch law, the emphasis is focused on the 
satisfaction of the creditors’ claims as opposed to the debt relief of the debtor so 
as to achieve a “fresh re-start” (Claassens and Klapper, 2005).  Suspension of 
payments under a moratorium agreement can lead to bankruptcy procedure, if it 
becomes obvious that the debtor cannot satisfy the creditors’ claims.  Bankruptcy 
can be initiated by any creditors (compulsory), by the debtor (voluntary) or by the 
public prosecutor in special cases.  
 
The Dutch courts require the debtor to have at least two creditors and at least one 
debt should be due and payable. If the petition for bankruptcy is granted the court 
appoints a trustee and a judge to supervise the trustee’s actions. The trustee 
should establish together with the judge whether any part of the firm should 
remain temporarily in operation and this can only be allowed if there is no 
detrimental impact on the creditors (Claassens and Klapper, 2005).  If the business 
is not continued, the trustee may sell the assets and liquidate the company. The 
number of bankruptcies in the Netherlands in 2013 was 9,456, a 9.7% increase 
from the 2012 equivalent. 
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iv) Italy 
The main source of the Italian Insolvency law is the insolvency act of 1942 (16-3-
1942,n. 267,  "Legge Fallimentare"). The act involves three different insolvency 
procedures of bankruptcy, involving a compulsory administrative liquidation, a 
bankruptcy agreement, and a pre-bankruptcy agreement with extraordinary 
administration proceedings (Prodi’s or Marzano’s). Prodi’s and Marzano’s 
administration proceedings as well as the pre-bankruptcy agreement form 
essentially a restructuring process on the basis of a “going concern” (Bisogno, 
2012; Mendola and Pappalardo, 2015). A firm may be considered for insolvency 
procedures if it is unable to fulfil its obligations and also when the debtor sells 
some of the company’s assets below their value so as to obtain cash or  when the 
debtor pays its creditors by means other than cash (in kind payments).  
 
From the different insolvency processes the firm may be placed in to bankruptcy 
if its annual assets were more than €300,000 or its revenues were more than 
€200,000 in the last three years before a petition for bankruptcy started or if there 
are more than €500,000 of debt. The compulsory administrative liquidation 
process can start if the firm is insolvent. A pre-bankruptcy agreement may be 
considered if the debtor is in crisis or proposes to creditors a plan that includes 
restructuring of debts and repayment with any possible means (including sales of 
assets). The plan should also categorise the creditors into different categories 
according to their legal status and have different treatment for the creditors 
according to their legal status (Mendola and Pappalardo, 2015).  
 
Bankruptcy agreement may occur if during the bankruptcy process one or more 
creditors propose a plan that includes the characteristics of the pre-bankruptcy 
agreement. The extraordinary administration procedures may be relevant to firms 
with more than 200 (Prodi’s) or 500 (Marzano’s) employees and total indebtedness 
of more than €300,000 (Marzano’s) and the business can be preserved and 
restructured within 2 years. There had been 14,272 bankruptcies in Italy within 
2013. This represents a 15% increase compared to 2012 numbers. 
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v) United Kingdom (UK) 
The Insolvency procedures in the UK are based in the Insolvency Act 1986 with 
some amendments in the Insolvency Act 2000 and the Enterprise Act 2002. In the 
UK there are pre-insolvency proceedings in which firms may enter into formal 
arrangements with their creditors to accept less than the full amount they are 
owed, such arrangements are not binding and there is no obligation for creditors 
to accept an arrangement (European Commission. European Judicial Network, 
2004). For businesses, the three different insolvency procedures are 
administration, administrative receivership and liquidation (winding-up) which can 
be either compulsory or voluntary. The insolvency procedures are broadly similar 
between England & Wales and Scotland.   
 
The administration procedure should “rescue the company as a going concern”; 
“achieve a better result for creditors than if the company were wound up”; “realise 
property to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors” 
(European Commission. European Judicial Network, 2004, online). 
 
In the case of the administrative receivership, or administration since the 
Enterprise Act 2002, “an insolvency practitioner is appointed by the holder of 
security under a floating charge that covers the whole or substantially the whole 
of the company’s assets.  A floating charge is one that does not give the charge 
holder any immediate right in rem6 over the assets covered by the charge.  The 
company is free to deal with the charged assets until such time as the charge 
crystallises.  The administrative receiver’s task is to realize those assets on behalf 
of the charge holder and is primarily answerable only to the appointing floating 
charge holder” (European Commission. European Judicial Network, 2004, online).  
 
Administration is the most common insolvency procedure for SMEs in the United 
Kingdom and it is usually initiated by a secured creditor who appoints the 
“administrative receiver” with the purpose to liquidate the firm’s assets so the debt 
can be repaid to the benefit of all creditors (Davydenko and Franks, 2008).   
 
                                                          
6 Claim “in rem” is a term used to describe the rights to dispose an asset and obtain satisfaction from 
the proceeds.   
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Finally, liquidation “involves the realization and distribution of a company’s assets 
and usually the closing down of the business.  There are three types of liquidation: 
Compulsory – where the court makes a winding-up order on the application of, 
usually, a creditor; Creditor’s Voluntary – where the company is insolvent and 
decides to wind itself up; and Member’s Voluntary – where the company is solvent 
and decides to wind itself up” (European Commission. European Judicial Network, 
2004, online). There have been 16,013 insolvencies in 2013 in the UK compared 
to 17,765 in 2012. 
 
vi) Germany 
Germany has one insolvency procedure for firms that tries to achieve an “equal 
satisfaction of the creditors” (European Commission. European Judicial Network, 
2004, online). Any procedures are based around the Insolvency Statute of 5 
October 1994 as amended by the Act of 20 December 2011. The inability to make 
payment and evidence of over-indebtedness can be sufficient grounds to initiate 
any insolvency proceedings. The definition of over-indebtedness is where the 
assets of the debtor cannot cover the obligations. It is up to the creditor to provide 
evidence that the grounds of insolvency exist and that he owns a claim against the 
debtor (European Commission. European Judicial Network, 2004). Moreover, “it is 
necessary for the financing of the insolvency proceedings to be secured. The 
application to open proceedings is therefore rejected if the debtor’s assets are 
unlikely to be sufficient to cover the costs of the proceedings (first sentence of 
Section 26(1) InsO)” (European Commission. European Judicial Network, 2004, 
online). The whole insolvency procedure is monitored from the insolvency court 
which appoints an insolvency administrator.  
 
Creditors have also significant influence over the insolvency proceedings and the 
regulations also have provisions for creditors’ meetings with the main purpose to 
decide the process for realizing the assets. The creditors’ meeting is convened and 
conducted by the insolvency court and consideration is given to whether a business 
should close down or if it should temporarily continue to be operated by the debtor 
(European Commission. European Judicial Network, 2004). Based on these 
decisions an insolvency scheme is submitted. If no insolvency scheme is 
submitted, the administrator can realize the assets of the firm so as to distribute 
the funds to the creditors. The administrator can also decide if it is optimum to sell 
 50 | P a g e  
 
the whole business or to break it up and sell off the separate parts. Germany 
realized 26,120 insolvencies in 2013 compared to 28,720 in 2012. 
 
vii) Ireland 
In Ireland there are three key mechanisms related to companies’ insolvency, 
namely, liquidation, examinership and receivership (Companies Act (Ireland), 
1990; Tiernan and Benson, 2009). Liquidation is governed by the Irish Companies 
Act (1963) and its aim is to liquidate a company’s assets so as to pay the creditors 
and dissolve the company. Liquidation can be voluntary (members’ liquidation) 
when the company is solvent and is winding down due to other reasons; a 
creditors’ voluntary liquidation is when the company is insolvent and a court 
liquidation is where creditors  apply to the court seeking the winding-up of the 
company due to the company’s inability to service its debts.  In the case of a 
creditors’ voluntary winding-up, the process typically starts by a creditor in an 
effort to prompt the company’s directors to start the winding-up process in 
situations where the firm cannot service its liabilities and it is insolvent.  
 
A key difference between the court and the creditors’ voluntary liquidation is that 
in the second case, the creditors are in control of the liquidation process as 
opposed to the court (which is the case in the court liquidation). In the creditors’ 
voluntary liquidation the creditors may appoint an alternative liquidator in place of 
the one appointed by the firms’ shareholders (Tiernan and Benson, 2009). 
Irrespective of who is appointed as the liquidator, his/her main role is to identify 
and take control of the company’s assets and liquidate them in order to satisfy the 
company’s creditors. In both the court and creditors’ voluntary liquidation, unless 
there are secured creditors that can directly rely on the security, the creditors must 
prove the legality of their claims and they may appoint a receiver to take control 
of the creditors’ potential fixed charges and their claims.  
 
Under Irish law, examinership can be an alternative to liquidation (Companies Act, 
1990). Under the examinership condition, the firm is given 100 days in which a 
court official (the examiner) takes control of the company in order to make it fit to 
continue to trade (Tiernan and Benson, 2009). The examinership can be initiated 
by either the company’s directors or its creditors.  
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Finally the receivership is relevant to secured creditors where a receiver is 
appointed by the court to take control of the company’s assets “with a view to 
ensuring the repayment of the debt owed to the debenture holder, either through 
receiving income or realising the value of the charged asset” (Tiernan and Benson, 
2009, p.7). In receivership the receiver-manager appointed by a debenture-holder 
is the most usual approach (Tiernan and Benson, 2009). Company insolvencies 
decreased by 18.9% in 2013 reaching a total of 1,365 firms. 
   
viii) Sweden 
“Insolvency is defined in the Swedish Bankruptcy Act (1987:672) as being unable 
to pay one’s debts in a proper manner where such inability is not temporary. 
Persons who are insolvent can be declared bankrupt (i konkurs) irrespective of 
whether they are legal or natural persons” (European Commission. European 
Judicial Network, 2004). Bankruptcy in Sweden is a judicial procedure and is 
administered by the receiver who is in charge of selling the debtors’ assets and 
protecting the creditors’ common rights. However, both businesses and individuals 
can take advantage of voluntary arrangements with creditors which are not 
specially regulated. Moreover, and as an alternative to bankruptcy, businesses can 
apply for reorganization under the company Reorganization Act (1996:764) if they 
can demonstrate that they are unable to re-pay their debts and if the 
reorganization can achieve the purpose of securing the continued operations of the 
business (European Commission. European Judicial Network, 2004). In either of 
the two procedures (reorganization or bankruptcy), an agreement should be 
reached with the creditors concerning the amount of the debt that will be repaid. 
This agreements could be on a voluntary basis or can be enforced by the court. 
 
The insolvency procedures above seem to have certain similarities in the routes 
that are available to a troubled firm. In particular, in most countries there are 
alternative procedures that business could follow depending on their 
circumstances. Additionally personal bankruptcy procedures may also be relevant 
for SMEs partly because creditors and financial institutions require personal 
guarantees when lending to SMEs (Claessens and Klapper, 2005). There were 
8,015 Swedish firms’ insolvencies in 2013, representing a 3.6% increase compared 
to 2012. 
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ix) Overview, Discussion and Critique 
In general, the particular procedures that apply in each insolvency process in each 
country vary in the detail7. For example, France’s insolvency process was deemed 
relatively unfriendly to creditors and the state is heavily involved in the procedure 
by imposing court-administered process with the main interest of keeping the 
business as a going process and maintain employment (Davydenko and Franks, 
2008) with the informal restructuring process being an exception to this rule. At 
the same time, under the French process, the creditors have a secondary 
(advisory) role in the insolvency process and liquidating the assets to the highest 
bidder is not the priority of the court (Davydenko and Franks, 2008).  
 
On the other hand, the insolvency procedures of the United Kingdom appear to be 
more creditor oriented and less court-driven since the court-driven procedures 
provided by the state can be vetoed by the creditors (Davydenko and Franks, 
2008) and therefore creditors’ rights appear to be more effectively protected 
(Blazy et al., 2013).  Ireland’s insolvency procedures seem also broadly similar to 
those of the U.K. Germany’s single insolvency procedure, appears to be in the 
middle ground between the United Kingdom and the French system since 
Germany’s insolvency procedure with court-driven, state-imposed insolvency gives 
creditors’ significant control over the process but they cannot strip-out completely 
the firm from its necessary assets while going concern status is still important 
(Davydenko and Franks, 2008).  France and Germany have nevertheless in 
common the requirement of collective procedures between creditors and courts 
and the requirement for court-supervision whereas the United Kingdom’s 
insolvency process does not require any of them (Davydenko and Franks, 2008).   
 
All the alternative legal procedures above are grouped into the “bankruptcy” failure 
state of the data that this study uses. Some of the above similarities and 
differences of the insolvency procedures can be summarized in collective groups 
of countries with similar, though not identical, characteristics. These can assist in 
the extraction of valuable information relating to the legal aspect of the business 
environment in the countries under consideration. This can be helpful as the 
discussion above reveals that some countries have amended their insolvency 
                                                          
7 All the “failure” stages in the insolvency procedures above are included in the “bankruptcy 
failure” state of the dataset. 
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procedures within the period that this study covers whereas other countries 
amended their insolvency procedures just after the period that this study covers. 
The legal origins can therefore be used for this purpose. 
 
2.3.3 Legal Origins 
 
The possibility of organizing the countries under consideration into groups of one 
or more than one that share at least some common elements in their legislation 
with long standing effects can be beneficial.  This is because the particulars of an 
insolvency procedure in a country may change but the underlying philosophy of its 
legal system is much more difficult to alter and it is considered (together with the 
legislation itself) as an integral part of the business environment whose 
contribution to firm failure has been well established both in failure event studies 
as well as in failure process studies. 
 
The literature on legal origins demonstrates a link between the origins of a 
country’s legislation and its application and it is therefore used as an analytical 
tool. The details around the insolvency procedures mentioned above, seem to 
conclude that separate elements of the insolvency procedures of different countries 
may have some impact on the actual insolvency outcome and the time required. 
However, the literature suggests that the individual countries’ insolvency 
procedures can be grouped into certain categories based on their legal origins. In 
fact, current legislation (including legislation around insolvencies) in any country 
is related to, and influenced by, the country’s legal origins (La Porta et al., 1997; 
La Porta et al., 1998) and there is evidence from the empirical literature that, by 
controlling for a country’s legal origins, certain idiosyncrasies arising from a 
country’s insolvency procedures (such as the power of creditors’ rights) are 
accounted for (La Porta et al., 1997).  Likewise, Wang (2012) provided evidence 
from 30 countries across the world showing that the legal origin of a country’s 
bankruptcy code was an important factor in determining if the firm will be 
liquidated once it was under distress or if other actions would be taken to avoid 
liquidation. 
 
Legal origin is the terminology used in order to describe the origins of the legal 
systems of different countries. The literature identifies four legal origins namely, 
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the English, the German, the French and the Scandinavian (La Porta et al., 1997). 
The English legal origin is common law made by judges and subsequently 
incorporated in the country’s legislation (La Porta et al., 1997).  On the other hand, 
French, German and Scandinavian law are legislator-sourced and follow the civil 
law tradition which can trace its roots back to Roman law (La Porta et al., 1997). 
It is believed that most countries have adopted their legal systems through 
occupation or colonization (La Porta et al., 1997). 
 
From the countries under consideration in this study, France, Spain, Netherlands 
are classified as having adopted the French legal origin while the United Kingdom 
and Ireland are classified under English common law. Germany has its own legal 
origin which has similar Roman law roots as the French tradition but it has greater 
judicial law-making (La Porta et al., 2008).  Sweden follows Scandinavian legal 
origin that is considered as part of civil law origins (as are German and French) 
but has the characteristic of being more distinct from other civil law traditions (La 
Porta et al., 2006).  Italy, on the other hand, is classified by legal scholars under 
the French law tradition but it does also have German law tradition influences (La 
Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, considering the EU countries that this thesis 
analyses, one can summarise that common law is associated with the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland and the Roman-based civil law legal tradition 
is associated with France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
 
Each legal origin has some particular characteristics that apply, to some extent at 
least, to the legislation (and consequently the insolvency procedures) of the 
countries that have adopted it. Countries with civil law origins have weaker 
investor and creditor protection, compared to common law countries (La Porta et 
al., 1998). From the civil law countries, those with French origin tend to have the 
weakest creditors protection and they have the most state-dependent procedures 
while the civil law countries of German and Scandinavian origins seem to be 
somewhere between the French and the common law origin (La Porta et al., 1998; 
La Porta et al., 2008).  This is in line with the critical observation that the 
insolvency procedures in France tend to be much more state-driven (through 
courts) compared to the U.K. where insolvency procedures are much more 
creditor-driven (also through courts) with the German and Swedish procedures 
being somewhere in the middle. The legal origins also appear to influence, and to 
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be connected with, the legislation and the regulations of each country and 
consequently to dictate creditors’ protection and the power of law enforcement (La 
Porta et al., 2008). Most importantly, evidence from the literature suggests that 
legal origins are related to historic economic impact (Sgard, 2008; La Porta et al., 
2008) whereas insolvency procedures in particular, tend to be linked to the 
economic growth of a country where overly punitive legislation may deter 
entrepreneurs from investing in new ventures (Succurro, 2010).  
 
Additionally, literature evidence suggests that the quality of law enforcement is 
highest under the Scandinavian and German tradition, followed by the common 
law origins with the French tradition being the (comparatively) lowest in the ranks 
(La Porta et al., 1998). However, for insolvency procedures, evidence suggests 
that the common law countries tend to have more efficient judicial systems which 
may result in more successful reorganization processes compared to countries with 
German and French legal origins (Wang, 2012). This is to some extent supported 
by World Bank data which show that common law countries (such as the UK, 
Ireland, Canada) have the fastest insolvency resolving times. 
 
2.3.4 Evaluation Overview and Hypothesis  
 
To conclude, the insolvency legislation has always been considered as an important 
factor in resolving firms’ financial distress (Gutierrez et al., 2012) and failure. 
Moreover, there is sufficient evidence from the literature which supports the 
argument that, while there may be differences in the details of the insolvency 
legislation between countries, there are also some common underlying 
characteristics that can be described under the term of legal origins (see for 
example LaPorta et al., 1998; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002;  Sgard, 2006). Legal 
origins are effectively the underlying legal traditions that have been carried over 
the years and have influenced countries’ legislation and consequently economic 
outcomes.  This statement is supported by the observation of analyzing the 
insolvency procedures of the countries under consideration. It has been well 
established and it is evident from the discussion above that countries that follow 
the common law origin are more creditor friendly and less state-driven and have 
been viewed as “market-friendly” whereas civil law countries are more state-driven 
with the French legal origin being the most state-driven and the Scandinavian and 
 56 | P a g e  
 
German legal origins being in the middle ground between the common law 
countries and the French.  
 
One can therefore argue that legal origins are effectively part of a country’s 
business environment and as such they may affect the firm failure process of firms 
that are operating in these countries despite that they are not a firm-specific 
characteristic, used to identify the processes. This is also implied because there 
appears to be an observed correlation between the legal origins and the time to 
resolve insolvency. In the context of alternative firm failure processes within the 
sample of EU countries this thesis proceeds with the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Countries’ legal origins differ between firms in the alternative 
failure processes in the EU countries under consideration; they are also 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
 
2.4  Financial and Economic Drivers of Firm Failure 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, there are two main approaches of research 
in firm failure studies, namely the failure events approach, as expressed in the 
failure prediction studies, and the firm failure process approach, as expressed in 
the failure process literature. In addition, wider firm failure studies that consider 
certain determinants of firms’ failure exist. One can argue that these studies 
consist of a third approach which, however, see the firm failure as an event. 
Elements of the individual determinants of failure will be examined in the general 
literature that considers the determinants of firm failures. Both approaches are 
trying to identify the key determinants that can predict or explain firm failures. It 
is worth remembering that the failure events literature considers financial ratios 
and other similar metrics as determinants of failure whereas the qualitative firm 
failure process approach considers management characteristics (discussed in the 
next section) and other firm-specific characteristics as well as the environment as 
part of the failure path.  This section deals with the financial and other firm-specific 
metrics that have been identified as failure determinants in any of the failure 
pillars. 
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Most of the current literature is focused on specific countries. Some inter-country 
comparisons have only recently been researched in the literature and any 
inferences from inter-country comparisons are linked to firm performance or firm 
exit from the business. Such examples are however, briefly mentioned so as to 
assist with inferences and hypothesis formulation. The few examples of inter-
country comparisons directly linked to small firms are between countries that have 
been researched on a stand-alone basis, such as the U.S. and the U.K. (see Altman 
et al., 2010 as an example). This section will therefore present evidence on the 
reasons why inter-country comparisons for business failure processes appears to 
be a significant matter. Key differences between key stand-alone firm failures 
studies will also be presented. 
 
2.4.1 Firm-Specific Financial Characteristics 
 
i) The Size and the Sector of the Firm 
The size of the firm has been associated with firm failure. In fact, Gupta et al 
(2014) employed the definition provided by the European Union to distinguish 
between ‘micro’, ‘small’ and ‘medium’ sized firms and used both financial and 
nonfinancial information to predict a firm’s failure hazard and concluded that the 
size of the firms can be an important determinant of failure as ‘micro’ firms tend 
to be different than the rest of the SMEs.  However, the importance of a firm’s size 
has been further linked with firm failure when it is combined with the sector 
classification and the return on assets and cash ratio in Spain as well (Camacho-
Minano et al., 2015). In other words, size appears to be sector-specific where the 
norms of some sectors may be (on average) larger firms. The size of the firm 
appears also to be country-specific to some extend as evidence from Italy 
suggested that within the medium sized firm sector, the size of the firm can be 
positively associated with a firm being unable to repay its loan obligations (Bottazzi 
et al., 2011), evidence that contrasts with other findings that suggest that the size 
of the firm is negatively associated with failure in the UK (see for example Altman 
et al., 2010).  
 
The industry of a firm itself has been also seen as an important determinant of 
business failure. Different industries have different business cycles and the 
financial structure of the firms operating in them tends to be materially different. 
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From the failure prediction literature, the industry of the firm (and in particular of 
the small firm) was one of the first non-financial variables that entered failure 
prediction models (see for example, Watson and Everett, 1999). Literature 
suggests that the manufacturing sector tends to have the highest bankruptcy rates 
partly due to the capital commitment it requires (Watson and Everett, 1999) with 
service businesses and retail to follow (Lowe et al., 1991). 
 
Platt (1989), produced modelling evidence at an industry level from a sample of 
US firms of all sizes. 16 Industries participated in that research covering most of 
the possible sectors. That was useful since different industries have different 
averages for financial ratios Platt (1989) and that resulted in modelling approaches 
with greater overall predictive accuracy. Most importantly that study highlighted 
the fact that failure rates depend also on industry financial conditions and on the 
state of the economy and that firm failure rates in vertically associated industries8 
may be correlated. Similarly, further evidence suggested that industry-adjusted 
financial ratios could be better predictors of firm failure at industry level, when the 
calculation of these ratios is possible (Platt and Platt, 1991). The industry-adjusted 
ratios that Platt and Platt (1991) used were Cash Flow to Sales (also multiplied by 
the Industry output), Fixed assets  to Total Assets, Total Debt to Total Assets (also 
multiplied with the Industry output), Short Term Debt to Total Debt and Sales 
Growth. From these ratios the Cash Flow to Sales was the only one that had a 
negative relationship with the failure propensity as the decreasing ability of a firm 
to generate sufficient cash from its sales can have an impact on its self-financing.  
 
In the wider SME failure literature, there is evidence from Italy that shows 
defaulted firms are less profitable than their industry peers for a number of years 
before any default occurs, making it an important determinant of default in their 
loan obligations (Bottazzi et al., 2011) and potentially leading to firm failure. 
Moreover, firm failure in different industries within the same country have found 
to have different failure processes within a sample of Italian firms because apart 
from the country-specific economic conditions, there appear to be industry-specific 
“distress-cycles”  (Zeli, 2014). 
 
                                                          
8 Platt (1989) defines vertically associated industries the industries that have buying/selling relationships. 
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Critically evaluating the evidence from the above studies, one can conclude that 
the industry classification of a firm could affect firm failure. In addition to a number 
of firm-specific characteristics such as the financial ratios’ performance or the 
impact of human capital in a firm (Platt and Platt, 1991; Laing and Weir, 1999) 
which all affect firms’ performance and failure, industry can be a significant 
characteristic to control for. In addition, one can assume that since the industry 
classification of the firm affects firm failure, in may also be a determinant of firms’ 
failure in alternative firm failure processes. Critically, there is little evidence in the 
quantitative firm failure process literature to suggest whether the industry 
classification of the firm differs in any alternative firm failure processes, especially 
in a multi-country analysis because a number of studies are sector-specific (see 
for example Laitinen et al., 2015; Lukason and Laitinen, 2016; Lukason et al., 
2016). As such, this thesis proposes the following hypothesis to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Industry classification differs between firms in the alternative firm 
failure processes in EU firms; it also differs as a determinant of firms’ transition to 
failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
ii) Financial Ratios and the Age of the Firm 
Firms’ financial ratios and the age of the firm represent elements of firm-specific 
quantitative information which is distinguished from firm-specific qualitative 
information, such as firms’ director characteristics. From the financial perspective, 
the capital structure, firms’ financing and the financial performance have been 
related to SMEs’ failure. Likewise, insolvency and its costs are amongst the 
important determinants of SMEs’ capital structure (Michaelas et al., 1999). Low 
levels of capital has been seen as a factor affecting firm failure. However, it is often 
difficult to prove if this is caused by management’s inability to predict the capital 
needs of the firm (Hall, 1992). Philosophov and Philosophov (2005) found that the 
chances of a firm going bankrupt depend not only on its debt to equity ratio but 
also on its debt maturity and quality. Moreover, evidence in the literature suggests 
that small firms are reliant to a certain extent on bank credit and trade credit 
(Cressy and Olofsson, 1997; Berger and Udell, 2006). As a result, inadequate 
access to bank credit can lead smaller firms, whose owners tend to borrow from 
friends and family, to consider alternative sources of finance (Bitzenis and Nito, 
2005). Financial distress or severe credit restrictions are negatively related to the 
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size of the firm (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990; Lopez-Gracia, Aybar-Arias, 2000) 
with SMEs suffering the most. This is in line with findings from the failure prediction 
literature around the role of firm financing and trade credit in small business failure 
(Altman et al., 2010).   
 
In fact, most of the literature on the financial characteristics of failed firms is 
derived from, or related to, the failure prediction literature. Failure prediction 
studies aimed to capture the financial characteristics described above so as to 
predict firm failure. In the context of this study, this is significant in the 
identification of the key financial measures that can be determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure in quantitative analysis. Additionally, these characteristics can 
be beneficial to help identify the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
Originally, most of the research in this area was based around large and usually 
stock exchange listed firms. From the early works of Beaver (1966) and Altman 
(1968), evidence showed that business financial characteristics, expressed in the 
form of financial ratios, are closely related to firm failure and can therefore be used 
to assess a firm’s propensity to fail.  Despite the fact that most of the literature 
used financial ratios as predictors of failure, it has become clear that financial ratios 
can at least provide information on the financial condition of the company. 
However, there has been no specific consensus regarding how financial ratios most 
effectively mirror a firm’s financial health. Some of the most commonly used ratios 
appear to be the Total Liabilities to Total Assets ratio and the working capital to 
total assets ratio, which are mentioned in a number of research papers (see for 
example, Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968, Deakin, 1972, Ohlson, 1980; Gloubos and 
Grammatikos, 1988;   Altman et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2012). The 
Total liabilities to Total Assets ratio is expected to have a positive relationship with 
the probabilities of failure. On the other hand, the Working Capital to Total Assets 
ratio is expected to have a negative relationship with the probabilities of failure; 
that is, the lower the ratio, the higher the propensity for failure as firms do not 
have sufficient levels of working capital to finance the asset side of their balance 
sheet.  
 
The typical model inputs included various combinations of financial ratios whose 
aim is to account for financial-related, firm-specific characteristics. For example, 
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Taffler’s (1983) model, which was one of the first models to consider companies 
in the United Kingdom, used financial ratios which cover the areas of profitability 
(Profit before Tax to Current Liabilities), working capital (Current Assets to Total 
Liabilities), financial risk (Current Liabilities to Total Assets)  and liquidity (Quick 
assets-Current Liabilities to Daily Operating Expenses) of which only the financial 
risk ratio was positively related with the probability of failure. However, Taffler’s 
(1983) model was mostly build for manufacturing companies as Altman’s (1968) 
z-score did.  
 
However, despite extensive corporate failure research, the equivalent research 
that dealt with SMEs has been less wide-ranging. This has happened despite early 
evidence from U.S. firms which showed that the application of similar types of 
technique using financial ratios is possible (though more difficult) in small firm 
failure by using a longer period with financial information (Edmister, 1972). Keasey 
and Watson (1986) also tried a modelling approach in the U.K. but their results 
were similar to that of Edmister (1972) in recognizing difficulties in modelling SMEs 
failure due to the nature of the firms. In terms of the financial ratio selection for 
SME failure, Pindado and Rodrigues (2004) concluded that the best way to 
quantitatively analyse and model SME financial ratios against failure is to have a 
parsimonious model with few financial ratios that can be interpreted in the light of 
financial theory. This was a requirement that most research that focused on failure 
prediction did not apply. Pindado and Rodrigues, (2004) included Interest 
Charges/Total Income, a ratio that has been positively associated with firm failure, 
Return on Assets and Accumulated Earning/Total Assets (both negatively 
associated with firm failure) as financial ratios while their analysis considered 
Spanish SMEs.  
 
Likewise, Atlman and Sabato (2007) provided evidence that financial ratios can be 
used as predictive determinants of SME failures in the USA whereas Altman et al 
(2010) expanded the research into U.K. SMEs and found evidence that trade credit 
payments behavior can be a significant predictor among age of the firm, sector 
and audit reports. In terms of the traditional financial ratios, Altman et al (2010) 
included Cash/Total Assets, EBITDA/Total Assets , EBITDA/Interest Paid, Retained 
Earning /Total Assets and Short Term Debt/Equity in one version of their model 
and Capital Employed / Total Liabilities, Current Assets/ Current Liabilities, Trade 
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Creditors/ Total Liabilities, Trade debtors/ Total Assets, Cash/ Total Assets, 
Retained Profit/ Total Assets, Quick Assets/ Current Assets, Total Liabilities/ Quick 
Assets, Trade Creditors / Total Liabilities, Inventory/ Working Capital, Net Cash/ 
Net Worth, Short Term Debt/ Net Worth together with credit bureau data in a 
second version of their model aiming at medium sized firms.   
 
However, the Altman et al., (2010) approach is not as parsimonious as the one 
that Pindado and Rodrigues (2004) suggested but is in line with most of the 
modelling literature, the focus of which is to try alternative combinations of ratios.  
Such an approach highlights the criticism that the failure prediction literature lacks 
a sufficient theoretical framework in the selection of its financial ratios (Platt, 1989; 
Pindado and Rodrigues, 2004; Crutzen and Caillie, 2008). 
 
More recent evidence did provide some links between financial ratios and the 
finance literature. For example, Wilson and Altanlar (2013) noticed that firms 
which have relatively high total asset figures in their first annual accounts tend to 
fail more frequently and they interpreted this as a sign that undercapitalized firms 
or firms unable to attract capital investment dissolve without insolvency 
proceedings. On the other hand, larger firms have higher insolvency risks due to 
the fact that there is more pressure from creditors. Non-insolvency related 
dissolutions are not regarded as failure but they are regarded just as critical for 
the year of dissolution.  
 
Non-financial information in Wilson’s and Altanlar’s (2013) study included County 
Court Judgements (CCJs). Charges on company’s assets (from creditors) were also 
taken into consideration together with late filings of accounts as they are 
considered indicators of financial distress. Interestingly for the purpose of our 
study, regional location was also taken into consideration by using the company’s 
address and thus its UK region. Moreover, both Altman et al., (2010) as well as 
Wilson and Altanlar, (2013) noted that newly incorporated (young) firms and very 
small firms have too few, or not any financial data and some fail without have any 
filings of financial information.  
 
For cross-country comparisons, Laitinen and Suvas (2013) and Wang (2012) 
analysed the predictability of financial distress in different European countries 
 63 | P a g e  
 
(Laitinen and Suvas, 2013)  and compared it across countries (Wang, 2012) by 
using a fairly simplistic analytical approach of cross-section logistic regression. 
Likewise, Ferreira Filipe et al. (2014) performed a comparison between European 
firms, including country-specific effects from the Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the UK. The authors split their 
distressed population into two categories (healthy and distressed) where the 
distressed situation is defined as the case where firms have final financial 
statements before it leaves the sample and the status of the firm is defined as “in 
receivership”, “bankrupt” or “in liquidation”. Furthermore, for cases where there is 
no status information, Ferreira Filipe et al., (2014) consider as “distressed” cases 
where the firm left the sample by having negative equity in the last year with 
available information. These definitions are similar to this project’s approach.  
 
The conclusions of Ferreira Filipe et al., (2014) were that SMEs in different 
European regions and countries are exposed to different systematic factors 
according to region-specific conditions and characteristics while SMEs themselves 
are vulnerable to the same idiosyncratic factors (profitability, coverage, leverage, 
cash flow). This ties in well with the evidence from failure prediction studies as 
despite the lack of agreement on the precise selection of financial ratios, in most 
cases the selected ratios are measuring profitability, leverage and cash flow.  
 
Despite the limitations of Ferreira Filipe et al., (2014) research due to their 
simplified methodology (cross-section logistic regression), their evidence is 
important. This is because firms’ idiosyncratic (financial) factors that they found 
as important determinants have been reflected in earlier country-specific literature 
on financial ratios.  Moreover, a key finding of this research has been the notion 
that idiosyncratic factors are relatively stable over time but systematic factors are 
more volatile according to macroeconomic conditions. However, in addition to any 
financial ratios, Ferreira Filipe et al (2014) mentioned some governance related 
characteristics that are of particular importance as failure determinants.  
The economic and business environment, including the local legislation and culture 
directly affect the characteristics of the failure event while differences in 
accounting practices jeopardize the ability of the financial predictors to reflect 
these characteristics in an identical way. This is a comment which is in line with 
the argument of Choi and Levich, (1991) that accounting practices can alone 
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destroy international comparability between firms. However, the fact that the 
research of Laitinen and Suvas (2013) used only financial ratios exaggerated the 
problem of dependency on the specific type of information. Perhaps most 
importantly, their paper was not restricted to SMEs. In fact, smaller firms were 
excluded from the analysis as the authors argued that financial information alone 
is not sufficient for the very small firms (Laitinen and Suvas, 2013) and therefore 
any outcomes from their research are fairly generic in nature. 
 
Hall et al., (2004) and Daskalakis and Psillaki, (2008) argued that SMEs’ financial 
structure, while influenced by firm specific-characteristics, is also impacted by 
country-specific characteristics. Such characteristics can be differences in taxation 
and the relationship with banks that is the norm in a country, as well as the wider 
economic and cultural-related issues that cannot be measured directly. Similarly 
countries with high investment to GDP ratios appeared to have highly efficient 
bankruptcy procedures (Succuro, 2012) which may in turn have an impact on the 
firm failure process across different countries. Therefore, one can conclude that 
there is scope for further investigation of the failure process across Europe whereas 
Pindado and Rodrigues’ (2004) arguments for the use of parsimonious models as 
far as financial ratios are concerned should be considered.   
 
The studies that have included SMEs and are mentioned above have been, by and 
large, single-country studies in the US (Altman and Sabato, 2007), Spain (Pindado 
and Rodrigues, 2004) and the UK (Altman et al., 2010; Keasey and Watson, 1986) 
with limited conclusions on the choice of financial ratios as failure determinants. 
The limited evidence from cross country comparisons suggests that there are 
country specific factors that affect firm failure on top of the idiosyncratic financial 
characteristics (expressed in the form of ratios) of the firms that are however 
similar between countries. This is in line with the nature of the failure prediction 
studies where the emphasis is on the failure event using ratios as detectors of the 
symptoms of failure.  
 
For firm failure process, there has been evidence that profitability, debt/equity 
ratio and the relationship between turnover and expenses do affect firm failures in 
alternative firm failure processes (Laitinen, 1991). Therefore, despite the lack of a 
universal agreement on the ratios that are the most effective determinants of firm 
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failure and considering the fact that the aim of this study centers around a cross 
country and within country comparison of alternative firm failure processes and 
firms’ transition to failure, one can conclude that a profitability ratio, a debt to 
equity ratio and a ratio that considers the relationship between turnover and 
expenses should be used in firm failure comparisons, particularly where the failure 
process is a matter of interest.  
 
Looking at the profitability ratios, Return on Assets has been employed by a 
number of studies both in SMEs and the larger firms (see for example, Pindado 
and Rodrigues, 2004; Altman et al., 2010; Altman, 1968; Deakin, 1972; Wu et al., 
2010) which indicate it is a valid determinant of firm failure. Likewise, Debt to 
Equity ratio has been used by Lin et al (2011) in large firms as well as by Altman 
et al., (2010) in SMEs. Linked with Ooghe and De Prijcker’s (2008) failure process, 
the Debt to Equity ratio also appears to be a sound determinant of failure. In terms 
of the relation between turnover, expenses and the propensity for failure, Ooghe 
and DePrijcker (2008) defined a combination of (low) sales and increased liabilities 
as a crucial combination in their failure process. It has been expressed as Gross 
Income to Total liabilities in Gloubos and Grammatikos (1988).   
 
In addition to that, evidence suggests that the younger the age of the firm 
(including large firms) is a contributing factor of failure (Evans, 1987; Thornhill 
and Amit, 2003; Ropega, 2011). Increased firm age tends to increase firms’ 
survival propensity when is combined with high capital intensity (Harris and Li, 
2010). Young firms tend to fail after a few years from their inception due to a 
number of resource, business and financial reasons, when the entrepreneurs can 
no longer support the firm as a going concern. The age of the firm and in particular, 
the younger the age, has also been consistently identified as a separate firm failure 
process in the qualitative and quantitative firm failure process literature (Argenti, 
1976; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008; Richardson et al., 1994; Lukason, 2018). 
 
Critical evaluation of the above suggests that there is not a clear theory on which 
financial ratios or combination of financial ratios are the ideal in order to identify 
the alternative firm failure processes between countries or even within a country. 
Nevertheless, the previous research agrees that financial ratios can be good 
predictors of firms’ failure and as such determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
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They can also be used successfully in order to identify alternative firm failure 
processes. The same applies for the firms’ age. Critically, for this thesis, both 
financial ratios and the firm age are firm-specific characteristics that will be used 
to identify the alternative firm failure processes that co-exist in the countries that 
this research considers. However, one can assume that the financial ratios and the 
age of the firm, should differ between the alternative firm failure processes. 
Therefore, in a cross-country comparison the following hypothesis can be 
established: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Financial performance represented by key financial ratios and the 
age of the firm, differ in the alternative firm failure processes of EU firms; they 
also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm 
failure processes. 
 
2.4.2 Economic & Business Environment Characteristics 
 
The economic and business environment (other than the legal origins) affect the 
firm failure process (Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008). This can be of a particular 
importance at a country level. 30%-50% of UK SME failure appeared to be related 
to macroeconomic factors such as interest rates and unemployment rates (Everett 
and Watson, 1998). Similar evidence from other countries also seem to confirm 
that notion. 
 
Studying large Portuguese businesses bankruptcies, Jardim and Pereira (2013) 
concluded that macroeconomic factors such as the differences in GDP, the inflation 
rate, the level of Foreign Direct Investment and the differences in the level of 
domestic credit availability are the most significant determinants of firm 
bankruptcy in that country.  These macroeconomic factors, together with taxation 
effects are also to some extent confirmed by studies on aggregated firm failure 
(see for example Wadhavani, 1986; Vlieghe, 2001; Jones, 2013).  
 
The economic environment was shown to be an important determinant of firm 
failure with Carling et al (2007) providing evidence that the inclusion of 
macroeconomic variables could enhance a model’s performance compared to 
similar models without such variables. However, this observation applied to a 
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sample of large European firms. Similarly, although for the larger companies, 
Castren et al., (2010) found evidence that major shocks in GDP can affect default 
failures at firm level.  Park and Han (2002) also focused on non-financial 
information which can be helpful in failure prediction by considering, size, growth 
and profitability, competitive advantages, management capacity and reliability, 
concluding that such characteristics can be associated with firms’ failure.  
 
Research around the association of business environment with SMEs’ failure is less 
extensive. For the SMEs in particular, weak business infrastructure, bureaucracy, 
levels of taxation, inadequate access to loans and instability in tax regulations and 
procedures are regarded as factors that influence negatively the small firm sector 
(Bitzenis and Nito, 2005). Likewise, Somoza (2011) provided evidence that a 
common reason of small and medium sized firm failure in Spain, during the recent 
recession period, was the unavailability of credit from the financial institutions 
whereas similar conclusions were drawn from Irish SMEs during the recent financial 
crisis (Kelly et al., 2015). This is despite evidence from the firm performance 
literature which  suggests that especially under adverse economic conditions, such 
as the financial crisis, firm-specific effects are determining firms’ fate (and 
performance) to a larger extent than environment-related effects (Bamiatzi et al., 
2016). During the crisis, successful SMEs outperformed the failed SMEs in 
profitability, assets turnover, liquidity and leverage (Ma and Lin, 2010).  
 
Despite the importance of these firm-specific conditions, the SMEs business 
environment in the UK has been considered as one particularly important factor 
that affects SMEs survival (Ma and Lin, 2010).  In particular the overall economic 
conditions and the downturn in trade led in an overall reduction to the firms’ 
turnover, cash flow and consequently to their ability to generate internal funds. 
This came on top of limited bank credit availability even towards successful SMEs 
that were managing to grow during the crisis. Of equal importance was the delay 
of payments that many firms experienced and that had further knock on effects 
on their cash flow and in their ability to repay their credit obligation (Ma and Lin, 
2010).   
 
Credit (un)availability has been a persistent problem in SMEs regardless the period 
of time and the wider economic conditions. In Spain, credit unavailability had 
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adverse  effects in SMEs due to their financing structure (Somoza, 2011). Credit 
unavailability can also heighten due to creditors’ coordination when a firm is in 
financial distress (Hertzberg et al. 2011). Under these circumstances financiers 
have limited appetite to provide finance to the firm, leading it to failure (Hertzberg 
et al. 2011).  
   
Gries and Naude (2009) found that the increased physical proximity to banks 
affects small business start-ups at a country level as well. This highlights the 
importance of the business and macroeconomic environment in an individual 
country.  From another perspective, Bosma and Schutjens (2009) argued that high 
population density within a region or within a country may stimulate 
competitiveness because of the need for suppliers to achieve economies of scale 
and/or scope. In addition, Bosma and Schutjens (2009) investigated the 
association between business (increased) population and failure, arguing that such 
conditions can be created when there are low entry bariers in an industry or an 
area. Such conditions can have an adverse effect on firms’ failure.  
 
Longhi et al. (2014) assessed the structural change in European major cities  under 
the economic integration process. That research was inspired by Krugman and 
Venables (1996)  who pointed out that there are emerging industrial districts in 
Europe, characterised by increased specialization. Longhi et al., (2014) used a Gini 
index to measure specialization in major European countries and cities. Their main 
conclusion was that country specialization is emerging in Europe, pointing out also 
that there are spatial patterns of agglomeration of economic activity. In particular, 
large metropolitan areas with more than 500,000 inhabitants appear to be more 
specialized in services whereas medium sized cities (of between 50,000 and 
500,000 inhabitants) tend to specialize in traditional manufacturing activities such 
as textiles and food whereas similar sized cities tend to have similar specializations 
(Henderson, 1997).  
 
Critically evaluating the above, one can argue that cross-country comparisons are 
relatively limited in the literature but it appears to be a growing area of interest. 
However, most of the comparisons in the literature above uses cross-sectional 
analytical tools that lack time effects and panel dynamics.  Moreover, there is no 
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distinction between the different stages of failure (such as financial distress and 
bankruptcy/liquidation) and therefore failure is viewed as a single stage event.  
 
Despite the fact that the qualitative firm failure process literature suggests that 
the economic environment is important, economic environment characteristics 
cannot be used to identify the existence of alternative firm failure processes 
between countries because they are not firm-specific events. However, the 
economic and business environment can affect firms’ decision making and 
performance. Argenti (1976) noted that management deficiencies in a firm may 
get exaggerated by a changing economic environment to which the management 
cannot adapt. Therefore one can assume that the economic environment can 
determine firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes.  
Given the evidence that key macroeconomic factors such as GDP growth and other 
economic environment characteristics (credit availability) have had significant 
attention in the small firm failure literature, the following hypothesis can be 
established on a cross country comparison basis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: In a cross country context, macroeconomic conditions differ 
between firms in the alternative firm failure processes in EU firms; they also differ 
as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure 
processes.  
 
2.4.3 Evaluation Overview 
 
It is evident from the literature that, although there is no universally accepted 
combination of financial ratios, the ratios measuring the basic financial dimensions 
of firms’  profitability, leverage and liquidity appear to be particularly popular in 
firm failure studies. Likewise, there is evidence of the impact of local economic 
conditions on firm failure propensity whereas the external business and economic 
environment also impact on firm failures. Therefore, we concluded that financial 
ratios related to profitability and indebtedness are important firm-specific financial 
determinants of failure. On top of that the industry of the firm can also be 
important failure determinants. On the external environment, the macroeconomic 
conditions are of particular importance, with changes on GDP being the most 
commonly used determinant.  
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2.5 SMEs Management and Failure 
 
2.5.1 Management Characteristics: Background on SME Management 
 
In the framework presented, the characteristics of management appear to be one 
of the internal factors of firm failure. In fact, SMEs tend to have their owners as 
managers or, in some occasions, a small team of managers and directors whereas 
whole families may assume the role of the board of directors. These characteristics 
make SMEs different to corporates in terms of the relationship between 
governance and firm failure.  
 
Directorship in SMEs is frequently associated with ownership and there is usually 
little or no distinction between the two (see for example Banham and He, 2010). 
Usually in SMEs the owners of the firm are also its directors. In SMEs, directors 
may have relatively limited power compared to the founder management affecting 
firm performance (Gabrielsson, 2007; Motwani et al., 2006; Zeitun, 2009) if these 
persons are different. In small firms in particular, the presence of a major 
shareholder appears to ensure stability and lowers the conflicts between directors 
and owners, resulting in a decreased failure propensity (Ciampi, 2015). Likewise, 
evidence from French SMEs suggests that family owned firms have a propensity 
to deliberately slow their growth by adopting a very conservative strategy that 
protects firm survival at the expense of firms’ growth (Hamelin, 2013).  However, 
quantitative information on ownership is very difficult to be obtained in SMEs. 
 
Whilst there is little evidence in the literature that certain management structures 
improve firms’ performance (Weir, 1999; Weir and Laing, 2001), manager and 
director characteristics and management capability overall can affect firm 
performance and failure (Ma and Tiang 2014). However, the literature evidence is 
much weaker when SMEs are specifically considered against failure.  With respect 
to the classification of the management issues for SMEs, the “Board Demography 
Approach” (Gabrielsson, 2007, p.517) was chosen. The arguments of relating 
board demography with firm performance is that “behavioural processes – such as 
communication, collaboration and information sharing – are assumed to take place 
automatically among board members. This means that scholars in the board 
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demography approach generally agree that the board–performance link operates 
through some set of ‘intervening’ behavioural processes” (Gabrielsson, 2007, 
p.518). According to this approach, the number of directors and the existence of 
non-executive9 directors are considered. In addition, the ownership of the firms 
will be discussed. The following sub-sections discuss the management 
characteristics and the ownership characteristics that affect SME failure. 
 
2.5.2 Management Characteristics: Age and Number of Directors 
 
SMEs can be significantly affected by management’s inability to adapt their 
practices in an evolving business environment (Jumpponen et al., 2008) or simply 
managerial incapability (Ma and Lin, 2010). For example, a usual reason of firms’ 
failure is associated with inability to manage change (Hambrick and Crozier, 1985). 
Such lack of managerial skills affects firms more in uncertain business  
environments (Venkataraman et al., 1990). A firm’s governance itself influences 
the likelihood of survival (Parker et al., 2002) as firms with weak governance 
appear to be particularly vulnerable in economic downturns (Lee and Yeh, 2004). 
Therefore the issue is the choice of measure to quantify management ability. 
Experience has been used as a proxy in a number of cases (see for example Wilson 
et al., 2013) and it can have two aspects namely, the years of experience of a 
director and the collective experience of the board. In fact, Ohlson and DePrijcker 
(2008) argued that managerial or industry related experience is the single most 
important managerial issue that affects the firm failure process.  In such occasions 
the age of directors is used as a proxy for the experience of the board of directors.    
 
The number of directors that a firm has, has been usually used as a proxy for the 
management’s ability to direct and to control effectively the firm (Bennett and 
Robson, 2004; Daily et al., 2002), reflecting the breadth of knowledge and 
business and social networks. Firm directors can have broader experience and 
broader knowledge of the industry depending on their age and on their number. 
Evidence from the wider corporate literature suggests that directors with wider 
experience, such as those (non-executive directors) who have experience in other 
firms’ boards have a positive effect in firms’ performance (Murayev et al., 2016) 
and as such, one can argue, have a reduced propensity to fail.  Among the specific 
                                                          
9 For this study, the terms “non-executive” and “external” directors will be used interchangeably. 
 72 | P a g e  
 
experience that firm directors may have is on past firm failures. Past failure 
experience, appears to be useful for small business directors but it can also act as 
a reputation destroyer for financiers and suppliers (Wilson et al., 2013). Therefore 
the experience of past failure does not always provide positive effects to the firm 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2010; Coad, 2013). A crucial point for firms that have directors 
with failure experience would be their firm’s financing at the early stages when 
lenders are unwilling to support them. On the other hand, one can critically assume 
that past failures can also be helpful experience but the relationship is not always 
easy to establish. 
 
Excluding the experience of past business failures, directors who have general 
previous directorship experience may have more effective networks that can be 
useful for the company, particularly for a new firm. These networks may provide 
young firms with access to external resources that are not otherwise easily 
accessible (Watson, 2007). Such external sources can include contacts with 
suppliers and market knowledge (Wilson et al., 2013). However, Zhao and Aram 
(1995) noted that any benefits associated with director experience diminish after 
a certain level. Too many directors are not necessarily a positive development in 
the knowledge and network base of the firm. 
 
In terms of the board composition of SMEs, there is evidence that a strong and 
vigilant board of directors can significantly affect the potential of the firm (Huse, 
2000) and perhaps reduce its failure propensity. In fact, when a small firm grows, 
it is expected that a board can offer advice on critical issues (Motwani et al., 2006; 
Stavrou, 2003) and direct the company appropriately so as to respond to changes 
in the market place (Zahra et al., 2009). As a result, the number of directors in a 
firm may add to the overall management experience and ability to make decisions. 
In fact, the number of  business directors together with the duality at the top (the 
CEO and the chairman’s positions are taken by the same person) has been of 
special interest  for many years in the  corporate literature (for duality at the top 
see for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Daily and Dalton 1994; He and Wang, 
2009; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; Krause et al., 2014; Murayev et al., 2014) 
although the application to SMEs is quite different due to the owner-centered 
nature of the smaller firms. 
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In the small firm failure area, De Maere et al., (2014) found evidence that  Belgian 
unlisted firms with boards where the CEO is independent of the board chair are 
less likely to become bankrupt, although this holds for firms where the directors 
are also longer-tenured with few additional directorships. Interestingly, De Maere 
et al., (2014) also found evidence that bankrupt firms tend to have a (marginally) 
larger board size compared to non-bankrupt examples. This finding contradicts the 
assumption that more directors increase the overall ability of a firm’s management 
and also contradicts earlier findings from the larger end of companies which found 
a positive association between board size and firm performance (Dalton et al., 
1999). This might suggest that SMEs are different to corporates when the 
relationship between board size and failure propensity is concerned. 
 
The size of the SMEs and the fact that they generally operate at a local or regional 
level has given rise to research on the locality of the directors. In other words, it 
is of importance for a director to know the local market, especially when the SME 
is quite new.  The locality of the directors especially in young firms can reduce the 
failure risk as it has been suggested that local directors tend to know the market 
well, have more effective networks locally and can access more support from the 
local economy (Wilson et al., 2013). Local knowledge, and professional networks 
in an area gives an advantage to SMEs especially in the early stage of their 
development through enhanced understanding of the local customer base, the 
supplier relationships and the regulators (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009; Wilson et 
al., 2013).  This local knowledge ultimately leads to a reduced probability of failure 
for small firms (Wilson et al., 2013). In the wider context of directors’ knowledge 
and experience, Zahra et al., (2009) suggested that these are particularly 
important directors’ characteristics in new SMEs since they are developing and 
providing human and social capital in the early stages of the business 
development. 
 
Likewise, to the extent that duality at the top concerns the larger end of SMEs, 
evidence suggests that this, together with outside directors that represent up to 
half of the board seats, is negatively correlated with failure in small firms (Ciampi, 
2015). This is contrasted to cases where there is duality at the top but outside 
directors represent over half of the board seats; in such cases the presence of 
outside directors is positively associated with small firm failure, possibly due to 
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external directors depriving the internal directors of the majority vote (Ciampi, 
2015).  
   
2.5.3 Management Characteristics: Gender Diversity 
 
Generally, it has been noted that management groups with gender diversity have 
been considered as more able in problem solving (Jehn et al.,1999) and that can 
be the case in boards well.  One of the most researched areas of board diversity 
has been gender and especially the presence of women in the board or in charge 
of firms. However, board heterogeneity can arise from differences in many areas 
as well as the gender, such as director education, experience, profession, and age 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Anderson et al., (2011) found evidence that 
shareholders place greater value on heterogeneity that comes from experience 
and professional practice than on heterogeneity based on directors’ gender, age 
and ethnicity. However, age is generally used as a proxy of a director’s experience 
while only gender has been explicitly researched in connection with firm failure 
(see for example Wilson et al., 2013), possibly due to the difficulty associated with 
obtaining data on the profession, education and perhaps ethnicity of a firm’s 
directors. 
  
Gender diversity within a board has been viewed as adding experience in the 
broadest sense. Early research on women in charge of firms found no evidence 
that women-led firms were more prone to failure (Kalleberg and Leicht, 1991) and 
board heterogeneity had no influence on firm performance (Farrell and Herch, 
2005).  On the aggregate level though, it has been noted that women, as firm 
owners, tend to be frequently involved in industries with relatively high failure 
(such as retail and services) rates and less frequently in industries with lower 
failure rates (such as manufacturing) (Watson, 2003). However, controlling for the 
industry, there has been little evidence of an association between gender and 
different failure rates (Watson, 2003).  
 
More recently, it has been shown that the presence of women on the board of 
directors is associated with reduced risk of insolvency (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Wilson et al., 2013) at least in newly incorporated SMEs. This is down to women 
being described as more risk aware (Adams and Funk, 2012) and more astute in 
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managing credit and cash flows (Wilson et al., 2013). In addition, female directors 
tend to bring a different dimension of human capital and change the dynamics in 
the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Due to their female nature, women can 
provide insights unique to them (Brammer et al., 2009) while, due to their 
participation in certain consumer markets, women directors may have specialist 
knowledge and skills in product positioning (Wilson and Altanlar, 2013).   
 
2.5.4 Evaluation Overview and Hypothesis  
 
To conclude this part of the literature, there is evidence that firms’ management, 
ownership and directors’ characteristics can be linked with the likelihood of firm 
failure, especially when they are already in financial distress. This “demographic” 
approach (Gabrielsson, 2007) to the measurement of management characteristics 
includes a number of important attributes. 
 
First management experience (proxied by the age of directors) is a factor that has 
a negative association with firm failure since more experienced managers can 
better manage a firm in order to avoid failure whereas the locality of directors is 
also negatively associated with firm failure as local directors tend to know the 
market when the (usually local market oriented) firm better. Second, a higher 
number of directors is usually negatively associated with the firm failure as more 
directors are expected to add experience to the board. However, there are some 
contradictory results in the literature where large boards result in management 
conflicts resulting in an increased propensity for failure. Thirdly, the gender of 
directors and particularly the existence of women in the directorship of the firm is 
negatively associated with failure due to the social capital that board heterogeneity 
offers.  
 
As seen above, most of the research in the literature is related to firms from one 
country without any specific reference on whether these management 
characteristics are different in firms from different countries. Regardless of the 
country dimension, critical evaluation of the above in the context of firm failure 
process implies that the experience, the diversity and the breadth of knowledge 
and networking of directors could be associated with firms’ transition to failure in 
alternative firm failure processes since all these characteristics have been 
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identified as determinants of firms’ failure, outside the firm failure process 
framework. In addition, evidence from the qualitative firm failure process literature 
suggests that management is a key element in firm failure process, both in 
identifying the alternative firm failure processes and also to determine failure. 
Critically, for this thesis, directors’ characteristics are firm-specific characteristics 
that will be used to identify the alternative firm failure processes that co-exist in 
the countries that this research considers. Therefore, this thesis proposes the 
following hypothesis to be tested in the context of alternative firm failure processes 
in the EU firms that this study considers:  
 
Hypothesis 5: Directors’ Characteristics such as the presence of women in SMEs’ 
management, director age as a proxy of director experience and the number of 
directors, differ in the alternative EU firm failure processes; they also differ as 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
2.6 Sustainable Growth and Firm Failure 
 
2.6.1 The Concept of Sustainable Growth 
 
Sustainable growth has been one characteristic that Argenti (1976) observed as a 
reason why firms in some failure processes fail. In the context of the qualitative 
firm failure process work, certain firm failures were associated with overtrading. 
This section aims to present the key literature findings in this area and to formulate 
the hypothesis that links the rapid growth as a determinant of failure coming from 
the qualitative aspects of the firm failure process literature with the concept of 
unsustainable growth in firms. 
 
Evidence from the firm failure process literature (see Argenti, 1976; Argenti, 1977; 
Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008; Richardson et al., 1994) suggests that firms that are 
growing rapidly, in terms of turnover for example, have an increased probability 
of failure. However, one limitation of the above mentioned literature is that it has 
been qualitative in nature. On the other hand, research that links unsustainable 
growth to SMEs failure is limited. Going back to the fundamentals of firm-specific 
characteristics of failure, a number of research papers on the firm failure process 
(Argenti, 1977; Argenti, 1976; Richardson et al., 1994; Ooghe and DePrijcker, 
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2008) argued that overtrading10 and a rapid increase in firm leverage (as a result 
of lack of financial skills and of defective cash flow planning), as well as investment 
in overambitious projects, have been mentioned as potentially serious triggers of 
firm failure. The rate of growth combined with an autocratic entrepreneur may be 
also fatal for a firm. Most of the failed firms are actually small firms with less than 
50 employees. Relevant to Argenti’s (1977) overtrading argument is the work of 
Higgins (1977) who introduced the concept of the sustainable growth of firms of 
any size. The definition of the term was given as “the annual percentage of 
increase in sales that is consistent with the firm's established financial policies” 
(Higgins, 1977 p.7). Higgins (1977) noted that inflation generally reduces the real 
sustainable growth rate. The concept of sustainable growth rate was further 
investigated by Platt et al., (1995) in the context of smaller private firms, including 
those in financial distress.  
 
Sustainable growth problems and, in particular, the case when the realized growth 
rate is higher than the sustainable growth rate, were considered to be important 
for a firm’s financial stability. In such cases of greater actual than sustainable 
growth, the issue of new equity was considered as an alternative choice in order 
to effectively balance the capital structure. However, this is not an option that 
many firms can choose.  
 
Other ways to manage excessive growth relate to the increase of leverage to 
finance growth or an increase in product prices (which may reduce sales and 
increase the profit margin) or a reduction in the range of products or services that 
a firm offers. However, these strategies can be harmful for the business as they 
effectively give market share to competitors. For sustainable growth under 
inflationary conditions Higgins (1981) noted that inflation makes firms more 
dependent on external sources of debt. Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) extended 
the work in this area with particular reference to Argenti’s work. Ooghe and De 
Prijcker (2008) also emphasized the failure process framework and identified four 
key categories11.  
                                                          
10 Aiming at challenging sales targets without equivalent profit targets. 
11 1) The failure of an unsuccessful company start-up. 
  2) The failure of ambitious company growth (which leads to failure). 
  3) The failure of a dazzled growth company  
  4) The failure process of an apathetic established company 
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Among these the rapid growth category implies that a firm has been in existence 
for some years and an experienced but highly optimistic management sets an 
over-optimistic plan (perhaps due to wrong demand/market size estimations) 
which is not achievable with the firm’s capability and resources. While these 
companies may be able to reorganize due to the experience of their management, 
they are nevertheless vulnerable to external conditions from their environment 
due to their insufficient financial structure. Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) contrasts 
their views of high growth risk with Argenti who relates the growth risk with 
insufficient skills in operational financial and administrative policy. Relevant to 
Argenti’s (1977) note around defective cash flows, a firm’s ability to create their 
own cash flow so as to sustain its growth has been named as self-financeable 
growth in the literature.  
 
While the concept of sustainable growth appears to have an important part in a 
firm’s path to failure, the self-financeable growth rate (SFG) is a newer concept 
which may also be relevant to firm failure and small firm failure in particular. 
Somoza (2011) suggested that internally generated funds are crucial for small 
firms in order to have a healthy growth and to avoid bankruptcy. Somoza (2011) 
suggested that small firms that are unable to generate internal funds from retained 
profit are particularly vulnerable to failure. This is because of SMEs’ difficulties to 
obtain external equity finance and potentially bank debt financing. Likewise, Gupta 
et al., (2014) provided empirical evidence that small firms unable to generate 
sufficient operating cash flow are prone to bankruptcy. Nevertheless, SFG has been 
seen an indicator of a firm’s ability to secure sound business conditions in some 
sectors (Lund, 2014). Marks et al., (2009) used SFG to define the desired rate of 
growth for a company without it running out of cash and risking failure. 
 
A company’s operating cash cycle is related to the amount of cash needed to 
finance sales and this, together with the amount of cash generated from each 
pound of sales are the key figures that are used to calculate the SFG (Churchill 
and Mullins, 2001; Marks et al., 2009). The operating cash cycle, effectively 
measures the length of time that cash is tied up in stock and receivables as working 
capital before the customers pay for the products/services sold. The amount of 
cash needed to finance sales is effectively the cash value that is involved in each 
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operating cycle while the amount of cash generated from each pound of sales is 
the amount of cash generated in each cycle (Churchill and Mullins, 2001). 
 
 
Churchill and Mullins (2001) argued that a balance between cash generating and 
cash consuming (due to a firm’s growth) should be defined in order for a firm to 
avoid financial distress. From an inter-country perspective, Evans et al. (2010) 
argued that SMEs which experience growth may be able to do so because of 
favourable market conditions and because they are able to take advantage of local 
niche markets. However, Evans et al. (2010) also state that, despite the above 
mentioned advantage that local markets can give to local SMEs, firms must be 
aware of business and political environment changes in order to see if their growth 
is sustainable.  Therefore, an empirical investigation of the SFG across countries 
and regions could add value to an understanding of business failure.   
 
2.6.2 Evaluation Overview and Hypothesis  
 
To conclude on the link between a firm’s growth and the firm failure process, the 
work of  Higgins, (1981), Churchill and Mullins, (2001), Marks et al., (2009)  could 
be indicative of a potential link between rapid growth and the likelihood of failure: 
Firms that are growing rapidly without being in a position to self-finance their 
growth have an increased likelihood of failure. At a European Union level there 
have been efforts to support business growth. However, excess growth at a firm 
level may be short-lived and one could also argue that, due to local regulations, 
industry structures and macroeconomic conditions, it seem possible that different 
levels of individual business growth rates are sustainable in different countries with 
respect to failure risk. Local market knowledge can be an advantage to medium 
and small sized firms but the firms should also be aware of business and macro-
environment changes in order to ensure that their level of growth is sustainable 
(Evans et al., 2010).  
 
Critically evaluating the above, one can conclude that, in line with the findings of 
the qualitative firm failure process literature, excessive growth can be associated 
with firms’ failure in some firm failure processes. One can argue that this implies 
that unsustainable growth is a determinant of firms’ transition to failure since a 
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number of studies from the wider firm failure literature have found evidence on 
that (Higgins, 1977; Platt et al., 1995). The level of growth (in total assets) is a 
financial ratio and as such differences in the overall level of growth in alternative 
firm failure processes would be captured in that ratio. After all evidence from the 
qualitative firm failure process literature suggest that increased growth or very 
slow growth can be both characteristics of alternative firm failure processes. On 
the other hand, the unsustainable growth, (partly) implies sales growth beyond 
the sustainable levels of a firm. Given the above, one can argue that whilst the 
existence of unsustainable growth may not in itself be a characteristic to define 
the alternative firm failure processes, it could differ between firms in these 
processes. In addition, it is not clear whether unsustainable growth is a 
determinant of firms’ transition to failure in alternative firm failure processes. As 
such this thesis proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The distribution of firms with unsustainable levels of growth differs 
between the alternative firm failure processes in EU firms; unsustainable levels of 
growth are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure 
 
2.7 The Regional Context: Intra-Country Firm Failure  
 
Since the 1960s most of the literature around firm failure has been country-
specific. Researchers focused their studies on either of the two firm failure research 
areas in one country, each time ignoring any spatial-regional effects. Most studies 
were undertaken on firms from the United States of America, the United Kingdom 
and often Germany. However, some evidence suggests that local business and 
economic conditions may vary within a country.  Although part of the intra-country 
literature uses definitions that do not match this study’s definition of failure (such 
as firm exits), it is still worth considering the fact that their findings may provide 
some evidence that failure determinants can also differ between countries. This 
variation can add some value to the failure process analysis as some countries 
tend to have regions that are non-homogenous. For example in some countries 
such as the UK, the south tends to be more affluent than the north while in Italy 
the north is considered more affluent.  
 
This section aims to link evidence from firm failure at country level to potential 
regional specific effects on firm failure.  The literature provides evidence on intra-
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country studies although the research for this thesis and the hypotheses are based 
on the United Kingdom. This is because the U.K. is has the richest data per region 
but most importantly because it is formed by different countries (Scotland, England 
Wales, Northern Ireland) each having some distinct economic characteristics and 
industry concentrations and with some (though limited) policy-making ability. 
Likewise, England is further divided into regions that are considered to be relatively 
diverse from an economic perspective. However, evidence of regional dynamics in 
firm failure can be drawn from other countries where some research has taken 
place. The remaining part of this section presents the current literature around 
regional/intra-country comparisons and presents the hypothesis around the link 
between failure process and the U.K. regions and countries. 
 
2.7.1 The Regional Context: New Businesses and Firm Failure 
 
There is a growing body of research that analysed the determinants and the 
survival of new business creation in the U.K. (see for example Ganotakis, 2010). 
Likewise, there is evidence that there are regional effects within the UK which 
affect new business creation (see for example Fotopoulos, 2013; Keeble and 
Walker, 1994). Region-specific characteristics may be different whereas start-up 
costs may vary considerably between regions in a country (Gries and Naude, 
2008). Moreover, there appears to be a distinctive regional variation in the 
industries of new firms (Keeble and Walker, 1994).  Similarly, Buenstorf and 
Klepper (2009) found evidence that firms located in regions with more 
concentrated economies have fewer probabilities of exit since they suggested that 
the most productive firms located in these regions are less vulnerable to economic 
shocks.  Buehler et al (2012) also noted that culture could vary across regions and 
that can affect the attitude towards failure and consequently the bankruptcy rates.  
 
At the UK level, most of the underlying rationale for any regional effects on 
business creation is related to the fact that most small firms created in British 
regions and countries aim to serve the local population, especially during their first 
few years of operation (Love, 1996). However, there appears to be a link between 
new firm creation within a region and firm exit (defined as any business closure 
and including but not limited to failure). In particular, evidence from the literature 
suggests that business entry rate is affected by the exit rate of firms within a UK 
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region. Most importantly for the purposes of this study is the evidence that 
business exits are influenced by business entry rates and changes in 
unemployment rates whereas the local economic infrastructure may also be 
important (Love, 1996). Moreover, the economic and business environment 
determinants of firm exits appear to be broadly similar with the determinants of 
new business formation. This is the case because the same geographical areas 
that have certain environment characteristics that support new business formation 
have also a higher population of new firms. These are prone to fail on average 
three years after their formation due to their young age (Keeble and Walker, 
1994). In that sense an element of endogeneity in the entry-exit relationship of 
firms in a certain geographical area potentially exists.  
 
Most of the studies mentioned above focus on the business environment as the 
key determinant of business generation and failure within a certain geographical 
area in the same way as the national and regional business failure literature. In 
particular, the unemployment rate, local GDP, household disposable income, the 
local population change and the potential impact of net migration are all economic 
factors that have been associated with the local business environment which 
affects business creation and exits at a regional level (Keeble and Walker, 1994; 
Love, 1996).   
 
From the firm-specific perspective, the age and size of the firm are two 
determinants that have been associated with the link between firm entry, exit and 
also failure as per this study’s definition. The literature evidence around firm failure 
suggests that new firms are prone to fail due to an inverse relationship between a 
firm’s age and failure propensity  (Dunne et al., 1988) particularly after their first 
two years of existence which is often described as a “honeymoon period” and up 
to their seventh year of survival (Wilson et al., 2014). As the probability of failure 
is larger in new firms, the age distribution of firms’ population becomes an 
important determinant of failure with an impact in regions with a high percentage 
of new firms. As such, regions that have high new business growth will have a 
higher percentage of exits or VAT de-registrations as well (Lane and Schary, 1991; 
Keeble and Walker, 1994).  Likewise, most new firms tend to be small and that 
has adverse consequences with regards to their failure propensity (Love, 1996).  
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The current literature has therefore provided some evidence on the relationship 
between new business formation and firms’ exit at a regional level by considering 
elements of the local business and economic environment. However, findings 
related to business exits (see for example Love, 1996) should be interpreted 
carefully as a firm’s exit (for any reason, including but not restricted to failure) can 
happen for reasons not related to financial difficulties. In fact, if a firm ceases 
trading for reasons not related to failure and given that SMEs tend to serve the 
local market mostly, then it is quite possible that new firm(s) are created so as to 
fill that gap in the local market.  
 
On the other hand, firms’ exits for reasons including failure can be interpreted as 
a sign of a very competitive market where only the most efficient firms can survive 
but at the same time they can be viewed as a sign of market weakness in the 
sense that the market is not strong enough to support many firms (Love, 1996). 
Moreover, whereas a number of regional economic factors have been analysed as 
co-determinants of the entry-exit link, the evidence on the this link is less 
substantive and is focusing at the macro-level. At the same time, it approaches 
the firm failure as an event (that is, an active firms fail or exit the market) but not 
as a process where a firm may first enter into financial distress before it fails. 
Therefore the link between new firms’ entry and failure at a regional level need 
further investigation as prior researches were based on fairly old evidence. 
 
The determinants of new firm creation at a regional level and firm exits at UK 
regional level have been shown to have some contradictory findings. On one hand, 
they have been identified as being non-time variant. In a study of the determinants 
of firm entry and exit in the UK regions from 1994-2007 Fotopoulos (2013) found 
evidence that both the determinants and also the inter-regional variations 
remained time-persistent. This finding implies that any efforts to boost small firms 
at a local level may not necessarily be successful given that the entry-exit link is 
associated with time-persistent determinants. On the other hand, recent evidence 
from UK regions suggested that there was a temporary regional variation during 
the first period of the financial crisis in the performance of the firms possibly due 
to differences in the industry composition that different UK regions have (Martin 
et al, 2016).  
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In the context of alternative firm failure processes within the UK regions, one can 
assess whether the percentage of new firms in a region could be a determinant of 
firms’ transition to failure in some or all the firm failure processes. The percentage 
of new firms in a region is not a firm-specific characteristic. Instead it is a business 
environment characteristic. As such it cannot be used as a key characteristic to 
identify alternative firm failure processes. However, one can argue that the 
percentage of new firms in a region is effectively part of a region’s business 
environment and as such the identification of the alternative firm failure processes 
may result in processes that include firms from business environments that differ 
on that aspect. This leads to the next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7: The number of new firms as a percentage of the existing business 
population in a UK region differs between the alternative firm failure processes in 
UK firms; it is also a determinant of firms’ transition to failure. 
 
2.7.2 The Regional Business Environment: The Industry of the firm 
 
The literature on firm failure at a country level has given evidence of some key 
firm-specific and environment-specific determinants. Glauben et al. (2006) found 
differences in firm exits in different regions of Germany. It has been discussed in 
section 1.3 that the scope of cross country comparison may have policy 
implications at the EU level. Similarly, there appears to be scope to investigate 
potential differences and similarities in the firm failure process within a country 
using the U.K. as an example. Intra-country determinants of firm failure, are 
therefore a relatively unexplored area despite evidence that the consideration of 
macroeconomic conditions of a country without any determinants related to the 
economic geography at local level may provide misleading results (Buehler et al., 
2012). 
 
At the wider economic and business environment level, local economic conditions 
(such as unemployment, GDP and local GVA growth, industry concentration, and 
business population) have been associated with firm failure at regional-level and 
since such conditions may vary locally these have also been linked with firm failure 
at the regional level. For example, the industrial concentration in some countries 
may differ significantly between different regions (for example, in the UK, Greater 
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London is more oriented towards financial services and the North is more 
traditionally linked to manufacturing) whereas other countries have to some extent 
devolved governments (Spain, the UK, Germany). This can have certain effects on 
the local firm failure process. 
 
Research on business bankruptcies dating back to the period 1839-1913 in 
Scotland provided evidence that there are local determinants which can affect firm 
failure at least at the aggregate level (Moss and Hume, 1983). Such determinants 
included the local business population, potential overtrading, the local availability 
or lack of financing and the concentration of certain industries in certain cities. 
Such concentration had resulted in a downturn in a specific industry leading to 
increased failure rates in cities or regions within the country. More recent evidence 
also suggest the increasing industrial specialization and dissimilarity in the 
industrial structure  in major European countries and cities seem to bring forth the 
emergence of US-like industrial districts in European countries that can lead to 
spatial patterns of agglomeration of economic activity in Europe (Longhi et al., 
2014). In particular, some metropolitan areas appear to be more specialized in 
financial services while others appear to be more specialized in ‘other services’. In 
fact, Lane and Schary (1991) pointed out that business failures in the United States 
are more affected by local rather than national economic conditions.   Since Longhi 
et al., (2014) and Krugman and Venables (1996), research has been extended into 
cities within a country and they viewed Europe as a collection of smaller regions. 
We can adapt the above hypothesis and test it within the United Kingdom’s regions 
and cities at intra-country level.  
 
Critically evaluating the evidence from the above studies, one can conclude that, 
in line with the hypothesis between the EU countries, the industry classification of 
a firm within a country could affect firm failure.  In addition, one can assume that 
since the industry classification of the firm affects firm failure, in can be a 
determinant of firms’ failure in alternative firm failure processes. The critical 
evaluation and research on the literature shows that there is little evidence in the 
quantitative firm failure process literature to suggest whether the industry 
classification of the firm differs in any alternative firm failure processes. The 
industry of the firm is not a firm-specific characteristic and as such it cannot be 
used to identify the alternative firm failure processes. However, the distribution of 
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alternative industries may differ in the alternative firm failure processes, once they 
are identified.  Most studies are sector-specific (see for example Laitinen et al., 
2015; Lukason and Laitinen, 2016; Lukason et al., 2016) and do not allow for a 
multi-industry comparison. As such, this thesis proposes the following hypothesis 
to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 8: Industry classification differs between the alternative firm failure 
processes in UK firms; it also differs as a determinant of firms’ transition to failure 
in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
2.7.3 The Regional Context: Financial Ratios  and the Age of the Firm 
 
Given the macro-focused evidence of the literature, the financial firm-specific 
characteristics by means of financial ratios may need further investigation given 
that most of the firm failure literature has been developed by using financial ratios 
as predictors.  
 
As already discussed in section 2.4, the critical evaluation on the literature around 
the usage of financial ratios in firm failure shows that there is not a clear theory 
on which financial ratios or combination of financial ratios are the ideal in order to 
identify the alternative firm failure processes.  Nevertheless, it has been discussed 
that the previous research agrees that financial ratios can be good predictors of 
firms’ failure and as such determinants of firms’ transition to failure. They can also 
be used successfully in order to identify alternative firm failure processes. 
However, one can assume that the financial ratios, being symptoms of firms’ 
failure, and metrics of firms’ financial performance should differ between the 
alternative firm failure processes in UK regions. 
 
Likewise, the age of the firm has been identified as a quantitative firm-specific 
characteristics that affects firms’ failure. In the UK, during the recent financial 
crisis, the younger SMEs have been among the most vulnerable firms (Orton et 
al., 2015; Helmers and Rogers, 2008). In addition, the qualitative firm failure 
process literature suggests that the age of the firm is a key characteristic of certain 
firm failure processes in a country (Argenti 1976; Richardson et al., 1994). 
Critically, for this thesis, both financial ratios and the firm age are firm-specific 
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characteristics that will be used to identify the alternative firm failure processes 
that co-exist in the countries that this research considers. Therefore, this thesis 
proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 9: Financial performance represented by key financial ratios and the 
age of the firm, differ in the alternative firm failure processes of UK firms; they 
also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm 
failure processes. 
 
Generally, the business environment is usually seen as having a significant impact 
on the cross-regional variability of firm failure with the availability of financing but 
also the presence of personal financial resources (proxied by house values) to be 
associated with firm failure (Keeble and Walker, 1994).  In fact, evidence from the 
failure prediction area of research provided some evidence that a model developed 
in a specific geographic area can perform more effectively than a wider reaching 
version (Ciampi and Gordini, 2013). However, most of the literature which 
suggests that the local economic environment affects business failures at a local 
level is based on studies with limited or no firm-specific information. One exception 
in the failure prediction literature suggested that macroeconomic data revealed 
very different company survival and failure rates over time and across regions and 
it was desirable to control for local economic conditions (Wilson and Altanlar, 
2013). Specifically researchers calculated aggregate company failure rates in each 
of the regions and constructed a regional Weight of Evidence for each year 
separately and for each region. This evidence can initiate further research in to the 
impact of local economic conditions on the failure process.  
 
Critically evaluating the evidence of the impact of the economic environment in 
firm failure within a country one can argue that it may affect indirectly the 
alternative firm failure processes. Argenti (1976) noted that management 
deficiencies in a firm may get exaggerated by a changing economic environment 
where the management cannot adapt to. Moreover, whilst the economic 
environment characteristics cannot be used to identify the existence of alternative 
firm failure processes between countries because they are not firm-specific events, 
they may determine the firms’ transition to failure. On the other hand, one needs 
to consider whether each of the alternative firm failure processes includes firms 
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whose economic environments differ between the alternative processes. Therefore 
this thesis proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 10: In an UK regional context, macroeconomic conditions differ 
between firms in the alternative firm failure processes in UK firms; they also differ 
as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure 
processes.  
  
2.7.4 The Regional Context: Firm specific Management Characteristics   
 
At the firm-level, firm management has been already discussed as a potentially 
important determinant of firm failure at a country level. As such, directors’ 
characteristics are areas of consideration at a cross-country comparison. For the 
intra-country comparison, there is evidence that an entrepreneur’s experience in 
related geographic or product markets when entering a specific market affects 
both the probability and the mode of exit (Dunee et al., 2005). 
 
As discussed earlier the exit is not necessarily the same as a firm’s failure but this 
ties in well with evidence from the governance literature which suggests that 
directors’ local market experience is beneficial for a firm to avoid failure12. 
Moreover, evidence from the failure prediction literature also shows that the 
presence of female directors is negatively associated with firm failure due to the 
social capital that gender heterogeneity brings (Wilson and Altanlar, 2013). 
Likewise, the number of directors is also negatively associated with firm failure 
due to the experience that the additional directors bring. As such it has a positive 
impact on firms’ survival by reducing failure rates in firms located in different 
regions in the UK (Helmers and Rogers, 2008). Therefore these can all be 
indicators of firm failure in regional comparison.  
 
As in the case of the discussion about alternative countries, and regardless of the 
regional or country dimension, critical evaluation of the above in the context of 
firm failure process implies that the experience, the diversity and the breadth of 
knowledge and networking of directors could be associated with firms’ transition 
                                                          
12 For further details, please see the Governance paragraph. 
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to failure in alternative firm failure processes since some of these characteristics 
have been identified as determinants of firms’ failure outside the firm failure 
process framework. In addition, evidence from the qualitative firm failure process 
literature suggests that management is a key element in firm failure process, both 
in identifying the alternative firm failure processes and also to determine failure. 
Critically, for this thesis, directors’ characteristics are firm-specific characteristics 
that will be used to identify the alternative firm failure processes that co-exist in 
the countries that this research considers. Given that a direct comparison between 
firm failure processes in different regions within a country has not be performed 
yet, this thesis proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 11: Directors’ Characteristics such as the presence of women in SMEs’ 
management, director age as a proxy of director experience and the number of 
directors, differ in the alternative UK firm failure processes; they also differ as 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
2.7.5 The Regional Context: Unsustainable growth   
 
With respect to the note of Moss and Hume (1983) on overtrading, their research 
did not include any regional comparison. However, one can assume that different 
local economic and business environments may be able to support varying levels 
of growth in companies that are operating in that area. In fact, Evans et al (2010) 
supports the argument that local market knowledge can give an advantage to 
medium and small sized firms but that firms should also be aware of business and 
macro-environment changes in order to ensure that their level of growth is 
sustainable (Evans et al., 2010). Evidence from the Department of Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform in the U.K. (2013), suggests that UK SMEs have 
had very different average turnover dynamics between 2009 and 2012. Given that 
turnover is a key metric in measuring business sustainable growth (Higgins, 1977), 
it would be interesting to investigate if different regions within the United Kingdom 
support different growth levels at an individual firm-level.   
 
Critically evaluating the above, together with the evidence provided in section 
2.6.1, one can conclude that, in line with the findings of the qualitative firm failure 
process literature, excessive growth can be associated with firms’ failure in some 
firm failure processes. One can argue that this implies that unsustainable growth 
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is a determinant of firms’ transition to failure since a number of studies from the 
wider firm failure literature have found evidence of that (Higgins, 1977; Platt et 
al., 1995). It is not clear whether unsustainable growth is a determinant of firms’ 
transition to failure in alternative firm failure processes. It has been associated 
with firm failure but not with the identification of alternative firm failure processes. 
In line with the arguments on unsustainable growth levels presented in section 
2.6.1 for the firm failure processes between firms in the EU countries, one can also 
argue that whilst the existence of unsustainable growth may not in itself be a 
characteristic to define the alternative firm failure processes, it could differ 
between firms in the alternative firm failure processes between a firms of on 
country. Likewise it can be a determinant of firms’ transition to failure. As such 
this thesis proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 12: The distribution of firms with unsustainable levels of growth 
differs between the alternative firm failure processes in UK firms; unsustainable 
levels of growth are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a review and evaluation of the existing firm failure and firm 
failure process literature that is relevant to the purposes of this thesis. There has 
been evidence from the qualitative firm failure process literature that management 
characteristics do affect the alternative firm failure processes. However this has 
not been tested in the existing quantitative firm failure process literature. In 
addition, a number of financial, firm-specific and business and economic 
environment characteristics, such as the legal traditions in a country, the economic 
growth in a country or a region, the credit availability, the new firms in a region 
and the excessive levels of growth of a firm have been identified from the wider 
firm failure literature as determinants of firm failure. However, this has not been 
contextualized within a firm failure process framework yet. 
 
In the context of the main aim of this study, which is to identify alternative SME 
failure processes, investigate the determinants of firms’ transition towards failure, 
within these processes and investigate the importance of geographic (spatial) 
location in the transition to failure, this chapter has analysed the main 
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characteristics of failure processes and determinants of failure. In addition, a 
number of research hypotheses were established. These hypothesis include firm-
specific characteristics (financial ratios, the firm age and directors’ characteristics)  
that will be used to identify the alternative firm failure processes. These, 
characteristics, together with a number of additional characteristics from the firms 
business and economic environment will then be tested to identify if they differ in 
the alternative firm failure processes and whether they are determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure in these processes. The investigation of the alternative firm 
failure processes in the EU firms and the UK regions’ firms, together with the test 
of the hypotheses are presented in the following empirical chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter explains the research design and research philosophy of this thesis. 
In addition, the quantitative methodologies that the study uses are presented, 
together with some background information from applied research in the area of 
firms’ failure. Further details on the techniques applied are also provided in each 
individual empirical chapter. The structure of this section is as follows. Section 3.2 
presents the research philosophy and design of this study; Section 3.3 defines the 
nature of the dependent variable used in the quantitative analysis, something 
which affects the analytical tools that this study uses; Section 3.4 reviews the 
rationale of quantitative techniques selection in this study with supportive evidence 
from the previous literature; Section 3.5 presents the application of these 
quantitative techniques in this study. This section also introduces two hypotheses, 
related to the existence of geographical (spatial) effects in aggregate firm failures 
in the failure processes of the EU countries and the UK regions. These hypotheses 
are more technical in nature and as such this chapter is more appropriate for their 
introduction. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
  
3.2. Research Philosophy and Design  
 
Research designs are plans that dictate the form that a study will take. There are 
three key types of research design: quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods 
(Creswell, 2009). The distinction between these research designs maybe 
sometimes difficult to discern as many studies may be mainly of a quantitative 
nature but include some elements of qualitative methods as well and vice versa.  
 
A qualitative research design usually involves the collection of data by the 
researcher who is central into the interpretation of the data usually through an 
inductive style (Creswell, 2009).  A quantitative research design is more focused 
on testing theories by examining relationships within various datasets. Usually 
quantitative researchers make assumptions about testing theories in a deductive 
style such that this research approach enables researchers to generalize and 
replicate their findings (Creswell, 2009). Finally, mixed-methods research is an 
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approach that combines quantitative and qualitative forms and may involve 
philosophical assumptions (Creswell, 2009). 
 
In practice the choice of the methodology is influenced by the assumptions of the 
researcher and the nature of the research aims. There are mainly four research 
philosophies that researchers tend to adopt so as to explain the different 
phenomena of their research. These are positivism, constructivism, pragmatism 
and realism. 
 
The positivist (also known as post-positivist research; empirical science or post -
positivism) research philosophy employs empirical observations and 
measurement, as well as theory verification to interpret research results. The 
researcher is external to the problem that is being researched and remains 
objective (Saunders et al., 2009). In addition, there is a deterministic philosophy 
in which some causes are potentially associated with some outcomes and therefore 
the problems that the research addresses represent the need to identify and 
investigate the causes that influence the outcomes (Creswell, 2009). As a result, 
only observable and measurable phenomena can provide credible facts to address 
the research problem and for that reason highly structured large samples are most 
commonly used to analyse the research problems (Saunders et al., 2009). As a 
result the positivist researcher usually employs quantitative research methods 
(Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
In the constructivist research philosophy (sometimes used interchangeably with 
the term interpretivism or it is combined with it), the researcher holds assumptions 
that “individuals seek understanding of the work in which they live and work” 
(Creswell, 2009, p.8). As a result the researcher seeks to understand the 
participants of the research. The aims of theory generation are based on social 
and historical observation and construction while the researcher is part of what is 
being researched (Saunders et al., 2009). In this philosophy of research, the 
researcher may be subjective in the way he or she interprets the world and there 
may be subjective meanings and social phenomena (Saunders et al., 2009). As a 
result, the research techniques that are adopted in this philosophy are usually 
qualitative in nature, possibly with in-depth interviews. 
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Pragmatism is another research philosophy which arises out of actions, situations 
and consequences as opposed to previous objective conditions (Creswell, 2009). 
In the pragmatist research philosophy, the researcher may adopt multiple views 
in order to answer the research questions whereas observable phenomena as well 
as subjective meanings can provide acceptable knowledge to answer the research 
questions (Saunders et al., 2009). The values of the research play a special role 
in analyzing and interpreting the results of the research and during this process, 
the researcher may adopt both objective and subjective interpretations (Saunders 
et al., 2009). Due to the mixed nature of objective and subjective interpretation 
of the observable phenomena, mixed methods are frequently used when the 
researcher adopts this research philosophy. 
 
Finally, in the research philosophy of realism, the researcher is objective and 
independent of beliefs or knowledge. Phenomena are interpreted through social 
conditioning and the phenomena themselves provide credible data (Saunders et 
al., 2009). Research under the philosophy of realism is value laden and the 
researcher is biased by world views and cultural experiences which in turn may 
have an impact on the interpretation of the research (Saunders et al., 2009). Both 
quantitative and qualitative methods can be adopted in this research philosophy.  
 
The majority of the studies in the broader area of finance tend to use a positivist 
research philosophy where the researcher is external to the observed phenomena 
with a clear focus on causality. In the firm failure literature, the majority of the 
previous studies have adopted positivism research philosophy and they rely on the 
measurement of large, structured data, with the researcher being independent of 
any social factors. As a result, most researchers used quantitative research 
methods to achieve their research objectives (see for example, Laitinen, 1991; 
Camacho-Minano et al., 2014; Pindado and Rodrigues, 2004). However, in the 
failure process literature, there has been evidence of qualitative research as well 
(see for example Argenti, 1976; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008; Richardson et al., 
1994). Nevertheless, the research philosophy adopted from the researchers in firm 
failure studies, even when the methodology was of qualitative nature, was that of 
the positivism, since the researchers remained external and objective to the 
research phenomena and there was a particular focus on causality of phenomena 
and results.   
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Given the nature of this study, the positivist research philosophy is adopted. This 
study aims to compare firm failures between countries and within a country. There 
is a clear element of structured large samples of data where the researcher 
maintains an external and objective view. Naturally the focus is on causality and 
making generalizations on the observed phenomena in order to draw objective 
conclusions. Consequently, quantitative research methods will be adopted. 
 
In terms of the research design, a deductive approach has been used. That means 
the hypotheses that drive this research will be developed; the quantitative 
methods will be used to test the hypothesis; and finally draw conclusions that will 
allow this research to achieve its research aims and objectives. 
 
3.3. The Dependent Variable and Discrete Response Models 
 
This study compares firm failures across different European countries and also 
across different countries and regions of the United Kingdom. The most common 
approach that quantitative studies in this research area adopt for the definition of 
their dependent variable, is the binary classification (see for example Altman 1968; 
Altman et al, 2010). This means that, at the cross-section, firms can be either 
failed or not failed. 
 
However, this study uses more classifications for the failed firms. All eventually 
failed firms in the sample have been classified into three categories depending on 
the point in time of the observation.  There are three possible outcomes for each 
firm-year observation in the sample and these outcomes can be denoted with a 
number that can be linked with their status.  
i. The first category includes firms that have not failed at the given year when 
the observation takes place. This means that these firms are not in financial 
distress and have not been under insolvency procedures for liquidation at 
that time. Such firm-year observations have an event_failure status of 
zero.  
ii. The second category includes firms that are in financial distress in a given 
year. These are firms that are not under liquidation but they have negative 
equity which means that their total liabilities exceed their total assets. For 
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the year when these firms are in financial distress their firm-year 
observation has the event_failure status of one. 
iii. Finally, the third category relates to firms that are insolvent and are 
liquidated (in some countries the equivalent term is bankrupt) or are in the 
process of liquidation in the year observed. Such firm-year observations 
have the event_failure status of two.  
 
The chosen states of the dependent variable in the present study have been 
established with a clear rationale. Non-failed firms are financially healthy firms 
that have no particular adverse financial or legal information against them at the 
time of observation. Financially distressed firms, are weak financially (being in 
negative equity) but their performance is not at a stage where their creditors or 
their owners have not entered the legal process of insolvency that will lead to the 
liquidation of the firm (at the time of observation). With little hope for the firm to 
perform well again, it is expected that liquidation is the last resort for creditors 
and owners. This classification is similar to the classification that Tsai (2013) 
adopted when researching corporate financial distress and bankruptcy, and to 
Johnsen and Melicher (1994). There is, however, a difference in that their 
“financially distressed” category contained firms that had defaulted on their loan 
obligations or that were reducing dividend payments, whereas this study uses 
negative equity as the measure of financial distress. A further difference is that 
their studies were focused on listed companies whereas this analyses SMEs. 
 
Given the three possible states of the dependent variable, the traditional binary 
classification of the dependent variable would not be sufficient to accommodate 
effectively three potential states for each firm. Instead, multinomial responses are 
preferable because they are able to accommodate multiple outcomes.  Multinomial 
dependent variables can use similar econometric techniques as are available for 
binary dependent variables although with certain modifications, which are 
explained in the following sections. 
 
One significant characteristic of multivariate discrete-responses is that the 
dependent variable may be either ordered or unordered in nature. In situations 
where there is no natural ordering of the alternative stages of the dependent 
variable, unordered models should be preferred. The key characteristic of 
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unordered responses is that neither their chosen values, nor their particular order 
signals a specific status for the dependent variable whereas they have no effect 
on the estimation inference or interpretation (Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
The second category of multinomial responses is the ordered response. This type 
of ordered response dependent variable is effectively used in ordered response 
(also known as discrete-choice) models which are effectively generalizations on 
the simple binary models (Brooks, 2008) and dependent variables specifications. 
The ordered response (also known as ordinal response) can take values 
{0,1,2,3…n} for some known value of n (Wooldridge, 2010). In this case, the 
numbers that are selected as states of the dependent variable cannot be arbitrary 
and while they do not have to have a specific meaning themselves, they need to 
have an ordered and specified hierarchy between them. The dependent variable 
should therefore behave in an ordinal fashion with respect to each predictor 
(Harrell, 2015).  
 
When the stages of the dependent variable have a logical or natural order, ordered 
response models should be preferred. For example, when there is a monotonic 
increase or decrease in the credit quality of a firm, this order should be reflected 
in the dependent variable (Brooks, 2008). If the credit quality for a company is 
ranked in a scale from zero to six where zero is the lowest ranking and six is the 
highest ranking, the fact that six is better than five or zero contains important 
information for the credit quality of the company even if the chosen numbers of 
the dependent variable have only ordinal meaning (Wooldridge, 2010). However, 
with an ordered response dependent variable, one cannot make inferences with 
regards to the difference between the ordinal scales. For example one cannot 
conclude that the difference between credit quality rankings four and two is 
somehow twice the difference between one and zero (Wooldridge, 2010).  That 
means that in substantive terms the difference between zero and two on the coded 
response may be different from the difference between four and six (Jackman, 
2000). 
 
In statistical terms, one can check the consistency of the order if there is an 
independent variable X that is related to the log odds of an event Y (that is, the 
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dependent variable). One can then plot the mean of X stratified by the alternative 
levels of Y which should be in a consistent order (Harrell, 2015).  
 
Given the nature of the research, the ordered response fits better the definition of 
this study’s dependent variable. Selecting an unordered response would result in 
loss of efficiency with the use of unordered response dependent variable (Johnsen 
and Melichen, 1994) models. In the context of this study’s data, one would expect 
that a non-failed firm (event_failure=0) is “better” than a firm into financial 
distress (event_failure=1) which is “better” than a firm into liquidation 
(event_failure=2). Conceptually, ordered response models have the ability to 
classify different states in a firm’s financial situation. This is a useful characteristic 
because not all firms that are financially distressed end up bankrupt and not all 
bankrupt firms have been in financial distress. In the context of ordered response 
dependent variables, it is important that the discrete responses should not be close 
substitutes as this will increase the errors in the model (Johnsen and Melicher, 
1994). This is a requirement that complies with the nature of the data used in this 
study. Therefore, there is some usefulness to treat financial distress and liquidation 
differently as two distinct statuses of firms’ failure.  
 
In the quantitative literature on firm failure there have been examples  of ordered 
response dependent variables although mostly from the corporate failure literature 
(Johnsen and Melichen, 1994; Tsai, 2013) as opposed to the SMEs literature. 
Nevertheless, the validity of the ordered response dependent variable model 
remains the same, from a statistical perspective. Johnsen and Melichen (1994) 
used an ordered-response approach, provided evidence that a further category of 
financially weak companies that sits between the non-bankrupt and the bankrupt 
firms is a valid option, and it may result in better model accuracy.  In their 
research, the particular classification of the dependent variable reduced 
classification errors from the econometric model. In addition, the authors noted 
that in the large companies of their sample, the three states of financial health of 
the companies appeared to be statistically independent.  
 
In summary, there is evidence from the literature that considers a binary status 
for the dependent variable. However, given the comparative nature of this study 
and the inclusion of alternative states for the failed firms, a multinomial dependent 
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variable will be used. Given the directional nature of the failure event (where a 
liquidated firm is in a worse state than a firm which is under financial distress), 
the ordered response specification is chosen for the dependent variable. This 
specification will be used for the modelling approaches that are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
3.4. Quantitative Techniques of Firm Failure 
 
3.4.1 Introduction to Methodological approaches 
 
The firm failure literature is composed of two types of research. The first type 
analyse the characteristics of the firm failure process while the other identifies the 
determinants of firms’ failure, often in the context of firm failure prediction. Both 
areas of research use quantitative techniques. Therefore, to some extent, similar 
quantitative methodologies have been applied to both areas of research. Due to 
the nature of the failure prediction literature, where small improvements in the 
prediction accuracy are important, that area gives a more rigorous review and 
application of the quantitative techniques that have been used in the wider firm 
failure literature. 
 
From a literature point of view, a number of techniques have been used to develop 
prediction models. Kumar and Ravi (2007) classified these models into two broad 
areas of statistical and intelligence/computing techniques. This classification in 
practice excludes the market-based model approaches which are not applicable to 
SMEs given that a large proportion of these firms are not listed in any stock 
exchanges. Statistical techniques are applicable to SMEs and they appear both in 
the failure prediction area and in the quantitative firm failure process area. 
Therefore, these statistical techniques will be the main focus of this analysis. 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) and Logistic Regression (logit) have been the 
most popular applications, with panel data techniques recently appearing 
increasingly in the literature. However, other techniques such as factor analysis 
have also been used in the firm failure determinants literature (see for example 
Gaskill et al., 1993; Modina and Pietrovito, 2014), but with relatively limited 
applications as a standalone technique in the firm failure prediction area. However,  
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these techniques are a useful tool to reduce an initially large number of potential 
independent variables to more manageable levels. 
 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) has been extensively used, starting from 
Altman’s (1968) z-score model. Many other authors followed the very same 
example (see for example Deakin, 1972; Edmister, 1972; Blum, 1974; Taffler, 
1982). The first Z-score has the following form (Altman, 1968): 
𝑍 = 𝜈1𝜒1 + 𝜈2𝜒2 + ⋯ + 𝜈𝑛𝜒𝑛 
The z-score was based on the linear general formulae of the Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis (MDA) which was according to Lachenbruch, (1975) was: 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑0 + 𝑑1𝜒𝑖1 + 𝑑2𝜒𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝑑𝑛𝜒𝑖𝑛 
MDA as a modelling technique had a number of advantages that made it appealing 
to researchers. It can discriminate between distinct populations, allowing it to 
distinguish between two different population outcomes (failure and non-failure) by 
using linear combinations of variables (Taffler, 1983). Moreover, MDA is relatively 
easy to use, making it an appealing solution to academics and risk professionals. 
It can also work with relatively small samples. In addition, the failure prediction 
accuracy results presented in the literature are adequate. In fact, Balcaen and 
Ooghe (2006) argued that MDA was the most popular application in the failure 
prediction literature. However, MDA has also a number of disadvantages. MDA’s 
assumption on the multivariate normal distribution of variables is quite strong and 
frequently violated in the applied failure research (Deakin, 1976; Taffler and 
Tisshaw, 1977) increasing the risk of producing biased error estimates (Eisenbeis, 
1977).  However, Lachenbruch (1975) demonstrated that the MDA estimations can 
be practically robust regardless of the violation in the assumptions. A limitation of 
the MDA technique is that it discriminates between binary outcomes which are 
usually two extreme business cases such as failure and non-failure. MDA examples 
in the literature have been applied in a cross-sectional data specification only. 
However, within the firm failure literature logistic regression applications largely 
replaced the MDA due to enhanced performance when larger datasets became 
available. 
 
Ohlson (1980) provided the first empirical evidence that used logistical regression 
(logit) in a pooled data sample to predict firm failure. Logit applications need larger 
data samples than, for example multiple discriminant analysis, something that was 
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becoming gradually possible due to advances in technology and data availability. 
The advantages of the logit method is that it gives a probability of an outcome 
(such as failure) without strong assumptions of prior probabilities of failure or strict 
assumptions on the distribution of predictors.  Typically, logit models (in their basic 
form) assume a binary outcome in the dependent variable, although multinomial 
applications can also be applicable. In any case the dependent variable outcomes 
should be non-overlapping and discrete. 
 
On the other hand, logit applications are more sensitive to multicollinearity. This 
characteristic can provide challenges when financial ratios are the main 
independent variables because they tend to have some degree of correlation with 
each other. In addition, the larger datasets that the logit applications require tend 
to generate some issues associated with the sample selection.  These are related 
to the inclusion of disproportionate numbers of failed firms in the sample. This 
issue is referred to as “choice-based sample bias” or “oversampling” (Zmijewski, 
1984). Over-sampling affects both logit and probit coefficients (Dietrich, 1984). 
However, evidence suggests that the above characteristics of logit applications do 
not reduce materially the performance of such models in the context of firm failure 
prediction (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Zmijewski, 1984). The sampling bias 
however, is not relevant in studies that analyze the determinants of firms’ failure 
but instead for those that deal with failure prediction. Therefore it can be argued 
that it is not a limitation in such studies. The overall capability of logit models has 
been proved through their continuous popularity as they are still used extensively 
in research studies. Most of the applications of logit techniques has been associated 
with cross sectional data structures and this continues to be the case to a large 
extend.  
3.4.2 Factor Analysis and Cluster Analysis 
 
The combination of factor analysis and cluster analysis has been the most 
frequently used analytical tool in quantitative firm failure process studies (see for 
example Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen and Lukason, 2014; Laitinen et al., 2014; 
Laitinen et al., 2015; Lukason and Laitinen, 2016; Lukason, 2018). This is because 
this combination allows a number of firm-specific characteristics, observed over 
time, to be regrouped into smaller set of variables (the factors). 
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Most of the assumptions around the use of factor analysis are conceptual as 
opposed to purely statistical (Hair et al., 2006). In that context, the researcher 
assumes that some underlying structure exists in the set of the selected variables 
that will enter the factor analysis. Previous research in the area of firm failure 
processes provides evidence that this can be done by utilizing characteristics that 
have been associated with failure, in wider firm failure studies. In addition, the 
qualitative firm failure literature does provide the conceptual structure on which 
quantitative research can be based (see for example Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008). 
In addition, the underlying sample that is used for the purposes of factor analysis 
should be homogeneous with regards to the potential factor structure (Hair et al., 
2006). In quantitative firm failure process studies this typically happens by only 
utilizing failed firms. However, this is conceptually valid because the failure process 
of any firm requires the firm to fail eventually. 
 
From a statistical point of view, departures from normality, homoscedasticity and 
linearity have limited application in factor analysis if the conceptual requirements 
for the variables that are included exist (Hair et al., 2006). However, the variables 
included in factor analysis need to be intercorrelated to some extent (Hair et al., 
2006) and for that reason Chapters 5 and 6 perform correlation and partial 
correlation analyses. Additional tests like the Bartlett test of sphericity was used 
to statistically assess if the levels of correlations among the variables are adequate 
for the factor analysis to proceed. In firm failure process studies, some correlation 
between the variables that enter the factor analysis exists partly because a number 
of lags of each variable are included in the analysis (see for example Laitinen et 
al., 2014; Laitinen, 1991). This is useful because the firm failure process evolves 
across a number of years thus this information should be included in the factors.  
 
Once the conceptual framework is determined and the correlations are assessed, 
one has to decide on the criteria that will be used to extract the factors. The latent 
root criterion is the most commonly used technique in factor analysis (Hair et al., 
2006). Under this criterion, each factor should at least account the variance of a 
single variable, in order to be retained in the analysis (Hair et al., 2006). For this 
reason an eigenvalue criterion by means of the Kaiser test (Kaiser, 1960), is 
employed in the analysis. In such cases, only factors with eigenvalues above 1 
should be allowed to return to the second step of the factor analysis which is the 
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VARIMAX rotation. The rotation of the factors is useful because it simplifies the 
factor structure. Subsequently, factor scores obtained from the analysis above are 
standardized and uncorrelated. These are useful characteristics which enable the 
use of cluster analysis after the factors are scored based on their factor loading 
(Hair et al., 2006). 
 
The factor scores are subsequently used as inputs to the cluster analysis. Cluster 
analysis is able to classify objects into groups that share similar characteristics. In 
particular, a partition cluster analysis approach can be employed due to its 
characteristic of breaking any observations into a number of non-overlapping 
groups. K-medians and k-means are two similar processes that are used to 
calculate the clusters. The methods differ in the estimation of the “centre” of the 
cluster. The k-medians uses the median while the k-means uses the mean (Whelan 
et al., 2015).  Cluster analysis also requires stopping rules which are used to 
identify the number of clusters. There is no evidence supporting any particular 
stopping rule from the many that are available (Hair et al., 2006). One of the most 
well-known partitioning criteria is the Calinski and Harabasz (1974) index 
(Vendramin et al., 2010).  It will be used in this research to define the appropriate 
number of clusters. 
 
The Calinski and Harabasz (1974) Pseudo-F formula is defined as follows: 
 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝐵)/(𝑔−1)
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑊)/(𝑁−𝑔)
 
Where B is the in-between clusters sum of squares and W is the within clusters 
sum of squares; g is the number of groups and N is the number of observations.  
 
3.4.3 Cross-Section Logistic Regression Models 
 
As discussed in sections 2.4.1 and 3.4.1, the logistic regression has been a popular 
analytical tool with its binary form in firm failure studies. Although one of  the main 
analytical tools for this study is the panel data ordered regression at firm-year 
observations, the key properties of the simple logistic regression and of its ordered 
logistic regression extension are presented as this methodology can be used as a 
baseline benchmark on firm-level results. 
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The logistic regression model with the traditional binary dependent variable 
specification has been used extensively in applications where the outcome from 
the dependent variable lies between 0 and 1. As it was discussed in Section 3.3, 
this binary classification does not mean that the numbers itself have a particular 
interpretation; it is the attributes attached to them that matter. Logistic Regression 
(logit) models have been particularly popular in the literature. One can broadly 
argue that logit effectively replaced multiple discriminant analysis as the 
benchmarking technique in the failure prediction literature while it has also been 
particularly popular in non-prediction studies.  
 
The logistic regression model (logit) is able to estimate probabilities that are 
between the 0 and 1 threshold, which is a traditional weakness of the ordinary 
least squares estimated linear regression model. In the firm failure literature 0 is 
usually used to denote the non-failed firms and 1 to denote the failed firms. Some 
of the key advantages of the logistic regression model is that it is relatively easy 
to implement, it does not make any assumptions on the multivariate normality and 
the equality of variance, and covariance between the groups that are analyzed 
while its statistical tests are easy to be implemented (Hair et al., 2006). The logistic 
function effectively transforms the traditional regression model, which limits its 
outcomes to be bounded within the (0,1) interval (Brooks, 2008). 
 
The form of the logistic model would be  
𝑃𝑖 =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛽1+𝛽2𝜒2𝑖+⋯+𝛽𝑘𝜒𝑘𝑖+𝑢𝑖)
 
Where the Pi is the probability, and e is the exponential number. Using the firm 
failure studies as an example, P will be the probability that a firm fails and the 𝜒s 
in the parenthesis of the denominator represent potential determinants of the firm 
failure and u is the error term. 
 
The logit model is, therefore, not a linear model, and as a result the maximum 
likelihood estimator is usually used for its interpretation. The principle for the 
maximum likelihood estimator is that the parameters are chosen to jointly 
maximise the log-likelihood function (Brooks, 2008), which means that the logistic 
regression aims to maximise the likelihood that an event occurs (Hair et al., 2006). 
In order to assess the goodness of fit of a logit model one can examine the 
predictive accuracy of the model (Hair et al., 2006). The likelihood value is the 
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best measure of how well the model fits the data but pseudo 𝑅2 measures can also 
be used.  For the likelihood value, a perfect model will, in theory, be the one with 
the lower -2 log likelihood where the minimum value of -2LL is 0 which corresponds 
to the perfect fit (Hair et al., 2006). In order to assess the accuracy of the model 
one can use the classification matrix which measures how well the allocation to a 
specific group has been done by the model (for example allocation between failed 
and non-failed group of companies).  
 
The principles that apply to the binary logistic regression models can be 
generalised to apply to the ordered logistic regression models.  In the corporate 
failure literature Johnsen and Melicher (1994) and Tsai (2013) are examples of the 
few studies that have used an ordered response logit model. These studies 
suggested that between the non-failed firms and the liquidated firms, there is an 
important interim stage of firms in financial distress that is not captured in a binary 
specification and therefore significant information around the determinants of the 
three stages of the firms is lost. 
 
A key advantage of the ordered logistic regression is that it can accommodate 
more than two outcomes and therefore it can enable the researcher to explain 
cases that fall between the two outcomes of the binary classification. It is 
important to note that in the ordered logistic regression there is no assumption 
around the spacing between the responses (Harrell, 2015). This means that in 
cases of the potential outcome takes the value of 0, 1 and 2, there is no assumption 
that the distance between 0 and 1 is the same as is between 1 and 2.  Despite this 
notion, whereas in the binary model we can observe that 𝑦𝑖 = 1 when 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0, the 
ordered response logit model needs to generalise this concept to introduce multiple 
thresholds for the alternative states of the dependent variable (Baum, 2006). For 
example, when there are three potential outcomes in the dependent variable we 
will have two thresholds over the variable.  The generalisation of this notion is: 
 𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟(𝐾𝜄−1 < 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢𝑗 < 𝐾𝑖). 
 
This means that the probability of an individual 𝑗 takes outcome 𝑖 depends on the 
𝑥𝑖𝛽 falling between the cutpoints (𝑖 − 1) and 𝑖. This represents the generalisation 
with regards to the dependent variable from the binary model when it has one 
threshold at zero (Baum, 2006). 
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3.4.4 Panel Data Logistic Regressions 
 
Relatively recently, there has been a growing interest around the use of panel data 
structures in the literature. The nature of panel data and its structure made it 
appealing since they are able to incorporate the time dynamics that are particularly 
helpful in failure studies which are related to the macroeconomic and business 
environment. In the failure prediction literature, panel data analysis was applied 
in the context of duration models with a binary outcome. For example, Shumway 
(2001) argued the panel structure could produce superior performance. Similarly, 
Nam et al., (2008) successfully used panel structures to get very strong results in 
terms of the model’s performance. Nam et al., (2008) in particular presented 
evidence that the panel approach outperformed a similar (in variables) cross-
sectional logit application. However, one should note that these panel applications 
were based on duration (also known as hazard) models. 
 
The determinants of firm failure literature (without the prediction element) also 
broadly followed similar quantitative techniques although with less emphasis on 
duration techniques. Bridges and Guariglia (2008) allowed for a panel logit 
specification while panel probit applications were also tested. They found no 
significant differences in the estimations. In other specifications of panel data, the 
discussion of the choice of panel data analysis techniques ranges between fixed 
effects and random effects models. Pindado and Rodrigues (2004) argued that in 
failure studies there is no clear answer on the choice between fixed-effects and 
random effects models. They opted for both specifications but found no evidence 
of material differences in the reported results between the two.   
 
3.4.4.1 Key characteristics 
Panel data analysis is used in situations where we have both cross sectional and 
time series data. Panel data can accommodate a large number of observations (for 
example firms or individuals) over multiple periods and therefore they 
accommodate both space and time (Brooks, 2008). For example, a sample of panel 
data may represent multiple observations on the same firms’ failure situation over 
a period of years.  In order for panel data methods to be applicable, a dataset 
should have the same objects (in this case firms) and measurement across time. 
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Panel data models may be based on balanced or unbalanced panels.  Balanced is 
a panel when each unit (for example firms) is present in every time period across 
the sample, while unbalanced means each unit is not present in every time period 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2010). The mechanics of the balanced and unbalanced 
models are similar but a careful assessment of why the panel is unbalanced is 
required. 
 
There are a number of advantages associated with the use of panel data analysis. 
Panel data is similar to pooled data where observations from the same units from 
different points in time are pooled together in a single dataset. However, when the 
parameters of a model are estimated by ordinary least square regressions, it is 
assumed that two aspects remain constant over time and across the cross-section. 
The first is the average value of the variables; the second is the relationships 
between them (Brooks, 2008). This is an oversimplified assumption that does not 
hold. 
 
Panel data are related to units’ (for example, individuals, firms’, counties) 
observations over time and can control the heterogeneity associated with these 
units (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). This important feature enables the researcher 
to effectively control for unobserved variables that are specific to the unit. For 
example, when modeling firm failure with financial variables as independent 
variables, the problem will be for the model to account unobservable factors that 
affect a firm such as managerial capability, etc. Therefore any results from a cross-
sectional analysis may be biased due to the lack of information on an unobservable 
variable. Panel data models are able to control for unobservable variables (also 
known as latent variables) by introducing fixed or random effects for each unit (in 
the example’s case, in each firm) of the sample.  In addition, panel data can 
capture effects that cannot be observed in pure cross-sectional data or in pure 
time series data alone. 
 
The combination of cross-section observations with time series, gives “more 
informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees 
of freedom and more efficiency” (Guajarati and Porter, 2009, p.592). Baltagi 
(2001) suggests that the variability in a panel can be separated into variation 
between different cross-sectional units and variability within each unit. Likewise, 
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by studying the repeated cross-section of observations, panel data can capture the 
changing dynamics in the data (Guajarati and Porter, 2009). 
 
In terms of limitations, panel data may be difficult to collect and manage due to 
the need of a rich cross-sectional with time series sample.  Many of the limitations 
are related to the data collection in surveys. These problems include issues of non-
response in surveys or problems with insufficient coverage of the population of 
interest (Baltagi, 1995).  Typically, panels cover a relatively short period of time 
in their time-series element for each unit. This means that the analysis is based 
on the number of units participating in the sample. Extending the time-series 
element of the sample may be costly. Likewise, the problem of attrition, where 
units are leaving the sample at some point may be relevant to panel data. This 
may be of significance if there is an unobservable reason why this is actually 
happening (Baltagi, 1995). In order to overcome this problem, we can assume 
random sampling in the cross-section dimension.  
 
3.4.4.2 Panel Data and the Ordered Response Logit 
One of the advantages that panel data models have is their treatment of 
unobserved variables. This is called unobserved heterogeneity. The treatment of 
these unobserved effects in a panel model can be done either by using a fixed 
effects or random effects treatment. 
 
According to Wooldridge (2010), a basic unobserved effects model for a randomly 
chosen cross section unit 𝑖 can be written as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡 = 1, 2 … . , 𝑇 
Where, 𝑖 represents an individual (for example a firm) and 𝑡 indicates the period 
(for example, the year); 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is 1×Κ, and can contain observable variables that 
change across 𝑡 but not across  𝑖; variables that change across 𝑖 but not across 𝑡 
and variables that change across both 𝑖  and 𝑡. The 𝑢𝑖𝑡 in the equation above are 
called idiosyncratic errors or idiosyncratic disturbances because they change 
across 𝑡  and 𝑖. The 𝑐𝑖 in the equation above is the unobserved heterogeneity 
element, also known as individual effect. The discussion on whether a panel model 
is a fixed effects model or a random effects model is related to the treatment of 
the individual effect. 
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The broad direction is that 𝑐𝑖 should be treated as a random effect when 𝑐𝑖 is viewed 
as a random variable and as a fixed effects when it is treated as a parameter to 
be estimated for each cross-sectional observation. A random effects framework 
means that the 𝑐𝑖   should experience zero correlation between itself and any of the 
observed explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2010). However, for the fixed effects 
treatment, the 𝑐𝑖 is allowed to be correlated with the observed independent 
variables. In every case the potential existence of non-time varying independent 
variables points to the usage of random effects panel models. 
 
Due to the importance of the choice between fixed and random effects treatment 
for the individual heterogeneity, the Hausman test can be applied in linear panel 
models. The Hausman test is based on the difference between fixed and random 
effects estimates. However, there are limitations on the potential applicability of 
the Hausman test. 
o The assumption of strict exogeneity. That means that 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑐𝑖) =
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑐𝑖)=𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖. 
When this assumption holds we say that the independent variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are 
strictly exogenous conditional on the unobserved effect 𝑐𝑖 (Wooldridge, 
2010). Given the equation 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 the strict exogeneity 
assumption can also be stated in terms of the idiosyncratic errors as: 
𝐸(𝑢𝑡|𝑥𝑖1, … 𝑥𝑖𝑇𝑐𝑖) = 0 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇. This implies that the individual effect and 
the idiosyncratic disturbance are uncorrelated. Moreover, this implies in 
turn, that independent variables in each period are uncorrelated with the 
idiosyncratic error in each period and therefore 𝐸(𝑥′𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑠, 𝑡 =
1,2, , 𝑇 (Wooldridge, 2010). 
o Since the fixed effects identify the coefficients on time-varying explanatory 
variables, we cannot compare fixed effects with random effects on time-
constant variables.  
o Assumes homoscedastic behaviour of the individual effect. 
 
Despite the above, evidence from the failure literature shows that it is sometimes 
difficult in practice to discriminate between fixed effects and random effects 
models. Pindado (2004) argued that using both specifications can produce similar 
results. The above panel data model characteristics are particularly applicable in 
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linear models, such as the ones that will be used in spatial analysis, but are less 
relevant to non-linear models such as ordered logistic regression.  
 
For panel ordered logistic regressions, Greene and Hensher (2010) proposed a test 
for the choice between fixed and random effects when the time invariant variables 
are excluded from the model. It is based on a likelihood ratio test and can be used 
instead of the Hausman test (Greene and Hensher, 2010). This test has two steps: 
i. First, a random effects model with the time varying independent variables 
should be used. A second model containing the same variables and 
additionally including the group means of the variables should be employed. 
The purpose of the means is to control the correlation between individual 
effects and the independent variables. Therefore, the group mean of 
variables should account the correlation between the individual effect and 
the regressors (Greene and Hensher, 2010).  
ii. Second, a likelihood ratio test should be carried out as a variable addition 
test of joint significance of the group means. Specifically, the estimates of 
the two models with and without the group means of the time-varying 
variables should be compared with the likelihood ratio, on the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the means are all zero. If this null 
hypothesis is rejected then the fixed effect approach should be undertaken. 
If such a correlation does not exist then the random effects model should 
be appropriate (Greene and Hensher, 2010). 
 
3.4.5 Spatial Panel Regressions 
 
The advantages of introducing a spatial effects into a panel data model are related 
to the likelihood that the units (such as countries, regions) differ in geographical 
backgrounds, with unobserved variables that are space-specific and time-
invariant. These are hard to measure but may affect the dependent variable 
(Elhorst, 2014). Such examples include variations in culture/people across 
different areas, or different social interactions and behavioral norms between 
individuals in different places. For panel data, spatial panel analysis may be 
relatively complicated as it usually requires inclusion of location metrics (such as 
geographical co-ordinates).  
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Spatial panel data have the same distinctions with the panel data as far as the 
panel element is considered, with the choice between fixed or random effects 
models. However, there are also distinctions regards to the treatment of the spatial 
element. Some of these restrictions have implications on the fixed and random 
effects selection. Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2008) considered the estimation of spatial 
panel data models using both fixed and random effects specifications, and propose 
a Hausman-type specification test to test for the nature of the individual effect. 
However, Elhorst (2004) argued that fixed effects spatial panels can only be 
meaningfully estimated when the time element is sufficiently large. On the other 
hand, a random effects model does not have this requirement.  
 
There are mainly two key categories on the types of spatial dependence, with some 
further variations. Spatial dependencies may lie on the disturbances (known as the 
spatial error model - SEM) or on the dependent variable, known as a spatial lag or 
spatial autoregression model (SAR) (LeSage and Pace, 2011; Anselin, et al., 2008; 
Coughlin et al., 2003). In spatial model specifications, the dependent variable 
and/or the error terms are correlated across space (Coughlin et al., 2003).  Anselin 
et al., (2008) suggest that the spatial lag model is appropriate when the focus of 
the analysis is on the assessment of the existence and the strength of the spatial 
interaction. The spatial error model on the other hand, is appropriate when the 
aim of the analysis is to correct the potential biases arising from spatial 
autocorrelation due to the usage of spatial data.  
 
For the estimation of spatial panels there is not a widely acceptable estimation 
method.  While in theory a spatial panel can be estimated in a similar way to a 
cross-sectional or any linear panel model, collecting data in that way may result in 
loss of information around the spatial effects (Elhorst, 2014). There are broadly 
three methods to estimate models that account for mixed dynamics in space and 
time (Elhorst, 2014). The first method is to bias-correct the maximum likelihood 
(ML) or quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimator (Elhorst, 2014). The second 
method is based on instrumental variables or generalized method of moments 
(IV/GMM). The third method utilizes the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) approach (Elhorst, 2014). Although there are considerable debates over 
the choice of the best estimator for spatial panel logistic regression, some authors 
argue that despite the computational heaviness that is requested under a 
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maximum likelihood estimator, this is an efficient estimator that has been popular 
both in cross-section logistic regressions as well as in panel logistic regressions. 
Therefore, for comparability purposes, the maximum likelihood estimator will be 
used in this study. 
 
Pinkse and Slade (1998), Kelejian and Prucha (1998), and Klier and McMillen 
(2008) proposed a Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) as a robust estimator. 
However, the correct application of GMM requires orthogonality conditions that are 
not easily applicable to multiple-response models (Wang et al., 2012). Bayesian 
frameworks have also been proposed in the wider literature (Wang et al., 2012) 
but with few applications in the firm failure area due to the complexities and the 
subjectivity of applying such techniques. In particular Bayesian applications have 
been criticized for the subjective elements of the Bayesian inference (Gelman, 
2008). 
 
3.5. Quantitative Approaches used in this Study 
 
The aim of this study is to enhance the quantitative firm failure process literature 
on SMEs, by incorporating elements from the qualitative failure process and the 
wider firm failure literature. 
 
To achieve this aim , a number of different techniques will be used. First, factor 
and cluster analysis will be performed to identify the alternative firm failure 
processes in firms from the EU countries and within the UK regions. Secondly, 
panel data ordered logistic regression will be used to investigate the determinants 
of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes, both in the 
EU countries and within the UK regions. Finally, linear spatial panel data analysis 
will be used to investigate the potential existence of spatial effects between firm 
failure processes in the EU countries and within the UK regions. Such a technique 
is used for the first time in the quantitative firm failure process literature and the 
wider SME failure literature. For this reason the hypotheses associated with this 
are introduced in this chapter. A number of associated statistical tests are also 
performed prior to these techniques. The statistical tests are discussed in each 
individual empirical chapter. 
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i) Factor and Cluster Analysis 
Factor and cluster analysis will be used to identify the alternative firm failure 
processes that are present in EU and UK firms, using a number of firm-specific 
characteristics proposed in the literature. This is associated with the main aim of 
the study and the first/second objectives. It considers financial ratios and the 
impact of firms’ management characteristics to identify alternative firm failure 
processes in the EU and the UK. It also investigates the determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure in the EU and the UK. The combination of factor and cluster 
analysis has been selected as a way to identify firm failure processes (Laitinen, 
1991; Lukason and Hoffman, 2014; Lukason and Laitinen, 2016; Laitinen et al., 
2014).  
 
Factor analysis is a technique whose purpose is “to define the underlying structure 
among the variables in the analysis” (Hair et al., 2006, p.104). In this thesis, factor 
analysis is used to summarize the firm specific-characteristics to reduce the 
number of variables that enter the cluster analysis process.  Cluster analysis will 
then be used identify the alternative firm failure processes for the firms in the EU 
countries and the UK regions.  
 
ii) Panel Data Ordered Regression 
Panel data ordered regression models will be used to investigate the determinants 
of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes. This will 
enable the thesis to address part of its aim which is to identify the determinants 
of firms’ transition towards failure. Moreover, panel ordered regressions will assist 
in addressing the second and third objectives related to the impact of firms’ 
management characteristics (in addition to the financial ratios), and the influence 
of business environment and excessive growth in firms’ transition to failure. 
 
The advantages of panel data analysis in business finance and firm failure studies 
are well documented in the literature as discussed in section 3.4.4. However, there 
has been limited work undertaken to identify the determinants of firms’ transition 
to failure in the quantitative firm failure process studies. Panel data can add value 
by controlling the existence of individual heterogeneity between firms. In addition, 
the traditional logistic regression based on cross sectional data remains one of the 
most popular techniques in firm failure studies (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006).  
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Results from simple ordered regression without the panel element will be used as 
benchmark for robustness checking purposes. One should note that the majority 
of the firm failure studies use binary definitions for the dependent variable (usually 
within the context of logistic regression). As it was explained in Section 3.3, this 
study uses ordered logistic regression in panel and spatial panel contexts. 
 
iii) Linear Spatial Panel Analysis 
The aim of the third empirical chapter (Chapter 7) is associated with the fourth 
objective of this study. In particular, it employs spatial panel data analysis to 
investigate the impact of spatial location in aggregated firm failures from the 
sample.  
 
The quantitative approach that is chosen is a linear spatial panel model. The 
theoretical advantage of this approach is associate with the advantages of spatial 
data in general. Spatial panel data account for potentially spatially correlated 
disturbances (across European countries and U.K. countries/regions) in addition to 
the normal time wise correlation (Arnold and Wied, 2014).   
 
The usage of spatial econometric techniques has seen growing interest within 
economic studies because these models introduce a different angle to the analysis 
of relationships between agents. In fact, the focus is shifted from the individual 
agent (in this case the firm) where decisions are made in isolation to an approach 
where the interaction between agents matters (Anselin, 1999; Diggle, 2013). 
Wang et al. (2012) argued that spatial data are particularly relevant for economic-
related studies, especially when considering different geographical locations. In an 
increasingly inter-connected economy the cross-sectional independence 
assumption between a sample’s observations (e.g. firms) is becoming less relevant 
(Wang et al., 2012). Similarly Cravo et al., (2014) showed the presence of spatial 
dependence in growth patterns on a sample of Brazilian SMEs. Likewise, spatial 
interactions could be due to competition between cross sectional units (in this case, 
businesses), business network issues, spill-overs of issues affecting firms’ failure, 
and regional issues (Kapoor et al., 2007). 
 
For the purpose of this study, the focus on the spatial effects will be at firm failure 
process in EU countries’ and the UK regions’ level. Firm failures are therefore 
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aggregated at the alternative firm failure processes of the EU countries and at the 
alternative firm failure processes of the UK regions. However, the focus of the 
spatial analysis (which is discussed in Chapter 7) is on the existence of spatial 
effects. As such this chapter introduces 2 hypotheses, with two variations each, 
which will be further investigated in Chapter 7: 
 
Hypothesis 13a: There are statistically significant spatial effects associated with 
EU firm failures. 
Hypothesis 13b: Spatial effects are the same between alternative firm failure 
processes in EU firms, in terms of statistical significance. 
 
Hypothesis 14a: There are statistically significant spatial effects associated with 
the UK firm failures. 
Hypothesis 14b: Spatial effects are the same between alternative firm failure 
processes in UK firms, in terms of statistical significance. 
 
In order to investigate and address the above hypotheses, a maximum likelihood 
estimator will be used, in line with STATA 15 procedures for spatial panel data 
analysis. In addition, the Greene and Hensher (2010) likelihood ratio test as well 
as the Hausman test for the existence of fixed or random effects will be employed. 
The model specification will include a spatial weights matrix and will control for 
spatial dependencies in the dependent variable and in the error terms. This 
approach is chosen because the study is interested in identifying the existence of 
spatial interaction in firm failures in the alternative firm failure processes. As such, 
Anselin et al., (2008) suggest that the spatial lag model is appropriate in that case. 
On the other hand, controlling for spatial effects in the residuals is also helpful for 
ensuring there is no bias arising from spatial autocorrelation resulting from the use 
of spatial data (Elhorst, 2014). In addition, a simple, non-spatial model will be 
used for robustness check purposes. 
 
3.6. Conclusions 
 
This Chapter discussed the key statistical techniques that have been used in the 
literature of firm failure studies. It also explains the rationale of methodologies 
that will be used in this thesis. Factor and Cluster Analysis, Ordered Panel Logistic 
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Regression and Spatial Panel Analysis will be the primary econometric techniques 
used to test this study’s hypotheses. These techniques are discussed further and 
are used in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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CHAPTER 4:  DATA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the sources of the data used in this study. The 
firms’ data have been sourced during 2014 – 2015 from the Amadeus (Bureau Van 
Dijk) database. They were then saved and analyzed in STATA 14 and subsequently 
STATA 15. Macroeconomic data for the EU countries have been collected from the 
World Bank database (http://data.worldbank.org/) in 2016. Some additional 
macroeconomic data for the UK regions were obtained from the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS), over the same period. Further discussion and analysis of these 
data is presented in the relevant sections of Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
The remaining of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the 
process and the criteria of the data collection; Section 4.3 discusses the dependent 
variable; Section 4.4 presents the independent variables; Section 4.5 discusses 
the missing values and Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Firm Dataset creation 
 
The firm-specific data for this study were sourced from the Amadeus database. 
The Amadeus database provides multi-year information for the financial accounts, 
the directors’ characteristics and the date of the status of the company. The year 
of the financial information was used to match the financial accounts data with the 
directors’ information and the date of the status of the firm.  
 
At the time of the data collection, the Amadeus database included financial and 
directors’ characteristics from the last 10 years. As a result  firms’ data covering 
the period from 2004 to 2013 were available and formed the data period of the 
study. Status information (and date) for the firms covers year 2014. This was the 
maximum number of years that was available from the database. However, this 
period is useful for the purpose of the study for a number of reasons. It covers a 
business cycle that includes a financial crisis. As a result, a satisfactory number of 
firm failures was recorded in the database. The vast majority of firms started to 
enter liquidation from 2008 onwards. In addition, due to the changes in the 
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economic environment over this period, the dataset allows a number of hypotheses 
around the business, economic and legal traditions environment to be tested. 
Moreover, this is one of the longest periods that has been covered in quantitative 
firm failure process studies. 
 
The data collection for the firms used in this study used a multi-step process to 
select a sample that would be able to support the aim and objectives of the thesis.  
The data needed to include failed SMEs from a wide range of EU countries that 
would be of sufficient diversity in order to cover different business and economic 
environments, including legal traditions (see Chapter 2 for discussion). For these 
reasons the following steps were taken: 
 
 The first step was to identify failed firms in the Amadeus database. This was 
achieved by using the relevant field selection in the database. This selection 
used the legal definition of “failure” that includes firms in liquidation (active 
and non-active), in receivership, or under bankruptcy. Each of the 
participating countries has slightly different legal terminology for the firms 
that are in a terminal stage of their business cycle. The Amadeus database 
provides the appropriate terminology. For the purpose of this study, 
receivership, liquidation and bankruptcy are deemed as equivalent legal 
statuses in nature and are considered as the terminal stage of firm failure. 
The status of the firms is identified from the relevant (status) field of the 
Amadeus database. Firms “in liquidation”, “in receivership”, “in bankruptcy” 
(active or dissolved) and firms under insolvency proceedings are classified 
as liquidated (status 2) for the purposes of this study, in line with other 
studies in the area (see for example Filipe et al., 2016). The approach of 
using the legal definition as a failure definition is consistent with other firm 
failure studies (see for example Charitou et al., 2004). For any firm to be 
eligible for selection and download from Amadeus, it should have at least 
one year’s data prior to the liquidation date in order to have some pre-
insolvency information for the identification of the failure processes. By 
using liquidation status dates firm data are matched with the status of the 
firms at the t-1 year (one year prior to the insolvency date) in line with 
Laitinen et al., (2014) and Appiah (2013).   
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 The second step was to identify firms whose size was within the SME 
definition. The choice of firms from the various countries were selected to 
have less than (or equal to) €43m in total assets or less than €50m turnover, 
in line with the European Union (EU) definition (European Commission, 
2015). The selection of firms is not based on the maximum number of 
employees (which is a further EU criterion for SMEs having up to 250 
employees) as this criterion is not always disclosed for all firms (Laitinen et. 
al., 2014). In order to comply always with at least one of the above criteria, 
total assets have been identified as a variable that is always available in all 
the firms of the sample and does not have any missing values. Therefore 
the total assets of a firm being up to or less that €43m always applies. 
 
 
 The third step was to filter out firms which had all of their financial and 
director information values missing (see section 4.5 for missing values).  
 
 The fourth step was to keep only countries that had at least 100 firms in the 
sample once the filtering process decribed above had been completed. The 
selected minimum number of firms from each country matches or exceeds 
the average number of failed firms that typical firm failure process studies  
use (see for example Laitinen et al., 2014) and it is regarded as a sufficient 
sample in this type of studies. 
 
The countries that resulted with firms that complied with the above selection 
process were the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Ireland and 
France.  A review of these countries demonstrates that their selection fulfils the 
diversity criteria for the business and economic environment. The UK and Ireland 
are under the common law legal tradition whilst the other countries in the sample 
are under the civil law legal tradition. Within the civil law tradition all the major 
distinctions (French, German and Scandinavian) are represented (see section 
4.4.6). Likewise, the economies of these countries are diverse in terms of their 
GDP growth and credit availability in the period that this study covers. For 
example, some countries such as Ireland, Italy and Spain had a more pronounced 
GDP reduction in 2008-2009 compared to countries such as Germany and Sweden. 
Similarly, the credit availability (as a percentage of GDP) differs significantly 
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between these countries. For example Ireland’s, Germany’s, Spain’s, Netherland’s, 
Sweden’s and UK’s credit availability to private sector reduced after 2009. By 
contrast, Italy’s and France’s credit availability (as a percentage of GDP) increased 
after 2009 and started deceasing in 2013. The resultant 8 countries compare 
favourably with current evidence in the quantitative firm failure process literature. 
A number of studies tends to focus on one country (see for example, Lukason, 
2018; Lukason et al., 2015). From the few studies that perfrom a multi-country 
comparison, most compare between 2 and 6 countries (see for example, Laitinen 
et al., 2014; Laitinen and Lukason, 2014), and the exceptions which investigate 
more than 6 countries point to the fact that some countries are represented with 
less that 100 firms and as such they focus on the countries that have sufficient 
representation in the sample (see for example Lukason and Laitinen, 2016). 
 
As a result, the sample of this study provides an improvement over samples that 
have been used in the existing quantitative firm failure process literature. In 
addition, the composition of the 8 countries in the sample varies from the current 
literature and as such, the sample extends the quantitative firm failure process 
comparison within EU countries, where the evidence is currently insufficient.  The 
Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Ireland are currently examples of EU countries 
whose firms have not been considered in the context of firm failure process studies. 
 
However, whilst the sample of firms from 8 EU countries with sufficient 
representation of firms in each country is an improvement over the current 
quantitative firm failure process literature, there is still a certain limitation 
associated with it. Generalization of results for every EU country should be made 
with caution, especially if the results show that there is an association between 
firm failure processes and countries. However, the key conclusions around the 
importance of the determinants should provide a good basis for further research 
(see Chapter 8 for further discussion). 
 
Once the sample was put together, following the steps described above,  an audit 
on missing values at firm level was performed. Some liquidated firms remained in 
the sample after the year of the liquidation event with all of their financial 
information missing. Thus years post-liquidation were removed from the sample if 
there was no financial information available. This is consistent with the panel data 
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structure where firms leave the dataset once they fail.  Therefore the final dataset 
covers 5,195 firms which have failed at some point during the period of the study. 
This makes a total of 40,122 firm-year observations. Table 4.1 provides 
information for the distribution of firms across the countries in the sample. Further 
details about the dataset used in this thesis are given in each of the empirical 
chapters. 
 
Table 4.1: Distribution of Firms in Each country  
 
One of the objectives of this study is to investigate the firm failure processes within 
the UK. In order to do so, a filter was applied to select the UK firms. Therefore, a 
sub-set of the 979 UK firms was created for Chapter 6. The area within the UK was 
identified by using the “region” filed in the Amadeus database. The definition of 
Amadeus “region” was then standardized according to the NUTS-1 definition. In 
order to do so, a mapping between the Amadeus’ “region” filed and the first level 
of the European Commission NUTS-1 identifier (for UK regions) was used. NUTS-
1 was initially defined with the EC No 1059/2003 and later had a number of 
amendments until its most recent (EC 2016/2066). This thesis uses the latest 
version of the NUTS-1 classification.  The distribution of UK firms in the regions 
(under the NUTS-1 definition) is shown in Table 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Number of Firms % 
France 774 14.90%
Germany 736 14.17%
Ireland 114 2.19%
Italy 1,245 23.97%
Netherlands 185 3.56%
Spain 1,042 20.06%
Sweden 120 2.31%
United Kingdom 979 18.85%
Total 5,195 100.00%
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Table 4.2: Distribution of Firms in UK region 
 
 
4.3 The Dependent Variable 
 
The sample of the study has been selected in a way that gives information on the 
year and firm’s status. A new variable called event_failure has been created to be 
the dependent variable for the study.   
 
The new firm-year variable (“event_failure”) is defined as follows: 
 
i) It takes the value “2” at the year when the status information of the firm is 
classified as in liquidation/bankruptcy/receivership.  As mentioned above, 
this is matched with financial information from the year before, 
incorporating the t-1 rule of matching firms’ data with their status. That is 
consistent with other quantitative examples from the failure process studies 
(see for example Laitinen et al., 2014; Laitinen 1991) as well as with failure 
prediction studies (see for example Altman et al., 2010).  A firm which went 
into liquidation in 2013 will be marked as “2” in the event_failure in the year 
that is using 2012 financial data. Following Ferreira Filipe et al., (2014), the 
event_failure also takes the value “2” in the last observation with available 
financial data of a firm that is marked as “liquidated” or “bankrupt” before 
it leaves the sample, in cases where the status date is not available. For the 
UK areas Number of Firms % 
Yorkshire  & Humber 104 10.62%
East Anglia 41 4.19%
East Midlands 33 3.37%
London 369 37.69%
N. Ireland 20 2.04%
North East 17 1.74%
North West 153 15.63%
Scotland 54 5.52%
South East 74 7.56%
South West 25 2.55%
Wales 18 1.84%
West Midlands 71 7.25%
Total 979 100.00%
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years prior to a firm becoming liquidated (excluding the year t-1), 
event_failure takes the value of 0 or 1 (see following paragraph).  
 
ii) The study considers the financial distress as an additional “failure” status. 
The literature review section showed that firms in financial distress are 
defined as those which have negative equity in a year. Therefore, the 
event_failure variable takes the value of 1 for any year in which a firm is in 
negative equity and is not under event_failure status of 2. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the distribution of the newly defined event_failure variable across 
countries. The average time in the sample for any firm is 8.5 years.  
 
Table 4.3: Distribution of Firm- Year Observation across event_failure values.  
 
 
From Table 4.3, one can observe that the event_failure=2 matches the total 
number of firms. This is because once each firm eventually failed and left the 
sample in the following year, creating an unbalanced panel where the reason of 
firms leaving the sample is known. In addition, one can observe that, a number of 
firms enter the financial distress (event_failure=1) status. In some countries such 
as Ireland, Sweden, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK firms stay in 
financial distress for a year or more, on average. In other countries, such as Italy 
and Spain, not all firms enter the stage of financial distress.  
 
 
 
Country 0 1 2 Total
FRANCE 3,959 956 774 5,689
GERMANY 3,087 758 736 4,581
IRELAND 514 398 114 1,026
ITALY 7,420 768 1,245 9,433
NETHERLANDS 890 203 185 1,278
SPAIN 6,097 504 1,042 7,643
SWEDEN 606 140 120 866
UNITED KINGDOM 6,913 1,714 979 9,606
Total 29,486 5,441 5,195 40,122
Event_failure in Firm Year Observations
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4.4 Independent & Control Variables 
 
The study uses a number of independent variables based on the literature review 
and with data availability. The independent variables that are used in this study 
are broadly in three categories: 
i) Firm specific characteristics: the financial ratios, the age of the firm, 
directors’ characteristics. 
ii) Economic and Business Environment characteristics: the GDP and 
GVA growth, the credit availability, the legal tradition of each country and 
the percentage of new firms in a UK region. 
iii) Wider control variables: the industry, the location of the firm and the 
presence of excessive growth in firms. 
 
Firm specific characteristics are used for the identification of the alternative firm 
failure processes in the EU countries and the UK regions. Economic and Business 
environment characteristics, together with the wider control variables are used, in 
addition to the firm specific characteristics, to analyse the firms’ transition to 
failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
This chapter presents and defines the variables that are available from the sample 
and will be used to test the research hypotheses. The purpose of this chapter is 
not to provide specific analysis on any of these variables. This is done in the 
analysis chapters (Chapters 5-7). However, the source of the data is explained, 
where relevant.  
 
4.4.1  Financial Ratios 
 
The sample includes balance sheet and profit-loss account data that can be used 
to formulate financial ratios.  Different authors have proposed different financial 
ratios and the literature does not provide a definite answer to which ratios are the 
best to be used. However, financial theory suggests that the basic financial 
dimensions of growth, efficiency, profitability, cash flow, leverage and liquidity are 
important determinants of a firm’s financial performance and failure propensity 
(Laitinen et al., 2014; Laitinen 1991). Financial ratios that have been used in 
previous studies fall into the above categories.  
 125 | P a g e  
 
 
i) Return on Investment 
Return on Investment (ROI) belongs to the category of profitability ratios that 
measure the return earned by a firm in a period.  It is defined as profit (loss) 
before tax, divided by total assets (Robinson et al., 2009). Its inclusion in the 
analysis is motivated by Laitinen et al., (2014), Altman et al., (2010) and Pindado 
and Rodrigues (2004). The rationale for using the ratio is that firms should provide 
sufficient returns to their owners in order to remain viable.  
 
ii) Growth Rate in total assets 
Rate of growth in total assets (Growth_rate) is defined as the year on year 
percentage growth in a firm’s total assets. Its inclusion in the analysis is motivated 
by Laitinen et al (2014) and Argenti (1976). Growth rate has been one of the 
fundamental drivers in Argenti’s (1976) failure trajectories, it is also linked with 
the sustainable growth concept (see below).  
 
iii) Net Sales to Total Assets 
Net sales to total assets (NSTA) is motivated by Laitinen (1991) and Altman 
(1968). This is a capital turnover ratio that demonstrates a firm’s ability to 
generate sales from the given firm’s assets (Altman, 1968). 
 
iv) Cash Flow to sales ratio 
Cash flow to sales ratio (CFTS) has been one of Laitinen et al (2014) ratios and 
one of the first financial ratios that Beaver (1966) proposed. The motivation behind 
the consideration of the CFTS ratio is that a cash flow ratio shows the ability of the 
firm to build a cash buffer against any variations of cash inflows and outflows, and 
therefore the solvency of the firm can be defined in terms of the probability that 
this buffer may be insufficient leaving the firm unable to pay for its obligations 
(Beaver, 1966). 
 
v)  Total Liabilities to Total Assets 
An alternative definition in the literature has been the total liabilities (also known 
as total debt) to total assets (TLTA) ratio (Altman et al, 2010; Deakin, 1972; 
Shumway, 2001; Appiah, 2013). TLTA directly measures the total debt of a firm 
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compared to its total assets. Theory suggests that a firm’s indebtedness is a 
determinant of firms’ failure (Appiah, 2013).   
 
vi) Quick ratio & Quick Assets to Current Assets 
The quick ratio is a measure of a firm’s liquidity and its usage has been motivated 
by the work of Deakin (1972), Laitinen (1992) and Pindado and Rodrigues (2004). 
The quick ratio considers the cash available in a firm and the accounts receivable 
divided by the current liabilities of the firm. A similar in nature ratio has been used 
by Altman et al (2010) in the form of the quick assets to current assets (QACA) 
which reflects the working capital of the firm. 
 
vii) Trade Credit as a proportion of Total Liabilities 
Trade Credit to total liabilities (TCTL) is a measure of trade credit (as opposed to 
bank credit) as a percentage of the total debt of the firm. The rationale for including 
the TCTL ratio is to control for the usage of trade credit that firms use between 
countries as this is a source of credit that small firms rely on when bank credit is 
not available to them (Altman et al., 2010).  
 
4.4.2 The Age of the Firm 
 
The age of the firm (“firmage”) is a characteristic that has been associated with 
alternative firm failure processes in the qualitative failure process literature (see 
for example Argenti, 1976). Young firms, defined as those that are younger than 
10 years old (Wagner, 2004; Davidsson and Klofsten, 2003) are additionally 
regarded as more likely to fail (Fichman and Levinthall, 1991) and as such, the 
age of the firm can also be a determinant of firms’ transition to failure. 
 
4.4.3 Directors’ characteristics 
 
i) Measuring the Directors’ Experience: Age of directors  
The age (Avg_dir_age) has been used as a proxy of the experience of the 
management of the firm in a number of studies (see for example Zhao and Aram, 
1995; Watson, 2007). The dataset provides information for the number of directors 
and the age of each of them. For practical reasons the average age of directors is 
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used as the “Avg_dir_age” for each firm. This is calculated by summing the total 
age of all the directors of the firm and dividing it with the total number of directors. 
 
ii) Measuring the Directors’ Knowledge and Networks: The Number of 
directors  
The number of directors (“Total_Dir_Nr”) has been used as a proxy the for the 
social and human capital, the knowledge and range of business and social networks 
of the board in line with evidence in a number of studies (see for example Zhao 
and Aram, 1995; Watson, 2007). The dataset provides information about the 
number of directors for all the EU firms. The number of directors is checked and 
implies ownership in most firms.  This is consistent with the SME literature were 
firm directors are usually co-owners of the firm. Meanwhile, the UK firms are using 
a slightly wider definition of directors that may include directors without ownership 
of the firm. For this reason, a number of robustness checks are performed in 
Chapter 6. 
 
iii) Measuring Directors’ Diversity: Number of Female Directors 
The number of female directors (female_nr) have been used as an indicator of 
board gender diversity. The existence of a diverse board of directors in terms of 
sex (measured by the number and/or the existence of female directors) has been 
associated with fewer firm failures – even in the small firms (see for example 
Altanlar and Wilson, 2013). 
 
4.4.4 Macroeconomic Environment 
 
Two key metrics have been used to control for the economic environment in the 
EU firms. These are the GDP growth and the credit availability to the private sector 
expressed as a percentage of a country’s GDP. In addition, for the UK firms, GVA 
growth has been used because of its advantage of being available at regional (as 
opposed to country) level. According to the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
the GVA plus taxes and less subsidies on products is equivalent to gross domestic 
product (GDP) (ONS, 2016, pp. 2). GDP growth (GDP_Growth) and credit available 
to the private sector information have been collected from the World Bank 
database and covers all countries in the sample. GVA growth has been obtained 
from the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS).  
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Including these variables will enable this analysis to evaluate, for the first time in 
a quantitative firm failure process study, the effects of the macroeconomic 
environment on firms’ transition to failure. GDP growth as a key macroeconomic 
variable has been used in Casten et al. (2010) (for corporate defaults) and credit 
availability has been cited by a number of authors as a trigger of small firms’ failure 
(see for example Somoza, 2011). Credit availability is expressed as a percentage 
of a country’s GDP. In particular, it is defined as the credit available to the private 
sector divided by a country’s GDP. In addition, for the analysis of UK firms’ 
transition to failure (including the spatial analysis), the GVA growth at regional 
level has been used instead of the GDP growth for robustness checks (in Chapter 
6) and for the spatial analysis (Chapter 7).  
 
4.4.5 Industry 
 
The sample provides information for the sector of the firm (“gensic”) by using the 
US SIC code classification. The classification available in the sample includes the 
division level and the more granular group-code level. Table 4.4 presents the 
distribution of EU firms for each industry classification. 
 
Table 4.4: Description of industry variables and number of failed EU firms in each 
industrial classification. 
 
 
As Table 4.4 shows, firms tend to be concentrated around the manufacturing, 
construction, wholesale trade, finance, insurance and real estate and other 
services sectors. Most of the firms in category gensic 8 (finance, insurance, real 
estate) tend to be real estate agents and brokers as opposed to finance firms as 
the criteria on size of SMEs does not allow for any financial institutions to 
participate in the sample.   
US SIC code at division level Group Codes Var. Name Nr. Of firms Percentage
Division A: Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 01-09 gensic 1 243 4.7%
Division B: Mining 10-14 gensic 2 16 0.7%
Division C: Construction 15-19 gensic 3 912 17.6%
Division D: Manufacturing 20-39 gensic 4 1,074 20.7%
Division E: Transportation, Comm. & Sanitary Services40-49 gensic 5 403 7.8%
Division F: Wholesale Trade 50-51 gensic 6 841 16.2%
Division G: Retail Trade 52-59 gensic 7 271 5.2%
Division H: Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate 60-67 gensic 8 669 12.9%
Division I: Services 70-89 gensic 9 766 14.7%
Total 5,195 100.0%
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4.4.6 Legal Tradition 
 
The legal origins of the firms is one of the fundamental variables that are used to 
identify whether the legal tradition of the country where a firm is based influence 
its transition to failure. The legal origins of the firms in the study will be defined 
by the country where a firm operates. A new variable “leg_trad” is created and is 
defined based on the legal tradition of each country. It takes  the value of 1 for 
firms associated to common law (UK, Ireland) and 0 for firms associated to legal 
traditions of civil law tradition (French, Scandinavian or German law and therefore 
the remaining countries).  
 
4.4.7 Competition from New firms in a UK region 
 
For the analysis of firms’ transition to failure in UK regions, an additional variable 
for the economic environment is considered (as a replacement for the legal 
tradition variable that is no longer valid within a same-country analysis). The UK-
region-specific variable measures the number of new firms (in a UK region) as a 
proportion of the existing number of firms in that area. As it will be explained in 
Chapter 6, the motivation for using this variable is related to evidence from the 
qualitative failure process literature (Argenti, 1976; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008) 
that included increasing competition as an influencing factor in firms’ failure. As 
such, the percentage of new firms in a region (“new_firms_perc”), sourced from 
UK’s Office of National Statistics (ONS), is used and is tested to identify whether 
it is a determinant of firms’ transition to failure for any of the firms in the 
alternative firm failure processes. 
 
4.4.8 Sustainable growth 
 
The concept of sustainable growth (“SGR”) has been linked to the firm failure. The 
growth of a firm has been seen as a determinant of the failure process (Argenti, 
1976; Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen et al., 2014). Higgins (1977) introduced the concept 
of the optimum growth of the firm. The representation is (Higgins, 1977 p.8): 
 
𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 =  𝑔∗ =
𝑝(1 − 𝑑)(1 + 𝐿)
𝑡 − 𝑝(1 − 𝑑)(1 + 𝐿)
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Where:  
 p : the profit margin on sales; 
 d : the target dividend payout ratio; 
 L: the total debt to equity ratio; 
 t : the ratio of total assets to net sales; 
 s : sales at the beginning of the year; 
 Δs : increase in sales during the year. 
 
Platt et al., (1995, p.148) provided an alternative SGR calculation for firms that 
do not have access to equity and debt markets. This definition may be closer to 
SMEs and is as follows:  
 
𝛥𝛢 = 𝛥𝑅 + 𝛥𝑅(
𝐷
𝐸𝑏𝑜𝑝
) 
Where: 
Δ: Difference operator; 
R: Retained Earnings; 
D: Total Debt;   
A: Total Assets; 
E: Equity; 
bop: stands for the beginning of the period. 
This can be written as: 
𝛥𝑅𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑝 = 𝐴(
𝛥𝑆
𝑆
)  and  𝑔∗ =
𝛥𝑅𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑝
𝐴
  where   
 
Where: 
Tbop: Ratio of total assets to Equity; 
S: Sales; 
g*: the sustainable level of sales growth. 
 
The SGR dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the firm’s total sales exceed the 
sustainable growth rate (g*) and the value of 0 otherwise. 
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4.4.9 Geographical Coordinates 
 
In order to make the spatial analysis of Chapter 7 possible, the geographical 
locations of the EU countries and UK regions were represented by their 
geographical coordinates: their longitude and their latitude.  For each EU country 
and UK region, the centroid coordinate was identified and its longitude and latitude 
was obtained. These data were downloaded from the LatLong.net database. 
LatLong.net is an online geographic database that provides the latitude and 
longitude of any country and/or city and region in the world. The data are based 
on GPS coordinates and comply with the World Geodetic System (WGS) standard 
and the data collected were verified in Google Maps.  
 
4.5 Missing Values treatment 
 
Missing data is an issue when dealing with financial data (Tucker, 1996; Wilson 
and Summers, 1999) and researchers tend to ignore or not report missing values 
information (Saunders et al., 2002).  In this research, the sample has excluded 
firms that have permanently all their financials missing during all years. However, 
some missing values still exist (Table 4.5).  Eliminating missing data completely 
has material disadvantages as it causes sample-selection bias. This means that 
failed firms are more likely to have some missing values and omission of firms with 
some missing observations could cause estimation errors (Zmijewski, 1984) as 
small firms are more likely to have incomplete data partly because not all of them 
are obliged to file full accounts (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Wilson and Summers, 
1999).  
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Table 4.5: Missing Values (%) in the Independent Variables  
 
 
The degree of randomness in missing values should be considered if any remedy 
action is to be taken. However, evidence from the literature suggests that low 
levels of missing values do not generally require treatment, especially in large 
samples. Hair et al., (2006) suggests that the researcher should seek whether 
there are specific patterns on the missing data and consider two options in general. 
The first is to ignore the missing data considering that this may create some noise 
in the accuracy of the results. The other is to use some remedy for substituting 
the missing values. However, substitution of missing values can create bias in the 
data.  The definition of an optimal cut-off, below which no missing values is 
required has been debated in the literature. Hair et al., (2006) and Bennett (2001) 
suggest that, as a rule of thumb, variables with up to 10% missing values do not 
require treatment  while Schafer (1999) recommends 5% as a maximum 
percentage of missing values and Peng et al., (2006) recommends a 20% 
maximum missing value percentage for no action.  
 
The missing values in the sample are closer to the lower of the above 
recommendations and there is no evidence of an existence of a non-random 
Missing Values in Independent Variables
Variable Missing %
ROI 5%
total_assets (and growth) 0%
NSTA 4%
CFTS 8%
TLTA 0%
QACA 5%
TCTL 5%
SGR 7%
Quick_ratio 4%
Avg_dir_age 6%
Total_dir_Nr 5%
Female_nr 5%
US_SIC_code 0%
GDP_Growth 0%
Leg_trad 0%
New_Firms_perc 0%
GVA 0%
Credit 0%
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pattern in the missing data13. As a result, there will be no action for treating 
missing values. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The data sample for this study has been collected and data-managed. A number 
of firm-specific, business and economic environment-specific and wider control 
variables have been identified/collected. These will be used and analysed in the 
following empirical chapters in order to identify the alternative firm failure 
processes and the determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the EU countries 
(Chapter 5),  the UK regions (Chapter 6). In addition, the role of location is further 
analysed by using geographical location information in Chapter 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
13 A tabulation of the missing values suggested no concentration related to the status of the firm, the year, or the 
country of the firm. 
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CHAPTER 5:  EU COUNTRIES’ FIRM FAILURE PROCESSES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters set out the research questions and hypotheses, the 
analytical methodology of the research and the data that are going to be used. A 
number of this thesis’ objectives are looking at the SMEs in the EU countries that 
this study considers. In particular, the first objective is to investigate the 
alternative firm failure processes between EU countries by considering financial 
ratios and the age of the firm; the second objective is to investigate the impact of 
firms’ management characteristics, in addition to the financial ratios and the age 
of the firm, in the identification of failure processes and their transition to failure 
between EU countries; the third onjective is to investigate the influence of business 
environment factors, management characteristics and excessive growth, in firms’ 
transition towards failure in the alternative failure processes in EU countries.  
 
This chapter analyses the factors that affect the different firm failure processes in 
EU firms. It uses firm specific characteristics (the financial ratios, the age of the 
firm and directors’ characteristics) to identify the alternative firm failure processes. 
Subsequently, it assesses whether these characteristics, as well as a number of 
non firm-specific characteristics differ in the alternative firm failure processes. 
Finally, the chapter analyses the influence of, financial ratios, the age of the firm, 
directors’ characteristics and business environment factors in firms’ transition 
towards failure for each of the identified failure processes.  
 
The combination of factor and cluster analysis has been used as an initial analytical 
technique to determine the existence failure process clusters. For the analysis of 
firms’ transition to failure, a panel data ordered regression is used. This 
methodology allows for the control for the firms’ individual heterogeneity and the 
cross-time effects of a number of explanatory variables from the business and 
economic environment. In the second part of the analysis, the purpose of the panel 
ordered regression is to identify the determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 presents the subset of the data that 
this chapter uses and proceeds with the necessary tests for normality. Section 5.2 
presents the data that are used in this chapter. Section 5.3 presents the factor 
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analysis. Section 5.4 presents the cluster analysis and identifies the firm failure 
processes. Section 5.5 presents the results of the panel data analysis and the 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure. Section 5.6 discusses the robustness 
checks for the analyses. Section 5.7 discusses the results of the previous sections 
in the context of the hypotheses. Section 5.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 General Data Description 
 
This chapter uses the sample of the data described in Chapter 4. This sample 
considers all the EU firms that went into liquidation at some point during the period 
that the data cover. This means that the firms whose dependent variable, 
(event_failure) eventually takes the value of 2 are considered. Therefore there are 
5,195 firms in the sample covering the period from 2004 to 2013. Status 
information (and date) for the firms also covers year 2014 but no financial or 
directors information is included for that year. Instead, there is a one-year lead in 
the dependent variable. As such, firm-specific information of 2013 is matched with 
an event_failure status of the following year, in this case 2014. This is common 
practice in firm failure studies (see for example Altman, 1968; Altman et al., 
2010).  The firms that have an event_failure = 2 firm-year observation in the 
sample, also have observations for the years that they were not in liquidation. As 
such, all firms start participating in the sample as event_failure = 0 (healthy) 
“progressing” to event_failure = 2 (liquidation) with some of them (c.25%) having 
the interim status of financially distressed (event_failure = 1). That is, the sample 
includes evidence for what we will refer to as the failure status progression of the 
(eventually) liquidated firms. Therefore, the total number of firm-year 
observations is 40,122 and the median time for each firm’s participation in the 
sample is 7 years. 
 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics of failed firms 
 
The descriptive statistics of the failed firms are displayed in Table 5.1 and the 
descriptive statistics for firms in each country are presented in Appendix A, Table 
A1. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of main continuous variables for firms that eventually 
failed. 
 
The results show that there are variations in the explanatory variables’ means. 
Considering the mean financial ratios of firms in each country (Appendix A; Table 
A.1), the mean Return on Investment (ROI) is negative in firms across all countries 
and therefore in the full sample. One reason for this is that the time period that 
the sample covers, includes the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Total assets’ mean 
growth rate in firms in Ireland is 28.28% compared to the sample mean of 5.30%. 
Firms in other countries record more modest total assets growth rates ranging 
from 0.27% in Spain to 6.30% in the United Kingdom. The higher total asset 
growth in Irish SMEs can be seen as a reaction to challenges the firms faced due 
to a prolonged period of instability and as such are explained from external factors 
related to market changes in Ireland, combined with fluctuating economic 
conditions (Kidney et al., 2017).  However, Irish firms had the highest (2.21) mean 
total liabilities to total assets (TLTA), implying that the total assets were financed 
by significant leverage. Swedish firms had the lower TLTA (0.76). 
 
The highest mean net sales to total assets (NSTA) ratios are recorded in Germany 
(4.35) with firms in other countries ranging from 1.44 (Spain) to 3.00 (United 
Kingdom) resulting in a sample mean of 2.38. The higher average ratio in Germany 
is mainly driven by strong sales of German firms. This is mainly driven by overall 
economic conditions in Germany whose economy was less affected from the 
Variable Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
ROI -0.16 6.54 -1272.00 107.18
growth_rate 5.30 45.82 -1.00 769.79
NSTA 2.38 13.45 -1.38 267.20
CFTS -0.49 17.43 -822.67 295.00
quick_ratio 6.82 11.64 -17.67 155.00
TLTA 1.03 10.10 0.00 170.00
QACA 0.84 0.39 -7.90 18.59
TCTL 0.26 0.23 -1.54 1.00
Firmage 11.75 33.27 1.00 110.00
Avg_dir_age      48.45 11.65 18.00 90.00
Nr_Female_Dir 1.11 1.73 0.00 7.00
Total_Dir_Nr   7.16 7.41 1.00 24.00
credit 124.04 40.15 67.91 200.61
GDP_gr 0.97 2.58 -5.64 6.33
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financial crisis due to strong usage of production capabilities in Germany (Funk, 
2012). This is partly reflected in mean quick ratios were German firms have 
significantly higher quick ratios, effectively measuring firms’ liquidity, than firms 
in other countries with Netherlands’ firms having the lower mean quick ratios.  
Likewise, quick assets to current assets (QACA) were relatively similar in the 
alterative countries, ranging from 0.69 in Spain to 0.96 in the United Kingdom. 
The sample mean for QACA is 0.84. 
 
On the other hand, cash flow to total sales (CFTS) is ranging from -1.13 in Spain 
to 0.02 on France with a sample average of -0.49. Spanish firms were particularly 
badly affected due to the credit crunch is the SME sector during the financial crisis. 
This was particularly the case in Spain because Spanish caja’s banks, effectively 
small savings banks, suffered significant losses and were unable to lend to small 
businesses (Illueca et al., 2014), resulting in a credit crunch for the SME sector 
(Carbo Valverde et al., 2016), affecting cash flows. Mean trade credit to total 
liabilities (TCTL), is relatively consistent across all countries, ranging from 0.17 in 
Germany to 0.39 in France driven mainly from marginally higher trade credit usage 
in France. TCTL’s sample mean is 0.26. 
 
In terms of the board composition, firms in Ireland and the United Kingdom have 
had more female directors in their firm boards on average (2.64 and 2.50 female 
directors respectively, compared to the sample mean of 1.1), while Germany was 
the country whose firms had fewer total number of directors on average (2.33 for 
German firms against 7.16 for the mean of all countries’ firms). 
 
Credit availability between countries also varies. France, Germany and Italy have 
had credit availability compared to their GDP that was well below the 124.04 
average at 89.76, 95.59 and 83.67 respectively. This is due to relatively 
conservative credit expansion in Germany and France combined with the effects 
of the credit crunch in Italy. The average GDP growth is positive in all countries 
with the exception of Italy.  
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5.2.2 Data and normality 
 
The distribution of the continuous variables in the population of firms is a necessary 
step before we proceed with the factor and the cluster analysis. Skewness and 
Kurtosis are the two main statistical metrics to assess the distribution of the 
explanatory variables in the data.   
 
“Skewness is a measure of asymmetry and kurtosis is a measure of tallness or 
flatness of a Probability Distribution Function” (Gujarati and Porter, 2010, p.449). 
Skewness is defined as the third moment and Kurtosis is the fourth moment (Park, 
2008). For all symmetrical probability distribution functions, the third moment is 
zero and in such a case the Skewness is also zero. If the skewness is greater than 
zero the distribution is positively skewed and if it is less than zero the distribution 
is negatively skewed.  
 
Kurtosis, on the other hand, measures the thinness of the tails of the probability 
distribution. Distributions with Kurtosis of less than 3 are called platykurtic (that 
is they have a fat and/or short tale) and distributions with kurtosis of greater than 
3 are called leptokurtic. The Kurtosis of a normal distribution is 3 (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2010).  
 
The simplest way to detect any evidence of Skewness and Kurtosis are the 
normality plots. In terms of statistical metrics, the Skewness and Kurtosis tests of 
normality, the Shapiro-Wilk (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) and the Shapiro-Francia 
(Shapiro and Wilk, 1972; Royston, 1983) tests of normality are applied. The 
Skewness and Kurtosis is a standard normality test. The Shapiro-Wilk is a 
frequently used test for normality and it is very powerful in a range of symmetric 
distributions (Mbah and Paothong, 2015) but it may be sensitive in large samples 
(Hair et al., 2006). The Shapiro-Francia test of normality is more appropriate for 
larger samples and according to Mbah and Paothong (2015) is the best statistic in 
detecting deviation from normality. 
 
The Skewness and Kurtosis plots are presented in Appendix A (Chart 1) and show 
evidence of non-normal distribution in all the tested explanatory variables. Table 
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A.2 (in Appendix A) presents the results of Skewness and Kurtosis analysis of the 
main data variables, applied to the firms in the sample. The null hypothesis that 
each of the explanatory variables is normally distributed is rejected at the 0.01 
level of significance. Table A.3 (Appendix A) presents the Shapiro-Wilk W test of 
normality results.  Consistent with the results from the Skewness/Kurtosis test, 
Shapiro-Wilk test results show that the null hypothesis of each of the variables to 
be normally distributed is rejected at the 0.01 level of significance. Finally the 
Shapiro-Francia test of normality also confirms that the hypothesis of a normal 
distribution is rejected at 0.01 level of significance, for each one of the variables 
in the sample (Appendix A, Table A.4). 
 
The presence of non-normally distributed variables in the sample has two potential 
implications. First, the use of the mean when clustering to create the failure 
processes can be problematic. Therefore the median will be used instead (in a k-
medians clustering approach). Second, the violation of the normality assumption 
potentially compromises the normality assumption in the ordered logistic 
regression. However, evidence suggests that logistic regression is relatively robust 
even in the presence of non-normally distributed data (Appiah, 2013). Therefore, 
no further actions are proposed with regards to the normality of the data. 
 
5.2.3 Correlation and Statistical Tests 
 
Exploring the correlations between independent variables is necessary in order to 
determine whether factor analysis can be actually used. Factor analysis requires 
the existence of some degree of collinearity between the variables that will enter 
the factors. For this reason the results of correlation analysis and partial correlation 
analysis are useful. Correlation analysis, partial correlation analysis, the Bartlett 
test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sample adequacy are 
used to investigate whether the level of potential correlations between the 
explanatory variables is sufficient to proceed with factor analysis.   
 
Correlation of the independent variables has been tested in the sample of 
event_failure status=2 at two stages.  The first stage includes all of the potential 
independent variables at levels. The second stage includes the financial ratios 
(independent variables) and the country-specific macroeconomic variables (GDP 
growth and Credit Availability) lagged at t, t-1, t-2…t-7. This will capture the 
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financial situation of firms up to 7 years before the failure event. The analysis tests 
for 7 year lags because the median time of firms before they enter the 
event_failure=2 status is 7 years and as a result the factor/cluster analysis will 
use these 7 years of historical information in the formation of failure process 
clusters. The director-related variables are only tested at levels as there is very 
little or no variation on director composition across time in most firms. Correlation 
above 30% can be regarded as sufficient for the purpose of factor analysis (Hair 
et al., 2006). The results (Appendix A, Table A.5) demonstrate that there is 
evidence of a sufficient level of correlation in a number of variables. 
 
Partial Correlations between variables have also been calculated (Appendix A, 
Table A.6). A partial correlation of a variable is the correlation that is left 
unexplained when the effects of the other variables are taken into consideration 
(Hair et al., 2006). Partial correlations between variables that would be potentially 
used in the factor analysis should be small and few. In particular, partial 
correlations of above 0.7 should question the application of factor analysis (Hair 
et al., 2006). Partial correlation results showed that there is little evidence of high 
partial correlations between potential variables into the factor analysis and 
therefore factor analysis can be used. 
 
Bartlett Sphericity is a statistical test that also investigates the existence of 
correlations between the variables that could allow a meaningful application of 
Factor analysis by examining the entire correlation matrix. STATA 15 applies the 
Bartlett test of sphericity together with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy (MSA) which measures the degree of inter-correlations among 
the variables and therefore assists with the assessment of the appropriateness of 
the Factor Analysis. 
 
The results of the Bartlett test of sphericity suggest that the hypothesis of no 
correlation between the variables is rejected at the 0.001 level. Moreover, the KMO 
MSA show that the variables are adequate for factor analysis having an overall 
KMO MSA score of 0.687 Table A.8 (Appendix A). These results include the 
complete variable input (with lags). Therefore the statistical assumptions to 
proceed with factor analysis are satisfied. 
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5.3  Factor Analysis for Firm Failure Process 
 
The combination of factor and cluster analysis has been selected as a way to create 
firm failure processes (Laitinen, 1991; Lukason and Hoffman, 2014; Lukason and 
Laitinen, 2016).  Factor analysis is used to summarise the firm specific-
characteristics of the firms in order to reduce the number of variables that will 
subsequently enter the cluster analysis process. Factor analysis only uses firm-
specific characteristics because the purpose of the failure process creation is to 
investigate which firm-specific characteristics determine the failure process of the 
firms. The factor analysis is used in two parts. 
 
In the first part, the financial ratios of each firm are used for up to 7 years (lag=7; 
t, t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, t-5, t-6, t-7) prior to event_failure=2, together with the age of 
the firm at the time of the liquidation. This is then followed by the associated 
cluster analysis to identify the firm failure processes.  
 
The second part includes three directors-related variables (total number of 
directors, number of female directors in the board and average age of directors) 
in addition to the variables used in the first part. This factor analysis is then 
followed by the associated cluster analysis to identify the firm failure process. 
 
The rest of the section presents the results of the factor analysis without directors’ 
characteristics and with directors’ characteristics as determinants in the failure 
process formation; it then compares findings with the literature. 
 
5.3.1 Factor Analysis without Directors’ Characteristics 
 
The first stage of the factor analysis (hereafter factor analysis without directors’ 
characteristics) examines the financial ratios from the 5,195 event_failure=2 
(liquidated/bankrupt) firms for up to 7 years prior to the failure event. That is, the 
financial ratios are lagged up to lag 7. Additionally, the factor analysis includes the 
firm age at the last year with available data before it entered liquidation. The age 
of the firm is not lagged as any such attempt would create a completely linear 
result. This part of the analysis aims to use metrics that have been previously used 
in the quantitative firm failure process literature, in order to offer a basis of 
comparison for the analysis with directors’ characteristics that follows. 
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An eigenvalue criterion by means of the Kaiser test (Kaiser, 1960), has been 
applied to factor analysis. Only factors with eigenvalues above 1 are allowed to 
return to the second step of the factor analysis which is the VARIMAX rotation. The 
first part of the factor analysis shows (Appendix A, Table A.9) that there are 12 
factors with an eigenvalue >1. These initial factors explain the 89% of the total 
variation of the initial variables, higher than previous studies where Factor Analysis 
explained 80% of the variables’ variation for Lukason and Laitinen (2016), 69% 
for Laitinen et al., (2014) and 52% for Laitinen (1991). This potentially indicates 
that the additional time periods that this study uses add value to the failure process 
extraction given that Laitinen (1991) used a six year period in his analysis but with 
two-year intervals while Laitinen et al., (2014) used a four year period (with yearly 
intervals) and Lukason and Laitinen (2016) used a five year period (with yearly 
intervals). 
 
The VARIMAX orthogonal rotation is then applied to the 12 factors in order for 
factors to be uncorrelated throughout the rotation process. VARIMAX rotation is 
perceived as the most popular (Hair et al., 2006) and best orthogonal rotation 
(Fabrigar, et al., 1999) to assist the interpretation of factors. Initial factors have 
cross-loadings and therefore the rotation technique should assist to develop a clear 
set of factor loadings. Consequently that would assist the development of 
reasonably separate failure processes. Table A.11 (Appendix A) presents the 
loadings of the factor analysis after the VARIMAX rotation. The interpretation of 
the first round of factor analysis is as follows: 
o The first factor is associated with the time series development of the trade 
credit to total liabilities ratio (TCTL). 
o The second factor is associated with the time series development of the 
Quick assets to current assets (QACA) ratio. 
o The third factor is associated with the total liabilities to total assets (TLTA) 
ratio between the 4th and the 7th year prior to failure. The same factor is 
also correlated with the return on investment (ROI) on the 7th year before 
the failure (Lag=7). 
o The fourth factor is associated with the net sales to total assets (NSTA) ratio 
between the years 4 and 7 before failure. 
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o The fifth factor is associated with QACA ratio between years 4 and 7 and 
with the TCTL ratio between years 5 and 7 prior to the failure event. 
o The sixth factor is correlated with TLTA on the 3rd year prior to failure and 
with ROI at the same time period. 
o The seventh factor is associated with the growth rate of the firm, 3 years 
prior to failure and with the NSTA (same as what you have done with in 
previous sentences, put full name here) ratio, also 3 years prior to failure. 
o The eighth factor is associated with ROI 1 and 2 years prior to failure, TLTA 
up to 2 years prior to failure and with NSTA just on the failure time. 
o The ninth factor is associated with the time series development of ROI and 
with TLTA on year 5. 
o The tenth factor is associated with the development of the quick ratio 
between years 2 and 5 from the time of failure. 
o The eleventh factor is associated with the development of NSTA ratio up to 
4 years before and up to the time of failure. 
o The twelfth factor is associated with the development of cash flow to total 
sales ratio (CFTS) between years 7 and 3 prior to the failure event. 
 
5.3.2 Factor Analysis with Directors’ Characteristics 
 
The second part of the factor analysis (hereafter factor analysis with directors’ 
characteristics) includes directors’ characteristics in addition to the previous 
analysis. The inclusion of director characteristics aims to capture some of the 
observations of the qualitative firm failure process literature within a quantitative 
approach. As such, the directors’ characteristics include a proxy for gender 
heterogeneity in the board as measured by the number of female directors. In 
addition, a proxy for the breadth of social capital that directors bring to the board 
is captured by the total number of directors. Finally, the experience of the board 
is captured by using the average age of directors as a proxy. 
 
The financial ratios were treated in the same way as in the first round of factor 
analysis. Firm age was also treated on the same way with the only the age of the 
firm at the year of failure entering the data. The directors’ characteristics were 
included at the time of failure and were not lagged. A specification with lagged 
directors’ characteristics was tested and returned broadly similar results. This is 
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because there was very limited variation in the structure of the board in the 7 
years prior to failure. In many firms there was no variation while the average age 
of directors had a linear relationship across the years. Therefore, only the results 
with directors’ characteristics that do not include lags in the directors are reported. 
 
The results demonstrate that there are again 12 factors with an eigenvalue above 
1 (Appendix A, Table A.13). With the inclusion of the directors’ variables the 12 
factors explain 87.67% of the total variance, slightly less than the 89% that was 
achieved without the directors’ variables. However the difference is relatively small 
to be a reason for not proceeding further with this classification. Therefore, we 
proceed to analyse the factors after the VARIMAX rotation is performed. Following 
the VARIMAX rotation the factors are presented in Table A.15 (Appendix A) and 
can be explained as follows: 
o The first factor is characterized by the time-series development of the trade 
credit to total liabilities ratio (TCTL). This is similar to the first factor without 
the directors’ characteristics. 
o The second factor is associated with the time series development of the 
Quick assets to current assets (QACA) ratio. This is also similar to the 
second factor on the factor analysis without directors’ characteristics. 
o The third factor is partly associated with the total liabilities to total assets 
(TLTA) ratio between the 4th and the 7th year prior to failure. It is also 
associated to some extend with the return on investment (ROI) on the 7th 
year before the failure (Lag=7) and it is broadly similar to the factor 
analysis without director characteristics. 
o The fourth factor is associated with the net sales to total assets (TLTA) ratio 
between the years 4 and 7 before failure. There is a weak association with 
the same ratio in years 0 to 3. The factor is similar to the one without the 
director characteristics. 
o The fifth factor is associated with QACA ratio between years 4 and 7 and 
has a weaker association with the TCTL ratio between years 6 and 7 prior 
to the failure event. In terms of the financial ratios this factor is broadly 
similar to the one in the analysis without the directors’ characteristics. 
Moreover, the firm age is more significant in factor 5 when the directors’ 
characteristics are included (-46.8% against -24.8% in the non-directors’ 
analysis). However, this factor is differentiated from its non-directors 
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characteristics counterpart because of its association with the number of 
female directors and the total number of directors. 
o The sixth factor is correlated with TLTA on the 3rd year prior to failure and 
with ROI at the same time period; similar to the 6th factor from the analysis 
without the directors’ characteristics. 
o The seventh factor is associated with the growth rate of the firm, 3 years 
prior to failure and with the NSTA ratio, similar to the 7th factor from the 
analysis without the directors’ characteristics. 
o The eighth factor is associated with ROI 1 and 2 years prior to failure, TLTA 
up to 2 years prior to failure and a weaker association with NSTA just on 
the failure time; broadly similar to the eighth factor in the analysis without 
directors’ characteristics. 
o The ninth factor is associated with the time series development of ROI 
(although not in lag 3) and with the growth rate at lag 6. In the case of ROI, 
there are similarities with the ninth factor in the analysis without the 
directors’ characteristics but here, there is evidence of an association with 
growth rate (6 years before failure) as opposed to the TLTA (5 years 
before failure) in the analysis without directors’ characteristics. 
o The tenth factor is associated with the development of the quick ratio 
between years 2 and 5 from the time of failure; similar to the tenth factor 
in the analysis without directors’ characteristics. 
o The eleventh factor is associated with the development of NSTA ratio up to 
4 years before and up to the time of failure, broadly similar to the eleventh 
factor in the analysis without directors’ characteristics. 
o The twelfth factor is associated with the development of CFTS between years 
7 and 3 prior to the failure event, broadly similar to the eleventh factor in 
the analysis without directors’ characteristics. 
 
One can conclude that the inclusion of directors’ characteristics has modified the 
fifth factor by adding the board dimension to some of them. In particular, the fifth 
factor (with directors’ characteristics) is associated with the number of female 
directors and the total number of directors in firms and therefore captures most of 
the effects of the board variables. 
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5.4 Cluster Analysis 
 
Factor scores obtained from the analysis above are standardized and uncorrelated. 
These are useful characteristics which enable the use of cluster analysis after the 
factors are scored based on their factor loading (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the adopted clustering method follows Laitinen et al., 
(2014) in applying a partition cluster analysis approach due to its characteristic of 
breaking any observations into a number of non-overlapping groups. K-medians 
and k-means are two similar processes that can be used to calculate the clusters. 
The methods differ in the estimation of the “centre” of the cluster. The k-medians 
uses the median while the k-means uses the mean (Whelan et al., 2015). K-means 
can be affected by outliers even when operating in large data sets as one outlier 
may pull the “mean” value away from the majority of the dataset (Whelan et al., 
2015). For that reason, we employ k-median, following Lukason and Laitinen, 
(2016) in the clustering analysis with Euclidean distance. This is the most 
commonly used approach to partitioning (Whelan et al., 2015) and is also 
supported in Stata 15. 
 
Stopping rules are used to identify the number of clusters that the analysis might 
give. There is no evidence supporting any particular stopping rule from the many 
that are available (Hair et al., 2006). One of the most well-known partitioning 
criteria is the Calinski and Harabasz (1974) index (Vendramin et al., 2010) and it 
will be used in this application to define the appropriate number of clusters. 
 
The Calinski and Harabasz Pseudo-F formula is defined as follows: 
 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝐵)/(𝑔−1)
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑊)/(𝑁−𝑔)
 
Where B is the between clusters sum of squares and W is the within clusters sum 
of squares; g is the number of groups and N the number of observations. 
 
5.4.1 Clusters without Directors’ Characteristics 
 
The factors from the factor analysis without directors’ characteristics are used in 
the first part of the cluster analysis (hereafter cluster without directors’ 
characteristics). In line with Calinski and Harabasz (1974), the results suggest that 
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there are 4 potential clusters and therefore 4 distinct failure processes. The index 
gave a Pseudo-F of 261.93 which was the largest value, indicating that that the 
four-clusters solution is the most distinct compared with potential solutions 
ranging from 2 to 12 clusters. When the potential number of clusters exceeded 4, 
the Pseudo-F values started gradually declining. The clusters’ characteristics define 
the failure processes which have the following broad characteristics (Appendix A, 
Table A.12): 
 
The first process is characterized by relatively new firms (median age 8 years 
old) that have had negative growth in the 5 years prior to failure, improving 
liquidity and working capital (expressed with the quick ratio and the QACA ratio) 
prior to failure.  
 
The second process is characterized by firms with wide-ranging financial 
difficulties. These firms have on average, negative returns (ROI) in the last 3 years 
prior to failure and negative growth rates (growth_rate) for most of the last seven 
years (years 3-7 prior to failure). This cluster’s firms have low sales for their assets 
(NSTA) in all years before failure and negative cash flows two years prior to failure. 
Liquidity and working capital issues are the worst from all the clusters and liabilities 
have been growing rapidly during the seven years prior to failure. The average age 
of these firms is 18 years and therefore they are not new firms. 
 
The third process is characterized by firms with negative growth few years before 
failure (3-7 years prior to failure), high sales compared to their assets but weak 
cash flows. These firms are making extended use of trade credit to finance their 
working capital cycle but their total liabilities appear to be relatively stable. Firms 
in this process are fairly matured with an average age of 18 years.  
 
The fourth process is characterized by firms with negative returns (ROI) in the 
year prior to failure and slow or negative growth across the seven years prior to 
failure.  Similar to the third process, the fourth process’ firms have relatively high 
level of sales (NSTA) for their assets and negative cash flow in the year of the 
failure. In contrast with the firms in the third process, these firms do not have high 
usage of trade credit, have good liquidity but growing total liabilities. Firms in this 
cluster are on average 10 years old. 
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The distribution of clusters in countries is presented in table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2: Distribution of firms in clusters (Clusters without directors’ characteristics).  
 
The total column shows that most firms were found in cluster 3 with cluster 4 
showing slightly fewer firms. Cluster 2 had the lowest number of firms. There 
appears to be some differentiation in the concentration of failed firms between 
countries and failure processes. In particular, there is a relatively low (5.72%) 
concentration of UK firms in clusters 1 and 2. In contrast, 73.77% of the German 
firms belong to clusters 1 and 2. Italian firms are slightly more concentrated in 
cluster 3 (44.90%) with the remaining firms to be relatively similarly concentrated 
in the other clusters. Irish firms are more concentrated in cluster 4 (58.77%) and 
less concentrated in cluster 1 (9.65%) with clusters 2 and 3 having a 14.04% and 
17.54% concentration of firms respectively. French firms are more concentrated 
in cluster 3 (50.13%) and less concentrated in cluster 2 (5.68%) with cluster 1 
and 4 having 28.81% and 15.37% firm concentrations respectively. Netherlands’ 
firms are slightly more concentrated in cluster 1 (33%) followed by cluster 3 (27%) 
and then cluster 4 (21.6%) and cluster 3 (18.4%).  Spanish firms are more 
concentrated in cluster 2 (39.25%) with the remaining of the clusters ranging from 
16.70% (cluster 1) to 22.65% (cluster 4). Swedish firms are relatively evenly 
concentrated across all clusters with concentrations raging form 21.67% (cluster 
2) to 29.17% (cluster 4).  
 
5.4.2 Clusters with Directors’ Characteristics 
 
The second stage of the cluster analysis includes the directors’ characteristics 
(hereafter clusters with directors’ characteristics) in addition to the previous 
analysis.  
  
Cluster
1 223 28.8% 385 52.3% 11 9.6% 251 20.2% 61 33.0% 174 16.7% 31 25.8% 15 1.5% 1,151 22.2%
2 44 5.7% 158 21.5% 16 14.0% 241 19.4% 34 18.4% 409 39.3% 26 21.7% 41 4.2% 969 18.7%
3 388 50.1% 50 6.8% 20 17.5% 559 44.9% 50 27.0% 223 21.4% 28 23.3% 296 30.2% 1,614 31.1%
4 119 15.4% 143 19.4% 67 58.8% 194 15.6% 40 21.6% 236 22.6% 35 29.2% 627 64.0% 1,461 28.1%
TOTAL 774 736 114 1,245 185 1,042 120 979 5,195
SWEDEN UK
Country
FRANCE TOTALGERMANY IRELAND ITALY NETHERANDS SPAIN
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Calinski and Harabasz (1974) suggests that there are 4 potential clusters and 
therefore 4 distinct failure processes for the factors that included the directors’ 
characteristics; the same number of clusters as in the analysis without directors’ 
characteristics. The Calinski and Harabasz index in this case gave a Pseudo F of 
225.57 which was the largest value, indicating that that the four-clusters solution 
is the most distinct compared with potential solutions ranging from 2 to 12 
clusters. When the potential number of clusters exceeded 4, the Pseudo-F values 
started gradually declining. The firm failure process clusters’ are having the 
following broad characteristics (Appendix A, Table A.16): 
 
The first process is characterized by relatively new firms (median age 8 years 
old) that have had negative returns (ROI) in the year prior to failure, high sales 
but deteriorating cash flows that turned negative prior to failure and at the year of 
failure. Despite these firms having increasing liquidity, they also have increasing 
total liabilities. These firms have had volatile quick assets given their current assets 
implying volatile working capital. There were on average 3 female directors and 
14 directors in total with an average age of 49 years.  
 
The second process is characterized by firms with negative growth 3 to 7 years 
before they fail and low cash flows that turn negative in the year of failure. Their 
liquidity is slightly stretched but there are wide variations in some of the firms of 
this cluster (standard volatility of quick ratio). These firms have reducing trade 
credit usage compared to their total liabilities which is however higher than that in 
the other clusters’ firms. These firms, on average, have been active for 20 years 
and have 5 directors, none of whom is a female, with average age of 48 years. 
 
The third process is associated with firms that have very few directors (3 on 
average), none of whom is female, and have an average age of 48 (broadly similar 
to other clusters). These firms have low returns (ROI) that turns negative one year 
prior to failure. However, this group of firms has got increasing sales (NSTA) but 
weak cash flows that turn negative in the failure year. Severe liquidity problems 
have been present in all years prior to failure even though they were improving 
marginally towards the final years prior to failure. The average firm age of this 
group is 11 years. 
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The fourth process is associated with firms that also have only 3 directors on 
average and have no females in the board. The average firm age is 13 years. In 
terms of financials, the fourth group’s firms are characterized by low ROIs, 
especially prior to failure, and negative or very low growth. Net sales are very high 
and increasing in the years prior to failure but these increases are not reflected in 
improving cash flows. Liquidity ratios are strong, in contrast with the firms in the 
third process. These firms have increasing usage of trade credit in the years to 
failure. The distribution of clusters in countries is presented in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Distribution of firms in clusters (with directors’ characteristics).  
 
As in the distribution of clusters without directors’ characteristics, there appears 
to be some differentiation in the concentration of failed firms between countries 
and failure processes. The clusters, signifying the alternative firm failure 
processes, in the two cluster analyses are not the same. All clusters in both 
analysis differ from each other. It is particularly important in the case of the first 
cluster which, in the analysis with directors’ characteristics, includes the existence 
of a female directors in the board and the total number of directors as a key 
characteristics of the cluster.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a persistent trend of UK and German firms having opposite 
concentrations in clusters. In the cluster analysis with directors’ characteristics, 
UK firms are highly concentrated in clusters 1 and 2 (78.96%) whereas German 
firms only have 7.20% concentration in these two clusters. The different profile of 
cluster 1 may have been a material determinant of the distribution of firms in these 
two countries, implying that board composition and experience are key 
differentiators in explaining failure processes in these countries. Netherlands’ firms 
have a very low concentration in cluster 1 (3.24%) with the remaining clusters 
ranging from 22.70% (cluster 2) to 37.84% (cluster 4). Irish firms are more 
concentrated in cluster 1 (42.11%) with the other clusters ranging from 14.04% 
(cluster 3) to 28.95% (cluster 4). French firms are mostly concentrated in cluster 
Cluster
1 90 12% 4 1% 48 42% 81 7% 6 3% 73 7% 7 6% 625 64% 934 18%
2 389 50% 49 6% 17 15% 517 42% 42 23% 243 23% 29 24% 148 15% 1,434 28%
3 168 22% 345 45% 16 14% 396 32% 67 36% 434 42% 43 36% 34 3% 1,503 29%
4 127 16% 338 44% 33 29% 251 20% 70 38% 292 28% 41 34% 172 18% 1,324 25%
TOTAL 774 736 114 1,245 185 1,042 120 979 5,195
TOTALFRANCE GERMANY IRELAND ITALY NETHERANDS SPAIN SWEDEN UK
Country
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2 (50.26%) with the remaining clusters having from 11.63% (cluster 1) to 21.71% 
(cluster 3) of the firms. Spanish firms are more concentrated in cluster 3 (41.65%) 
and less concentrated in cluster 1 (7.01%) with clusters 2 and 4 having 23.32% 
and 28.02% of the firms respectively. In contrast with the cluster analysis without 
directors’ characteristics, Swedish firms are not as evenly concentrated in the 
clusters’ with directors’ characteristics. Swedish firms are less concentrated in 
cluster 1 (5.83%) with the rest of the clusters ranging from 24.17% (cluster 2) to 
35.83% (cluster 3).  
 
Some inferences can be drawn from the distribution of firms in the alternative 
clusters and therefore between firm failure processes. The majority of UK and Irish 
firms’ characteristics in the sample fit in the first firm failure process, characterized 
by relatively new firms with negative returns, increasing debt but also gender 
diversity on the board. These characteristics are consistent with the observations 
from the firms’ descriptive statistics for these countries where UK and Irish firms 
have the higher means for female directors and TLTA. The majority of Italian and 
France firms are concentrated in the second firm failure process which in turn is 
characterized by firms with low liquidity that are older. Indeed, on average Italian 
firms have the lowest mean quick ratios whilst France firms have slightly higher 
average quick ratios, although far from the highest in the sample. The third firm 
failure process has the majority of German, Swedish and Spanish firms. This is a 
process characterized by very few directors, increasing sales but weak cash flows. 
German firms’ descriptive statistics show that these firms have on average the 
highest NSTA ratios and fewest directors whilst Spanish firms have the lowest CFTS 
ratios, on average. Swedish firms, on the other hand have one of the lowest 
numbers of directors, high NSTA (compared to other countries) and weak cash 
flows. Finally, the fourth firm failure process whose characteristic is the increased 
trade credit usage, high net sales but low ROI is dominated by firms from 
Netherlands whose low ROI and high TCTL are key characteristics on average. 
 
5.4.3 Hypothesis Testing on Clusters 
 
Having developed the clusters of the firm failure processes (with and without 
directors’ characteristics) and having discussed some observable differences in the 
concentration of firms among different clusters, the chapter proceeds to analyze 
 152 | P a g e  
 
whether there are any statistically significant differences between the failure 
processes as expressed in the two versions of the clusters. These tests include 
both the firm-specific (financial ratios, firm age and directors’ characteristics) 
characteristics that were used in order to identify the alternative firm failure 
processes as well as a number of additional characteristics, associated with the 
economic and business environment. The latter have been discussed in the 
development of the Hypotheses (Chapter 2). 
 
The approach undertaken to test the Hypotheses relating to the cross-country 
comparison of the firm failure processes applies the median test for continuous 
variables. For categorical variables, the Pearson chi square test of the 
independence of rows and columns in a two-way distribution table is employed.  
Table 5.4 presents the results of the chi-square tests and Table 5.5 the results of 
the median test 
 
Table 5.4: Pearson Chi-Square on Differences in Firms’ Characteristics between  Firm-
Clusters 
 
 
Table 5.5: Median test- Pearson Chi-Square values on Differences in Financial Ratios 
between Firm-Clusters 
 
The first step, is to ascertain whether the firm failure processes are independent 
to the countries. In addition, it is tested whether the (mainly) business 
environment characteristics that are categorical variables in nature differ between 
the alternative firm failure processes (with and without directors’ characteristics). 
The results for the independence between countries and firm failure processes are 
assessed with a Pearson chi-square test (Table 5.4). The null hypothesis of the 
Pearson Chi-square is that there is no difference in the distribution of firms 
between the rows (countries) and the columns (firm failure processes). 
Firm Clusters 
(Failure Processes)
 
Legal Origins
 
Industry Countries
 
SGR
Clusters without Directors' characteristics 705.17 / 0.000 122.45 / 0.000  189.16 / 0.000 13.93 / 0.003
Clusters with Directors' characteristics 429.32 / 0.000 875.81 /  0.000 125.97 / 0.000  9.32   / 0.025
Chi-Squared statistic/p-value
Firm Clusters 
(Failure Processes) ROI
GROWTH
RATE NSTA CFTS
QUICK
RATIO TLTA QACA TCTL
FIRM
AGE
 
GDP
Growth
 
Credit 
Availability
 
Women
 
Age of 
Directors
 
Nr. Of 
Directors
Clusters without Directors' characteristics
245.79 /
 0.000
 221.49 / 
0.000
308.79 / 
0.000
 283.39 /
0.000
 647.04 / 
0.000
192.82 /
0.000
887.37 /
0.000
111.03 /
0.000
284.84 /
0.000
338.88 /
0.000
560.70 /
0.000
88.80 /
0.000
102.95 / 
0.000
343.76 /
0.000
Clusters with Directors' characteristics
391.99 /
 0.000
445.78 /
 0.000
343.78 / 
0.000
491.94 / 
0.000
561.72 /
 0.000
414.93 / 
0.000
608.86 /
0.000
697.95 /
0.000
 343.08 /
0.000
 500.07 /
0.000
579.62 /
0.000
140.00 /
0.000
13.08 /
0.004
120.02 /
0.000
Chi-Squared statistic/p-value
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Consequently, the alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference in the 
distribution between firm failure processes and countries and as a result firm 
failure processes differ between countries. The results, reported in Table 5.4, show 
the chi-square test is significant at the Sig. <0.01 level. Therefore one can reject 
the null hypothesis.  This applies to both analyses with and without directors’ 
characteristics. In addition, a number of hypotheses that were set in earlier 
chapters are tested. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Countries’ legal origins differ between firms in the alternative 
failure processes in the EU countries under consideration; they are also 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
 
In the context of the Chi-square test, the null hypothesis is that the rows (legal 
origins) and columns (failure process clusters) do not differ in the distribution of 
firms. The alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference in the distribution of 
firms between failure processes and legal origins and therefore that countries’ legal 
origins differ between firms in the alternative firm failure processes. 
The Pearson Chi-square is significant (at p level<0.01), confirming that the null 
hypothesis is rejected and therefore there are statistically significant differences 
in the distribution of firms’ legal origins in the failure clusters (Table 5.4). 
Therefore, this part of the analysis accepts the first part of Hypothesis 1 that 
countries’ legal origins differ between the alternative failure processes in the 
European countries under consideration. The results are consistent irrespective of 
whether the clustering has been with or without directors’ characteristics. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Industry classification differs between firms in the alternative firm 
failure processes in EU firms; it also differs as a determinant of firms’ transition to 
failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
In the context of the Chi-square test, the null hypothesis is that the rows 
(industries) and columns (failure process clusters) have no difference in the 
distribution of firms.  
The alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference in the distribution of firms 
between failure processes and the industries they belong to. The Pearson Chi-
square is significant (Table 5.4) with 27 degrees of freedom (p-value <0.01), 
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rejecting the null hypothesis. Therefore one can conclude that there is a 
statistically significant difference in the industry distribution across the failure 
clusters. As such the first part of Hypothesis 2 is accepted: Industry classification 
differs between firms in the alternative firm failure processes in EU firms. The 
results are consistent for both sets of clusters, with and without directors’ 
characteristics. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Financial performance represented by key financial ratios and the 
age of the firm, differ in the alternative firm failure processes of EU firms; they 
also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm 
failure processes. 
 
The financial ratios and the age of the firm are firm specific characteristics that 
were used to identify the alternative firm failure processes. As such one would 
expect that these will differ in the alternative firm failure processes. The median 
test (using a Pearson chi square statistic) has been applied to compare the 
medians of all financial ratios across the different clusters. In the context of the 
median test, the null hypothesis is that there is no statistical difference in the 
medians of the financial ratios and of the firms’ age between failure clusters. The 
alternative hypothesis suggests there is a difference in the medians of the financial 
ratios and of the firms’ age in the alternative firm failure processes. The results 
(Table 5.5) for both failure clusters (with and without directors’ characteristics) 
reject the null hypothesis and therefore they indicate that there are statistically 
significant differences between firm failure clusters’ in all financial ratios’  and the 
firm age medians. Therefore, the medians of financial ratios and of the age of the 
firms are not the same across firm failure clusters. As such, this part of the analysis 
accepts the first part of Hypothesis 3: Financial performance represented by key 
financial ratios and the age of the firm, differ in the alternative firm failure 
processes of EU firms. The results are consistent for both sets of clusters, with and 
without directors’ characteristics. 
 
Hypothesis 4: In a cross country context, macroeconomic conditions differ 
between firms in the alternative firm failure processes in EU firms; they also differ 
as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure 
processes.  
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GDP growth and the credit availability are both continuous variables. The median 
test (Pearson chi square) has been applied to compare the median GDP growth 
and credit availability between difference clusters. The null hypothesis of the 
median test suggests that there is no statistical difference in the medians of GDP 
growth and credit availability between failure clusters. The alternative hypothesis 
suggest that there is a difference in the medians in the alternative firm failure 
process clusters. The results (Table 5.5) in both failure clusters (with and without 
directors’ characteristics) indicate that there is statistically significant difference 
between firm clusters’ in both the GDP growth and the credit availability as the 
null hypothesis is rejected for both economic metrics. Therefore, the first part of 
Hypothesis 4 is accepted: In a cross country context, macroeconomic conditions 
differ between firms in the alternative firm failure processes in EU firms. 
  
Hypothesis 5: Directors’ Characteristics such as the presence of women in SMEs’ 
management, director age as a proxy of director experience and the number of 
directors, differ in the alternative EU firm failure processes; they also differ as 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
The directors’ characteristics are firm specific characteristics that were used to 
identify the alternative firm failure processes. As such one would expect that these 
will differ in the alternative firm failure processes. The median test (Pearson chi 
square) has been applied to compare the median number of women in the board, 
median age of directors and median number of directors  across the 4 different 
failure clusters (with and without directors’ characteristics). The null hypothesis of 
the median test suggests that there is no statistical difference in the medians of 
the director characteristics between failure clusters. The alternative hypothesis 
suggests that there is a difference in the medians of the director characteristics in 
the alternative firm failure process clusters. 
 
The result (Table 5.5) in both failure clusters (with and without directors’ 
characteristics) indicate that firm failure clusters have statistically different median 
number of women in the board, age of directors and total number of directors. 
Therefore, the first part of Hypothesis 5 is accepted: Directors’ Characteristics such 
as the presence of women in SMEs’ management, director age-as a proxy of 
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director experience and the number of directors, differ in the alternative EU firm 
failure processes. The results are consistent for both sets of clusters, with and 
without directors’ characteristics. This is a further indication that the inclusion of 
directors’ characteristics is important in the identification of firm failure processes 
in the quantitative failure process literature and confirms the evidence from the 
qualitative failure process literature (see for example Argenti, 1976; Richardson et 
al., 1994; Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008). 
 
Hypothesis 6: The distribution of firms with unsustainable levels of growth differs 
between the alternative firm failure processes in EU firms; unsustainable levels of 
growth are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
 
The Sustainable growth variable (SGR) has been developed by employing the 
formulae presented in Chapter 4.  The SGR takes the value of 1 if a firm’s annual 
growth in sales exceeds the calculated sustainable growth level and 0 otherwise. 
A rapid increase of a firm’s sales, beyond the sustainable levels has been 
associated with firm failure (Argenti, 1976; Richardson et al., 1994; Higgins, 
1977).  The null hypothesis of the chi square is that there is no difference in the 
distribution of firms in the rows (SGR) and columns (failure clusters). The 
alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference in the distribution of firms 
between failure processes and the SGR. 
 
The results (Table 5.4) demonstrate that the Pearson Chi-square is significant with 
3 degrees of freedom (p-value <0.01). Therefore, one can accept hypothesis 6: 
The distribution of firms with unsustainable levels of growth differs between the 
alternative firm failure processes in EU firms. This is because there is a statistically 
significant difference in the distribution of firms where SGR=1 and therefore with 
unsustainable levels of growth across the failure clusters. 
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5.5 Panel Data Analysis  
 
5.5.1 Introduction 
 
After reviewing the results of the hypothesis tests on clusters, the results of panel 
data logistic regressions are presented. Panel data ordinal logistic regression has 
been applied to the 8 different failure processes (four for with directors’ 
characteristics and four for without directors’ characteristics) in order to identify 
whether the independent variables that are identified in the hypotheses are 
significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure. That is, the transition from 
a healthy firm status, to financially distressed and ultimately to liquidation, and 
therefore failure. In addition, one can compare the differences between the 
alternative firm failure processes when firms’ transition to failure is concerned. 
 
There are two reasons why a panel ordered specification was used. First, the focus 
is to investigate whether the variables that have been used to cluster firms in the 
alternative failure processes are significant in all firm failure clusters. It will be 
assisted by using a number of control variables to provide an additional angle in 
answering the research hypotheses. Secondly the dependent variable of the model 
is ordered where 0 is when the firm is still healthy; 1 is when the firm is in financial 
distress; 2 is when the firm is bankrupt. 
 
All the firms that are participating in this analysis eventually went into liquidation. 
The application of ordered panel regressions assists in identifying whether the 
explanatory variables are determinants for the failure status progress of a firm 
(from a healthy status to liquidation). This is a salient issue that has not been 
discussed in the failure process literature where firms are classified/clustered 
based on their final failure status. This thesis has already provided evidence that 
the failure process takes a number of years and involves a number of firm-specific 
characteristics. However, little is known about the role of the intermediate status 
of the firm (the financial distress) which has been a major part of research in the 
failure prediction literature.  
 
Therefore, the panel structure is used to check whether there is a difference 
between the clusters (and in the full firms’ population) and between the failure 
status progress. It also gives the ability to test in a more dynamic structure all of 
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the characteristics that were used in the factor/cluster analysis given that the 
dimensions of a) the firms’ individual heterogeneity, b) the intermediate stages of 
failure are considered and c) the effects of time are explicitly considered. This 
section’s results do not attempt to re-assess the potential independent variables 
in the context of whether they are determinants between firms that failed and 
firms that never failed. Such an attempt is outside the scope of this thesis. This 
chapter analyses the determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the context of 
the alterative firm failure processes in order to identify potential differences 
between them. The next section of the analysis presents the results of the panel 
ordered logit model. 
 
5.5.2 Fixed or Random Effects Test  
 
The use of panel data analysis for ordered logistic regression leads to the question 
of whether a fixed or random effects estimator should be used. Should we proceed 
by using a fixed-effects ordered logistic regression, the “blow-up and cluster” 
(BUC) approach would have to be used (Baetschmann et al., 2015) due to the 
fixed effects estimator for the nonlinear ordered model being inconsistent. The 
BUC estimator has been shown to outperform other available fixed effects 
estimators for panel ordered logistic regressions, such as the FF estimator from 
Frijters et al., (2004) and the Das and Van Soest (1999) estimator, both in terms 
of bias and consistency (Baetschmann et al., 2015).  
 
Nevertheless, an assessment of the characteristics of the data suggests that a 
random effects ordered panel model should be used for two reasons. First, the 
regressors will include time invariant characteristics (eg. industry, country, legal 
tradition). These cannot be treated in a fixed effects model but only in a random 
effects context (Greene and Hensher, 2010). Second, evidence also shows that 
even when only the time-varying variables are included in an ordered panel logistic 
model applied to all firms in the sample (and separately in each of the clusters), 
the random effects estimator was still preferred (Greene and Hensher, 2010).   
 
The test for the existence of fixed or random effects when the time invariant 
variables are excluded from the model was the one proposed by Greene and 
Hensher (2010). This is based on a likelihood ratio test and can be used in the 
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place of the Hausman test, when ordered logistic regressions are concerned 
(Greene and Hensher, 2010). The Hausman (1978) test is only effective for linear 
regression techniques. The steps of this approach are as follows. 
 
First, a random effects model with the time varying independent variables has 
been used to which we add the group means of the variables. The purpose of the 
means is to control for correlation between the individual effects and the 
independent variables. Therefore, the group mean of variables should account for 
the correlation between the individual effect and the regressors (Greene and 
Hensher, 2010). If this correlation is confirmed then the fixed effect approach 
should be undertaken. If such a correlation does not exist then the random effects 
model should be appropriate (Greene and Hensher, 2010). The random effects 
model was run in all the failed firms’ data (and then separately in each cluster) 
and included all the time varying variables (financial ratios, firm age, credit 
availability, GDP growth and directors’ characteristics) and their means. These 
models’ estimates were then stored and a similar random effects model without 
the means was also run (and its estimates were also stored). 
 
Second, a likelihood ratio test was carried out as a variable addition test of joint 
significance of the group means. Specifically, the estimates of the two models with 
and without the group means of the time-varying variables were compared with 
the likelihood ratio, on the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the means are 
all zero, following Greene and Hensher (2010).   
 
The results (not reported) did not reject the hypothesis (at p=0.01 with 10 degrees 
of freedom) and therefore this suggests that the random effects specification 
should be used. The same approach was then applied to the individual failure 
clusters which are essentially smaller subsets of the main dataset. There are no 
significant differences in the results. 
 
5.5.3  Independent Variables in the Panel Ordered Logistic 
Regression  
 
A few notes about the independent variables should be made. The regressions use 
the firm-specific characteristics such as the financial ratios, the firm age and the 
directors’ characteristics that have already been discussed in the factor and cluster 
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analysis. The number of female directors has been tested in two alternative 
specifications. The first specification reports the number of female directors in the 
board (Female_nr). The alternative specification includes a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if a firm has any female member on the board and 0 otherwise. 
Both specifications gave similar results in terms of statistical significance at the 
Sig.<0.05 level across all the data splits (full data and splits in clusters). The 
specification with the number of female directors (female_nr) is only reported in 
the analysis section (5.5.5; Table 5.7).  
 
A number of additional control variables are used in the regressions. The legal 
tradition variable is used in order to control for the legal tradition each firm is 
associated to (based on the country it belongs to) for relevant hypothesis testing 
purpose. The specification of this variable was attempted with two formats. In the 
format reported here the leg_trad variable takes the value of 1 for firms associated 
to common law and 0 for firms associated to legal traditions of civil law tradition 
(French, Scandinavian or German law).  
 
Table 5.6: Description of gensic variable and number of failed firms in each industrial 
classification. 
 
 
Industry variables (gensic) are used as control dummy variables for the industrial 
classification of the firms. The sample includes 9 industrial classifications and for 
that reason 8 dummy variables (gensic1-gensic8, with service as the reference) 
have been used. Table 5.6 provides a description of the industry that each dummy 
variable covers. The Services industry is used as a reference dummy variable due 
to its fast growing importance in the EU economy (Muller et al., 2015). 
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Control dummy variables also include 8 countries (Italy, Spain, Germany, Sweden, 
The Republic of Ireland, The Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom). 
Therefore 7 dummy variables for the countries have been used (country1 – 
country7) as presented in table 5.7. The United Kingdom is the reference and as 
such, it does not have a dummy variable per se; when all the country dummy 
variables=0, this means that the firms are belonging to the UK.  The UK is set as 
the reference country for two reasons. The first is that it has been one of the most 
widely researched countries in the firm failure literature (see for example Altman 
et al., 2010; Laitinen, 1992; Keasey and Watson, 1991). The second is that the 
UK is further analyzed for its regions’ firm failure processes in the following 
chapter. 
 
The sustainable growth dummy variable (SGR) represents the situation where a 
firm’s growth has exceeded the sustainable growth level. The SGR takes the value 
of 1 when the firm’s growth exceeds its sustainable level and 0 when it doesn’t.  
 
Finally, variables that control for the wider economic environment of the country 
have been used by means of the GDP growth (GDP_gr) variable and the credit 
availability as a percentage of GDP in a country (credit) variable. 
 
5.5.4 Statistical Assumptions of the Panel models 
 
Econometric theory suggests that the parallel regression assumption is one of the 
assumptions that one has to test when applying an ordered logistic regression 
model (panel or not).  This can be done either conceptually or statistically by using 
tests such as the Brant (1990) test.  Woolridge (2010) points out that a statistical 
rejection of the parallel assumption “…need not imply that ordered probit or 
ordered logit estimates of the response probabilities are poor estimates of the true 
response probabilities” (Woolridge, 2010 p.658). Additionally, “if logic dictates that 
the dependent variable is  an ordered response, the possibility that estimated 
probabilities  ?̂?(𝑦 ≤ 𝑗|𝑥), are not increasing in j for all values of x- which can happen 
if the 𝛽𝑗 are allowed to differ- does not make sense and it makes little sense to 
estimate an unordered model…” (Woolridge, 2010 p.658). Given the assumption 
that the event_failure =2 (liquidation) is conceptually a higher status than the 
event_failure=1 (financial distress) in a sample where all firms eventually fail in 
 162 | P a g e  
 
their final year in the sample, there is little to gain by proceeding with further 
parallel regression tests as it is conceptually unclear what the alternative 
specification might be. The regressions in this section, use standard errors. 
 
5.5.5 Panel Data Results 
 
The main objective in this section is to investigate the determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes of EU firms when firm-
specific characteristics and business and economic environment specific 
characteristics are considered. As such, this section focuses on the second and 
third objective of this study, in the context of EU firms’ transition to failure. The 
independent variables were previously introduced. This part of analysis is not 
intended to calculate partial or marginal effects of the independent variables or to 
interpret the threshold parameters of the panel ordered logit models. 
 
Nine Ordered Random Effects Panel Logit regressions were run by using 
information for all the firm-year observations in the sample. The first considered 
all the firms, grouped together ignoring the firm failure process (cluster) 
allocations. Eight further regressions with the same explanatory variables were run 
for each of the four clusters (with and without directors’ characteristics) 
separately. The results are presented in Table 5.7. The Likelihood Ratio test in the 
panel indicates that there is enough variability between firms in the sample to 
favor the panel specification over a simple ordered logistic model.  
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Table 5.7: Panel Data Regression across failed firms and clusters.  
 
 
5.5.5.1 Results 
The results in the full sample regression (Table 5.7, column 2) show all the 
independent variables on the first half of the table and the control variables in the 
second half. The signs of the coefficients are important to explain the direction of 
the effects for each independent variable. A positive sign in the coefficient signals 
Column:                1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Process 1 Process 2 Process3 Process4 Process 1 Process 2 Process3 Process4
ROI  -0.084***    -0.187***  -0.107**   -0.316** 0.011    -0.120*** -0.013  -0.136***  -0.241***
growth_rate   0.163***     0.037**  0.192**    0.322**   0.160** 0.166**    0.363**  0.180***  0.069***
NSTA  -0.026***  0.008* -0.020  -0.053**  -0.034**  -0.077*** 0.007 0.008  -0.011***
CFTS  -0.007** -0.001  -0.006** 0.001  -0.032**  -0.022* -0.006  -0.004**  -0.020**
quick_ratio  -0.004** -0.001 -0.002  -0.020**  -0.009**  -0.059**  -0.099**  -0.001*  -0.002**
TLTA  0.008***  0.020**   1.714** -0.001  0.009*  0.157** -0.010  0.040**  0.016**
QACA  -0.173***  0.193**  -0.327**  0.192*  -0.860** -0.135  0.550** 0.041  -0.797**
TCTL  -1.178**  -0.353**  -0.912** -1.300  -2.415**  -1.570**  -1.980**  -0.372** -0.020
Firmage  -0.002*** 0.001 0.001   0.002*  -0.002**  -0.009*** 0.003** 0.004  -0.004***
Avg_dir_age       -0.004*** -0.007 -0.004 0.002  -0.007***
Nr_Female_Dir 0.001 -0.004 0.043  -0.078**  -0.067* 
Total_Dir_Nr    -0.006*** -0.004  -0.025**  -0.022** -0.002
Credit  0.020***     0.020**    0.029**    0.069** -0.002 -0.002  0.092***  0.035** 0.002
GDP_gr  -0.043***    0.050**  -0.081** -0.001    -0.098**  -0.088** 0.002  -0.025**  -0.051**
Leg_trad.  -2.147***  -1.714**  -2.980**    -5.854***  -0.985**  -1.310***  -7.372***  -2.555***  -0.413* 
  SGR  0.434***   0.649** -0.089  0.642**  0.452**  0.525***  0.501***  0.187***  0.438***
Control_Ind (Agriculture)  -0.838** 0.069 -0.095 -0.029  -1.339**  -1.733* -0.095 -0.007 -0.429
Control_Ind (Mining) -0.771 -0.406 -0.693 0.181  -1.162* -1.073 -1.354 -0.755 -0.733
Control_Ind (Construction)  -1.012**   -0.242** -0.149  -0.378**  -1.419**  -1.974**  -0.265**  -0.175*  -1.005* 
Control_Ind (Manufacturing)  -0.915** -0.018 -0.154  -0.335**  -1.208**  -1.642*  -0.256**  -0.183* -0.829
Control_Ind (Trasp. & Comm.)  -0.730* -0.042 -0.061 -0.085  -1.075**  -1.598* -0.111 0.144 -0.725
Control_Ind (Wholesale)  -0.878**   -0.167* -0.209 -0.063  -1.328**  -1.812* -0.034  -0.248**  -0.924* 
Control_Ind (Retail)  -0.814** -0.052 -0.090 -0.025  -1.342**  -1.868** 0.015 -0.011 -0.815
Control_Ind (R. Estate)  -0.728*     0.210** -0.025 -0.067  -1.150** -1.525 -0.028 0.071 -0.525
Country1 (France)  0.353**    0.440** 0.279  1.630** -0.206 -0.436  2.349**  0.630**  0.298* 
Country2 (Germ.)  0.220** 0.007 -0.036  0.940**  -0.376* 0.063  1.659*  0.402** 0.210
Country3 (Ireland)  1.389**   0.863**  1.216**  3.062**  0.767**  0.938**  4.403**  1.390**  0.961**
Country4 (Italy) 0.110 0.419* -0.095  1.694**  -1.086**  -1.100**  2.555**  0.657** -0.172
Country5 (Netherl.)  -0.321** -0.313  -0.662**  -0.954** -0.312 -1.034  -0.419* -0.253 -0.187
Country6 (Spain)  -1.666**    -1.445**  -2.253**  -3.858**  -1.107**  -1.235**  -5.075**  -2.093**  -0.407**
Country7 (Sweden)  0.246** 0.014 0.000  0.042** 0.000  0.058**  1.465**  0.506**  0.243**
\cut1  1.611*** 3.127 4.772 8.669 -2.172  -2.518***  11.266***  4.637***  -0.581***
\cut2  2.212*** 3.702 5.412 9.121 -1.300  -1.291***  11.683***  5.227***  -0.010*
Sigma_2u 0.403 0.005 0.002 0.134 0.296 -2.518 0.102 0.731 0.015
std. Error Sigma_2u 0.015 0.000 0.002 0.037 0.037 1.124 0.038 0.068 0.025
LR test vs. ologit model 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.047 0.057
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
ROI TLTA Nr_Female_Dir 
growth_rate QACA Total_Dir_Nr   
NSTA TCTL Credit
CFTS Firmage GDP_gr
quick_ratio Avg_dir_age      Leg_trad.
SGR
Control Variables
Main Independent Variables
Independent
Variables
All 
Firms
Failure Processes w/out Directors' Characteristics Failure Processes with Directors' Characteristics
Coeff.
P>|z|   
Trade Credit to Total Liabilities
Firm Age
Average age of Directors
Number of Female Directors
Total Number of Directors
Credit availability (% GDP)
GDP Growth (%)
Legal Tradition
Return in Investment
Growth Rate (in total assets)
Net Sales to Total Assets
Cash Flow to Total Sales
Quick ratio
Glossary 
Total Liabilities to Total Assets
Quick Assets to Current Assets
Dummy for unsustainable growth rate
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an increased propensity for firms’ transition to failure. Therefore if an independent 
variable has a positive sign on the coefficient that means that an increase in that 
variable is associated with an increased tendency towards failure. On the other 
hand, a negative coefficient suggest that a decrease in an independent variable is 
associated with increased tendency towards failure. 
 
 Table 5.7, column 2, shows that all financial ratios are significant (at Sig.<0.05 
level or Sig.<0.01) determinants of the failure status of the firm. A number of 
financial ratios are negatively associated with firms’ transition to failure, as 
demonstrated by their negative coefficients. A reduction in ROI, NSTA, CFTS, quick 
ratio, QACA and TCTL are associated with an increased propensity for firms to 
transition to failure. As such, a reduction on the return on investment that a firm 
produces; a reduction in its sales compared to its total assets; a reduction to the 
cash flows it generates from its sales; a reduction in liquidity; a reduction in 
working capital and a reduction in trade credit compared to its total liabilities are 
all financial symptoms that are associated with increased propensity for firms’ 
transition to failure. 
 
The experience in the board of directors as measured by the average directors’ 
age and the total number of directors is negative and significant at the Sig.<0.01 
level. This means that firms’ transition to failure is associated with boards that 
have younger directors as well as fewer directors. On the other hand, the number 
of female directors is not significant (p-value 0.912). This has also been the case 
if the dummy variable of any women on the board was used instead.  
 
Credit availability and the GDP growth in the country where the firms operate are 
both significant determinants (at Sig.<0.01 level) of the firms’ transition to failure.  
Reduced GDP growth is associated with an increase in a firm’s likelihood of failure. 
The credit availability coefficient is positive because GDP growth fell faster than 
credit availability. This resulted in a rise in the ratio. Therefore, lower credit 
availability is associated with an increase in firms failing. A country’s legal tradition 
is a highly significant dummy variable (Sig.<0.01) (here discriminating between 
common law and Roman-based French, Scandinavian and German). The negative 
sign of the coefficient shows that firms in countries under the common law system 
are less likely to fail. The results have been tested with further dummy variables 
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for French, Scandinavian and German law separately but the results were 
quantitatively similar. In any split, the legal traditions are a significant determinant 
of the failure status progression of failed firms (from healthy to financially 
distressed and then liquidated/bankrupt).   
 
The age of the firm is also a significant determinant of the failure status 
progression as is the SGR. Considering the negative and positive signs of the 
coefficients, respectively, the results suggest that the younger firms and firms 
whose rates of growth (in sales) exceed the sustainable level are more stongly 
associated with failure. The presence of unsustainable levels of growth appears to 
be a significant determinant of the failure status progress for the firms regardless 
of the economic, or legal environment. The country dummy variables are generally 
significant with the exception of Italy. The presence of industry dummy variables 
for control gives mixed results. All industry classifications are significant at the 
Sig.<0.10 level but not everyone is at the Sig.<0.05 level, with exception of 
Mining. 
 
5.5.5.2 Results on Failure Processes w/out Directors 
We are now moving to the clusters that were developed without considering the 
directors’ characteristics. These are reported in columns 3-6 in Table 5.7. The 
analysis without directors’ characteristics is used to establish a reference point 
with the existing firm failure process literature before proceeding to the analysis 
with directors’ characteristics and the additional insights that it offers for SME 
board structure.  
 
In the first firm failure process (Table 5.7; column 3), not all financial ratios 
are significant. Net sales to total assets (NSTA), Cash flow to total sales (CFTS) 
and the quick ratio are not significant at 0.05 level (although NSTA is significant 
at Sig.<0.10 level).  
On the other hand, ROI and TCTL are significant determinants of firms transition 
to failure with a negative sign in the coefficient, implying that decreasing return 
on investment (ROI) and decreasing usage of trade credit are associated with 
increased propensity for firms’ transition to failure. In contrast, the growth rate (in 
total assets), TLTA and QACA are significant with a positive coefficient.  As such 
increasing total liabilities are associated with increased propensity towards failure. 
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However, the sign of the coefficient for QACA is not in line with expectations. This 
is because firms in this process are characterised by a decreasing trend on QACA, 
on average, wich temporarily improves prior to failure. Such a behaviour may 
imply firms’ efforts to impove their working capital conditions before their failure 
at a time when it is too late to save the (young) firm. 
 
The economic and legal environments are highly significant as are credit 
availability, the GDP growth and the legal tradition, all significant at the 0.05 level. 
SGR is highly significant at the Sig.<0.05 level. For the control variables, results 
on the countries’ and the industry dummies are mixed. From the countries’ 
dummies, Germany, Netherlands and Italy are not significant even at the 
Sig.<0.10 level despite the finding that Germany and Italy include the highest 
concentration of firms in that cluster. This indicates that within this cluster the 
failure status progress from a healthy status to liquidation is not necessarily 
country specific. Cluster 1 firms were entities that were relatively new that were 
characterized by having sufficient liquidity. It therefore appears that the 
determinants for failure status progression are mainly related to the 
macroeconomic environment and their growth-related issues.  
 
In the second firm failure process (Table 5.7; column 4), financial ratios are 
significant at the Sig.<0.05 level of significance with the exception of the quick 
ratio and the NSTA and the quick ratio. The firms in this cluster were characterized 
by their low NSTA and their worse liquidity issues relative to the all clusters results 
(in terms of quick ratio). Therefore, it is possible that NSTA and quick ratio (whilst 
characteristics of this firm failure process) were not sufficient to further determine 
their failure status progression. The other financial ratios are significant and in line 
with expectations. A reduction in ROI, CFTS, NSTA, QACA and TCTL is associated 
with increased propensity for firms’ transition to failure. In contrast, an increase 
in total assets’ growth rate and in total liabilities (TLTA) is associated with 
increased propensity for firms transition to failure.  
 
Firm age is also not significant at the Sig.<0.05 level. The legal tradition and the 
economic environment variables are all highly significant. A reduction in GDP and 
in credit availability (shown with a positive coefficient due to it being expressed as 
a percentage of GDP) are associated with an increased propensity to fail. On the 
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other hand, the SGR variable is not significant in this cluster. For the control 
variables, the industrial classification is not significant and the countries of 
operation are mixed (France, Germany and Italy are not significant). Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the determinants of transition to liquidation for this group 
of firms is largely related to the economic environment and the financial 
performance of the firms. In addition, unsustainable levels of growth do not appear 
to be significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure for these firms. 
 
In the third firm failure process (Table 5.7; column 5), ROI, NSTA and the 
quick ratio, are significant (Sig.<0.05) and negatively associated with firms’ 
transition to failure. As a result, a decrease in these ratios is associated with an 
increase in firms’ propensity to fail. On the other hand, the growth rate (in total 
assets) and the QACA are significant and positively associated with failure. 
 
The firms’ age is not significant at Sig.<0.05 level but it is at the Sig.<0.10 level 
of significance. This result still implies that the younger the age of the firm, the 
higher the propensity to fail. GDP growth is not significant. However, credit 
availability and the legal tradition are significant determinants of the failure status 
progression as is the sustainable growth (SGR). As such, a decrease in the levels 
of available credit (due to credit availability being expressed as a percentage of 
GDP) is associated with increased failure risk. Likewise, firms with unsustainable 
levels of growth (SGR=1) and firms whose legal tradition is the civil law 
(Leg_trad=0) are associated with a higher likelihood of firms’ transitioning to 
failure. 
 
From the control variables, all countries appear significant but the industrial 
classification is mixed.  In the third firm failure process, firms were characterized 
by their extensive usage of trade credit and yet it does not appear to be a 
significant determinant of the transition to failure. In contrast, the availability of 
credit in the economy and the unsustainable levels of growth are both significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure.  
 
In the fourth firm failure process (Table 5.7; column 6), all the financial ratios 
are significant with the exception of the return on investment (ROI). Cluster 4 was 
characterized by firms that had negative ROI. A number of financial ratios were 
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significant with negative coefficients. NSTA, CFTS, quick ratio, QACA and TCTL 
were negatively associated with firms’ transition to failure. As such a reduction in 
these ratios is associated with increased propensity for firms’ transition to failure 
in this failure process. On the other hand, growth rate (in total assets) and TLTA 
were (as in other firm failure processes) positively associated with firms’ transition 
to failure. Therefore, an increase in these ratios is associated with increased 
propensity to failure. 
 
GDP growth, the legal tradition and the SGR are all significant determinants of the 
failure status progression but credit availability is not. Reduced levels of GDP 
growth and increasing growth in sales, beyond the sustainable levels (SGR=1) are 
both associated with an increased propensity to failure. For the control variables, 
the industry classification appears to be generally significant in this cluster but the 
country of origination is mixed. Therefore, one can conclude that firms’ transition 
to failure in this cluster is related to the observed financial ratios and also the 
industry they belong to, as this is the only firm failure process where most of the 
variables controlling for the industry are significant. 
 
5.5.5.3 Results on Failure Processes with Directors 
We are now moving to the clusters that were developed by considering the 
directors’ characteristics. These results constitute the main contribution of this 
thesis as there is currently no evidence on the impact of including directors’ 
characteristics in the quantitative firm failure process literature.  The results are 
reported in columns 7-10 in Table 5.7.  
 
The first firm failure process (Table 5.7, column 7) is characterized by the 
significance of all financial ratios with the exception of quick assets to current 
assets (QACA). This is a financial ratio that was identified as having increased 
volatility in the cluster’s medians.  The investigation of firms’ transition to failure 
in the first firm failure process shows that decreased levels (negative coefficients) 
of return on investment (ROI), net sales to total assets (NSTA), cash flow to total 
assets (CFTS), liquidity (quick_ratio) and trade credit to total liabilities (TCTL) are 
all significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure. As a result when these 
financial ratios are falling, the firm’s propensity to transition to failure is increased. 
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On the other hand, increased rates of growth in total assets, and increased 
liabilities (TLTA), demonstrated by the positive coefficients in these financial ratios,  
are determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the first firm failure process. As a 
result, an increase in these financial ratios is associated with increased propensity 
for firms to transition to failure. 
 
In contrast to the first firm failure process without directors’ characteristics, firm 
age is a negative and significant determinant of the failure status progression in 
this case despite this cluster having, on average, fairly young firms. As a result, 
the younger the age of the firm, the higher the propensity for transition to failure. 
Credit availability is not a significant determinant of the failure status progress and 
none of the directors’ characteristics are either. It therefore appears that although 
this cluster is characterized as having female directors and a larger total number 
of directors, these are not significant characteristics that determine the failure 
status progression. The legal tradition and GDP growth are determinants, 
negatively associated with firms’ transition to failure in the first failure process. 
This implies that lower GDP growth in a country is associated with increased 
propensity for transition to failure. In addition, the negative sign of the coefficient 
for the legal tradition dummy variable suggests that firms in countries under the 
common law system are less likely to enter liquidation.  SGR’s positive association 
with the transition to failure implies that firms that have SGR=1 and therefore 
unsustainable levels of (sales) growth are associated with transition to failure. The 
control variables are mixed in their significance. 
 
In the second firm failure process (Table 5.7; column 8), an increase in the 
growth rate, and in the Quick Assets to Current Assets (QACA) as well as a 
decrease in the quick ratio, and in the Trade credit to Total Liabilities (TCTL) are 
all significant ratios associated with firms’ transition to failure. In addition, 
increasing firm age and the decreasing levels of directors’ experience proxied by a 
lower total number of directors are associated with increased propensity towards 
failure. This is a cluster that was characterized by a large volatility in liquidity and 
it appears that this volatility actually determines the failure status progression.. 
As shown above, this cluster includes some signs in the coefficients that are not 
entirely expected and vary from the signs that have been observed in the all firms 
sample (Table 5.7, column 2). Increased firm age is positively associated with 
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increased propensity for firms’ transition to failure. This contradicts the common 
view that firms’ age is negatively associated with failure due to the young age of 
the firm being an indicator of an unestablished firm. However, Argenti (1976) 
suggests that there is a firm failure process for old firms that have become 
“apathetic” and fail because of that. This finding fits in that context as the second 
firm failure process is associated with some of the oldest firms in the sample. 
Moreover, increased working capital (QACA) is positively associated with firms’ 
transition to failure. This can be explained in the context of the second firm failure 
process. Firms in this process have improving working capital in the years towards 
failure. On the other hand, decreased liquidity (quick ratio) and trade credit usage 
compared to their total liabilities (TCTL) (a sign that suppliers do not trust these 
companies and so are less willing to extend them credit) are negatively associated 
with firms’ transition to failure.  
 
Credit availability in the economy is a significant determinant of failure 
progression. Decreasing levels of credit and number of directors (the positive sign 
here is due to the credit availability being calculated as a percentage of GDP; GDP 
was reducing more aggressively than the credit availability for a number of years 
resulting in an increasing ratio) are also associated with firms’ transition to failure. 
This cluster is characterized by firms that, on average (median), had high, though 
reducing, trade credit usage (TCTL).   
 
Both the legal tradition and SGR are significant at the Sig.<0.01 level. The negative 
sign of the coefficient for the legal tradition dummy variable, suggests that firms 
in countries under the common law system are less likely to enter liquidation. 
Likewise the positive sign of SGR suggests that firms with unsustainable levels of 
(sales) growth (SGR=1) are associated with an increased propensity for transition 
to failure.  
 
From the control variables the countries are generally significant but the industrial 
classification is mixed. 
 
In the third firm failure process (Table 5.7; column 9), increased growth rates 
in total assets and total liabilities to total assets (TLTA), are associated with an 
increased propensity for firms’ transition to failure.  
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On the other hand,decreased ROI,  CFTS, liquidity  and TCTL on the other hand, 
are significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure at Sig. <0.01 and 
Sig.<0.05 levels (with TLTA, QACA and the quick ratio significant at Sig.<0.10 
significance level). As a result, when return on investment, cash flow generation 
as a percentage of the total sales liquidity and trade credit usage are decreasing, 
the propensity for firms’ transition to failure is increasing. This cluster is 
characterized by constant liquidity problems and therefore it appears that liquidity 
alone is not the main determinant of the failure status progression (quick ratio 
significant at Sig.<0.10 level).  
 
In terms of the directors’ characteristics, fewer directors and therefore reduced 
social capital as proxied by the total number of directors and reduced gender 
diversity in the board, proxied by the number of female directors (also tested with 
a dummy variable for the existence of any female directors with similar results) 
are further significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure at the Sig.<0.05 
level despite the fact that this is a cluster that is characterized by a small total 
number of directors. Given the negative signs of the coefficients in both 
characteristics, one can assume that further reduction in board social capital and 
heterogeneity is a determinant associated with firms’ transition to failure for the 
firms in this process. Given that the clusters considered directors’ characteristics 
at the last year (of failure) it looks plausible that variations in the number of 
directors might be significant determinants of failure status progression for these 
firms. The economic and legal tradition environment are significant determinants 
of failure status progression in these firms (at Sig.<0.05 level) as is the SGR. The 
sign of the coefficient for the legal tradition variable implies that firms in countries 
under a civil law system have a higher propensity towards failure. Moreover, firms 
with unsustainable levels of growth (SGR=1) are also more likely to fail. Control 
variables’ significance is mixed for this cluster. 
 
In the fourth firm failure process (Table 5.7; column 10), all financial ratios 
are significant, with the exception of TCTL. This cluster’s firms are characterized 
by relatively increasing usage of credit in the years prior but this does not appear 
to be a key determinant of the failure status progression. ROI, NSTA, CFTS, 
quick_ratio and QACA have all negative coefficients, implying that a reduction in 
these financial ratios is associated with transition to failure. Growth rates in total 
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assets and TLTA are determinants of firms’ transition to failure, with a positive 
coefficient. This implies that an increase in these ratios is associated with an 
increased propensity for firms’ failure. 
 
Firm age is a significant determinant of failure status progression with the expected 
negative sign. As such, younger firm age is associated with the transition to failure. 
In terms of the management structure, reduced presence of female directors and 
therefore gender diversity as well as reduced average age of directors and 
therefore experience are all associated with firms’ transition to failure. Likewise, 
reduced GDP growth and increased levels of unsustainable growth (SGR=1) are 
both associated with the transition to failure. As in the case of the firm failure 
process 3, it appears that changes in the directors across time affect the failure 
status progression. The legal tradition is significant at the Sig.<0.10 level (p-
value=0.053) implying that firms in countries under the common law tradition are 
less likely to be associated with transition to failure. Most of the control variables 
appear insignificant at the Sig.<0.05 level. 
 
The results of the analysis of the determinants of firms’ transition to liquidation for 
the full sample and for the alternative firm failure processes where directors’ 
characteristics are included, demonstrate that the inclusion of directors’ 
characteristics is statistically significant. In the full sample (table 5.7, column 2) 
the total number of directors and their average age are significant determinants 
of firms’ transition to failure. This implies that the experience of directors and the 
additional dimension of social and human capital that they provide in a firm are 
determinants of transition to failure. However, the results differ in the alternative 
firm failure processes. These results, further illustrate that the inclusion of 
directors’ characteristics is significant in a firm failure process study. 
 
5.5.5.4 Marginal Effects of Failure Processes with Directors’ Characteristics 
This section looks at the marginal effects of firms’ transition to failure in the 
alternative countries and the alternative firm failure processes. The results derive 
from the panel regressions and, by extension, show a comparison for the firms of 
each country compared to the UK, which was the reference country in the 
regression analysis’ dummy variables. The aim of this section is to provide a 
breakdown of the relative magnitude of the country effects (that were shown as 
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significant in the regression analysis) for each one of the alternative firm failure 
statuses as this is not explicitly obvious in the panel regression results. Effectively 
the marginal effects capture the magnitude of change in the dependent variable 
(firm failure status) for a change in the independent variable (country). In this 
section, these are presented as probabilities of each country to be in a firm failure 
status (0: healthy; 1: financial distress; 2: liquidation). Table 5.8 shows the 
results.  
 
Table 5.8: Marginal effects – All EU firms 
 
The following are some observations to be made when looking at the marginal 
effects at means for each country separately. The percentages are capturing the 
magnitude of change in the firm failure status (the dependent variable) for each 
country (therefore for a change in the dummy variable representing each country). 
These are translated as percentages against the average firm. The structure of the 
regression represents that with UK firms which were the reference dummy 
variables. 
o French firms’ probability for the terminal status is 6.4%; 1.7% higher for 
financial distress and -8% for financial health, at means. 
o German firms’ probability for the terminal status is 4%; 1% for financial 
distress and -5% for financial health, at means. 
o Irish firms’ probability for the terminal status is 25%, higher than the 
average (UK) firm and than any other country. This means that firs located 
in Ireland “cause” a 25.3% increase (on average) in the dependent variable. 
Therefore Irish firms are much more likely to be in liquidation (firm failure 
status = 2). Likewise, the marginal effect of 6.5% for financial distress and 
-32% for financial health, show that Irish firms are more likely to be 
associated with financial distress and less likely to be associated with 
financial health. 
Firm Failure
Status France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden
0 -8.1% -5.0% -31.8% -2.5% 7.4% 38.1% 8.0%
1 1.7% 1.0% 6.5% 0.5% -1.5% -7.8% -1.6%
2 6.4% 4.0% 25.3% 2.0% -5.9% -30.3% -6.4%
Marginal Effects in EU Countries (All firms/ UK as reference country)
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o Italian firms’ probability for the terminal status is 2%. In contrast, Italian 
firms’ probability for financial distress is 0.05% and -2.5% for financial 
health at means. 
o Netherland firms’ probability for the terminal status is -6%; -1.5%   for 
financial distress and 7% for financial health, at means. 
o Spanish firms are associated with a -30% lower probability for the 
liquidation status; -8% for financial distress and 38% with financial health 
status, at means. 
o Swedish firms are associated with a -6.4% probability for the liquidation 
status; -1.6% for financial distress and 8% probability for financial health 
status, at means. 
 
Table 5.9: Marginal effects – EU firms by Firm Failure process 
 
On the other hand, one can observe some differentiations on the countries’ 
marginal effects when the alternative firm failure process are concerned (Table 
5.9). All other things, being equal, in the four alternative firm failure processes, 
firm failure processes, Spanish firms have the highest probabilities in the firm 
failure status of the healthy firm (event_failure=0). This is because in all the 
alternative firm failure processes, Spansh firms have the highest percentage in 
Firm Failure Status=0. In contrast, Irish firms are the ones with the lowest 
probabilities of being in the firm failure status of the healthy firm in all the 
alternative firm faiure processes.  
Firm Failure
 Status France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden
0 -4.8% -3.0% -18.9% -1.5% 4.4% 22.7% 5.2%
1 -1.9% -1.2% -7.6% -0.6% 1.8% 9.2% 2.1%
2 6.7% 4.3% 26.5% 2.1% -6.1% -31.8% -7.3%
0 -5.7% -3.6% -22.4% -1.8% 5.2% 26.9% 5.5%
1 1.9% 1.2% 7.4% 0.6% -1.7% -8.8% 2.0%
2 3.8% 2.4% 15.1% 1.2% -3.5% -18.1% -7.5%
0 -6.8% -4.3% -26.9% -2.1% 6.2% 32.3% 6.9%
1 1.9% 1.2% 7.6% 0.6% -1.8% -9.2% -1.8%
2 4.9% 3.1% 19.3% 1.5% -4.5% -23.1% -5.1%
0 -6.9% -4.3% -27.3% -2.2% 6.3% 32.7% 6.7%
1 1.9% 1.2% 7.6% 0.6% -1.8% -9.1% 1.4%
2 5.0% 3.1% 19.6% 1.6% -4.5% -23.6% -8.1%
Marginal Effects in EU countries (FOURTH PROCESS WITH DIRECTORS/ UK as reference country)
Marginal Effects in EU countries (THIRD PROCESS WITH DIRECTORS/ UK as reference country)
Marginal Effects in EU countries (SECOND PROCESS WITH DIRECTORS/ UK as reference country)
Marginal Effects in EU countries (FIRST PROCESS WITH DIRECTORS/ UK as reference country)
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On the other hand, in the case of firms transition to financial distress 
(event_failure=1), Irish firms are the ones that have the lowest probability (7.6%) 
in the first firm failure process. As such Irish firms are the least likely to be 
associated with financial distress in the first firm failure process. Spanish firms 
have the lowest probabilities from all countries’ firms to be in the firm failure status 
of financial distress in the second, third and fourth firm failure process. 
 
When, liquidation is considered (event_failure=3) Irish firms have the highest 
probabilities in all firm failure processes (26.5%, 15.1%, 19.3% and 19.6% higher 
than the UK firms in the first second, third and fourth firm failure process 
respectively).  
 
Therefore, evidence from the marginal effects at means analysis shows that firms 
from different countries have different distribution of propensities for transition to 
failure for each of the alternative failure stages (financial distress and then 
liquidation) when all other independent variables take their mean values. 
5.5.6 Panel Regression Results’ implications on the Hypotheses 
 
Table 5.10 summarises whether the hypotheses relevant to this chapter are 
accepted. 
 
Table 5.10: Summary table for Chapter 5 Hypotheses 
 
 
 
Nr. Hypothesis Statement Accepted?
H1
Countries’ legal origins differ between firms in the alternative failure processes in the EU countries under 
consideration; they are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure.
Yes
H2
Industry classification differs between firms in the alternative firm failure processes in EU firms; it also 
differs as a determinant of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes.
Yes
H3
Financial performance represented by key financial ratios and the age of the firm, differ in the alternative 
firm failure processes of EU firms; they also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the 
alternative firm failure processes.
Yes
H4
In a cross country context, macroeconomic conditions differ between firms in the alternative firm failure 
processes in EU firms; they also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm 
failure processes. 
Yes
H5
Directors’ Characteristics such as the presence of women in SMEs’ management, director age as a proxy of 
director experience and the number of directors, differ in the alternative EU firm failure processes; they 
also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes.
Yes
H6 The distribution of firms with unsustainable levels of growth differs between the alternative firm failure 
processes in EU firms; unsustainable levels of growth are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure
Yes
Table of Hypotheses for EU firms
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Hypothesis 1: Countries’ legal origins differ between firms in the alternative 
failure processes in the European countries under consideration; they are also 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
 
The first part of Hypothesis 1 has already been accepted on the basis of the cluster 
analysis. Consistent with this, the evidence from the panel regressions show 
additionally that a country’s legal origins is a statistically significant determinant 
of firms’ transition to failure in all firm failure processes. Therefore Hypothesis 1 is 
fully accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Industry classification differs between firms in the alternative firm 
failure processes in EU firms; it also differs as a determinant of firms’ transition to 
failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
With regards to the industry classification, it has been already reported that there 
is a statistically significant difference in the industry distribution across the failure 
clusters on the basis of the cluster analysis results. Evidence from the panel 
regression show that the significance of the industry effects in firms’ transition to 
failure does differ between clusters and is also industry-specific. Therefore 
Hypothesis 2 is fully accepted.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Financial performance represented by key financial ratios and the 
age of the firm, differ in the alternative firm failure processes of EU firms; they 
also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm 
failure processes. 
 
Based on the cluster analysis it has already been evidence that the medians of 
financial ratios and of the firm age are not the same across firm failure clusters. 
The panel regressions also show that the significance of financial ratios differs 
between clusters. There are differences between the financial ratios that are 
significant determinants firms’ transition to failure for each of the alternative firm 
failure processes.  The same applied for the firm age. The firm age is significant 
determinant of firms’ transition to failure for the first, second and fourth firm failure 
process as well as for the full EU firms’ sample. Therefore Hypothesis 3 is fully 
accepted. 
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Hypothesis 4: In a cross-country context, macroeconomic conditions differ 
between firms in the alternative firm failure processes in EU firms; they also differ 
as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure 
processes.  
 
The results in the cluster analysis indicated that there are statistically significant 
differences between firm failure processes in both GDP growth and in the credit 
availability. The results from the panel analysis show that, even when controlling 
for the country of the firm’s operation and its financial ratios, GDP growth and the 
credit availability are significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure in a 
number of firm failure processes. However, they are not significant determinants 
of firms’ transition to failure in all the firm failure processes. As such, there are 
differences in their significance between the alternative firm failure processes.  
Therefore Hypothesis 4 is fully accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Directors’ Characteristics such as the presence of women in SMEs’ 
management, director age as a proxy of director experience and the number of 
directors, differ in the alternative EU firm failure processes; they also differ as 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
The result from the cluster analysis indicated that firm failure processes have 
statistically different median numbers of women in the board, statistically different 
ages of directors and statistically different total number of directors. Evidence from 
the panel analysis further indicates that the directors’ characteristics are significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in a number of firm failure processes. 
However, different combinations of directors’ characteristics are statistically 
significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure 
processes. Therefore Hypothesis 5 is fully accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The distribution of firms with unsustainable levels of growth differs 
between the alternative firm failure processes in EU firms; unsustainable levels of 
growth are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
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The results from the cluster analysis indicate that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the distribution of firms with sustainable growth levels across the 
alternative failure processes. This is consistent with the panel regression results 
which show that unsustainable growth levels are a significant determinant in a 
number of firm failure processes. Therefore Hypothesis 6 is fully accepted. The 
SGR is a significant determinant of firms’ transition to failure in most of the 
alternative firm failure processes. 
 
5.6 Robustness Checks   
 
Two additional analyses for robustness were undertaken. The results are presented 
in Table 5.11.  
 
First, the ordered random effects panel model was bootstrapped (100 iterations 
with replacement) in order to test whether the results remain the same and that 
there is no bias in the error components. The results (Table 5.11, column 3) 
indicate that the directors’ characteristics, the legal tradition, the age of the firm, 
the sustainable growth indicator and all the industry-specific and country-specific 
control variables have practically the same results. There is some small variation 
in some financial ratios (ROI, NSTA, CFTS, Quick Ratio) which are now significant 
at the 10% level. The only material difference is the TLTA financial ratio that is not 
significant at 5% or 10% level. However, this does not affect the overall conclusion 
of the study. 
 
Second, a simple (non-panel) ordered logit model with the same variables is 
applied to all firms. Although there are some small variations in the level of 
significance of the quick ratio and some of the control variables such as Ireland, 
the results (Table 5.11, column 4) indicate the same variables were determinants 
of the firms’ transition towards failure as in the original panel random effects 
ordered model. The direction of the coefficients is also the same. However, the 
reported Likelihood Ratio test (Sig.<0.01) indicates a significant variability 
between firms in the sample which makes the panel data approach the preferred 
specification (if comparing panel and simple ordered logit).  
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Table 5.11: Robustness checks and comparison with the results of the original 
regression. 
 
 
 
Column:                1 2 3 3 4
ROI  -0.084***  -0.084* -0.084  -1.429***
growth_rate   0.163***   0.163***    0.163***  0.064***
NSTA  -0.026***  -0.026*    -0.026***  -0.010***
CFTS  -0.007**  -0.007*   -0.007**  -0.005**
quick_ratio  -0.004**  -0.004*  -0.004**  -0.001*
TLTA  0.008*** 0.008 0.008  5.690***
QACA  -0.173***  -0.173**  -0.173***  -0.105***
TCTL  -1.178**  -1.178**  -1.178**  -0.727**
Firmage  -0.002***  -0.002* -0.002  -0.002***
Avg_dir_age       -0.004***  -0.004***    -0.004**  -0.004***
Nr_Female_Dir 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003
Total_Dir_Nr    -0.006***  -0.006*  -0.006*  -0.007***
Credit  0.020***  0.020***  0.020**  0.020***
GDP_gr  -0.043***  -0.043***  -0.043**  -0.043**
Leg_trad.  -2.147***  -2.147**  -2.147**  -2.360**
  SGR  0.434***  0.434***  0.434***  0.249***
Control_Ind (Agriculture)  -0.838**  -0.838*  -0.838**  -1.615**
Control_Ind (Mining) -0.771 -0.771 -0.771  -1.481**
Control_Ind (Construction)  -1.012**  -1.012**  -1.012**  -1.929**
Control_Ind (Manufacturing)  -0.915**  -0.915**  -0.915**  -1.663**
Control_Ind (Trasp. & Comm.)  -0.730*  -0.730*  -0.730*  -1.836**
Control_Ind (Wholesale)  -0.878**  -0.878**  -0.878**  -1.762**
Control_Ind (Retail)  -0.814**  -0.814*  -0.814*  -1.701**
Control_Ind (R. Estate)  -0.728*  -0.728*  -0.726*  -1.497**
Country1 (France)  0.353**  0.353**  0.353**  0.204**
Country2 (Germ.)  0.220**  0.220**  0.220*  0.137**
Country3 (Ireland)  1.389**  1.389** 1.389** 1.921*
Country4 (Italy) 0.110 0.110 0.110 -0.389
Country5 (Netherl.)  -0.321**  -0.321**  -0.321*  -0.463**
Country6 (Spain)  -1.666**  -1.666**  -1.666**  -1.664**
Country7 (Sweden)  0.246**  0.246**  0.246*  0.221**
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Independent Variables
Control Variables
P>|z|   
Independent
Variables
All Firms
Random 
Effects 
Ordered Panel
All Firms
Random Effects 
Ordered Panel
Bootstrap
All Firms
Random Effects 
Ordered Panel
Robust Errors
All Firms
 Simple 
Ordered 
Logit
Coeff.
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The results of the above tests are also repeated at firm failure process level without 
material variations from the original regressions. Therefore the results of the 
robustness tests confirm that a panel ordered random effects model captures the 
dynamics of the firms’ individual heterogeneity in a better way than the non-panel 
approach. At the same time, there is evidence that the use of the panel 
specification does not alter the conclusions of the study from a statistical 
perspective. Likewise, although there are some evidences of a weaker significance 
in some of the financial ratios under the bootstrap application, the primary 
conclusions of this analysis are confirmed since these variations do not affect the 
overall conclusion or direction of the results.  
 
5.7 Discussion  
 
The objective of this chapter is to identify and compare SMEs’ failure processes in 
European Union countries and to either confirm or reject the hypotheses. This 
section discusses the findings with the existing evidence from the literature. 
 
The factor/clustering analysis results with and without directors’ characteristics 
show evidence that indeed firm failure is a process that develops across a number 
of years. The above results concluded that there are four main failure processes, 
broadly in line with the qualitative (eg. Argenti, 1976; Ooghe and DePrijcker, 
2008) and quantitative literature (eg. Laitinen et al, 2014; Laitinen et al., 2015; 
Lukason and Laitinen, 2016) that has historically identified between 2 and 6 firm 
failure processes. In addition, once directors’ characteristics are included in the 
formation of the firm failure processes, the total number of processes remains the 
same. 
 
As discussed above, the inclusion of directors’ information adds further insights 
into the formation of the failure processes. In addition, the inclusion of directors’ 
characteristics is a significant determinant of firms’ transition to failure for a 
number of alternative failure processes as well as for the full sample of the firms. 
For these reasons the focus on the discussion will be given on the failure processes 
with directors’ characteristics. For this reason the focus on the discussion will be 
given on the failure processes with directors’ characteristics. 
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5.7.1 Discussion on Firm Failure process 
 
5.7.1.1 Critique on Failure Processes  
This section provides a critical evaluation of the four firm failure processes that are 
identified in the EU countries and discusses the similarities with the processes 
analysed in the qualitative and quantitative literature in other countries. 
 
One of the key differences between the processes for the results with and without 
directors’ characteristics is that the first firm failure process with directors’ 
characteristics includes female directors. This differs from any other cluster in this 
analysis and provides an addition to the existing literature that so far does not 
consider directors’ characteristics as a potential explanatory variable in the firm 
failure process. 
The rest of the results of the analysis can be linked to the broad classification of 
the failure processes that the qualitative literature describes. The qualitative firm 
failure process literature proposes broadly four types of failure processes. The first 
type of failure process is the relatively new firm that never becomes successful 
and fails; the second type of failure process is that of an ambitious growth 
company; the third type of failure process is that of a dazzled growth company 
and the fourth type of failure process is that of the established apathetic company 
(Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008; Argenti, 1976). SMEs of up to 10 years old are 
generally defined as new (Wagner, 2004; Davidsson and Klofsten, 2003).  
 
The young age of the firm is one of the first characteristics that have been 
identified as determinants of firm failure processes. According to Ooghe and De 
Prijcker, (2008) the relatively new firm that never succeeds, fails within five years 
of its launch, after having a period of limited growth and a lack of profitability. 
That failure process can be broadly linked with the first failure process of this 
analysis. That is, the relatively new firm that never becomes successful. The 
results show that the firms in this process have historically low returns. Firms in 
the first cluster had growing sales but failed to convert them to increased cash 
flows or overall growth rates (in assets), which is consistent with Ooghe and De 
Prijcker, (2008) who argued that firms in such a failure process suffer from weak 
cash flows and profitability. The average age of these firms (in the first failure 
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process) in this analysis is 8 years, which is slightly higher than the 5 years that 
Ooghe and De Prijcker, (2008) suggest but in both cases they are classified as 
young firms.  The presence of female directors in the board and the relatively high 
total number of directors in these young firms, may imply that management 
experience and diversity are not a problem in the first firm failure process. There 
is sufficient social and gender diversity on these firms’ boards.  
 
The process of an “apathetic” old firm (Argenti, 1976) could be relevant to firms 
that are older and performing in a stable manner for many years. Such a process 
resembles to the second firm failure process of this analysis. Firms in the second 
failure process have the highest average age of all the failure processes. These 
firms are on average 20 years old and had a number of years with mainly negative 
or borderline positive financial metrics. In fact, the second firm failure process is 
the only one where firms’ age is a significant determinant of transition to failure 
and with a positive sign, further supporting the qualitative observation of Argenti 
(1976) that in some cases the age of the firm can be linked to management apathy 
and dis-interest towards the firm’s viability. 
 
On the other hand, the failure process of an ambitious company (Ooghe and De 
Pricker, 2008) is possibly related to the third firm failure process.  These are firms 
that have increasing sales compared to their assets and increased usage of trade 
credit compared to their liabilities (TCTL). The latter may imply difficulties of 
obtaining bank finance as their total liabilities are generally increasing. As a result 
these firms turn to their suppliers to achieve trade credit. The fact that these firms 
can increase their use of trade credit signals trust from their suppliers who are 
willing to extend credit in situations where banks are not willing to do so (Berger 
and Udell, 2006). Nevertheless, the cash flows and the returns for these firms 
remain low although there is a mild improvement in their working capital (QACA). 
These firms have a small management team that lacks depth and potentially 
management experience. As such firms in this failure process are particularly 
vulnerable to the economic conditions. This is evidenced from being the only failure 
process where both the GDP growth and the Credit availability are both highly 
significant determinants of transition to failure, in addition to the characteristics of 
their management. 
 
 183 | P a g e  
 
Finally, the failure process of a dazzled growth and apathetic firm (Ooghe and De 
Prijcker, 2008; Argenti, 1976b) can be linked to the fourth failure process. These 
firms had positive total assets growth 6-7 years prior to failure and rapidly 
increasing net sales which however were not converted to sustainably high returns 
on equity or cash flows. In line with Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008), these firms’ 
total liabilities are gradually increasing and cash flows are decreasing as the firms 
cannot pay their liabilities. These firms also have fewer managers, potentially 
highlighting less available experience on the board. Lack of management depth 
though has been one of the key characteristics of failure in firms of any size 
(Argenti, 1976b; Ross and Kami, 1973; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992). This is 
empirically confirmed in this study, because the number of directors is a 
determinant of firms’ transition to failure in this process. 
 
5.7.1.2 Discussion on Hypotheses 
In relation to the hypotheses testing, the identification of four firm failure 
processes without directors’ characteristics has been in line with the academic 
literature that identified between 3 and 6 firm failure processes (see for example 
Laitinen et al, 2014; Laitinen and Lukason, 2014; Lukason and Laitinen, 2016). 
The results of this study also suggest that the inclusion of directors’ characteristics 
in a firm failure process study adds further insight in the firm failure processes. 
The study provides evidence that the first firm failure process that is characterized 
by young firms is also characterized by diversity in the board of directors in the 
form of female directors. The wider SME literature and the qualitative firm failure 
process literature implies that firms’ directors’ characteristics is a differentiating 
factor between some firm failure processes (Argenti 1976; Garcı́a-Olalla and 
Garcı́a-Ramos, 2010). 
 
Whilst the average age of directors in the firms of the first firm failure process is 
broadly the same with the others, the results provide evidence that these firms 
also have more directors on their board, which suggests significant experience in 
the management team. This is the first time that such evidence is produced in the 
context of a quantitative study of SMEs’ failure processes. The qualitative firm 
failure process literature provided early evidence that a firm’s management is a 
key characteristic of a firm’s failure process. Argenti (1976) argued that 
management is one of the three key components of firm failure, where for 
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example, the management of the firm lacks experience or is resistant to change. 
In addition to that, there are sufficient evidences in the wider firm failure literature 
that the gender diversity of the board (proxied by the existence of female 
directors) and the breadth of knowledge and experience (proxied by the number 
of directors) on firms' board of directors is (negatively) associated with firm failure 
(see for example, Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Wilson et al., 2014). This study 
therefore confirms that directors’ characteristics differ between alternative firm 
failure processes. The following section will further discuss whether directors’ 
characteristics are determinants of the firms’ transition towards failure.  
 
The financial ratios that measure the basic dimensions of a firm’s liquidity, 
indebtedness, profitability and working capital are also differ across various 
alternative firm failure processes. This is broadly in line with the quantitative firm 
failure process literature that used primarily financial ratios to establish the firms’ 
failure processes (see for example Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen et al, 2014; Laitinen 
and Lukason, 2014; Lukason and Laitinen, 2016). This result is also consistent 
with the qualitative firm failure literature (Argenti, 1976; Richardson et al., 1994; 
Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008), which provided evidence that firm growth, limited 
profitability and liquidity determine firm failure processes. Each of the firm failure 
processes are characterized by one or more of the basic dimensions of financial 
ratio issues.  
 
Section 5.4.2 discussed the characteristics of the alternative firm failure processes. 
The firms’ transition to failure analysis, using panel data, shows that financial ratios 
differ between the alternative firm failure processes. In the first firm failure process 
all the financial ratios are significant with the exception of QACA. As such the 
financial dimensions of profitability, efficiency, liquidity, leverage, growth and cash 
flow are significant determinants of the transition to failure but the working capital, 
expressed by QACA, is not. In contrast, in the second firm failure process only the 
dimension of liquidity (quick ratio), working capital (QACA), growth and trade 
credit are significant. The third firm failure process has most of the ratios as 
significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure with the exception of the 
NSTA, a measure of efficiency and QACA (for working capital). Likewise the fourth 
firm failure process has all the financial ratios as significant determinants with the 
exception of TCTL. This mixture of financial ratios being significant in the 
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alternative firm failure processes, but without the same ratios always being 
significant, is consistent with evidence from the quantitative firm failure process 
literature where there is little consistency in the financial ratios used, (see for 
example Laitinen, 1991; Lukason and Laitinen, 2016; Lukason et al., 2016). It is 
also consistent with similar observations from the wider firm failure literature 
(Ohlson, 1980; Ooghe et al., 1995; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006).  
 
The countries’ legal origins differ significantly between the alternative firm failure 
processes in the countries under consideration. This is a new finding for a firm 
failure process study. This finding can be linked with the concentration that firms 
from different countries have in the alternative firm failure processes. Whilst there 
is no evidence in the academic literature connecting small firm failure processes 
with the legal origins, evidence from the wider firm failure literature pointed that 
legal origins are closely associated with the characteristics of the insolvency 
legislation in a country (example LaPorta et al., 1998; Sgard, 2006). Moreover, 
evidence suggested that common law countries have better protection for 
creditors’ and investors (Wang, 2012) and as such the legal origin of a country’s 
bankruptcy code is an important determinant of firms’ failure.  
 
With regards to the industry classification, this study found evidence that the 
industry classification is different between the alternative firm failure processes. 
Whilst there has been little evidence of such a result in the firm failure process 
context, evidence from the wider firm failure literature suggested that such results 
could have been expected. Different industries tend to have different business 
cycles which in turn are significant determinants of firm failure or financial distress 
(see for example Watson and Everett, 1999; Lowe et al., 1991; Platt, 1989; Platt 
and Platt, 1991; Bottazzi et al., 2011; Zeli, 2014).   
 
Evidence from the qualitative literature implied that challenging economic 
conditions can impact the firms’ failure process (Argenti, 1976). The chi-square 
tests on the underlying economic and credit conditions highlighted that they are 
significantly different among the alternative firm failure processes. Given the 
evidence from the wider firm failure literature, and the prior results of this study 
that have already identified significant differences in the distribution of countries 
between the alternative firm failure processes, such a result is intuitive. As such it 
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adds to the current body of literature within the quantitative SME firm failure 
process literature. 
 
The last element that has been tested between the alternative firm failure 
processes is the sustainable growth dummy variable. Evidence from earlier 
sections of this study demonstrated that firms’ total asset growth is different 
between the alternative firm failure processes. In addition, the distribution of firms 
with unsustainable growth levels differs between the alternative firm failure 
processes. This is a new finding given that previous quantitative firm failure 
process studies (see for example Laitinen, 1991; Lukason and Laitinen 2016) did 
not consider the potential differences of sustainable growth levels between 
alternative firm failure processes. However, Argenti (1976) had identified 
unsustainable growth as one key characteristic in one firm failure process in the 
context of qualitative studies. 
 
The above results highlight that there are four firm failure processes for SMEs in 
the countries under consideration. The firm-specific characteristics that were used 
to define these firm failure processes are indeed different across the processes. 
The non-firm-specific characteristics that were tested with the hypotheses 
discussed above, also provide evidence of wider differences among the alternative 
firm failure processes. The following section discusses how both the firm specific 
and the environment specific characteristics determinants the firms’ transition 
towards failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
  
5.7.2 Discussion on Firms’ Transition to Failure 
 
This section discusses the results of the panel regressions that considered the 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure for all the EU firms and for each firm 
failure process. Since there is no evidence in the quantitative literature of firms’ 
failure processes on the determinants of firms’ transition to failure, the discussion 
is based on evidence from the wider firm failure literature. 
 
The basic dimensions of firms’ liquidity, profitability, working capital and leverage 
(Berk and DeMarzo, 2011) are important contributors to the firm failure processes 
in EU firms. However, as discussed in earlier sections, the financial ratios and their 
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combinations, differ between the alternative firm failure processes, when firms’ 
transition to failure is considered. Therefore, this further highlights the importance 
of having separate firm failure processes and not treating all firms that fail in the 
same way. In this context the fundamental rationale of identifying the alternative 
firm failure processes is significant. This has been a fundamental motivation behind 
the firm failure process studies which argued that the different characteristics of 
firms should be considered carefully as different firm failure processes have 
different underlying reasons that drive the failure (Argenti 1976; Argenti 1976b; 
Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008; Richardson et al., 1994).  The differences of the 
financial ratios and their combinations, as determinants of firms’ transition to 
failure in the alternative firm failure processes, are in line with evidence from the 
wider firm failure literature that has not managed historically to identify a specific 
combination of financial ratios that can be used universally to identify or to predict 
firms’ failure (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006).  
 
In fact, the results of this study support the argument of Argenti (1976) on the 
necessity of identifying firm failure processes offering a possible explanation for 
why there cannot be consistency in the financial ratios as predictors of failure. The 
ratios have always been regarded as symptoms of failure (Argenti, 1976). 
However, different firm failure processes have different causes of failure that 
predate the failure event for a number of years. As such the financial symptoms 
are also different. 
 
In particular, the results of the Ordered Random Effects regression indicate that 
all financial ratios are significant at the Sig.<0.05 level in the full firms’ sample. 
Reduced profitability, high growth rates, lower sales to assets, lower cash flow to 
sales, reducing quick ratio, increasing liabilities compared to the assets of the firm, 
reducing working capital and reducing access to trade credit compared to the total 
liabilities of the firm are significant determinants of the status transition of firms 
from being active and financially healthy to being financially distressed and 
eventually into failure. However, there are differences between the alternative firm 
failure processes. QACA is not significant in the first process, indicating that 
working capital is not a determinant of firms’ transition to failure in these young 
firms that the first firm failure process includes. The second firm failure process is 
the one where firms’ transition to failure is less driven by the financial ratios. Only 
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growth rate (in total assets) and working capital are a positive determinants of 
firms’ transition to failure and liquidity and trade credit are negatively associated 
with transition to failure. These apply to a firm failure process where old firms 
suffer from negative growth for a number of years, before some positive growth 
signs a couple of year prior to failure. Net sales to total assets (NSTA) and working 
capital (QACA) are the only financial ratios that are not significant determinants of 
firms’ transition to failure in the third failure process. This is potentially due to 
these firms being characterized by increased sales but reduced cash flows and 
return on investment. Likewise, only TCTL is not a significant determinant of firms’ 
transition to failure in the fourth firm failure process, indicating that trade credit 
to total liabilities is not a failure transition determinant for these firms which belong 
to a process, characterized by low growth.  
 
Firm age is also significant indicating that younger firms are more likely to become 
bankrupt.  This applies to the all firms’ sample and the first and fourth firm failure 
processes. These results are in line with prior expectations. The literature suggests 
that young firms are likely to fail after the first few years of their “honeymoon 
period” during which the firm’s management is able to overcome any financial, 
personal and business hurdles (Fichman and Levinthall, 1991; Thornhill and Amit, 
2003; Cressy, 2006). Firms’ age in the second firm failure process however is 
positively associated with failure. One can conclude that this is because the second 
firm failure process is associated with old firms (the oldest, on average, in the 
sample) for which evidence from the qualitative firm failure process literature has 
suggested that may be prone to failure because of management apathy (Argenti, 
1976). Under this theory, these firms’ management is no longer interested in the 
development of the firm and as such these firms eventually fail. 
 
The financial ratios mentioned above as well as the age of the firm have been 
shown to be useful determinants of SMEs failure in previous studies (see for 
example Pindado and Rodrigues, 2004; Altman et al., 2010; Wagner, 2004; 
Davidsson and Klofsten 2003). The results of this study now provide evidence that 
these metrics are also determinants of the firms’ transition to failure when only 
eventually liquidated firms are considered. This is a new finding because it confirms 
that these determinants are indeed significant in the firms’ transition towards 
failure. This is significant because it provides statistical evidence that the basic 
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dimensions of firm profitability, liquidity, leverage and growth are important to the 
development of firm failure processes. Additionally, these results show that these 
metrics which were previously associated with the wider firm failure prediction 
literature on (see Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006) are not only useful for differentiating 
between failed and non-failed firms but they also demonstrate that these metrics 
are significant in determining firms’ transition to failure in alternative firm failure 
processes. 
 
Moreover, hypothesis 3 that the financial ratios characterizing the alternative firm 
failure processes differ between them does hold, as already discussed. The panel 
regression results of the alternative firm failure processes show that the 
significance of financial ratios differs between the alternative firm failure processes 
too. Evidence from the qualitative firm failure process literature suggests that not 
all the basic dimensions of the firms’ profitability, leverage, growth, liquidity and 
working capital are characteristics and determinants that are present in the same 
firm failure processes at the same time(see for example Argenti, 1976; Laitinen, 
1991). 
 
On the other hand, the age of the firm is only significant for processes 3 and 4 and 
with opposite signs when no directors’ characteristics are considered. In the third 
firm failure process the age of the firm is positively associated with failure 
(significant at Sig.<0.10). This firm failure process has been associated with older 
firms (18 years old on average). On the other hand the negative sign of the 
coefficient in the fourth failure process, is closer to the wider firm failure literature 
that negatively associates firms’ failure with the age of the firm. Firms in the fourth 
firm failure process are younger and therefore potentially closer to the literature 
stream of Altman et al., (2010); Wagner, (2004) and Davidsson and Klofsten, 
(2003). 
 
In addition to the financial ratio and the age of the firm metrics, evidence showed 
that directors’ characteristics are significant determinants of firms’ transition to 
failure. In the all firms’ sample, the experience of the directors, as proxied by the 
average age of directors and the number of directors, are negative and significant 
indicating that firms with younger and fewer directors are more likely to go 
bankrupt. However, the significance of these metrics differs in the alternative firm 
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failure processes. The experience (average age) of directors is only significant in 
the fourth firm failure process. Likewise, the number of social and business 
contacts that additional directors bring to a board (total number of directors) is 
significant in the second and third firm failure processes. The interpretation is that 
younger and fewer directors, with less experience and breadth of networks may 
lack the depth of experience required to avoid failure. This is consistent with prior 
evidence from the literature suggesting that more directors are generally bringing 
more contacts and experience, assisting firms’ performance (Cope et al., 2007). 
These results are also consistent with prior evidence from the qualitative firm 
failure process literature (see for example Argenti, 1976; Adams and Ferreira, 
2009). 
 
In contrast to expectations that the board diversity metric, expressed by the 
number of female directors, should be a determinant that is significantly and 
negatively associated with failure, the number of female directors is not a 
significant determinant of firms’ transition to failure in the all firms’ sample. An 
alternative definition of the metric, with a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
a firm has one or more women on their board and zero otherwise was also tested 
with the same results. Therefore, the conclusion is that although board diversity 
in the form of female directors is a significant determinant when discriminating 
between firm failure and survival (see for example, Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Wilson et al., 2014), it is not a significant determinant of the firm’s transition 
towards failure. However, whilst this observation holds for the full firms’, the 
presence (and number) of female directors is a significant determinant of firms’ 
transition to failure in the third and fourth firm failure processes. These are the 
firm failure processes that are characterized from the smaller board sizes in the 
sample. Therefore, the implication is that in small boards, gender diversity is 
important. Reduced diversity (proxied by a negative sign in the coefficient of the 
number of female directors’ variable) is a significant determinant of firms’ 
transition to failure. Therefore, this result further highlights the differences in the 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure between firm failure processes and 
demonstrates why the identification of the failure process is potentially a significant 
first step on interpreting and analyzing firms’ failure.  
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In terms of the business environment-related variables the results suggest that 
credit availability is associated with the firms’ transition to failure. The reason for 
the positive coefficient is that credit availability is expressed as a percentage of 
GDP in a given country. During the financial crisis the reduction in GDP was greater 
than the reduction in credit, thus the ratio of credit availability as a percentage of 
GDP was actually increasing. The interpretation of this result is therefore that 
reduced credit availability is associated with firms’ transition to failure14. Berger 
and Udell (2002), provided evidence that the lack of credit availability is a 
determinant of SME failure, especially under a financial crisis, such as the period 
of 2007-2009 that this study partially covers. In addition, there is evidence in the 
literature that shows that during the 2007-09 crisis, any credit availability was 
channeled towards larger firms, leaving SMEs with limited access to bank credit 
(Psillaki and Eleftheriou, 2015). The economic conditions and the credit availability 
have also been found to be significant determinants in the wider firm failure 
literature (Bunn and Redwood, 2003; Jardim and Pereira, 2013). The lack of credit 
availability at firm level has been a key determinant of SME failure (Berger and 
Udell, 2002) whilst the credit availability at country level may be targeted towards 
the larger firms during a financial crisis such as the one in 2008-2009, leaving 
SMEs without access to credit and therefore leading them to financial distress or 
failure (Psillaki and Eleftheriou, 2015). 
 
As such, the results that a lack of credit availability is a significant determinant of 
firms’ transition to failure in a number of alternative firm failure processes are in 
line with the wider firm failure literature. On the other hand, GDP growth was 
negative and significant suggesting that an economic downturn is a determinant 
of the firms’ transition towards failure. This is in line with evidence from the firm 
failure literature (see for example Bunn and Redwood, 2003). Given the focus of 
this chapter on firms in the EU countries, one observes that not all countries are 
significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure. In relation to the industry 
sector, although there are differences between the alternative firm failure 
processes, the industry is not a frequently significant determinant of firms 
transition to failure, in the alternative firm failure processes, many countries are 
                                                          
14 An alternative specification of the model, measuring year on year change in absolute levels available credit was 
tested. The results showed a negative and significant coefficient. Therefore, that confirms that reduced credit is 
associated with firms’ transition to failure. 
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significant determinants. The control variables of industry and country are in most 
cases significant at 0.10 level, which are in line with evidences from the literature 
(Platt, 1989; Platt and Platt, 1991; Bottazzi et al., 2011).  
 
Likewise, the legal tradition dummy is a significant determinant of firms’ transition 
to failure indicating that the legal system is a significant determinant of the failure 
status transition of the firms in all firm failure processes. This result is therefore in 
line with previous literature (see for example La Porta et al., 1997).  The negative 
sign denotes that firms whose countries that have a civil law system are associated 
with the transition towards failure. Looking at the transition to failure in the four 
alternative firm failure processes and the hypotheses which concerns the legal 
tradition of the firms, the legal tradition is highly significant across all firm failure 
processes. This result largely confirms the evidence from the wider firm failure 
literature suggesting that the legal tradition affects firms’ failures (Wang, 2012). 
In this case, this thesis shows that the legal tradition is also a significant 
determinant of firms’ transition to failure in a number of EU firms’ failure 
processes.  
 
The results from the regression analysis on the determinants of EU firms’ transition 
to failure also included the SGR dummy variable. The sustainable growth dummy 
variable is significant and negative suggesting that firms with excessive growth 
rates (in sales) are more likely to fail. This is in line with evidence from the 
qualitative firm failure process literature that suggested that overtrading can be a 
characteristic of failure in certain firm failure processes (Argenti, 1976). In 
addition, such evidence is in line with evidence from the wider firm failure literature 
where overtrading is considered as a characteristic that is associated with firms’ 
failure (Higgins, 1977). However, this is the first time that the concept of 
sustainable growth is directly linked with the firms’ transition to failure in the 
context of alternative firm failure processes. This result is consistent across a 
number of firm failure processes. In line with evidence from the literature that 
suggests that increased unsustainable growth (in sales) is an indicator of failure,  
the sign of the coefficient in the SGR (dummy) is positive, indicating that firms 
whose growth levels exceed the sustainable level are positively associated with the 
transition towards failure.  
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5.8 Conclusion and Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter aims to achieve three research objectives. First, to compare firm 
failure processes across countries and to test whether firm-specific characteristics 
differ among alternative failure processes. Second, to investigate the impact of 
firms’ management characteristics in the identification of firm failure processes in 
EU firms. Third, to test whether the firm-specific characteristics that characterise 
the alternative firm failure processes, together with variables from the wider 
business and economic environment (such as the legal tradition) are also 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure.  
 
The results show that there are 4 different failure processes for SMEs. These 
processes are affected by directors’ characteristics but there is no standalone 
failure process that is solely defined by the directors’ characteristics. Instead they 
are part of the failure process of a firm that is also affected by a number of financial 
symptoms. Nevertheless, the analysis and the identification of the firm failure 
processes with directors’ characteristics indicates that the inclusion of such 
characteristics in the firm failure process formation adds value and insight to the 
identification and the analysis of the alternative failure processes. Additionally, the 
firm failure process is at least partly related to the country where a firm operates. 
Although there are no standalone firm failure processes for each country, some 
countries have significant concentrations in certain firm failure processes. For 
example there is a concentration of UK, Italian, Spanish and German firms in the 
first, second, third and fourth firm failure process respectively. This means that a 
significant proportion of firms that fail in these countries follow the characteristics 
of the particular firm failure processes.  In addition, evidence shows that whilst 
non firm-specific characteristics were not used in the identification of the 
alternative firm failure processed, they did differ between them. This implies that 
the alternative firm failure processes include firms whose business and economic 
environments differ. Such evidence was implied in the qualitative firm failure 
process literature (see for example Argenti, 1976) but there has been little such 
evidence in the quantitative failure process literature. 
 
Firms’ transition to failure on the other hand is also determined by the firm specific 
characteristics. Therefore, financial ratios and directors’ characteristics are 
significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure. In addition, a number of 
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business and economic environment characteristics determine firms’ transition to 
failure. Industry classification, legal origin and the wider economic environment, 
measured by means of the GDP growth and credit availability determine firms’ 
transition to failure. However, these characteristics (and the combinations of 
them) differ between the alternative firm failure processes, when firms’ transition 
to failure is considered.  
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CHAPTER 6: UK REGIONS’ FIRM FAILURE PROCESSES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters set out the research questions and hypotheses, the 
analytical methodology of the research and the data that are going to be used. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that there are four different firm failure processes in EU 
firms and each country has a different representation across the firm failure 
processes. Using the same methodology this section aims to address the same 
three objectives objectives as in chapter 5 but from a UK SMEs’ perspective. 
Therefore this chapter extends the analysis of firm failure process to a within-
country context.  
 
The United Kingdom (UK) is one of the countries in the sample with the highest 
number of liquidated firms covering all of its regions in the period under 
investigation. Likewise, the UK has been used as the reference country in the 
chapter 5 analysis of the determinants of firms’ transition to failure. In the context 
of this chapter, UK regions are the regions of England (London, East Anglia, South 
East, South West, North East, North West, West Midlands, East Midlands), plus the 
countries of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The UK and its regions and 
countries (hereafter referred to as regions) are analyzed to identify whether 
different firm failure processes occur within the UK regions. 
 
The analytical methodology is similar to Chapter 5. The analysis uses firm-specific 
characteristics (the financial ratios, the age of the firm and directors’ 
characteristics) to identify the alternative firm failure processes. Subsequently, it 
assesses whether these characteristics, as well as a number of non firm-specific 
characteristics from the business and economic environment, differ in the 
alternative firm failure processes. Finally, it analyses whether these characteristics 
are determinants of firms’ transition to failure. In the first step, the quantitative 
techniques of factor and cluster analysis are used to identify the firm failure 
processes.  In the second step, an ordered panel regression is used to assess the 
determinants of the different stages of failure and therefore firms’ transition 
towards failure.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the subset of the data that 
this chapter uses and proceeds with the necessary tests for normality. Section 6.3 
presents the results of the factor analysis. Section 6.4 performs the cluster analysis 
for the identification of firms’ failure processes and describes the results. Section 
6.5 presents the results of the panel data analysis for the determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure. Section 6.6 explains the robustness checks of the panel data 
analysis. Section 6.7 discusses the results of the regressions in the context of the 
Hypotheses. Section 6.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 General Data Description for UK firms 
 
This chapter uses a subset of the data described in Chapters 4 and 5. The particular 
subset contains firms from the UK that went into liquidation at some point during 
the full sample period. The dependent variable of the firms in the UK sample 
denotes the liquidation status of the firm by using the event_failure dependent 
variable. On the year that the firm enters into liquidation, the event_failure 
dependent variable takes the value of 2. There are 979 UK firms covering the 
period from 2004 to 2013. Status information (and date) for the firms additionally 
covers the year 2014.  These event_failure=2 firms in the sample, also have 
observations for the years that they were not in liquidation. All firms start 
participating in the sample as event_failure=0 (healthy) “progressing” to 
event_failure=2 (liquidation). Some firms additionally have the interim status of 
financial distress (defined as negative equity) and are therefore event_failure=1 
for some years prior to their liquidation. That is, the sample includes evidence for 
what we will refer to as the transition towards liquidation of the (eventually) 
liquidated firms. The number of firms that become financially distressed prior to 
liquidation is 175 (approximately 17%) out of the 979 UK firms. The total number 
of firm-year observations is 7,041.  For consistency with the between-EU countries, 
firm failure process analysis each of the firms in the UK’s regions will be assessed 
for 7 years prior to liquidation. 
 
6.2.1 Regional Splits 
 
The definition of regions has been done by using the first level of the European 
Commission NUTS-1 classification system.  It has been initially defined with the 
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EC No 1059/2003 and later had a number of amendments until its most recent 
(EC 2016/2066) version which is adopted for this analysis. The regional split and 
the number of failed firms for each region are presented below. 
 
Table 6.1 shows the region/country concentration of liquidated/bankrupt UK firms. 
The majority of firms are concentrated in London (37.69%) followed by the North 
West (15.63%) and the Yorkshire and the Humber regions (10.62%). 
 
Table 6.1: Regional Concentrations of UK failed firms.  
 
 
The distribution of firms in the sample is largely representative of the distribution 
of firms across the UK with London having the biggest proportion of UK business 
concentration and Wales and North East of England having a smaller business 
population (Rhodes, 2018). 
 
6.2.2  Descriptive statistics of failed firms 
 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for the failed UK firms in the sample.   
 
6.2.2.1 Main Variables at UK-level 
Table 6.2 shows that failed UK firms tend to have, on average, negative (-1.460) 
return on Investment (ROI), a negative Cash Flow to Total Sales (CFTS) ratio (-
1.248) and positive and relatively high (21.528) growth rates (measure in total 
assets’ growth). Net Sales to Total Assets (NSTA), is positive (5.920), 
demonstrating that, on average across all years, UK firms have the ability to 
REGION (NUTS-1) Freq.     Percent  (%)    Cum. Percentage (%)
London 369 37.69 37.69
North West (England) 153 15.63 53.32
Yorkshire & the Humber   104 10.62 63.94
South East 74 7.56 71.50
West Midlands 71 7.25 78.75
Scotland 54 5.52 84.27
East (England) 41 4.19 88.46
East Midlands 33 3.37 91.83
South West 25 2.55 94.38
N.Ireland 20 2.04 96.42
Wales 18 1.84 98.26
North East (England) 17 1.74 100.00
Total 979 100.00
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generate sales from the assets they employ. Quick ratio is also positive and high 
(7.699), highlighting good adequate levels of liquidity. Total liabilities to total 
assets (TLTA) are above 1 highlighting that, on average across all years, UK firms’ 
are relatively over indebted with their total liabilities exceeding the value of their 
assets.  Trade credit to total liabilities (TCTL: 0.246) and quick assets to current 
assets (QACA: 0.972) show that trade credit is a relatively limited source of credit 
for UK firms while their working capital (in terms of quick assets) is relatively high. 
UK firms tend to have around 2 female directors while the overall managing 
structure has on average 14 directors with an average age of 51. Economic 
conditions have been positive on average, with increasing credit availability and 
an average GDP growth of 1.05%. The level of GDP growth is relatively low due to 
the sample including the recessionary years of 2008 and 2009 when UK GDP 
contracted by 0.47% and 4.19% respectively.  
 
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics of main continuous variables for UK firms that 
eventually failed. 
 
 
6.2.2.2 Additional Region-Specific Variables 
In addition to the above mentioned variables that are used throughout this thesis, 
this chapter employees two UK regions-specific variables. These are the number 
of new firms in a region as a percentage of the existing business population in that 
region (new_firms_pc) and the regional Gross Value Added (GVA) product. The 
Variable Mean St.Dev Min Max
ROI -1.46 40.65 -127.20 25.32
growth_rate 21.52 53.87 -1.00 266.15
NSTA 5.92 79.71 -0.01 251.17
CFTS -1.25 25.24 -784.45 2.99
quick_ratio 7.70 43.55 0.00 79.00
TLTA 2.90 56.65 0.00 71.00
QACA 0.97 0.34 0.01 2.00
TCTL 0.25 0.25 0.00 1.00
Firmage 18.49 14.90 1.00 83.00
Total_Dir_Nr   14.16 9.93 1.00 24.00
Nr_Female_Dir 2.50 2.15 0.00 3.00
Avg_dir_age      50.85 8.74 20.00 75.00
credit 171.83 19.50 144.51 200.61
GDP_gr 1.30 2.28 -4.19 3.00
new_firms_pc 2.53 2.77 -4.70 8.10
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former variable will be used in the main part of this analysis and the latter as an 
additional robustness check (Section 6.6). 
 
GVA measures the value generated by any unit engaged in the production of goods 
and services, at regional level.  According to the UK Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) the GVA plus taxes and less subsidies on products is equivalent to gross 
domestic product (GDP) (ONS, 2016, pp. 2). However, GVA has the advantage of 
it being available at regional level and can therefore be used as a region-level 
proxy for the regional GDP growth. Therefore the main part of the analysis will 
consider GDP growth for consistency with the other chapters of the thesis while 
GVA growth will be additionally used for robustness checks in this chapter. GVA 
growth between 2004-2013 has been relatively different between UK regions 
(Figure 6.1). The South East and East of England, West and East Midlands and the 
Northern Ireland had a more pronounced reduction in GVA growth during 2009, 
compared to the UK average. North West and Yorkshire and the Humber and 
Scotland had a reduced GVA growth decline compared to the UK average over the 
same year. The remaining regions were broadly in line with the UK average.  On 
the other hand, Scotland had a different trend with a trough in 2010 and a recovery 
thereafter. 
 
Figure 6.1: UK GVA in UK and the regions.  
 
Source: Adapted graph based on data from ONS.  
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Table 6.3 presents the average GVA growth (%) across all the years in the sample 
for each region. The (ONS) data are weighted by the concentration of firms in each 
region.  It can be seen that GVA has been quite different between regions, 
highlighting the differences in Economic growth that UK regions have. London is 
the area with the highest GVA growth in the early years that this study covers. 
East Midlands is the area with the largest GVA drop in 2009. The direction of the 
means remains broadly similar even when the weighting of firms in each region is 
not considered. Therefore, it highlights the differences in the regional economic 
environment in the UK.  
 
Table 6.3: Average GVA growth in UK and the regions.  
 
 
The number of new firms created in a given year in any given UK region as a 
percentage of the firm population in that region is also used to test for the first 
hypothesis. Table 6.4 presents the descriptive statistics at both the UK in full and 
in regional level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year
North
East
North
West
Yorkshire 
& Humber
East
Midlands
West
Midlands
East of 
England London
South
 East
South
 West Wales Scotland
Northern
 Ireland
United
Kingdom
2004 8.1 5.4 5.9 3.2 5.1 2.4 4.8 1.4 4.2 7.3 7.0 3.2 4.4
2005 5.5 4.1 3.8 5.4 3.6 3.6 6.7 3.9 3.9 4.7 6.0 6.8 4.9
2006 5.5 6.3 4.5 4.6 4.1 5.1 3.4 3.9 3.6 5.1 6.2 6.1 4.6
2007 1.9 3.5 5.0 4.0 2.2 2.4 7.2 4.0 4.1 3.1 4.0 6.8 4.4
2008 1.8 2.0 0.1 1.3 0.3 2.6 1.8 2.2 1.7 -1.4 2.0 -2.2 1.6
2009 -2.5 -1.3 -1.6 -4.7 -4.6 -4.4 -2.0 -3.3 -1.4 -1.9 -0.1 -4.0 -2.4
2010 0.9 0.9 -0.4 3.5 2.8 1.3 1.3 2.4 2.3 0.0 -2.2 -0.5 1.3
2011 1.8 -1.1 1.1 2.1 1.9 0.8 4.1 1.2 -0.6 3.9 1.5 0.6 1.7
2012 2.3 2.7 1.7 2.3 3.2 2.1 2.9 3.7 2.0 3.1 1.7 1.9 2.7
2013 2.4 4.2 2.5 3.6 3.0 4.0 2.2 3.1 2.9 2.9 4.3 2.6 3.2
Yearly UK and Regional GVA growth (%) 
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Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics of new firm creation as a percentage of the firm 
population in the UK and the regions.  
 
 
The highest average new business creation (as a percentage of the local business 
population) is in London (13.96%) and the lowest in N. Ireland (8.79%). This is 
largely related to London’s economic performance across the years that this study 
covers, where London has had the highest average GVA growth. In contrast, N. 
Ireland had the lowest overall GVA growth across all the years that this study 
covers. 
 
6.2.3 Data and normality 
 
The analysis of the distribution of the continuous variables in the population of 
firms, in the UK-specific sample is a necessary step before we proceed with the 
factor and the cluster analysis.  Consistent with the methodology that this thesis 
uses for the firm-level analysis, the Skewness and Kurtosis tests, the Shapiro-Wilk 
(Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) and the Shapiro-Francia (Shapiro and Wilk, 1972; 
Royston, 1983) tests of normality are applied in firms-specific characteristics of 
the UK firms. Additionally the normality plots are presented in Appendix B (Chart 
1). 
  
The explanatory variables of the UK firms’ sample are not normally distributed. 
The null hypothesis that each of the explanatory variables is normally distributed 
is rejected at the 0.01 level in the Skewness/Kurtosis test. The Shapiro-Wilk test 
results also show that the null hypothesis of each of the variables to be normally 
    Variable     Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
UK 12.159 1.837 6.530 17.930
London 13.955 0.987 12.570 17.930
North West (England) 11.768 1.358 9.710 14.700
Yorkshire & the Humber   11.284 1.049 9.940 13.700
South East 10.924 0.919 9.670 13.060
West Midlands 10.999 1.219 9.370 13.390
Scotland 10.985 0.949 9.760 13.280
East (England) 10.932 0.955 9.510 13.270
East Midlands 10.956 1.318 9.120 13.680
South West 10.200 1.165 8.620 12.250
N.Ireland 8.791 1.687 6.530 11.060
Wales 10.167 1.458 8.300 13.370
North East (England) 11.828 1.497 9.410 14.160
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distributed is rejected at the 0.01 level of significance. Finally the Shapiro-Francia 
test of normality further confirms that the hypothesis of a normal distribution is 
rejected at 0.01 level of significance for each one of the variables in the UK sample.  
 
Table 6.5: Skewness/Kurtosis, Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia test of Normality for 
UK firms 
 
 
As in the case of the full sample of failed firms in EU countries, discussed in Chapter 
5, the presence of non-normally distributed variables in the sample has two 
potential implications. First, the usage of the mean when clustering to create the 
failure processes can be problematic. For that reason, the median will be used 
instead (in a k-medians clustering approach). Second, the violation of the 
normality assumption potentially compromises the normality assumption in the 
ordered logistic regression. However, evidence suggests that logistic regression is 
relatively robust even in the presence of non-normally distributed data (Appiah, 
2013). In addition, robustness checks, utilizing bootstrapping have been used, in 
order to reduce the risk of invalid results. 
 
6.2.4 Correlation and Statistical Tests 
 
Exploring the correlations between independent variables is necessary in order to 
determine whether factor analysis can be used. Factor analysis requires the 
existence of some degree of collinearity between the variables that will enter the 
factors. For this reason a three step approach is applied. First, correlation analysis 
between explanatory variables is applied at levels and lags. The correlation 
Variable 
Pr
(Skewness) 
 Pr
(Kurtosis)     chi2(2)   Prob>chi2   W           V         z       Prob>z   W'          V'        z       Prob>z
roi 0.000 0.000 26238.220 0.000 0.009 3633.819 21.733 0.000 0.009 3982.382 21.438 0.000
Growth Rate     0.000 0.000 21300.750 0.000 0.017 3607.388 21.713 0.000 0.016 3953.153 21.419 0.000
nsta 0.000 0.000 25695.450 0.000 0.018 3603.615 21.711 0.000 0.017 3949.842 21.417 0.000
cfts 0.000 0.000 22772.270 0.000 0.025 3577.111 21.691 0.000 0.024 3921.251 21.398 0.000
quick ratio 0.000 0.000 23651.900 0.000 0.024 3579.634 21.693 0.000 0.023 3923.663 21.400 0.000
tlta 0.000 0.000 26332.410 0.000 0.007 3640.903 21.738 0.000 0.007 3989.699 21.443 0.000
qaca   0.000 0.000 272.680 0.000 0.933 246.567 14.601 0.000 0.933 270.565 14.484 0.000
tctl 0.000 0.000 876.630 0.000 0.925 273.991 14.880 0.000 0.928 290.243 14.665 0.000
firmage 0.000 0.000 1916.830 0.000 0.852 544.116 16.699 0.000 0.852 596.102 16.527 0.000
avg_dir_age 0.000 0.000 406.320 0.000 0.980 74.408 11.425 0.000 0.980 81.436 11.379 0.000
Nr_Female_Dir 0.000 0.000 3256.330 0.000 0.900 366.293 15.650 0.000 0.901 396.951 15.475 0.000
Total_dir_nr 0.000 0.000 2834.630 0.000 0.847 560.597 16.778 0.000 0.847 612.918 16.599 0.000
credit 0.000 0.000 27550.540 0.000 0.951 181.467 13.788 0.000 0.951 198.644 13.685 0.000
GDP_gr 0.000 0.000 1545.740 0.000 0.758 886.467 17.993 0.000 0.758 971.176 17.789 0.000
GVA_gr 0.000 0.000 188.070 0.000 0.980 72.880 11.370 0.000 0.980 78.988 11.300 0.000
New_firms_pc 0.096 0.000 111.540 0.000 0.973 99.050 12.183 0.000 0.973 108.537 12.122 0.000
Skewness/Kurtosis Test Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Francia
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analysis includes 7 lags for each independent variable with the exception of 
directors’ characteristics and firm age. The director-related variables are only 
tested at levels as there is very little or no variation on director composition across 
time in most firms. Firm age, naturally, has a completely linear function with its 
lags and therefore the lags were also excluded. 
 
Second, partial correlation analysis is applied between all the independent 
variables’ combinations. Third, the Bartlett test of Sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sample adequacy are used in the UK firm sub-sample to 
investigate whether the level of potential correlations between the explanatory 
variables is sufficient to proceed with factor analysis.   
 
Correlation of the independent variables has been tested in the sample of 
event_failure status=2 at two stages.  First, with all the potential independent 
variables at levels15 and second with the financial ratios (independent variables) 
and the country-specific macroeconomic variables (GDP growth and Credit 
Availability)  at t, t-1, t-2…t-7, in order to capture the financial situation of firms 
up to 7 years before the failure event. We selected to test for 7 year lags in order 
to be consistent with the length of lags that was adopted in Chapter 5. For the 
same reason, the director-related variables are only tested at levels as there is 
very little or no variation on director composition across time in most firms. 
Correlation above 30% can be regarded as sufficient for the purpose of factor 
analysis (Hair et al., 2006). The results (Appendix B; Tables B.1 and B.3) 
demonstrate that there is evidence of sufficient level of correlation between a 
number of variables. 
 
Partial Correlations between variables have been also calculated. A partial 
correlation of a variable is the correlation that is left unexplained when the effects 
of the other variables are taken into consideration (Hair et al., 2006). Partial 
correlations between variables that would be potentially used in the factor analysis 
should be small and between few variables. In particular, partial correlations of 
above 0.70 would question the application of factor analysis (Hair et al., 2006). 
Partial correlation results demonstrated no evidence of high (>0.70) partial 
correlations in any of the countries’ samples. 
                                                          
15 The term signifies that no lags have been used for these “at level” variables. 
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The third step of statistical tests is to confirm whether the Factor analysis is a 
statistically valid technique for the UK firms’ sub-sample include the Bartlett 
Sphericity test and the KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA). 
 
The results of the Bartlett test suggest that the hypothesis of no correlation 
between the variables is rejected at the 0.001 level. Moreover, the KMO MSA 
values are above the 0.50 that can be considered as the minimum acceptable cut-
off level for factor analysis (Yong and Pearce, 2013).  The KMO for the UK firms is 
0.715 (Table 6.6). Therefore the statistical assumptions to proceed with factor 
analysis are satisfied. 
 
Table 6.6: Bartlett test of Sphericity and KMO for the UK Firms.  
 
 
6.3  Factor Analysis for Firm-Specific Characteristics 
 
The establishment of failure processes at regional level is methodologically 
consistent with the previous chapter. The factor analysis only uses firm-specific 
characteristics as the purpose of the failure process creation is to investigate which 
firm-specific characteristics determine the failure process of the firms. Consistently 
with the analysis in EU firms, factor analysis for the UK firms is applied in two 
parts. 
 
In the first part, the financial ratios of each firm are used in up to 7 years (lag=7; 
t, t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, t-5, t-6, t-7) prior to event_failure=2 together with the age of 
the firm at the time of the liquidation. In cases where data from the earlier years 
are not available due to firms being younger in age, the lagged values in these 
years take the value of 0. The particular value is selected because these are not 
missing values in the sense of being missing at random. They are instead firms 
Determinant of the correlation matrix Det =0.000
Bartlett test of sphericity
Chi-square       38642.589
Degrees of freedom 2080
p-value        0.00
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
KMO         0.715
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that have been too young or (in some cases) have been insolvent and therefore 
their accounts are actually nonexistent. However, because STATA does not 
recognize blank values, the value of zero was selected to effectively denoting that 
liquidation is the reason for the missing value. This allows the firms to remain in 
the sample without affecting the performance of the factor analysis at the scoring 
phase where any missing values would return a blank score for that factor. The 
factor analysis is then followed by the associated cluster analysis to identify the 
firm failure processes. The first part of the analysis only utilizes financial ratios and 
the firm age, in line with evidence from the quantitative firm failure process 
literature. The aim is to produce a comparable benchmark with the existing body 
of the quantitative failure process literature before proceeding with the 
investigation of directors’ characteristics’ influence in the formation of firm failure 
processes in UK firms. 
 
The second part adds three directors-related variables: the total number of 
directors, the number of female directors in the board and the average age of 
directors to the variables used in the first part. The aim is to analyse the effects 
that directors’ characteristics have on the formation of the alternative firm failure 
processes and as such add to the existing body of the quantitative firm failure 
process literature. This factor analysis is also followed by the associated cluster 
analysis to identify the firm failure process. In this section the focus is at the 
within-country level. 
 
The rest of the section presents the results of the factor analysis in UK firms where 
the factors are without directors’ characteristics. Section 6.3.2 presents the results 
of the factor analysis with directors’ characteristics as determinants in the failure 
process formation. 
 
6.3.1 Factor Analysis without Directors’ Characteristics 
 
The first stage of the factor analysis (without directors’ characteristics) considers 
the financial ratios from the 979 UK event_failure=2 (liquidated/bankrupt) failed 
firms for up to 7 years prior to the failure event. That is, the financial ratios are 
lagged up to lag 7 using the event_failure=2 date as a starting point. Additionally, 
consistent with the approach used in the previous chapter, the factor analysis 
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includes the firm age at the last year with available data before entering 
liquidation. The age of the firm is not lagged as any such attempt would create a 
completely linear result with little added value to the factor creation.  
 
The Kaiser (1960) criterion of retaining factors with eigenvalues above 1 has been 
applied to the factor analysis of UK firms. Therefore, factors with Eigenvalues >1 
return to the second step of the factor analysis which is the VARIMAX rotation. The 
first part of the factor analysis shows (Appendix B; Table B.4) that there are 12 
factors with an eigenvalue >1. These initial factors explain 87.4% (Table 6.7) of 
the total variation of the initial variables. Although this is lower than the percentage 
achieved in the full sample with the EU countries’ firms (89%), it remains higher 
than previous studies where Factor Analysis was explaining 80% of the variables’ 
variation for Lukason and Laitinen (2016), 69% for Laitinen et al., (2014) and 52% 
for Laitinen (1991).   
 
The VARIMAX orthogonal rotation is then applied to the 12 factors in order for 
factors to be uncorrelated throughout the rotation process.  
 
Table 6.7: Eigenvalues of VARIMAX- rotated factors (with Eigenvalues >1) for UK firms; 
financial ratios and firm age as variables.  
 
 
The factor loadings for UK firms after the VARIMAX rotation are presented in Table 
6.8. The interpretation of these factors is as follows: 
o The first factor is associated with the time series development of the trade 
credit to total liabilities ratio (TCTL). The first factor’s loadings in the UK 
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firms are similar with the first factor’s loadings in all (EU) firms as presented 
in Chapter 5. 
o The second factor is associated with the development of NSTA ratio making 
it relatively similar to the eleventh factor in the all (EU) firms’ data set.  
o The third factor is associated with the development of the Quick assets to 
current assets (QACA) ratio across time, which is also similar to the results 
from all (EU) firms’ factor 2. 
o The fourth factor is partly associated with the total liabilities to total assets 
(TLTA) ratio between in the four years prior to liquidation. The same factor 
is also correlated with the return on investment (ROI) on the year before of 
event_failure=2.  Therefore, this factor is broadly similar with the third 
factor in the full (EU) data sample although the timing is different as the 
ROI was more closely associated at the third lag in the all firms’ sample 
while the TLTA was significant up to 3 years prior to failure in that case. 
o The fifth factor is solely associated with TLTA from the seventh to the second 
year prior to event_failure=2 and is quite different compared to the all firms’ 
factors in chapter 5. 
o  The sixth factor is associated with ROI, CFTS and TLTA, one year prior to 
event_failure=2. This is also a factor which is not directly comparable with 
any of the factors in Chapter 5. 
o The seventh factor is associated with the quick ratio up to 3 years prior to 
the event_failure=2.  This has some similarities with the tenth factors from 
the all firms’ dataset where the quick ratio was associated with failure 2 to 
5 years prior to that. 
o The eight factor is associated with ROI 5 and 6 years prior to failure, with 
TLTA 4 to 6 years prior to failure and with CFTS 5 years prior to failure. This 
factor is not directly similar with any of the factors identified in the all (EU) 
firms’ data. 
o The ninth factor is associated with the ROI 7 years prior to event_failure=2 
and with TLTA 7 years prior to failure. This factor has some similarities with 
the 6th factor in the all firms’ sample but with different timing in the financial 
ratios. 
o The tenth factor is associated with the firms’ growth rate 6 year prior to the 
event_faulure=2 status and with NSTA 6 and 7 years and QACA 7 years 
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prior to that status.  There are therefore some limited similarities with the 
seventh factor in the all (EU) firms’ data. 
o The eleventh factor is associated with ROI between year 4 and year 2 prior 
to event_fauilure=2 as well as the growth_rate 4 years prior to that status. 
This factor is not directly comparable to any of the factors in chapter 5. 
o The twelfth factor is associated with the CFTS and the growth rate 7 years 
prior to the event_failure=2 status without having any directly comparable 
factor in the all EU) firms analysis. 
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Table 6.8: Factor Loadings for UK Firms without directors’ characteristics (post 
VARIMAX rotation). 
 
 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 Factor9 Factor10 Factor11 Factor12
             roi           -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.971 0.035 0.010 -0.014 -0.025 -0.022 0.037 0.047 0.016
           roiL1           -0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.036 0.031 0.519 0.034 0.013 -0.023 0.059 0.192 0.071
           roiL2        0.030 0.001 0.047 -0.089 0.057 -0.032 0.006 0.117 -0.066 0.084 0.512 0.222
           roiL3       0.087 0.007 -0.029 -0.142 -0.074 -0.001 0.026 0.069 0.073 -0.082 0.633 -0.019
           roiL4       0.095 0.007 0.043 -0.215 -0.135 0.031 0.009 0.279 0.054 0.071 0.454 0.124
           roiL5     0.036 -0.006 0.061 0.010 0.011 0.014 -0.002 0.820 -0.052 -0.002 0.059 0.108
           roiL6         0.026 -0.023 0.073 0.057 -0.261 0.001 -0.016 0.372 0.147 0.161 0.262 0.288
           roiL7      -0.013 -0.012 0.029 0.024 0.020 0.004 -0.004 -0.110 0.857 0.020 0.071 0.092
growth_rate    -0.002 -0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.031 0.011 -0.002 0.014 0.002 -0.018 0.010 0.001
growth_rateL1 -0.039 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.023 0.007 0.001 0.009 0.000 -0.001 0.010 0.009
growth_rateL2    -0.036 -0.008 0.003 0.139 0.047 -0.109 -0.005 0.044 -0.109 0.102 0.056 0.122
growth_rateL3    -0.046 -0.021 0.036 0.136 -0.008 -0.001 -0.025 0.113 -0.056 0.142 -0.390 0.171
growth_rateL4 -0.076 -0.023 0.032 0.206 0.089 0.011 -0.006 -0.133 0.212 0.022 -0.124 0.237
growth_rateL5   -0.083 0.188 -0.032 0.004 0.101 -0.172 -0.021 -0.259 0.216 0.012 -0.009 0.155
growth_rateL6 0.029 0.005 0.039 -0.014 0.206 -0.075 -0.004 -0.166 -0.092 -0.309 -0.205 0.206
growth_rateL7  -0.151 -0.028 -0.011 0.018 0.243 -0.040 0.048 -0.027 0.089 0.141 -0.041 -0.513
nsta              -0.015 0.025 -0.006 0.006 0.000 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002 -0.013 -0.045 0.003 0.027
nsta_L1                  0.029 0.964 -0.002 -0.007 0.014 0.016 0.006 -0.034 -0.017 0.041 -0.010 -0.005
nsta_L2           0.018 0.966 0.006 0.015 0.011 -0.020 -0.003 0.007 -0.035 0.052 0.039 0.014
nsta_L3                0.016 0.946 0.004 0.007 -0.023 0.008 -0.009 0.015 0.009 -0.010 0.004 -0.017
nsta_L4              0.005 0.971 0.003 0.006 -0.028 0.005 -0.003 0.014 0.014 -0.029 -0.008 -0.004
nsta_L5         -0.016 0.940 -0.003 0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.002 0.006 0.023 0.006 -0.006 0.007
nsta_L6    0.150 0.568 0.029 -0.029 0.128 -0.002 0.031 -0.079 -0.017 0.337 -0.059 0.107
nsta_L7              0.076 0.491 0.038 -0.071 0.020 -0.004 0.040 -0.029 0.038 0.673 -0.028 0.015
cfts                       0.041 0.014 -0.011 0.001 0.021 0.015 0.003 -0.007 -0.011 0.019 0.015 -0.002
cfts_L1         0.011 0.000 -0.018 0.049 0.113 0.929 -0.014 -0.030 -0.074 0.050 0.074 0.038
cfts_L2       0.021 0.024 -0.050 -0.014 0.005 0.034 0.029 0.045 0.043 -0.096 0.080 0.127
cfts_L3              0.149 0.046 -0.017 -0.103 -0.082 0.065 0.074 0.098 0.055 -0.179 0.196 0.200
cfts_L4          0.045 0.020 -0.048 -0.026 -0.004 0.007 0.021 0.034 0.009 -0.052 0.008 0.167
cfts_L5                0.016 -0.007 -0.014 -0.013 0.223 0.015 0.014 0.698 0.142 0.007 0.039 -0.040
cfts_L6              -0.019 0.013 -0.070 0.004 -0.032 0.000 0.005 0.079 0.025 0.101 0.007 0.089
cfts_L7                    0.104 0.031 0.046 -0.015 -0.118 0.013 0.030 0.159 -0.031 0.019 0.077 0.624
quick_ratio -0.093 -0.007 0.095 -0.025 -0.053 0.043 0.332 0.049 0.008 -0.009 0.022 0.045
quick_ratioL1    -0.040 0.002 0.017 0.002 -0.009 0.002 0.857 0.002 -0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.002
quick_ratioL2  -0.054 -0.001 0.009 -0.001 -0.019 0.014 0.927 0.003 -0.005 0.006 0.010 0.000
quick_ratioL3    -0.070 -0.007 0.007 0.000 -0.017 0.016 0.505 0.010 -0.006 0.049 0.014 -0.018
quick_ratioL4   -0.094 -0.012 0.002 -0.018 -0.057 0.026 0.221 0.022 0.006 0.086 -0.020 0.033
quick_ratioL5  -0.084 -0.010 0.003 0.002 -0.024 0.003 0.114 0.008 -0.008 0.099 -0.023 0.048
quick_ratioL6   -0.044 -0.003 0.113 -0.009 -0.030 0.007 0.019 0.005 -0.002 0.034 0.001 0.001
quick_ratioL7      -0.042 -0.017 0.005 -0.023 -0.036 -0.011 0.128 0.002 0.012 0.132 -0.043 0.048
tlta                       0.004 0.009 0.002 0.966 -0.031 -0.083 0.015 0.025 0.025 -0.036 -0.040 -0.011
tltaL1              -0.069 -0.014 -0.007 0.235 0.221 -0.900 -0.030 -0.054 -0.080 0.072 0.111 0.044
tltaL2         -0.108 -0.027 -0.029 0.566 0.460 -0.256 -0.085 -0.155 -0.186 0.146 0.099 0.051
tltaL3               -0.087 -0.021 -0.005 0.441 0.343 -0.081 -0.079 -0.117 -0.081 0.095 -0.145 0.052
tltaL4                   -0.036 -0.008 0.003 0.450 0.458 -0.047 -0.064 -0.327 0.044 -0.046 -0.046 0.093
 tltaL5            -0.009 0.006 0.026 0.011 0.722 -0.053 -0.020 -0.357 0.212 0.031 0.063 0.031
tltaL6                    -0.003 0.014 0.012 -0.041 0.845 -0.021 -0.001 0.357 0.134 -0.076 -0.073 -0.111
tltaL7                       -0.055 -0.003 0.010 -0.013 0.483 -0.009 -0.015 0.241 0.746 0.047 -0.055 -0.196
qaca                     -0.108 0.014 0.758 0.005 0.032 -0.030 0.022 0.023 -0.025 0.005 -0.027 0.109
qacaL1           -0.074 0.013 0.842 0.006 0.034 -0.039 0.032 -0.004 -0.023 -0.012 0.016 0.103
qacaL2                 -0.074 -0.010 0.859 -0.012 -0.010 0.004 0.024 0.003 -0.012 -0.021 -0.022 0.056
qacaL3              -0.080 0.008 0.876 0.003 -0.004 0.009 0.005 0.025 0.002 -0.014 -0.014 -0.004
qacaL4                  -0.085 0.011 0.840 -0.005 0.021 0.010 -0.010 0.001 0.028 0.035 -0.030 -0.018
qacaL5              -0.044 -0.010 0.823 0.004 -0.030 0.006 -0.007 0.015 0.017 0.069 0.040 -0.109
qacaL6           -0.039 0.008 0.765 0.010 -0.005 0.017 -0.022 0.001 0.068 0.069 0.047 -0.107
qacaL7                 -0.129 -0.014 0.378 -0.052 -0.082 0.005 -0.004 0.066 0.074 0.568 0.069 -0.217
tctl                           0.783 0.048 -0.069 -0.018 0.022 0.037 -0.015 -0.015 -0.009 -0.064 0.101 -0.067
tctlL1                       0.828 0.036 -0.087 -0.026 0.012 0.050 -0.042 0.003 -0.014 -0.069 0.078 -0.062
tctlL2                      0.855 0.028 -0.087 -0.012 -0.002 0.042 -0.036 -0.002 -0.020 -0.060 0.097 -0.049
tclL3                          0.885 0.022 -0.070 -0.012 0.013 0.008 -0.008 -0.013 -0.001 -0.053 0.050 -0.006
tctlL4                     0.860 0.008 -0.063 -0.006 -0.041 0.021 -0.014 0.044 -0.016 0.089 -0.045 0.020
tctlL5                      0.765 0.022 -0.053 0.023 -0.043 0.004 -0.031 0.057 -0.014 0.126 -0.111 0.143
tctlL6                  0.736 -0.020 -0.097 0.013 -0.040 -0.045 -0.029 0.005 0.004 0.159 -0.129 0.223
tctlL7            0.486 -0.017 -0.039 -0.046 -0.060 -0.041 -0.010 0.016 0.034 0.527 -0.095 0.147
firmage   0.199 -0.037 -0.128 -0.040 -0.063 0.064 0.057 0.129 0.009 -0.011 0.077 -0.006
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6.3.2 Factor Analysis with Directors’ Characteristics 
 
The second part of factor analysis (with directors’ characteristics) includes 
directors’ characteristics in addition to the 7-years of financial ratios the firm age 
that the factor analysis without directors’ characteristics used. Directors’ 
characteristics consist of the number of female directors on the board, the total 
number of directors and the average age of directors. 
 
The financial ratios and firm age were treated in the same way as in the first part 
of the factor analysis. The directors’ characteristics were included at the time of 
failure and were not lagged, consistent with the approach used in Chapter 5 for all 
the (EU) firms. 
 
The results after the VARIMAX rotation (Table 6.9) demonstrate that there are 13 
factors with an eigenvalue > 1 (Appendix B; Table B.6) for UK firms. These factors 
explain 87.6% of the total variance in UK firms; which is slightly more than the 
87.4% that the (12) factors with eigenvalue >1 were explaining in the analysis 
without directors’ characteristics.  
 
Table 6.9: Eigenvalues of VARIMAX- rotated factors (with Eigenvalues >1); UK firms’ 
factor analysis with directors’ characteristics.  
  
 
Therefore, we proceed in analyzing the factors after the VARIMAX rotation is 
performed. Factor loadings are presented in Table 6.10 and can be explained as 
follows:  
 
     Factor      Variance   Difference      Proportion   Cumulative
Factor1 5.260 0.082 0.135 0.135
Factor2 5.178 0.141 0.133 0.268
Factor3 5.037 2.300 0.129 0.397
Factor4 2.738 0.457 0.070 0.467
Factor5 2.281 0.090 0.059 0.525
Factor6 2.191 0.106 0.056 0.582
Factor7 2.086 0.008 0.054 0.635
Factor8 2.077 0.487 0.053 0.688
Factor9 1.591 0.033 0.041 0.729
Factor10 1.558 0.103 0.040 0.769
Factor11 1.455 0.063 0.037 0.806
Factor12 1.391 0.053 0.036 0.842
Factor13 1.339 . 0.034 0.876
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(2278)= 4.7e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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o The first factor is characterized by the development of the trade credit to 
total liabilities ratio (TCTL). This is similar to the first factor without the 
directors’ characteristics and similar to the all firm results in chapter 5. It is 
also similar with the first factor with directors’ characteristics in the all (EU) 
firms’ sample in Chapter 5. 
o The second factor is associated with the development of the Net Sales to 
Total Assets (NSTA) ratio, similar to the results without directors’ 
characteristics. It is also relatively similar to the eleventh factor in the all 
firms’ data set. 
o The third factor is associated with the development of the Quick Assets to 
Current Assets (QACA) ratio and is therefore similar to the third factor 
without directors’ characteristics. It is also similar with the second factor in 
the all firms’ data with directors’ characteristics in Chapter 5. 
o The fourth factor is associated with return on investment (ROI) at the time 
when event_failure=2 and the TLTA for the 4 years prior to that status. This 
factor is also similar to the fourth factor without directors’ characteristics 
and has the same combination of ratios (but different timings) with the third 
factor with directors’ characteristics in Chapter 5. 
o The fifth factor is associated with TLTA between 7 and 2 years prior to 
failure. This factor is similar with the fifth factor without directors’ 
characteristics but with slightly shorter development across time (years 2-
4 prior to failure as opposed to all years prior to failure). There is not any 
significant association with the factors from Chapter 5. 
o The sixth factor is associated with the cash flow to sales (CFTS) in the 5th 
year prior to the status date when event_failure=2 and with TLTA 4 and 5 
years prior to that status. There is also an association with ROI between 4 
and 6 years prior to failure. This is broadly similar to the eighth factor 
without directors’ characteristics although with slightly different time lags 
but without any direct association with Chapter 5 factors. 
o The seventh factor is associated with the quick ratio up to 3 years prior to 
the event_failure=2 status and therefore it is broadly similar to the seventh 
factor without directors’ characteristics. There is also some similarity with 
the tenth factor from Chapter 5 but with different timings. 
o The eight factor is associated with ROI, CFTS and TLTA, 1 year prior to the 
status becoming event_failure=2. This factor is not closely associated with 
 212 | P a g e  
 
any of the factors in the part without directors’ characteristics but there are 
some similarities in terms of the combination of ratios with the eighth factor 
from Chapter 5 (with directors’ characteristics). The timings are different 
though. 
o The ninth factor is associated with growth rate 6 years prior to the 
event_failure=2 status, QACA and TCTL 7 years prior to that status and 
NSTA 6 and 7 years prior to that status.  This factor is similar to the tenth 
factor without directors’ characteristics but there is no direct association 
with factors from Chapter 5. 
o The tenth factor is associated with TLTA and ROI 7 years prior to the 
event_failure=2 status being, relatively similar to the ninth factor without 
directors’ characteristics and the sixth factor from chapter 5 but with 
different timings. 
o The eleventh factor is associated with ROI, 2-4 years prior to the 
event_failure= 2 and growth rate 3 years prior to that status. It is 
additionally associated with the total number of directors, therefore differing 
from the factors without directors’ characteristics. There is no direct 
association with any of the factors in Chapter 5. 
o The twelfth factor is associated with growth rate 7 years prior to 
event_failure=2 and CFTS at the 3rd and 7th year prior to that status. It is 
not closely associated with any of the factors in the analysis without 
directors’ characteristics or with any of the Chapter 5 factors. 
o The thirteenth factor is associated with ROI 2 years prior to the failure status 
and TLTA 1-3 years prior to that status. There is also an association with 
the age of directors and therefore the experience of the board. There is 
some similarity in the combination of ratios with the fourth factor without 
directors’ characteristics and the third factor in Chapter 5 but the timing is 
different.  
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Table 6.10: Factor Loadings with directors’ characteristics (post VARIMAX rotation) in 
UK firms. 
 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 Factor9 Factor10 Factor11 Factor12Factor13
             roi           0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.983 0.023 -0.014 -0.007 0.016 0.016 -0.003 0.025 -0.001 -0.017
           roiL1           0.004 0.008 0.002 -0.067 -0.022 0.042 0.039 0.533 0.012 0.022 0.123 0.033 0.154
           roiL2        0.056 0.019 0.052 -0.166 -0.064 0.193 0.019 0.003 -0.025 0.041 0.335 0.134 0.452
           roiL3       0.076 0.001 -0.033 -0.130 -0.033 0.082 0.011 -0.011 -0.010 0.038 0.642 0.069 0.002
           roiL4       0.103 0.014 0.044 -0.250 -0.134 0.339 0.011 0.042 0.040 0.095 0.360 0.107 0.155
           roiL5     0.038 -0.003 0.062 0.006 0.139 0.808 0.000 0.014 -0.020 -0.060 0.009 0.105 -0.001
           roiL6         0.037 -0.016 0.074 0.024 -0.248 0.453 -0.009 0.015 0.110 0.203 0.155 0.241 0.144
           roiL7      -0.001 -0.002 0.031 0.001 0.013 -0.082 0.003 0.009 -0.013 0.894 0.037 0.044 0.007
growth_rate    -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 -0.024 0.017 -0.002 0.012 -0.016 0.000 0.028 0.000 -0.013
growth_rateL1 -0.044 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.015 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.004 -0.005 0.038 0.010 -0.010
growth_rateL2    -0.018 0.004 0.008 0.093 -0.047 0.087 0.009 -0.081 0.005 -0.031 -0.032 0.027 0.298
growth_rateL3    -0.027 -0.011 0.040 0.100 -0.060 0.139 -0.008 0.018 0.044 0.012 -0.475 0.063 0.131
growth_rateL4 -0.080 -0.025 0.032 0.200 0.057 -0.148 -0.006 0.013 0.024 0.219 -0.148 0.213 0.062
growth_rateL5   -0.082 0.188 -0.031 -0.009 0.040 -0.261 -0.019 -0.165 0.007 0.235 -0.029 0.128 0.100
growth_rateL6 0.026 0.008 0.042 -0.014 0.167 -0.215 -0.003 -0.075 -0.307 -0.092 -0.194 0.196 0.026
growth_rateL7  -0.140 -0.020 -0.008 -0.007 0.213 -0.051 0.052 -0.030 0.092 0.101 -0.037 -0.565 0.086
nsta              -0.015 0.027 -0.005 0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.048 -0.008 0.000 0.020 0.016
nsta_L1                  0.027 0.962 -0.003 -0.001 0.020 -0.043 0.004 0.014 0.069 -0.028 0.002 0.011 -0.028
nsta_L2           0.023 0.970 0.007 0.002 -0.011 0.017 0.000 -0.014 0.046 -0.017 0.013 -0.003 0.066
nsta_L3                0.018 0.948 0.004 0.006 -0.015 0.016 -0.009 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.006 -0.013 -0.024
nsta_L4              0.008 0.974 0.004 0.003 -0.025 0.018 -0.001 0.006 -0.021 0.020 -0.005 -0.009 -0.016
nsta_L5         -0.014 0.941 -0.002 0.002 0.009 0.006 -0.001 0.007 0.015 0.026 -0.001 0.004 -0.002
nsta_L6    0.139 0.552 0.024 -0.009 0.131 -0.110 0.024 -0.009 0.388 -0.050 -0.061 0.140 0.010
nsta_L7              0.062 0.467 0.030 -0.046 0.043 -0.041 0.029 -0.013 0.736 -0.007 -0.034 0.052 -0.008
cfts                       0.044 0.016 -0.011 -0.010 0.004 -0.006 0.002 0.016 0.009 -0.001 -0.012 -0.013 0.043
cfts_L1         0.025 0.010 -0.016 0.015 0.043 -0.017 -0.007 0.944 -0.011 -0.024 0.002 -0.014 0.152
cfts_L2       0.005 0.015 -0.052 0.017 0.057 0.015 0.020 0.022 -0.031 -0.003 0.135 0.178 -0.089
cfts_L3              0.121 0.031 -0.021 -0.048 0.022 0.062 0.057 0.042 -0.060 -0.027 0.292 0.305 -0.203
cfts_L4          0.039 0.014 -0.051 -0.009 0.027 0.021 0.017 -0.003 -0.016 -0.015 0.012 0.207 -0.063
cfts_L5                0.010 -0.009 -0.015 0.003 0.368 0.637 0.009 0.008 0.027 0.096 0.041 -0.012 -0.063
cfts_L6              -0.021 0.009 -0.072 0.008 -0.016 0.084 0.004 -0.002 0.109 0.021 -0.008 0.095 -0.001
cfts_L7                    0.091 0.019 0.043 0.006 -0.083 0.168 0.025 0.006 0.067 -0.045 0.044 0.662 0.007
quick_ratio -0.091 -0.005 0.095 -0.030 -0.049 0.058 0.333 0.043 -0.013 0.015 0.011 0.036 0.002
quick_ratioL1    -0.040 0.002 0.017 0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.857 0.001 0.001 -0.007 0.008 0.005 -0.021
quick_ratioL2  -0.053 0.001 0.009 -0.003 -0.016 0.005 0.927 0.013 0.006 -0.003 0.009 0.001 -0.016
quick_ratioL3    -0.064 -0.003 0.007 -0.017 -0.035 0.021 0.507 0.019 0.030 0.011 -0.021 -0.039 0.044
quick_ratioL4   -0.094 -0.013 0.004 -0.009 -0.052 0.032 0.223 0.030 0.082 0.006 0.011 0.014 0.000
quick_ratioL5  -0.082 -0.011 0.004 0.006 -0.033 0.017 0.117 0.009 0.088 -0.002 -0.009 0.024 0.035
quick_ratioL6   -0.047 -0.004 0.113 -0.006 -0.027 0.006 0.018 0.007 0.040 -0.005 0.013 -0.004 -0.002
quick_ratioL7      -0.043 -0.019 0.005 -0.024 -0.043 0.009 0.129 -0.007 0.128 0.016 -0.046 0.029 0.025
tlta                       -0.004 0.005 0.000 0.978 -0.020 0.015 0.008 -0.089 -0.015 0.005 -0.019 0.006 0.024
tltaL1              -0.056 -0.006 -0.005 0.192 0.116 -0.044 -0.022 -0.877 0.004 -0.026 0.024 -0.022 0.359
tltaL2         -0.077 -0.008 -0.023 0.475 0.241 -0.141 -0.068 -0.211 -0.011 -0.066 -0.084 -0.095 0.632
tltaL3               -0.072 -0.013 -0.001 0.399 0.225 -0.134 -0.068 -0.059 0.011 -0.024 -0.235 -0.031 0.315
tltaL4                   -0.043 -0.015 0.002 0.456 0.382 -0.402 -0.069 -0.046 -0.023 0.024 -0.040 0.105 0.166
 tltaL5            -0.014 -0.001 0.025 0.021 0.647 -0.462 -0.024 -0.049 0.055 0.183 0.075 0.051 0.194
tltaL6                    -0.015 0.005 0.010 -0.007 0.935 0.186 -0.009 -0.030 -0.027 0.049 -0.026 -0.054 0.019
tltaL7                       -0.053 -0.002 0.010 -0.004 0.569 0.158 -0.016 -0.013 0.051 0.710 -0.032 -0.195 -0.059
qaca                     -0.103 0.017 0.760 -0.008 0.005 0.031 0.027 -0.022 -0.020 0.000 -0.055 0.077 0.083
qacaL1           -0.067 0.017 0.843 -0.010 -0.001 0.008 0.037 -0.030 -0.037 0.005 -0.018 0.073 0.096
qacaL2                 -0.070 -0.008 0.859 -0.016 -0.019 0.010 0.026 0.006 -0.028 -0.001 -0.034 0.047 0.011
qacaL3              -0.082 0.007 0.876 0.006 0.006 0.020 0.003 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.011 0.002 -0.025
qacaL4                  -0.086 0.010 0.839 -0.003 0.027 -0.007 -0.012 0.008 0.046 0.022 -0.027 -0.015 -0.018
qacaL5              -0.049 -0.014 0.822 0.016 -0.004 0.012 -0.011 0.000 0.096 -0.004 0.067 -0.084 -0.062
qacaL6           -0.043 0.003 0.764 0.023 0.023 -0.007 -0.027 0.010 0.101 0.044 0.071 -0.077 -0.068
qacaL7                 -0.138 -0.030 0.372 -0.032 -0.040 0.077 -0.013 -0.002 0.605 0.038 0.086 -0.191 -0.041
tctl                           0.778 0.047 -0.070 -0.014 0.040 -0.034 -0.023 0.027 -0.032 -0.031 0.109 -0.030 -0.055
tctlL1                       0.822 0.035 -0.086 -0.022 0.030 -0.012 -0.047 0.044 -0.046 -0.031 0.096 -0.034 -0.053
tctlL2                      0.852 0.027 -0.087 -0.008 0.014 -0.011 -0.041 0.036 -0.038 -0.034 0.108 -0.018 -0.050
tclL3                          0.885 0.023 -0.070 -0.009 0.019 -0.018 -0.009 0.006 -0.047 -0.005 0.062 0.007 -0.029
tctlL4                     0.865 0.012 -0.061 -0.015 -0.051 0.059 -0.009 0.027 0.060 0.004 -0.058 -0.008 0.021
tctlL5                      0.775 0.026 -0.051 0.012 -0.064 0.080 -0.022 0.014 0.083 0.019 -0.142 0.099 0.054
tctlL6                  0.742 -0.019 -0.096 0.008 -0.068 0.025 -0.021 -0.035 0.124 0.033 -0.149 0.176 0.068
tctlL7            0.482 -0.030 -0.042 -0.037 -0.067 0.033 -0.009 -0.035 0.525 0.035 -0.104 0.118 0.061
firmage   0.200 -0.045 -0.130 0.012 0.014 0.141 0.064 0.065 0.017 -0.027 0.196 0.045 -0.151
avg_dir_age 0.199 -0.014 -0.091 0.020 0.039 0.097 0.030 0.041 0.026 -0.038 0.112 0.148 -0.243
Nr_Female_Dir -0.170 -0.027 0.073 0.014 -0.005 0.036 0.036 0.056 -0.053 0.046 0.193 -0.092 0.124
Total_Dir_Nr -0.077 -0.068 0.103 0.033 0.060 0.088 0.046 0.066 -0.040 0.009 0.379 -0.003 -0.034
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The comparison of the results from the factor analysis of the UK firms and with the 
full sample of firms are presented in Table 6.11. One can conclude that the 
inclusion of directors’ characteristics adds further dimensions to the factor 
analysis. Comparing the two factor analyses (with and without directors’ 
characteristics) of the UK firms, one can observe that their primary difference is 
the 11th factor where the analysis with directors’ characteristics also includes the 
total number of directors. Moreover, the analysis with directors’ characteristics has 
got an additional 13th factor. Other factors tend to be broadly similar, although the 
order may be different. For example the 9th factor in the UK sample without 
directors’ characteristics is similar with the 10th factor in the analysis with directors’ 
characteristics. 
 
Comparing the results with the all (EU) firms’ sample, the first and the second 
factors from the EU firms sample are practically the same with the first and third 
factors from the UK firms (both with and without considering management 
characteristics). The fourth factor for the EU firms has similar characteristics with 
the second factor from the UK firms but with different timing in the Net Sales to 
Total Assets ratio which is the primary driver of these factors. The other factors 
are different, demonstrating that the inclusion of directors’ characteristics adds 
further latent dimensions in the factor analysis. 
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Table 6.11: Comparison of Factors for all firms sample and UK firms. 
 
 
 
6.4 Cluster Analysis and the Identification of Firm Failure Processes 
 
Factor scores obtained from the analysis above are standardized and uncorrelated. 
After the factors are scored, based on their factor loading (Hair et al., 2006), 
Cluster Analysis is applied. 
 
The clustering method is the k-medians with Euclidean distance for the reasons 
already explain in Chapter 5. The stopping rules that are used to determine the 
number of clusters that the analysis might give is again the Calinski and Harabasz 
(1974) index. 
 
 
Factor W/out Directors With Directors W/out Directors With Directors
1st TCTL (all years) TCTL (all years) TCTL (all years) TCTL (all years)
2nd QACA (all years) QACA (all years) NSTA (all years) NSTA (all years)
3rd TLTA (4-7 years) TLTA (4-7 years) QACA (all years) QACA (all years)
4th NSTA (4-7 years) NSTA (4-7 years)
ROI (at failure);
  TLTA (0-4 years)
ROI (at failure);
  TLTA (0-4 years)
5th
QACA (4-7 years);
TCTL (5-7 years)
QACA (4-7 years );
TCTL (6-7 years );
Fi rm age;
N. Female Dir.;
Tota l  Dir. Nr.
TLTA (2-7 years) TLTA (2-7 years)
6th
ROI (3rd year);
TLTA (3rd year)
ROI (3rd year);
TLTA (3 years)
CFTS (1st year);
TLTA (1st year);
ROI (1st year)
CFTS (5th year);
TLTA (4-5 years );
ROI (4-6 years )
7th
Growth Rate (3rd year);
NSTA (3rd year)
Growth Rate (3rd year);
NSTA (3 year)
Quick Ratio (0-3 years) Quick Ratio (0-3 years)
8th
ROI (1st year);
TLTA (0-2 years );
QACA (5th year)
ROI (1st year);
TLTA (0-2years);
ROI (5-6 years );
CFTS (5th year);
TLTA (4-6 years )
ROI (1 year);
CFTS (1 year);
TLTA (1 year)
9th
ROI (4-7 years);
Growth Rate (6th year)
ROI (2-7 years);
Growth Rate (6th year)
ROI (7th year);
TLTA (7th year)
Growth Rate (6th year);
NSTA (6-7 years );
QACA (7th year);
TCTL (7th year)
10th Quick Ratio (3-6 years) Quick Ratio (3-5 years)
Growth Rate (6th year);
NSTA (6-7 years );
QACA (7th year);
TCTL (7th year)
ROI (7th year);
TLTA (7th year)
11th NSTA (0-4 years) NSTA (1-4 years)
ROI (2-4 years);
Growth rate (3rd year)
ROI (2-4 years );
Growth rate (3th year);
Tota l  Dir. Nr.
12th CFTS (3-7 years) CFTS (3-7 years)
CFTS (7th year);
Growth rate (7th year)
Growth Rate (7th year);
CFTS (3rd year);
CFTS (7th year)
13th N/A N/A N/A
ROI (2nd year);
TLTA (1-3 years)
All Firms UK Firms
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6.4.1 Clusters without directors’ characteristics 
 
The factors without directors’ characteristics are used in the first part of the cluster 
analysis. The Calinski and Harabasz (1974) test suggests that there are 4 potential 
clusters and therefore 4 distinct failure processes for UK firms. The Calinski and 
Harabasz (1974) Pseudo-F of 58.08 is the highest that can be achieved and is 
produced when 4 clusters were tested. That indicates that the four-clusters 
solution is the most distinct compared to alternative clustering tested that ranged 
from 2 to 12 clusters. The Pseudo-F rose when the number of clusters were 
increasing up to the 4 clusters and fell thereafter. This result is intuitive because 
UK firms had also four clusters with failed firms in the all (EU) firms’ cluster 
analysis. Looking at the four clusters of the UK firms, one can observe that the 
differences between the financial ratios in the alternative clusters are relatively 
small. Therefore, this is a relatively homogeneous group with regards to financial 
ratios and the main differentiating factor appears to be the age of the firm. The 
clusters’ characteristics are described as follows (results in Appendix B; Table B.5). 
 
The first process is characterized from firms that are 7 years old, with the lowest 
ROI compared to the other three clusters. These firms had high growth rates 4-7 
years prior to failure which reduced sharply subsequently. Despite these firms’ 
sales generation ability being high (as is in most clusters), their ability to generate 
cash from their sales was weak and deteriorated in the most recent years. These 
firms’ liquidity used to be very high in 4 to 7 years prior to failure but deteriorated 
rapidly thereafter. As a result, firms in this cluster have the lowest levels of 
liquidity. In addition, the firms if this cluster are the most-indebted of this analysis 
and have very limited usage of trade credit.  
The second process is characterized by firms by firms that are 17 years old. 
These firms have generally negative growth rates for a number of years prior to 
failure. Similar to firms in cluster 1, these firms have a good sales generation 
ability for their assets but poor conversion of sales to cash. Liquidity is strong and 
broadly stable. Total liabilities are also stable without being excessive while these 
firms are using trade credit more than any other firm cluster. 
The third process is characterized by firms that are 14 years old and of negative 
growth. These firms have the best cash generating ability from their sales 
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compared to other clusters’ firms and very limited usage of trade credit but strong 
working capital. 
The forth process is characterized by firms that are 13 years old and of volatile 
growth. Their cash generating ability from their sales was relatively strong in the 
6-7 years prior to failure but deteriorated rapidly closer to the failure event despite 
increasing sales. The distribution of clusters in the UK regions is presented in Table 
6.12.  
 
There appears to be some differentiation in the concentration of failed firms 
between regions and failure processes. No region has its most significant 
concertation of firms in the first firm failure process, which is characterized by 
young firms with low levels of liquidity. One plausible explanation is that (with the 
young age of the firm being key characteristic of this failure process) firms of 
young age (less than 10 years old) are not the most significant population in any 
region. On the other hand, South West (40%), East Midlands (55%), Yorkshire 
and the Humber (34%), West Midlands (37%), East Anglia (34%) and North West 
(31%) are more concentrated in the second firm failure process, which is 
characterized by older firms with negative growth rates. London (34%), N. Ireland 
(40%), Scotland (43%) and South East (34%) are more concentrated on the third 
firm failure process which is characterized by firms that have weak cash generating 
ability. Wales’ firms are equally concentrated (33% each) between the second and 
the third firm failure processes respectively. The fourth firm failure process, 
characterized by firms of volatile growth, has, in general, the fewer firms, with no 
particular concentration from any region. 
 
Table 6.12: Distribution of UK firms in clusters (Clusters without directors’ 
characteristics). 
 
 
6.4.2 Clusters with Directors’ Characteristics 
 
The second stage of the cluster analysis includes the factors that considered the 
directors’ characteristics (with directors’ characteristics). Therefore the 13 factors 
Cluster
Yorkshire 
& Humber East
East
Midlands London N.Ireland
North
East
North
West Scotland
South
East
South
West Wales
West
Midlands Total
1 21 (20%) 12 (29%) 6 (18%) 86  (23%) 4 (20%) 4 (24%) 24 (16%) 7 (13%) 16 (22%) 2 (8%) 5 (28%) 15 (21%) 202 (21%)
2 35 (34%) 14 (34%) 18  (55%) 103 (28%) 5 (25%) 6 (35%) 47 (31%) 13 (24%) 18 (24%) 10 (40%) 6 (33%) 26 (37%) 301 (31%)
3 27 (26%) 12  (29%) 6  (18%) 125 (34%) 8 (40%) 4 (24%) 46 (30%) 23 (43%) 25 (34%) 7 (28%) 6 (33%) 20 (28%) 309 (32%)
4 21 (20%) 3 (7%) 3 (9%) 55 (15%) 3 (15%) 3 (18%) 36 (24%) 11 (20%) 15 (20%) 6 (24%) 1 (6%) 10 (14%) 167 (17%)
Total 104 41 33 369 20 17 153 54 74 25 18 71 979
 218 | P a g e  
 
that included the financial ratios, the firm age and the directors’ characteristics of 
UK firms (number of female directors, average directors’ age and total number of 
directors) were clustered using the same approach. 
  
Calinski and Harabasz (1974) suggest that when analyzing firms with director 
characteristics the number of the clusters that maximizes the Pseudo-F value is 4; 
the same number of clusters as in the analysis of UK firms without directors’ 
characteristics. The Calinski and Harabasz index is maximized (56.52) when four 
clusters are identified after testing alternative potential solutions ranging from 2 
to 12 clusters. When the potential number of cluster exceeded 4, the Pseudo-F 
values fell. The firm failure process with directors’ characteristics (clusters) have 
the following broad characteristics (results in Appendix B; Table B.7):  
 
The first process is associated with firms that are 12 years old and, have 1 female 
director and 10 directors in total whose average age is 51 years. These are firms 
with deteriorating growth rate and relatively high usage of trade credit.  
The second process is associated with firms that are 11 years old, have 11 
directors (2 female) with an average age also of 51 years. These firms are 
characterized from their inability to create cash flows out of their sales despite 
their sales generation ability being very strong.  
The third process is associated with firms that are 15 years old, have 13 directors 
(2 of them women) with an average age of 51 years. These firms appear to have 
limited usage of trade credit but a deteriorating ability to generate cash flows and 
ROI despite strong growth rates in the years prior to failure. 
The fourth process is associated with firms that are 9 years old, have 10 
directors (2 women) of an average age of 47 years. These firms are over indebted, 
have weak cash generating ability and also weak liquidity, ROI and growth.   
  
The distribution of clusters in the UK regions is presented in table 6.13. Similar to 
the analysis for EU firms with directors’ characteristics in chapter 5, UK firms 
appear to have relatively more limited concentration in one of the failure processes 
(in that case the fourth failure process).  
 
Some regions also exhibit some cluster-specific concentration. Yorkshire and the 
Humber (50%), East Anglia (51%), East Midlands (70%) and London (45%), North 
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East (65%), North West (41%), Wales (56%) and West Midlands (52%), are more 
concentrated on the first firm failure process which is characterized by firms with 
one female director that have deteriorating growth. N. Ireland (40%), Scotland 
(41%), South East (39%) are more concentrated on the third failure process which 
is characterized by firms that are the oldest (on average), have the largest board 
of directors and a deteriorating cash generating ability. The second and the fourth 
firm failure processes are characterized by firms with good sales but poor cash 
flows and from young firms and have the lowest concentration of failed firms across 
all regions. 
 
Considering the firm failure processes with directors’ characteristics, one can 
conclude that the inclusion of the directors’ metrics has added further insight in 
the firm failure processes. In particular the failure processes appear to have some 
differentiation in the firms’ board structure and the number of directors. In 
addition, some key characteristics, other than the directors, that the failure 
process literature has identified (such as the age of the firm, the growth of the 
firm and the basic dimensions of liquidity and profitability) still remain 
differentiators of the alternative firm failure processes even when directors’ 
characteristics are included. However, the differences in such metrics are relatively 
small in the alternative firm failure processes. As such, the inclusion of directors’ 
characteristics adds a dimension to the firm failure process identification. 
 
Table 6.13: Distribution of UK firms in clusters (with directors’ characteristics).  
 
 
6.4.3 Intra-country firm failure processes and Hypotheses 
 
The factor/clustering analysis results, both with and without directors’ 
characteristics, show evidence that UK firms do have 4 different failure processes. 
The number of firm failure processes identified remains in line with the qualitative 
(eg. Argenti, 1976; Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008) and quantitative literature (eg. 
Cluster
Yorkshire 
& Humber East
East
Midlands London N.Ireland
North
East
North
West Scotland
South
East
South
West Wales
West
Midlands Total
1 52 (50%) 21 (51%) 23 (70%) 165 (45%) 7 (35%) 11 (65%) 62 (41%) 17 (31%) 28 (38%) 11 (44%) 10 (56%) 37 (52%) 444 (45%)
2 20 (19%) 3 (7%) 5 (15%) 58 (16%) 3 (15%) 3 (18%) 36 (24%) 11 (20%) 14 (19%) 7 (28%) 1 (6%) 10 (14%) 171 (17%)
3 27 (26%) 15 (37%) 4 (12%) 119 (32%) 8 (40%) 1 (6%) 50 (33%) 22 (41%) 29 (39%) 6 (24%) 6 (33%) 23 (32%) 310 (32%)
4 5 (5%) 2 (5%) 1 (3%) 27 (7%) 2 (10%) 2 (12%) 5 (3%) 4 (7%) 3 (4%) 1 (4%) 1 (6%) 1 (1%) 54 (6%)
Total 104 41 33 369 20 17 153 54 74 25 18 71 979
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Laitinen et al, 2014; Laitinen and Lukason, 2014; Lukason and Laitinen, 2016) 
that has historically identified between 2 and 6 firm failure processes. 
 
However, the intra-country comparison of the UK firms’ failure processes shows 
that, by large, the failure processes are not region-specific. In other words, when 
clustering firms with similar firm-specific characteristics, each cluster (firm failure 
process) has had firms from a number of different regions. Nevertheless, some 
firm failure processes have a relatively higher concentration in certain regions. In 
UK firms, the number of directors and the age of the firm appeared to be key 
differentiators of the alternative failure processes with financial ratios being less 
different between the alternative failure processes. Nevertheless, the growth rate, 
the liquidity and the cash flow generation (CFTS) appeared to be the main 
differentiators of failure processes from a financial ratio point of view while the 
board diversity did not differentiate between alternative UK firm failure processes.   
 
One important point to be made is that the literature that focuses on regional firm 
failures is focused around the effects of the economic and business environment 
that affect different regions. There is limited evidence relating to whether the firm-
specific characteristics that determine the firm failure processes are affected 
differently in different regions. This is discussed in the following section. 
 
6.4.4 Hypothesis Testing on Clusters 
 
Having developed the clusters of the UK firm failure processes (with and without 
directors’ characteristics), and having discussed some observable differences in 
the concentration of firms between different clusters, we proceed to compare 
whether there are any statistically significant differences between the failure 
processes as expressed in the two versions of the clusters and a number of 
characteristics that have been discussed in the development of the Hypotheses of 
this study (Chapter 2). 
 
One aim of this chapter is to identify the alternative firm failure processes in the 
UK regions. In that context, it is important to ascertain whether the firm failure 
processes are independent of the UK regions. In addition, it is tested whether the 
(mainly) business environment characteristics, that are categorical variables in 
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nature, differ between the alternative firm failure processes (with and without 
directors’ characteristics). The approach in testing the Hypotheses for the intra-
country comparison of the firm failure processes applies the median test for 
continuous variables to investigate whether the different processes have 
significant differences across the different metrics that the hypotheses pose. For 
categorical variables, the Pearson chi square test of the independence of rows and 
columns in a two-way distribution table is employed. These tests are applied on 
the firm-specific characteristics that were used in order to identify the alternative 
firm failure processes as well as on a number of additional characteristics, 
associated with the economic and business environment. 
 
The null hypothesis of the Pearson Chi-square is that there is no difference in the 
distribution of firms between the rows (regions) and the columns (firm failure 
processes). Consequently the alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference in 
the distribution between firm failure processes and UK regions and as a result firm 
failure processes differ between them. The results of the hypothesis tests are 
presented in Tables 6.14 and 6.15.  
 
Table 6.14: Chi-Square results on hypothesis testing for UK firms.  
 
 
Table 6.15: Median Test results on hypothesis testing for UK firms for continuous 
variables. 
 
 
With regards to the main hypothesis that the firm failure processes are 
independent of the regions, the results in Table 6.14 show p-values of 0.203 
(without directors’ characteristics) and 0.089 (with directors’ characteristics). This 
means that in the first case (without directors), the hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Firm Clusters 
(Failure Processes)  
 
Industry Regions
 
SGR
Clusters without Directors' characteristics   124.40/ 0.000 39.41 / 0.203 18.44/0.000
Clusters with Directors' characteristics  98.46/0.000  44.41/ 0.089 24.23/0.000
Chi-Squared statistic/p-value
Firm Clusters 
(Failure Processes) ROI
GROWTH
RATE NSTA CFTS
QUICK
RATIO TLTA QACA TCTL
FIRM
AGE
 
GDP
Growth
 
Credit 
Availability
Regional 
GVA
New 
Business
 
Female
Directors
 
Age of 
Directors
 
Nr. Of 
Directors
Clusters without Directors' characteristics
 86.79/ 
0.000
 51.04/ 
0.000
30.33/ 
0.000
305.35/ 
0.000
 45.02/
0.000
137.80/
0.000
66.68/
 0.000
111.03 /
0.000
 291.74/
 0.000
338.88 /
0.000
560.70 /
0.000
  52.27/
0.000
13.84/
0.003
153.54/
 0.000
95.54 / 
0.000
53.81/
 0.000
Clusters with Directors' characteristics
 
128.55/
 0.000
33.35/
 0.000
12.16/
0.007
471.12/
 0.000
 67.55/
 0.000
208.25/
 0.000
36.33/
0.000
697.95 /
0.000
223.36/
 0.000
 500.07 /
0.000
579.62 /
0.000
 20.24/
0.000
 10.56/
 0.014
130.91/
 0.000
56.35/
 0.000
93.89/
0.000
Chi-Squared statistic/p-value
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When directors’ characteristics are included, the hypothesis is still not rejected at 
the 5% significance level but it is rejected at the 10% significance level 
(Sig.<0.10). Therefore, when directors’ characteristics are used to determine the 
failure processes then differences between regions are significant at the 10% level. 
The remaining of the section discusses the separate hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The number of new firms as a percentage of the existing business 
population in a UK region differs between the alternative firm failure processes in 
UK firms; they are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
 
The median test (by using a Pearson chi square statistic) compares the medians 
of new business formation as a percentage of the business population in each 
region and across all the different firm failure processes. The null hypothesis of the 
median test is that there is no statistical difference in the medians of the new 
business formed in each region as a percentage of the regional business population 
across clusters (the firm failure processes). The alternative hypothesis is that there 
is a statistical difference between regions’ new firms and firm failure processes. 
The results (Table 6.15) for both failure clusters (with and without directors’ 
characteristics) reject the null hypothesis of no statistical difference in the medians 
of new firms across the alternative firm failure processes (p value <0.00). 
Therefore, the first part of the alternative hypothesis (H7) that there is a 
statistically significant difference between firm failure processes and new firms as 
a percentage of the existing business population in UK regions is accepted. 
Therefore, the medians are not the same across firm failure clusters. As such, 
evidence from the qualitative failure process literature (Argenti, 1976; Ooghe and 
De Prijcker, 2008) that included increasing competition as an influencing factor in 
the alternative firm failure processes is confirmed in the quantitative context. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Industry classification differs between the alternative firm failure 
processes in UK firms; it also differs as a determinant of firms’ transition to failure 
in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
Considering the industry classification, the null hypothesis of the chi square is that 
the rows (industries) and columns (failure clusters) in the distribution between 
firms’ industry classification and the failure clusters do not differ. The first part of 
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the alternative hypothesis (H8) is that industry differs between firms in the 
alternative failure processes in UK regions. The Pearson Chi-square is significant 
(Table 6.14; p-value <0.01) for all the clustering approaches. Therefore we can 
conclude that there is a statistically significant difference in the industry 
distribution across the failure processes (clusters). As such, the first part of H8 is 
accepted. The implication of the acceptance of H8 is that it links evidence from the 
wider firm failure literature (Watson and Everett, 1999) that highlighted the 
significance of firm’s industry in firms’ failure, with the failure process literature. 
This shows that the distribution of industries can differ between the alternative 
firm failure processes. 
 
 Hypothesis 9: Financial performance represented by key financial ratios and the 
age of the firm, differ in the alternative firm failure processes of UK firms; they 
also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm 
failure processes. 
 
The financial ratios and the age of the firm are firm specific characteristics that 
were used to identify the alternative firm failure processes. As such one would 
expect that these will differ in the alternative firm failure processes. The median 
test (using a Pearson chi square statistic) has been applied to compare the 
medians of all financial ratios and of the age of the firm across the different clusters 
(firm failure processes). The null hypothesis of the median test suggests that there 
is no statistical difference in the medians of the financial ratios and of the firms’ 
age between failure processes. The alternative hypothesis suggest there is a 
difference in the medians of the financial ratios and of the firms’ age in the 
alternative firm failure processes (clusters). The results (Table 6.15) in both failure 
clusters (with and without directors’ characteristics) indicate that the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is statistically significant differences 
between firm failure processes in all financial ratios’ medians. Moreover, there is 
statistically significant difference between the firm failure processes in the firms’ 
age medians. As such the first part of H9 can be accepted, and therefore the results 
of this study are in line with evidence from the existing quantitative firm failure 
process literature, which uses only financial ratios and in some cases the age of 
the firm for the identification of the firm failure processes (eg. Laitinen, 1991; 
Laitinen et al., 2014; Lukason, 2018). In addition, the results show that even when 
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directors’ characteristics are added, the financial ratios remain different in the 
alternative firm failure processes. 
 
Hypothesis 10: In an UK regional context, macroeconomic conditions differ 
between firms in the alternative firm failure processes in UK firms; they also differ 
as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure 
processes.  
 
GDP growth and the credit availability are both continuous variables as are the 
regional GVA and the number of new business births as a percentage of the 
existing population at regional level. The median test (Pearson chi square) has 
been applied to compare the median GDP growth and credit availability between 
difference clusters. The null hypothesis of the median test suggests that there is 
no statistical difference in the medians of GDP growth and credit availability 
between failure clusters. The alternative hypothesis is that there is statistically 
significant difference in the median GDP growth, GVA growth and credit availability 
between firms in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
The results (Table 6.15) in both analyses (with and without directors’ 
characteristics) reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, the first part of the 
alternative hypothesis (H10) is accepted. Therefore, the results indicate that there 
is statistically significant difference between firm failure processes and GDP 
growth, GVA growth and credit availability. These results are quite surprising as 
the GDP growth and the Credit availability is measured at country level. However, 
a closer look at the time when firms in failure processes entered the 
event_failure=2 status provides an explanation for the result. The fourth failure 
process without directors’ characteristics and the second process in the clustering 
with directors’ characteristics are characterized by firms that failed mostly in 2010 
and therefore close to where the GPD growth and the credit availability were at 
their lowest levels (Tables 6.16 and 6.17). These firm failure processes are 
characterized by firms that have weak cash generation ability from their sales and 
it is possible that they were the first to go into liquidation due to the financial crisis. 
It is also possible that these firms had difficulties in accessing credit and as such 
they were the first to fail. The analysis of firms’ transition to failure in the next 
section provides additional insight into these issues. 
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Table 6.16: Distribution of firms according to the year of liquidation (clusters without 
directors’ characteristics).  
 
 
Table 6.17: Distribution of firms according to the year of liquidation (c lusters with 
directors’ characteristics).  
 
  
 
Hypothesis 11: Directors’ Characteristics such as the presence of women in SMEs’ 
management, director age as a proxy of director experience and the number of 
directors, differ in the alternative UK firm failure processes; they also differ as 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
Directors’ characteristics are firm specific characteristics that were used to identify 
the alternative firm failure processes. As such one would expect that these will 
differ in the alternative firm failure processes. The median test (Pearson chi 
square) has been applied to compare the median number of women in the board, 
median age of directors and median number of directors  across the 4 different 
failure clusters (with and without directors’ characteristics). The null hypothesis is 
that there is no difference in the distribution of women, number of directors and 
age of directors between the alternative firm failure processes. The first part of the 
alternative hypothesis (H11) suggest that these characteristics differ in the 
alternative firm failure processes. The results (Table 6.15) in both failure clusters 
(with and without directors’ characteristics) indicate that firm failure clusters have 
Cluster
(No Directors) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
1 0 0 0 78 108 16 202
2 0 0 2 138 128 26 294
3 0 0 0 134 142 33 309
4 1 2 154 6 9 2 174
Total 1 2 156 356 387 77 979
Number of Firms per at Year of Event_failure=2
Cluster
(With 
Directors) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
1 0 0 0 203 202 35 440
2 1 2 155 5 13 2 178
3 0 0 1 127 148 31 307
4 0 0 0 21 24 9 54
Total 1 2 156 356 387 77 979
Number of Firms per at Year of Event_failure=2
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statistically different median number of women in the board, age of directors and 
total number of directors. The implication of this finding is that directors’ 
characteristics are an important characteristic of the alternative firm failure 
processes and as such it should be explicitly used. Moreover, this result confirms 
evidence from the qualitative firm failure process studies that the management of 
firms differs between the alternative firm failure processes (Argenti 1976; Argenti 
1976b; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008). 
 
Hypothesis 12: The distribution of firms with unsustainable levels of growth 
differs between the alternative firm failure processes in UK firms; unsustainable 
levels of growth are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
 
The sustainable growth variable (SGR) has been developed by employing the 
formulae presented in Chapter 4. SGR takes the value of 1 if a firm’s annual growth 
in sales exceeds the calculated sustainable growth level and 0 otherwise. The null 
hypothesis of the chi square is that the rows (SGR) and columns (failure clusters) 
do not differ in their distribution between the alternative firm failure processes. 
The first part of the alternative hypothesis is that firms with unsustainable levels 
of (sales) growth differ between firm failure processes. That is, the distribution of 
firms which have SGR=1, and therefore unsustainable levels of sales growth differs 
between the alternative firm failure processes. The results (Table 6.14) show that 
the Pearson Chi-square is significant (p-value <0.01). Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the first part of the alternative hypothesis (H12) is 
accepted. As such, we can conclude that there is a statistically significant difference 
in the distribution of firms with unsustainable growth levels across the failure 
clusters. This confirms evidence from the qualitative firm failure process literature 
that unsustainable levels of (sales) growth can be a characteristic of some firm 
failure processes (Argenti 1976b; Richardson et al., 1994). 
 
6.5 Panel Data Analysis for Firms’ Transition to Failure 
 
6.5.1  Introduction 
 
After presenting the results of the hypothesis tests on clusters, the results of panel 
data logistic regressions are presented. Panel data ordinal logistic regression has 
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been applied to the 8 different failure processes (with and without directors’ 
characteristics) of the UK firms, in order to identify whether the independent 
variables that are posed under the hypotheses are significant determinants of 
firms’ transition to failure. That is, the transition from a healthy firm status to 
financially distressed and ultimately to liquidation. 
 
The generic form of the model is: 
 
𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐷𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 
 
Where FS is the failure status in the form of an ordered choice variable. Similar to 
the approach that was applied in Chapter 5, the dependent variable of the model 
is ordered where 0 states the firm is still healthy; 1 indicates the firm is in financial 
distress; and 2 indicates that the firm is bankrupt. All the UK firms that are 
participating in this analysis eventually go into liquidation. FR represents the 
financial ratios entering the model. DIR represents the Directors characteristics. 
DIND represents the dummy variables for the industrial classification of the firm, 
DC represent the dummy variables for region. NF (New_firm_percentage) 
represents the number of new firms in the region. CR represents the credit 
availability in the UK in a given year. GDP_gr represents the annual GDP growth 
in the UK in a given year and SGR is a dummy variable that represents firms that 
have unsustainable growth rates.  
 
The application of ordered panel regressions will assist in identifying whether the 
explanatory variables are determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the 
alternative firm failure processes (and in the full UK sample). This is a salient issue 
that has not been discussed in the failure literature where firms are 
classified/clustered based on their final failure status (see for example Altman et 
al., 2010; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2008). In addition, there is no evidence in the firm 
failure process literature that either firm or business environment characteristics 
determine firms’ transition to failure. The characteristics of the alternative firm 
failure processes discussed in earlier sections may be helpful in identifying the firm 
failure processes but not necessarily determinants of the transition to failure.  
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6.5.2  Fixed or Random Effects Test  
 
Consistent with the approach used in Chapter 5, a random effects panel model 
specification was used for the UK firms. First, the dependent variables of the model 
include time-invariant (dummy) variables which make the fixed-effects 
specification unsuitable. Second, the test for the existence of fixed effects on the 
time varying variables that applied in Chapter 5 was also applied to the sub-set of 
UK firms. 
 
The results did not reject the null hypothesis (at p=0.01 with 10 degrees of 
freedom) that the coefficient of the means of the (time varying) independent 
variables are all zero and therefore we conclude that this is a further reason why 
the random effects specification should be used. The same approach was then 
applied to the individual failure clusters which are essentially smaller subsets of 
the main dataset with no difference in the results. 
 
6.5.3   Independent Variables in the Panel Ordered Logistic 
Regression  
 
The independent variables that were used in the analysis of the UK firms are the 
same with those used in Chapter 5 with one exception. The dummy variable for 
the legal tradition has been removed given that the legal tradition remains the 
same across the regions of the UK. Meanwhile, a region-specific variable is added 
in order to test the hypothesis that new business entries affect firm failure. The 
number of new businesses in each region as a percentage of the total number of 
businesses in that region was used in order to capture the effects of the business 
environment at regional level.  
 
The remaining independent variables had the same specification with those in 
Chapter 5 with the exception of the country-level dummy variables which were 
replaced by dummy variables representing regional effects. A (regional) dummy 
variable is taking the value of 1 for firms that operate in the particular region and 
0 otherwise. London is the reference region because it is the UK capital and is one 
of the regions that have one of the best economic performances in terms of 
GVA_growth and new business formation. In addition, its firms are relatively well 
distributed between the alternative firm failure processes.  
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Similarly to Chapter 5, the number of female directors has been tested in two 
alternative specifications. The first specification reports the number of female 
directors in the board (Female_nr) and is the one that is reported in the results. 
The alternative specification includes a dummy variable which takes the value of 
1 if a firm has any female member in the board and 0 otherwise.  
 
6.5.4 Panel Data Results 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to consider potential differences in the significance 
of all the independent variables discussed previously across the clusters in 
determining UK firms’ transition to failure. 
 
Nine Ordered Random Effects Panel Logit regressions were run by using all the 
firm-year observations of the sample of UK firms. The first considered all the UK 
firms, grouped together, ignoring the cluster allocations. Eight further regressions 
with the same explanatory variables were run for each of the clusters with and 
without directors’ characteristics. The clusters that were formed without directors’ 
characteristics are not regressed against directors’ characteristics. The results are 
presented in Table 6.18. The Likelihood Ratio test in the panel indicates that there 
is enough variability between firms in the sample to favor the panel specification 
over a simple ordered logistic model. 
 
6.5.4.1 Results 
The results of the full sample regression (Table 6.18; column 1) show that, in 
contrast with all the firms in Chapter 5, not all financial ratios are significant 
determinants of UK firms’ status transition to failure. 
 
A number of financial ratios are significant determinants (Sig.<0.01) of firms’ 
transition to failure and are negatively associated with failure, demonstrated by 
the negatve coefficients. This implies that a reduction in these financial ratios is 
associated with an increased propensity for firms’ to transition to failure. As such, 
CFTS, QACA, TCTL are as expected, all significant determinants of the UK firms’ 
transition to failure and negatively associated with it. On the other hand, growth 
rate (in total assets) is positively associated with the transition to liquidation. As 
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such, the implication is that increasing levels of total assets’ growth is associated 
with increased propensity for firms’ transition to failure.  
 
The firm age, the average age of directors, GDP growth and the credit availability 
are also significant (Sig.<0.01) and negatively associated with the transition to 
“worsening” event_failure statuses. Therefore, the results imply that, in the full 
firms’ sample, the younger the firm, the higher the propensity for transition 
towards failure. Likewise, reductions in the GDP growth and the credit availability 
are associated with increased propensity for firms’ to transition to failure. 
 
The percentage of new firms in a region and the presence of (un)sustainable 
growth are also significant determinants of UK firms’ eventual transition to failure 
with a positive coefficient that is in line with expectations. This means that when 
the level of firms’ (sales) growth exceeds the sustainable level (and therefore 
SGR=1), there is an increased propensity for firms’ to transition to failure. 
Moreover, the increasing numbers of new firms in a region are also associated with 
an increased propensity for firms’ to transition to failure. On the other hand, the 
presence of female directors (or their number) is not significant determinant of UK 
firms’ transition to failure. 
 
In terms of the control dummy variables, reported in the second part of the table, 
it should be noted that regional effects do not appear to be significant variables in 
that context with the exception of Scotland and N. Ireland. London has been 
chosen as the reference for the regional dummy variables due to its size and 
significance for the UK economy. In that respect, both Scotland and N. Ireland 
have a positive sign in their coefficient, implying that firms in these areas are more 
likely to transition to failure, compared to London. 
 
Finally, a number of the industry control variables (Agriculture, Construction, 
Manufacturing, Transportation and Communication, Wholesale, Retail) are only 
significant at the Sig.<0.10 of significance. Agriculture, Construction and Retail 
have negative coefficients implying that they are less likely to transition to failure 
than firms in the Services sector which is the reference industry. Manufacturing, 
Transportation and Communication and the Wholesale sectors have positive sign 
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in the coefficient and as such they are more likely to transition to failure than firms 
in the Services sector. 
 
Table 6.18: Panel data analysis results for alternative clusters.  
 
 
 
 
Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ROI -0.002 -0.077 *** -0.074 -0.509 *** -0.313 *** -0.194 *** -0.507 *** 0.015 -0.175 ***
NSTA -0.002 0.003 0.131 *** -0.073 -0.059 *** 0.017 -0.050 *** -0.015 0.054
CFTS -0.012 *** -0.184 *** -0.006 -0.012 * -0.037 *** -0.067 *** -0.014 -0.009 ** -0.001
quick_ratio -0.002 -0.006 * -0.241 *** -0.002  -0.009 ** -0.011 * -0.009 ** -0.006 0.000
growth_rate 0.004 *** 0.108 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.349 *** 0.002 0.294 *** 0.005 *** 0.099 *
TLTA 0.001 0.144 *** -0.052 0.117 *** 0.035 * 0.398 *** 0.418 *** 0.013 0.077 **
QACA -0.611 *** -0.335 -0.952 ** -0.946 *** 0.264 -0.457 * 0.412 -0.973 *** -1.176 **
TCTL -1.866 *** -5.160 *** -0.697 0.852 -0.728 -2.459 *** 0.198 -0.116 -2.212 *
Firmage -0.036 *** -0.045 *** -0.021 ** -0.019 * -0.052 *** -0.037 *** -0.046 ** -0.014 0.016
Avg_dir_age      -0.040 *** -0.007 -0.002 -0.045 ** -0.048 **
Nr_Female_Dir -0.060 -0.122 ** 0.120 -0.266 *** 0.102
Total_Dir_Nr   0.010 -0.005 -0.010 0.046 *** -0.043
GDP_gr -0.051 ** -0.068 -0.059 -0.070  0.123  -0.027  0.132 -0.086 * -0.152 *
Credit -0.011 *** -0.021 *** -0.016 ** -0.008  0.018 * -0.012 ** 0.023 ** -0.011 ** -0.025 **
new_firms_perc 0.128 *** 0.242 0.286 *** 0.195 *** 0.075 *** 0.113 * 0.005 *** 0.221 *** 0.429 ***
SGR 0.902 *** 0.840 *** 0.972 *** 0.530 *** 0.695 ** 0.860 *** 0.467 0.809 *** 0.609
Control_Ind (Agriculture) -0.957 * -0.987 ** 1.451 ** -0.695 -3.586 -0.321 -1.698 -0.811 * -1.073
Control_Ind (Mining) -0.221 -0.280 1.590 1.472 -26.113 0.343 -24.264 1.790 2.302 *
Control_Ind (Construction) -0.213 * -0.249 -0.535 -0.426 -5.206 * -0.405 -3.036 -0.256 0.126
Control_Ind (Manufacturing) 1.072 * 1.047 ** -0.588 -0.752 -2.862 -0.121 -0.478 -0.507 -1.273
Control_Ind (Trasp. & Comm.) 0.611 * 0.577 -0.572 -0.638 -1.887 -0.377 -0.016 -0.077 -2.049 *
Control_Ind (Wholesale) 0.429 * 0.365 -1.121 ** -0.705 -4.696 * -0.596 * -2.574 0.099 -1.395
Control_Ind (Retail) -0.801 * -0.818 -0.274 -1.102 * -3.270 -0.493 -1.302 -0.861 0.280
Control_Ind (R. Estate) -0.154 -0.158 0.763 0.335 -3.124 -0.052 -0.577 -0.247 0.325
region_York 0.318 0.222 0.501 0.768 -1.854 * 0.474 -2.026 * 0.939 * 1.237
region_east 0.218 -0.098 1.179 -0.473 1.270 0.360 1.239 0.085 -1.705
region_east_midlands 0.661 1.155 0.884 2.005 ** -23.127 0.754 -2.253 0.965 7.775 ***
region_n_ireland 1.049 * 1.787 1.719 ** 0.529 -3.622 * 1.603 ** -3.522 2.103 *** 1.050  
region_north_east 0.674 -1.729 1.092 2.892 *** -3.859 * 0.198 -3.830 * 4.416 *** 1.039
region_north_west 0.190 0.131 1.296 *** -0.041 ** -0.796 0.528 -0.954 0.215 1.271
region_scotland 1.211 *** 1.308 * 2.575 *** 0.873 -0.475  1.315 *** -0.589 * 1.040 * 2.282 **
region_south_east 0.205 -0.029 0.468 0.896 * -2.181 * 0.399 -2.817 ** 1.285 1.084
region_south_west -0.401 -0.898 0.958 -0.209 -1.419 -0.032 -1.628 -0.126 -2.774
region_wales -0.356 0.092 -17.822 -0.778 -25.323 0.059 -24.711 -1.250 0.724
region_west_midlands 0.416 0.719 1.464 ** 0.767 -3.974 ** 0.865 ** -4.234 ** 1.441 *** 3.078 **
\cut1 -5.286 -2.311 2.532 2.211 -3.384 -0.110  0.190 0.236 -2.218
\cut2 -2.916 0.466 4.125 4.618 2.003 2.054  6.028  1.923 2.253
Sigma_2u 3.346 1.645 2.487 2.791 6.006 1.613 6.072 2.398 0.862
std. Error Sigma_2u 0.314 0.360 0.539 0.465 1.628 0.279 1.686 0.433 0.368
LR test vs. ologit model 929.850 *** 84.210 *** 123.030 *** 262.500 *** 130.530 *** 132.720 *** 117.870 *** 200.900 *** 15.760 ***
ROI
growth_rate
NSTA
CFTS
quick_ratio 
SGR Dummy for unsustainable growth rate
Main Independent Variables
Control Variables
Average age of Directors
Total_Dir_Nr   
Credit
GDP_gr
new_firms_perc
Number of Female Directors
Total Number of Directors
Credit availability (% GDP)
GDP Growth (%)
Percentage of New firms in a region
Nr_Female_Dir TLTA
Quick ratio
Net Sales to Total Assets
Cash Flow to Total Sales
TCTL
Firmage
Avg_dir_age      
Return in Investment
Growth Rate (in total assets) QACA
Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 Process 4
Total Liabilities to Total Assets
Quick Assets to Current Assets
Trade Credit to Total Liabilities
Firm Age
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary 
Coeff.
Failure Processes w/out Directors' Characteristics Failure Processes with Directors' Characteristics
Process 1 Process 2
P>|z|   
Independent
Variables
All 
Firms Process 3 Process 4
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6.5.4.2 Results on Failure Processes without Directors 
Considering the clusters without directors’ characteristics, the results in Table 6.18 
(columns 2-5) show that the alternative firm failure processes have different 
combinations of significant financial ratios. 
 
The transition to failure of the firms in the first failure process (column 2) are 
negatively  associated with return on investment (ROI), generation of cash flows 
relatively to their sales, liquidity as expressed from the quick ratio and trade credit 
relatively to total liabilities (TCTL). As a result, a reduction in these variables is 
associated with an increase in firms’ propensity towards failure. On the other hand, 
growth rates and total liabilities compared to the total assets of the firm (TLTA) 
are positively associated with the transition to failure. This implies that increases 
in growth rates (of total assets) and increased total liabilities are associated with 
an increased propensity for transition to failure. 
 
The firms in the second failure process (Table 6.18; column 3) are affected by 
different financial ratios. Liquidity, as measured by the quick ratio, and negative 
working capital, as expressed by quick assets to current assets (QACA), is a 
significant determinant of these firms’ transition to failure with a negative (as 
expected) coefficient. A reduction in these financial ratios is therefore associated 
with an increase in the propensity of  firms’ transition to failure. On the other hand, 
net sales compared to total assets (NSTA) is significant with a positive coefficient, 
implying that an increase in NSTA is associated with higher probabilities for firms’ 
transition to failure. This result  is potentially counter-intuitive as it implies that 
the increase a firm’s sales generating activity from its assets is positively 
associated with the transition to failure. In this firm failure process, the result may 
be related to two things. First, excessive growth in sales is related to unsustainable 
growth and the SGR variable is also highly significant and positive, implying that 
unsustainable levels of growth (SGR=1) are associated with firms’ transition to 
failure. Second, this firm failure process is associated with firms that have strong 
sales generation but poor conversion to cash (CFTS). In this thesis we have seen 
that variables that are key characteristics of the failure process identification (in 
this case poor conversion of sales to cash-CFTS) are not necessarily determinants 
of firms’ transition to failure as all the firms in that process share these.   
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The financial ratios that determine the transition to failure for firms in the third 
failure process (Table 6.18; column 4), are negative returns on investment 
(ROI), negative cash flows compared to their total sales (CFTS) and declining 
working capital (QACA). The negative association with failure is in line with 
expectations for these financial ratios. On the other hand, increasing growth in 
total assets and total liabilities compared to their total assets (TLTA) are positively 
associated with firms’ transition to failure and these results are also in line with 
expectations. 
 
Finally, the financial ratios that have significant impact on the transition to failure 
for firms in the fourth firm failure process, (Table 6.18; column 5), are 
associated with negative returns on investment (ROI), negative net sales to total 
assets (NSTA), negative cash flows compared to total sales (CFTS), reducing 
liquidity (quick ratio) and increasing growth rate and total liabilities compared to 
their total assets. The signs of the financial ratio coefficients for firms’ transition 
to failure in this failure process are intuitive and in line with expectations. With the 
exception of TLTA, a reduction in any other significant financial ratio is associated 
with an increased propensity for firms’ transition to failure. In the case of TLTA, 
increased total liabilities compared to firms’ total assets are associated with 
increased propensity for firms’ to transition to failure. 
  
The age of the firm is significant in all 4 firm failure processes. The sign of the 
coefficient is negative associating younger firms with higher propensity to failure.  
 
Credit availability is also a significant driver of the firms’ failure transition in the 
first, second and fourth firm failure processes. Moreover, whilst the sign of the 
coefficient is the expected negative in the first three firm failure processes, it is 
positive in the fourth. This could be explained by the timing of failure 
(event_failure=2) of the firms in this failure process which was, generally 
concentrated on 2010. At that time, GDP_growth was falling and as such the credit 
availability as a percentage of GDP was found to be increasing, despite the fact 
that, in absolute terms, credit availability was not increasing. Credit availability is 
not significant determinant of the transition to failure in the third firm failure 
process. 
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The percentage of new firms in a region is a significant determinant of the firm 
failure transition in the second, third and fourth firm failure processes but not in 
the first. The sign of the coefficient as expected is positive, meaning that increased 
number of firms in a region can potentially lead to competition and existing firms’ 
transition to failure. 
 
The sustainable growth rate (SGR) metric takes the value of one when firms 
exceed their (sales) sustainable level of growth. SGR is a significant variable in all 
firm failure processes. The sign of the coefficient is positive, which is in line with 
theoretical expectations that an excessive level of growth is positively associated 
with firm failure. 
 
From the industry control variables there is no particular trend over the 
significance of the control variables. In the first firm failure process agriculture is 
negatively associated with the failure transition while manufacturing is positively 
associated with it. In the second firm failure process Agriculture is positively 
associated with the transition to failure and wholesale trade is negatively 
associated with it. In the third firm failure process only retail sector is negatively 
associated (at 10% level of significance) with the firm failure transition whilst in 
the fourth firm failure process construction and wholesale ae both negatively 
associated with the transition to failure. 
 
In terms of the regional control variables, the first firm failure process is 
characterized by Scotland being positively associated with the firm failure 
transition; the second firm failure process has N. Ireland, North West England, 
West Midlands and Scotland, positively associated with firm failure transition; the 
third firm failure process has East Midlands and the North East and South East  as 
positively associated with the transition to failure and the North West, negatively 
associated with the transition to failure. The fourth firm failure process has York, 
N. Ireland, North East, South East and West Midlands negatively associated with 
the transition to failure. 
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6.5.4.3 Results on Failure Processes with Directors’ Characteristics 
The results for the clusters with directors’ characteristics (Table 6.18; columns 6-
9), show that there are variations between the failure processes with regards to 
the financial ratios. However, not all the firm failure processes have the same 
financial ratios as significant. 
 
In the first firm failure process: Looking at the financial ratios first, firms’ 
transition to failure (Table 6.18; column 6) is determined a number of financial 
ratios with negative coefficients. The return on investment (ROI), cash flow to total 
sales (CFTS), liquidity (quick ratio), working capital (QACA) and trade credit to 
total liabilities (TCTL) are all significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
A decrease in these ratios is associated with an increase in firms’ propensity to 
transition to failure,in line with expectations.  
 
On the other hand increasing total liabilities compared to the assets of these firms 
(TLTA) are positively related with the transition to failure, implying that an increase 
in TLTA is associated with an increased risk of transition to failure. Considering the 
board characteristics in the first firm failure process, female directors are 
negatively associated with transition to failure. In other words, fewer female 
directors are associated with an increased propensity for  firms’ to transition to 
failure in this process. From the economic and business environment, reduced 
credit availability (as a percentage of GDP) is associated with an increased 
propensity for firms’ to transition to failure whilst increased competition from new 
firms in the regions is positively associated with firms’ transition to failure. Levels 
of (un)sustainable (sales) growth is also a determinants of transition to failure in 
the first firm failure process. The positive sign of the SGR coefficient suggests that 
firms with unsustainable levels of growth are associated with an increased 
propensity to fail. On the other hand, the age of firm is negatively associated with 
transition to failure for this failure process. As such, younger firms are likelier to 
transition to falure. 
 
In terms of the industry control variables, the first firm failure process has 
wholesale trade as significant at the 10% level with negative coefficient. This 
implies that wholesale trade have a lower significant association with transition to 
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failure comparing to those in the Services sector which is the reference industry. 
Finally, the regional control variables demonstrate that the first firm failure process 
includes the regional control variables of Yorkshire & the Humber, N. Ireland, 
Scotland, East and West Midlands as significant with positive coefficients and 
therefore riskier than London which is the reference region. 
 
In the second firm failure process  (Table 6.18; column 7): A number of 
financial ratios have the expected negative coefficient, impying that a decrease in 
these ratios is associated with an increased propensity for firms’ to transition to 
failure. As such, the statistically significant ROI and NSTA, imply that falling returns 
and net sales compared to the total assets are linked with the transition to failure. 
Likewise, the quick ratio is negatively associated with firms’ transition to failure, 
implying that reduced levels of liquidity increase the propensity of transition to 
failure for these firms.  
 
On the other hand, growth rates and TLTA are positively associated with the 
transition to liquidation. These results for the financial ratios are in line with 
expectations. The positive sign in growth rates has been associated with firms’ 
transition to failure in a number of occasions throughout this study, highlighting 
that firms’ growth is not necessarily a positive development in SMEs that 
eventually fail. The second firm failure process, despite being characterized by 
young over-indebted firms with a small board that includes female directors, is a 
process where the directors’ characteristics are not significant determinants of 
firms’ transition to failure.  However, credit availability and increased competition 
from new firms are determinants of firms’ transition to failure. The positive 
coefficient in the credit availability is associated with these firms’ failure timing 
(largely in 2010) where GDP_growth was reducing having as a result increased 
credit availability as a percentage of GDP growth. Nevertheless, credit availability 
was reducing in absolute terms and as such the positive coefficient is still related 
to reduced credit availability to firms.  
 
SGR is a significant determinant, positively associated with firms’ transition to 
failure, in line with expectations.  As a result, firms with unsustainable levels of 
(sales) growth (SGR=1) are more likely to transition to failure. 
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The age of firm is a determinant negatively associated with transition to failure for 
this failure process. This is in line with expectations as younger firms have an 
increased risk of failure.  
 
In terms of the control variables, real estate is the only industry that is significant 
determinant of firms’ transition to failure. The negative coefficient implies reduced 
propensity to failure compared to the services sector. In terms of the regional 
control variables the second firm failure process has Yorkshire & the Humber, West 
Midlands and South East as significant with negative coefficients, implying that in 
this firm failure process these regions are less risky than London for SMEs. 
 
In the third firm failure process (Table 6.18; column 8): There are two 
statistically significant ratios that determine the firms’ transition to failure with a 
negative coefficient in this process. A reduction in CFTS and QACA is associated 
with an increased propensity for firms’ to transition to failure. On the other hand, 
an increase in growth rate (in total assets) is associated with increased propensity 
to failure for these firms. Therefore, the signs of financial ratios’ coefficients for 
firms’ determinants of transition to failure are in line with expectations for this firm 
failure process. 
 
In terms of the board characteristics, all directors’ characteristics are significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in this process. The experience of 
directors (proxied by the average directors’ age) has a negative coefficient 
implying that decreased directors’ experience is associated with increased 
propensity towards failure. Likewise reduced gender diversity (proxied by the 
number of female directors) is  associated with an increased propensity for firms’ 
to transition to failure. On the other hand, the number of directors is positively 
associated with firms’ transition to failure in the third firm failure process. This 
implies that increasing the number of directors increases the risk of failure in this 
process. This result contrasts with evidence from other firm failure processes and 
implies that increased social capital is not helping the firms in this firm failure 
process to avoid failure. This result is specific to this failure process which is 
already characterised by a limited number of directors in the board. Nevertheless, 
the directrors’ characteristics in the third firm failure process are all significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure.  
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In addition, the business and economic environment metrics are all significant. 
Reduced GDP growth, credit availability and increased competition from new firms 
in a region are all significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure and are 
associated with the increased propensity of firms’ to transition to failure. Likewise, 
unsustainable levels of sales growth (SGR=1) is a positively associated 
determinant of transition to failure. As such, firms with increased levels of (sales) 
growth that exceed the sustainable levels, are more likely to fail. 
 
In terms of the control variables, agriculture is the only industry that is significant 
determinant of firms’ transition to failure. The negative coefficient implies reduced 
propensity to failure compared to the services sector. The third firm failure process 
has Yorkshire & the Humber, N. Ireland, North East, Scotland, South East and 
West Midlands as significant regions with positive coefficients, implying that in this 
firm failure process these regions are more risky than London. 
 
In the fourth firm failure process (table Table 6.18; column 9): A number of 
financial ratios are statistically significant determinants of firms’ transition to 
failure in this process.The negative sign of the coefficients for ROI, QACA and TCTL 
are in line with expectations. Reduced levels of returns, reduced liquidity and 
reduced usage of trade credit (for example when bank credit is unavailable) are 
associated with an increased propensity for firms’ to transition to failure and are  
significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure.  
 
On the other hand, growth and total liabilities to total assets (TLTA) arepositively 
associated determinants of firms’ transition to failure for these firms. As such, an 
increase in TLTA and growth rate (in total asets) is associated with increased 
propensity for firms to transition to failure.  
 
In terms of the directors’ characteristics, the average age of directors, as a proxy 
for management experience, is negatively associated with firms’ transition to 
failure. This implies that reduced age of directors and therefore reduced 
experience, is associated with an increased propensity towards failure. This is   
expected because reduced directors’ experience can adversely affect firms’ ability 
to succeed. Likewise, GDP growth and credit availability are significant 
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determinants with a negative coefficient, impying that a reduction in these 
variables is associated with increased propensity to failure. On the other hand the 
increased number of new firms in a region is positively associated with an 
increased risk towards failure, due to the positive coefficient. A deteriorating 
economic environment with reduced credit availability and GDP growth and a 
business environment with increased competition from new firms are all 
determining these firms’ transition to failure. 
 
In terms of the control variables, the  Mining industry together with Transportation 
and Communication are the only industries that are significant determinants of 
firms’ transition to failure. The negative coefficient implies reduced propensity to 
failure compared to the services sector. The fourth firm failure process has East 
Midlands, Scotland and West Midlands as significant with positive coefficients. This 
implies that these regions are riskier than London in firms’ transition to failure in 
the particular firm failure process. 
 
6.5.4.4 Marginal Effects of Failure Processes with Directors’ Characteristics 
This section looks at the marginal effects of firms’ transition to failure in the 
alternative UK regions and the alternative firm failure processes. The aim of this 
section is to provide a breakdown of the relative magnitude of the regional effects 
(that were shown as significant in the regression analysis) for each one of the 
alternative firm failure statuses as this is not explicitly obvious in the panel 
regression results.  The results derive from the panel regressions and as such they 
effectively show a comparison for the firms of each region compared to London, 
which was the reference region in the regression analysis’ dummy variables. 
Effectively the marginal effects capture the magnitude of change in the dependent 
variable (firm failure status) for a change in the independent variable (region). In 
this section, these are presented as probabilities of each region to be in a firm 
failure status (0: healthy; 1: financial distress; 2: liquidation). Table 6.19 shows 
the results.  
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Table 6.19: Marginal effects – All UK firms 
 
 
The results in Table 6.19 show the relative differences in the probabilities of firms’ 
transition to the alternative failure stages (firm failure status) in each region 
associated with a particular firm failure status (0: healthy; 1: financial distress; 2: 
liquidation). London is not included as it served as reference region in the Panel 
regressions prior to the marginal effects analysis. It can be seen that South West 
and Wales are more likely to be associated with the healthy firm failure status 
while N. Ireland and Scotland with the worse status (liquidation). Specifically, 
South West and Wales have higher percentage (3.6% and 3.4% respectively) in 
the firm failure status of the healthy firm (event_failure=0). In other words, they 
have higher probability than the firms in London (and any other region in this case) 
to remain in this firm failure status. In contrast, N. Ireland and Scotland are 
associated with the lowest (-10.3% and -11.7% respectively) change in the 
depdendent variable at this failure status. 
 
Considering the firm failure status of financial distress (event_failure=1), Scotland 
(8.7%) and N. Ireland (7.7%) are associated with higher probability (magnitude 
of change)  to transit in this stage of failure. Conversely, Wales (-2.5%) and South 
West (-2.7) have the lowest probabilities of transition to financial distress. Finally, 
for the firm failure status of liquidation (event_failure=2) which is the terminal 
stage of the firms’ transition to failure, firms in Scotland and N. Ireland have the 
highest probabilities of transition to this stage of failure. These results confirm the 
evidence from the analysis of firms’ transition to failure in the full UK firms’ sample 
(Table 6.18; column 1), where the regions of Northern Ireland and Scotland were 
significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure in UK countries/regions. 
 
The analysis of the marginal effects of regions, Table 6.20, considers the marginal 
effects for each firm failure process. In the first firm failure process N. Ireland (-
15.2%), Scotland (-12.5%), West Midlands (-8.2%) and East Midlands (7.2%) are 
Firm Failure
 Status
Yorkshire 
& Humber East
East
Midlands N.Ireland
North
East
North
West Scotland
South
East
South
West Wales
West
Midlands
0 -3.1% -2.1% -6.4% -10.3% -6.6% -2.2% -11.7% -2.0% 3.6% 3.4% -4.1%
1 2.3% 1.5% 4.7% 7.7% 4.9% 1.6% 8.7% 1.5% -2.7% -2.5% 3.0%
2 0.8% 0.5% 1.6% 2.7% 1.7% 0.6% 3.0% 0.5% -0.9% -0.9% 1.0%
Marginal Effects in UK regions (All firms/ London as reference region)
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the regions with the lowest probability (magnitude of change in the dependent 
variable) of remaining in the Firm Failure Status of the healthy firm. Likewise, 
these are the regions that have the highest probabilities (compared to London and 
to the rest of the regions) to transit to the firm failure status of financial distress 
and subsequently to liquidation (failure).  
 
In the second firm failure process (table 6.20) the results between regions are 
mixed. Scotland’s firms have the lowest probability of remaining in the failure 
status of the healthy firm, followed by Northern Ireland (-9.7%) and the North 
East (-6.2%). The highest probability for transition to financial distress is with 
Scotland (8.3%), N. Ireland (7.3%) and East Midlands (4.5%) firms and the 
highest probability of transition to liquidation is associated with Scottish (2.7%), 
N. Irish, East Midland’s and North East’s firms (1.5%). Yorkshire and the Humber, 
North East, Scotland, South east, and West Midlands regions were significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure. In the third firm failure process North 
East (-34.4%), N. Ireland (-16.4%), West Midlands (-11.2%) are the regions with 
the lowest probability of remaining in the firm failure status of the healthy firm 
with South East (-10%), Yorkshire and the Humber (-73%) and East Midlands 
having also significantly reduced probabilities of remaining in this status, compared 
to London and other regions. In terms of transitioning to the firm failure status of 
financial distress, firms in North east (23.3%), N. Ireland (11.1%), East Midlands 
(5.1%), South East (6.8%), West Midlands (7.6%), and Yorkshire and the Humber 
(5%) have some of the highest probabilities of being in the firm failure status of 
financial distress and subsequently transitioning to liquidation. Of those, Yorkshire 
and the Humber, N. Ireland, North East, Scotland, and West Midlands were 
significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure.  
 
In the fourth firm failure process East Midlands (-156.8%), West Midlands (-62.1% 
and Scotland (-46%) are the regions whose firms have the lowest probability 
(compared to London) of remaining in the healthy firm failure status, by some 
margin. Additionally these regions are also those whose firms’ have the highest 
probability (compared to London) to transition to financial distress (136.1%, 
53.9% and 39.9% respectively) and to liquidation (20.7%, 8.2%, and 6.1% 
respectively). As such the fact that these regions have also been identified as 
significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure makes intuitive sense. 
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Table 6.20: Marginal effects – Firm Failure Processes with Directors characteristics- 
UK firms 
 
 
The above demonstrate that the regional effects (captured from the regional 
dummy variables) are associated with different magnitudes of change in the 
alternative statuses of the dependent variable. In other words, firms across 
different UK regions perform (on average) differently with regards to their failure 
status (stage of the dependent variable) and depending on the firm failure process 
they are associated with. In addition, certain regions (N. Ireland and Scotland) are 
characterized by consistently higher probabilities for transition to failure compared 
to the reference of London, but also the rest of the UK regions. One should note 
that the significance  of these regions were shown to be significant determinants 
of firms’ transition to failure in the panel regressions of the previous section in all 
the firms and in a number of the alternative firm failure processes. Whilst local 
economic indicators may have a role to play on that, other unobservable 
characteristics, related to the spatial location in these geographical areas should 
also be considered. This is discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
6.5.5   Panel Regression Results’ implications on the Hypotheses  
 
Section 6.4.4 discussed the hypotheses in the context of the results from the 
identification of the alternative firm failure processes and the chi-squared tests 
that were subsequently used to accept and reject the hypotheses. This section 
Firm 
Failure
 Status
Yorkshire 
& Humber East
East
Midlands N.Ireland
North
East
North
West Scotland
South
East
South
West Wales
West
Midlands
0 -4.5% -3.4% -7.2% -15.2% -1.9% -5.0% -12.5% -3.8% 0.3% -0.6% -8.2%
1 3.6% 2.7% 5.7% 12.1% 1.5% 4.0% 9.9% 3.0% -0.2% 0.4% 6.5%
2 0.9% 0.7% 1.5% 3.1% 0.4% 1.0% 2.6% 0.8% -0.1% 0.1% 1.7%
0 -2.9% -1.9% -6.0% -9.7% -6.2% -2.1% -11.0% -1.9% 3.4% 3.2% -3.8%
1 2.2% 1.5% 4.5% 7.3% 4.7% 1.6% 8.3% 1.4% -2.5% -2.4% 2.9%
2 0.7% 0.5% 1.5% 2.4% 1.5% 0.5% 2.7% 0.5% -0.8% -0.8% 0.9%
0 -7.3% -0.7% -7.5% -16.4% -34.4% -1.7% 4.4% -10.0% 1.0% 9.7% -11.2%
1 5.0% 0.5% 5.1% 11.1% 23.3% 1.1% 3.0% 6.8% -0.7% -6.6% 7.6%
2 2.4% 0.2% 2.4% 5.3% 11.1% 0.5% 1.4% 3.2% -0.3% -3.1% 3.6%
0 -24.9% 34.4% -156.8% -21.2% -21.0% -25.6% -46.0% -21.9% 55.9% -14.6% -62.1%
1 21.7% -29.9% 136.1% 18.4% 18.2% 22.3% 39.9% 19.0% -48.6% 12.7% 53.9%
2 3.3% -4.5% 20.7% 2.8% 2.8% 3.4% 6.1% 2.9% -7.4% 1.9% 8.2%
Marginal Effects in UK regions (FIRST PROCESS WITH DIRECTORS/ London as reference region)
Marginal Effects in UK regions (SECOND PROCESS WITH DIRECTORS/ London as reference region)
Marginal Effects in UK regions (THIRD PROCESS WITH DIRECTORS/ London as reference region)
Marginal Effects in UK regions (FOURTH PROCESS WITH DIRECTORS/ London as reference region)
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aims to discuss the hypothesis in the context of firms’ transition to failure and to 
untimately conclude whether they are accepted. As such, the key aspects of each 
hypothesis are discussed in order to compare the determinants of firms’ transition 
to failure in the alternative firm failure processes. Table 6.21 presents a summary 
of the hypotheses that this Chapter has considered and shows if they are accepted.  
 
Table 6.21: Summary table for Chapter 6 Hypotheses 
 
  
 
Hypothesis 7: The number of new firms as a percentage of the existing business 
population in a UK region differs between the alternative firm failure processes in 
UK firms; they are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
 
The first part of Hypothesis 7 has already been accepted on the basis of the cluster 
analysis. The evidence from the panel regressions shows additionally that the 
number of new businesses in a region (as a percentage of the business population 
in that region) is a significant determinant of firms’ transition to failure. In most 
failure processes a higher percentage of new businesses is positively associated 
with transition to failure with the exception of the first firm failure process when 
directors’ characteristics are not considered. This result highlights the importance 
of the business environment, at regional level, to firms’ transition to failure 
regardless of the firm failure process.  Therefore Hypothesis 7 is fully accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Industry classification differs between the alternative firm failure 
processes in UK firms; it also differs as a determinant of firms’ transition to failure 
in the alternative firm failure processes. 
Nr. Hypothesis Statement Accepted?
H7 The number of new firms as a percentage of the existing business population in a UK region differs between 
the alternative firm failure processes in UK firms; it is also a determinant of firms’ transition to failure.
Yes
H8
Industry classification differs between the alternative firm failure processes in UK firms; it also differs as a 
determinant of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes.
Yes
H9
Financial performance represented by key financial ratios and the age of the firm, differ in the alternative 
firm failure processes of UK firms; they also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the 
alternative firm failure processes.
Yes
H10
In an UK regional context, macroeconomic conditions differ between firms in the alternative firm failure 
processes in UK firms; they also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm 
failure processes. 
Yes
H11
Directors’ Characteristics such as the presence of women in SMEs’ management, director age as a proxy of 
director experience and the number of directors, differ in the alternative UK firm failure processes; they 
also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes.
Yes
H12 The distribution of firms with unsustainable levels of growth differs between the alternative firm failure 
processes in UK firms; unsustainable levels of growth are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure.
Yes
Table of Hypotheses for UK firms
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The first part of the hypothesis was accepted on the basis of the cluster analysis. 
The regression analysis on the determinants of firms’ transition to failure show 
that the industry to which a firm belongs is a determinant of firms’ transition to 
failure in a number of the firm failure processes. A number of industries were 
significant (Sig.<0.10) determinants in the full UK firms’ sample (Table 6.18; 
column 1). Therefore, considering the alternative firm failure processes, one can 
conclude that industrial differenes exist across the different firm failure processes. 
Overall, the influence of industry classification as a determinant of transition to 
failure is reduced once firms are allocated into failure processes. However, the 
industry as a determinant of failure indeed differs in the alternative firm failure 
processes. Therefore Hypothesis 8 is fully accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Financial performance represented by key financial ratios and the 
age of the firm, differ in the alternative firm failure processes of UK firms; they 
also differ as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm 
failure processes. 
 
Based on the cluster analysis it has already been shown that the medians of the 
financial ratios and of the firms’ age are not the same across firm failure processes. 
As such the first part of this hypothesis has been accepted in the context of the 
alternative firm failure processes. In the context of the determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure, the panel regression results also show that the significance of 
financial ratios as determinants of firms’ transition to failure, differ between the 
alternative firm failure processes. There are differences between the financial 
ratios that are significant determinants in the failure status progress in each failure 
process. Likewise, the age of the firm is significant determinant of firms’ transition 
to failure in the first and second firm failure process but not in the third and fourth. 
As such H9 still stands in the context of the failure determinants. Therefore 
Hypothesis 9 is fully accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 10: In an UK regional context, macroeconomic conditions differ 
between firms in the alternative firm failure processes in UK firms; they also differ 
as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure 
processes.  
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The results from the cluster analysis demonstrated that there is statistically 
significant difference between failure processes in both the GDP growth and the 
credit availability. This remains the case for the panel analysis. Economic 
conditions, captured by the GDP growth and the credit availability are significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the full UK sample. However, these 
indicators differ in their significance in the alternative firm failure processes. One, 
both or none of them can be significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure, 
depending on the firm failure process. As such the macroeconomic conditions differ 
as determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative failure processes. 
Therefore Hypothesis 10 is fully accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Directors’ Characteristics such as the presence of women in SMEs’ 
management, director age as a proxy of director experience and the number of 
directors, differ in the alternative UK firm failure processes; they also differ as 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
The result from the cluster analysis demonstrated that directors’ characteristics 
differ in the alternative firm failure processes.  In the context of the determinants 
of firms’ transition to failure only the average age of directors was a significant 
determinant of the transition to failure. In the context of the alternative firm failure 
processes, all three of the metrics of directors’ characteristics (number of female 
directors, total number of directors and average age of directors) are significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure, with different combinations in the 
alternative firm failure processes. Apart from the second firm failure process where 
no directors’ characteristics are significant, the other firm failure processes do have 
at least of one director characteristic as a determinant of firms’ transition to failure. 
Therefore, one can conclude that board characteristics (with different combinations 
for each failure process) affect the alternative firm failure processes as 
determinants of failure. Therefore Hypothesis 11 is fully accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 12: The distribution of firms with unsustainable levels of growth 
differs between the alternative firm failure processes in UK firms; unsustainable 
levels of growth are also determinants of firms’ transition to failure. 
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The results from the cluster analysis accepted the first part of Hypothesis 12. In 
the context of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes, 
one can observe that SGR is significant in the full sample and most alternative firm 
failure processes, with the exception of the second and the fourth, when directors’ 
characteristics are considered. As such, one can observe that the SGR as a metric 
of firms’ unsustainable is a significant determinant of firms’ transition to failure in 
most but not all the failure processes. Therefore Hypothesis 12 is fully accepted. 
 
6.6  Robustness Checks 
 
Additional analysis has been undertaken as a robustness check for the results 
discussed above. The first test (Table 6.22) involves a rerun of the regression in 
the firms’ failure processes with a regional indicator capturing the state of the 
economy at regional level. GVA growth has been used instead of GDP growth. The 
second test (Table 6.23) involves a further regression check in the all firms 
dataset. Here the panel ordered regression was applied using bootstrapped 
(instead of standard) errors. The third check (Table 6.23), involved a simple 
ordered logistic regression model (non-panel).  
 
First, an alternative specification of the model with regional GVA growth instead of 
the (national) GDP growth has been tested in order to detect whether a more 
regional oriented metric for the macroeconomic environment at regional level 
would produce different results (Table 6.22).  
 
At the all UK firms panel regression, the results remain the same when using the 
GVA growth instead of the GDP growth with the exception of the control variable 
of East Midlands which becomes significant at Sig.<0.10. However, for the firm 
failure process without directors’ characteristics, the GVA growth is significant in 
the first, second and third firm failure processes. Additionally, the percentage of 
new firms in the region is now significant at the 5% level and positively correlated 
with the transition to liquidation. In the second firm failure process, GVA is also 
significant and negatively associated with the transition to liquidation with all the 
other independent variables remaining at similar levels of significance and with the 
same coefficients. In the third firm failure process, GVA becomes significant as 
does the credit availability. The fourth firm failure process returns results similar 
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to those of the main analysis (section 6.5) as GVA did not return as significant. 
Considering the failure processes with directors’ characteristics, the main variation 
is in the first firm failure process. GVA is highly significant in the first failure process 
(as is credit availability) and is significant at the 1% level in the third and fourth 
(GDP was significant at 10%). 
 
 
Table 6.22: Panel data analysis results for alternative clusters using a region -specific 
metric for macroeconomic conditions.  
 
 
Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ROI -0.002 -0.080 *** -0.067 -0.515 *** -0.312 *** -0.189 *** -0.507 *** 0.013 -0.180 ***
NSTA -0.002 0.002 0.122 *** -0.068 -0.056 *** 0.016 -0.047 *** -0.020 0.060
CFTS -0.011 *** -0.176 *** -0.006 -0.011 * 0.036 *** -0.066 *** -0.012 -0.009 ** 0.000
quick_ratio -0.002 -0.005 * -0.241 *** -0.002  0.009 ** -0.012 * 0.010 ** -0.006 0.000
growth_rate 0.004 *** 0.114 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.334 *** 0.002 0.278 *** 0.005 *** 0.090 *
TLTA 0.001 0.151 *** -0.046 0.111 *** 0.035 * 0.391 *** 0.418 *** 0.012 0.076 **
QACA -0.615 *** -0.366 -0.827 ** -0.931 *** 0.264 -0.457 * 0.400 -0.970 *** -1.063 **
TCTL -1.881 *** -5.075 *** -0.696 0.641 -0.751 -2.416 *** 0.162 -0.333 -2.224 *
Firmage -0.036 *** -0.046 *** -0.021 ** -0.018 * -0.053 *** -0.037 *** -0.047 ** -0.014 0.017
Avg_dir_age      -0.040 *** -0.008 -0.002 -0.048 ** -0.041 *
Nr_Female_Dir -0.061 -0.123 ** 0.117 -0.281 *** 0.118
Total_Dir_Nr   0.011 -0.006 -0.008 0.048 *** -0.048
GVA -0.203 *** -0.155 *** -0.271 *** -0.223 *** -0.020  -0.185 *** -0.021  -0.244 *** -0.253 ***
Credit -0.023 *** -0.028 *** -0.033 *** -0.020 *** 0.006  -0.025 *** 0.010  -0.023 *** -0.035 ***
new_firms_perc 0.247 *** 0.231 ** 0.445 *** 0.325 *** 0.013 ** 0.241 *** 0.043 ** 0.373 *** 0.539 ***
SGR 0.685 *** 0.862 *** 0.940 *** 0.574 *** 0.706 ** 0.833 *** 0.482 0.839 *** 0.537
Control_Ind (Agriculture) -4.137 * -0.978 ** 1.464 ** -0.712 -3.499 -0.322 -1.613 -0.841 * -1.131
Control_Ind (Mining) -3.006 -0.273 1.641 1.522 -26.475 0.333 -23.500 1.655 2.328 *
Control_Ind (Construction) -4.093 * -0.242 -0.548 -0.433 -5.101 * -0.434 -2.937 -0.269 0.127
Control_Ind (Manufacturing) -3.560 * 1.054 ** -0.546 -0.747 -2.758 -0.131 -0.401 -0.511 -1.313
Control_Ind (Trasp. & Comm.) -3.597 * 0.576 -0.564 -0.647 -1.804 -0.433 0.044 -0.087 -2.191 *
Control_Ind (Wholesale) -4.106 * 0.370 -1.112 ** -0.711 -4.569 -0.627 * -2.461 0.099 -1.513
Control_Ind (Retail) -4.215 * -0.822 -0.305 -1.116 * -3.172 -0.543 -1.217 -0.857 0.147
Control_Ind (R. Estate) -3.449 -0.156 0.768 0.294 -3.097 -0.051 -0.578 -0.281 0.223
region_York 0.475 0.327 0.702 0.917 * -1.681 * 0.628 * -1.844 * 1.098 ** 1.348
region_east 0.126 -0.144 1.012 -0.619 1.295 0.291 1.267 -0.040 -1.915
region_east_midlands 0.858 * 1.340 * 1.078 2.180 ** -23.390 0.957 * -2.064 1.172 7.956 ***
region_n_ireland 1.480 *** 2.075 2.236 0.957 -3.325  2.010 ** -3.203 2.612 *** 1.513  
region_north_east 0.868 -1.573 1.360 3.136 *** -3.662 * 0.407 -3.610  4.584 ** 1.281
region_north_west 0.329 0.225 1.414 *** 0.050  -0.634 0.655 ** -0.781 0.309 1.372
region_scotland 1.561 *** 1.470 ** 2.981 *** 1.209 ** -0.292 1.602 *** -0.393  1.380 ** 2.636 **
region_south_east 0.338 0.151 0.493 0.955 * -1.970 * 0.586 -2.574 ** 1.393 *** 0.990
region_south_west -0.119 -0.717 1.237 0.026 -1.215 0.235 -1.404 0.095 -2.537
region_wales -0.017 0.370 -19.403 -0.428 -25.489 0.397 -23.725 -0.873 0.917
region_west_midlands 0.526 0.825 1.567 *** 0.829 -3.831 ** 1.003 ** -4.072 ** 1.544 *** 3.140 **
\cut1 -6.196 -2.477 1.252 1.347 -4.788 -1.073  -1.389 -0.543 -2.640
\cut2 -3.781 0.330 2.892 3.809 0.572 1.125  4.419  1.186 1.943
Sigma_2u 3.458 1.663 2.549 2.879 5.854 1.662 5.901 2.582 0.862
std. Error Sigma_2u 0.324 0.363 0.547 0.478 1.582 0.286 1.636 0.464 0.370
LR test vs. ologit model 949.840 *** 85.370 *** 126.590 *** 270.760 *** 129.410 *** 135.450 *** 116.380 *** 211.730 *** 15.470 ***
ROI
growth_rate
NSTA
CFTS
quick_ratio 
SGR Dummy for unsustainable growth rate
Control Variables
Main Independent Variables
Independent
Variables
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary 
Return in Investment Number of Female Directors
Coeff.
P>|z|   
Growth Rate (in total assets) QACA Quick Assets to Current Assets Total_Dir_Nr   Total Number of Directors
Failure Processes w/out Directors' Characteristics Failure Processes with Directors' Characteristics
Process 1 Process 2 Process 3
All 
Firms Process 4 Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 Process 4
Quick ratio Avg_dir_age      Average age of Directors new_firms_perc Percentage of New firms in a region
Net Sales to Total Assets TCTL Trade Credit to Total Liabilities Credit Credit availability (% GDP)
Cash Flow to Total Sales Firmage Firm Age GVA GVA Growth (%)
TLTA Total Liabilities to Total Assets Nr_Female_Dir 
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These results, broadly confirm that the financial ratios and the directors’ 
characteristics remain at the same levels of significance when alternative 
(localized) macroeconomic environment characteristics are considered instead of 
the UK- wide macroeconomic characteristics.  Furthermore, the two sets of results 
suggest that there is evidence that certain firm failure processes are more affected 
by the local economic environment whilst others are more affected by the national 
economic environment. This also affects the significance of the regions in some 
firm failure processes, where certain regions are significant determinants and 
others stop being significant when the local (GVA) economic conditions are 
considered. The riskiness of regions is considered in the next section.   
 
Second, additional robustness checks were performed in the form of a random 
effects panel ordered regression with bootstrapped errors in order to check 
whether any non-normality in the residuals could potentially lead to contradicting 
results. The results (Table 6.23) for the random effects panel ordered regression 
with bootstrapped errors are similar with those of the original regression with 
standard errors therefore confirming the results of the study. There are some 
differences in the significance of some financial ratios with CFTS and growth rate 
being significant at the 10% level as opposed to 1% in the non-bootstrapped 
regression. Additionally, most industry control variables are significant at the 1% 
in the bootstrapped regression compared to the non-bootstrapped. However, these 
differences do not alter the overall results. 
 
Third, robustness checks were performed in the form of a simple ordered logit 
regression produced (Table 6.23).  The results were slightly different. In particular, 
ROI and TLTA were significant in the simple regression but not in the original panel 
regression. On the other hand QACA, TCTL and average directors’ age were not 
significant in the simple logit but they were in the original panel regression. 
Likewise average directors’ age was not significant in the simple logit but the 
number of female directors was. Such differences between logit and panel R.E. 
regression were not observed in the full data with all EU countries. One possible 
explanation for this discrepancy is the treatment of individual heterogeneity in the 
panel data. It is possible that the element of individual heterogeneity is particularly 
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pronounced in the UK firms, making the two regressions marginally different in 
their determinants.  
 
Table 6.23:  Robustness checks with simple logistic regression and bootstrapped errors 
in Panel Random Effects Ordered regression. 
 
 
Column: 1 2 3
ROI -0.002 -0.002 -0.497 ***
NSTA -0.002 -0.002 -0.024  
CFTS -0.011 *** -0.012 * -0.037 ***
quick_ratio -0.002 -0.002 0.000  
growth_rate 0.004 *** 0.004 * 0.010 ***
TLTA 0.001 0.001 8.651 ***
QACA -0.615 *** -0.611 *** 0.056  
TCTL -1.881 *** -1.866 *** -0.345  
Firmage -0.036 *** -0.036 *** -0.016 **
Avg_dir_age      -0.040 *** -0.040 *** -0.004  
Nr_Female_Dir -0.061 -0.060 0.096
Total_Dir_Nr   0.011 0.010 0.007  
GDP_gr -0.203 ** -0.051 *** -0.050  
Credit -0.023 *** -0.011 *** -0.009 *
new_firms_perc 0.247 *** 0.113 ** 0.236 ***
SGR 0.685 *** 0.691 *** 0.610 ***
Control_Ind (Agriculture) -4.137 * -3.997 *** 3.293
Control_Ind (Mining) -3.006 -2.860 ** 3.814
Control_Ind (Construction) -4.093 * -3.953 *** 2.475
Control_Ind (Manufacturing) -3.560 * -3.430 *** 2.883
Control_Ind (Trasp. & Comm.) -3.597 * -3.448 *** 2.532
Control_Ind (Wholesale) -4.106 * -3.965 *** 2.530
Control_Ind (Retail) -4.215 * -4.069 *** 2.903
Control_Ind (R. Estate) -3.449 -3.302 *** 3.392
region_York 0.475 0.318 0.770 **
region_east 0.126 0.218 0.187
region_east_midlands 0.858 * 0.661 0.797
region_n_ireland 1.480 *** 1.049 ** 0.955
region_north_east 0.868 0.674 0.736
region_north_west 0.329 0.190 0.387
region_scotland 1.561 *** 1.211 *** 2.101 ***
region_south_east 0.338 0.205 0.871 **
region_south_west -0.119 -0.401 0.256
region_wales -0.017 -0.356 -0.200
region_west_midlands 0.526 0.416 1.158 ***
Control Variables
Independent Variables
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
All Firms 
Random Effects 
Ordered Panel 
Bootstrap
All Firms 
Simple Ordered 
Logit
Independent
Variables
All 
Firms
Coeff.
P>|z|   
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6.7  Discussion   
 
The first objective of this chapter is to identify SMEs’ failure processes in UK regions 
and to confirm or reject the hypotheses that relate to comparisons between the 
alternative failure processes. The second objective is to discuss the determinants 
of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative UK firm failure processes.  
 
The literature review section has discussed the relative lack of intra-country firm 
failure process comparisons. This chapter extends the literature of firm failure 
processes by providing a regional, intra-country analysis for firm failure processes 
and their determinants of the transition to failure, using the U.K. as an example. 
The results of the analysis suggest that when director characteristics are not 
included, the number of firm failure processes is in line with evidence from the 
existing quantitative firm failure process literature (Laitinen et al, 2014; Laitinen 
et al., 2015; Lukason and Laitinen, 2016). In addition, once directors’ 
characteristics are included in the formation of the firm failure processes, the total 
number of processes remains the same but the inclusion of directors’ information 
adds further insight into the characteristics of the alternative firm failure 
processes. In addition, the inclusion of directors’ characteristics is a significant 
determinant of UK firms’ transition to failure for a number of alternative failure 
processes as well as for the full sample of the firms. For this reason the focus on 
the discussion will be given on the failure processes with directors’ characteristics. 
 
6.7.1  Discussion on Firm Failure processes  
 
This section provides a critical evaluation of the four firm failure processes that are 
identified in the UK regions and discusses the similarities with the processes 
analysed in the qualitative and quantitative literature in other countries. In 
addition, some differences and similarities between the within the UK regions’ and 
the between the EU countries failure processes are analyzed and evaluated. 
 
The analysis of UK firms’ failure processes employed factor and cluster analysis 
approach to investigate the situation at the UK regional level.  This is consistent 
with evidence from the quantitative firm failure process literature where the same 
methodology has been used for the identification of the firm failure processes using 
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financial ratios (Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen and Lukason, 2014; Laitinen et al., 2014; 
Lukason and Laitinen, 2016; Lukason et al., 2016; Lukason and Vissak, 2017). 
 
There has been no evidence in the academic literature for intra-country regional 
analysis of firm failure processes. Nevertheless, the key characteristics of the age 
of the firm together with the financial ratios, as symptoms of failure, do 
characterize the alternative firm failure processes in the UK regions, which is in 
line with the quantitative literature on firm failure processes. This thesis provided 
evidence that four firm failure processes co-exist within the UK, which is broadly 
in line with the qualitative (eg. Argenti, 1976; Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008) and 
quantitative literature (eg. Laitinen et al, 2014; Laitinen et al., 2015; Lukason and 
Laitinen, 2016) that has historically identified between 2 and 6 firm failure 
processes in country-level studies. One can therefore conclude that, depending on 
the countries and the sample of firms, there is a finite number of firm failure 
processes that can be identified. As such, the quantitative literature, including the 
findings in this chapter, support the qualitative literature that provided a number 
of descriptions of the alternative firm failure processes that have been identified, 
regardless of the size of the firms or the country. 
 
The results for the UK firms demonstrated that there are differences between firm 
failure processes across the UK regions. The inclusion of directors’ characteristics 
in the identification of the alternative firm failure processes differentiates this study 
from other quantitative firm failure studies. That includes the number of directors, 
their average age and the number of female directors. These characteristics play 
the role of proxies for the experience, social network and capital and gender 
diversity in firms’ management. The analysis of the alternative firm failure 
processes reveals differences on these characteristics within the different clusters 
that represent the alternative firm failure processes. This provides an addition to 
the existing literature that so far does not consider directors’ characteristics as a 
potential of the alternative firm failure processes within a country. Moreover, this 
finding is in line with evidence from the wider firm failure literature which supports 
the argument that gender diversity on the board can influence firms’ failure or 
even performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Given that gender diversity is an 
important characteristic of the alternative firm failure processes and given the 
evidence from the wider failure literature that diversity affects firms’ failure, one 
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can infer that gender diversity can also be an additional indicator of management’s 
experience and expertise that the qualitative firm failure literature has used as an 
identification characteristic for failure processes (Argenti, 1976; Argenti, 1976b). 
The same can be inferred from the other directors’ characteristics, namely the total 
number of directors as a proxy for the social capital and networks that directors 
bring to a firm and for the average age of directors as a proxy for directors’ 
experience. Collectively, Argenti (1976; 1976b) argued that management’s lack of 
understanding and experience characterize certain firm failures and lead to bad 
financial management. In other words, the management of the firm is the most 
important aspect of a firm’s failure, especially in SMEs (Ropega, 2011).  Such an 
argument is in line with the findings reported here. Different firm failure processes 
are associated with differences in directors’ characteristics and as such the 
inclusion of them in the quantitative firm failure literature provides further 
differentiate characteristics and additional insight in the failure processes. 
 
The rest of the analysis results can be linked to the broad classification of the 
failure processes that found in the qualitative literature. The literature proposes a 
number of characteristics that are associated with alternative firm failure processes 
in qualitative and quantitative studies. For example, the relatively new firm that 
never becomes successful and fails; the failure process of an ambitious growth 
company; the failure process of a dazzled growth company and fourth is the failure 
process of the established apathetic company (Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008; 
Argenti 1976). 
 
The four firm failure processes that the full analysis (with directors) identified in 
this chapter are consistent with evidence from the qualitative firm failure process 
literature (Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008). In addition, a link between the existing 
qualitative firm failure processes literature is created. As such the findings of this 
study extend the reach of the quantitative firm failure process literature at the 
intra-country regional level. 
 
The first firm failure process has deteriorating growth, a relatively small board 
(compared to other failure processes) and high trade credit usage. This firm failure 
is associated with the third firm failure process that Argenti (1976) identified where 
a firm has had some strong years before its performance start deteriorating and 
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eventually fail. Given the small management board, it is possible that the 
entrepreneur has excessive influence in the firm’s decision making to an extent 
that this excessive influence creates management problems for the firm (Ropega, 
2011).  
 
On the other hand, the second firm failure process is associated with firms that 
have financial management efficiency problems and in particular an inability to 
generate cash from their sales. Argenti (1976) argues that deficient management 
is a key characteristic and that could be relevant for firms in this firm failure 
process. This will be discussed further in the next section which addresses the 
determinants of firms’ failure. However, the combination of that and the 
“apathetic” (Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008) or acute failure firms firm that Laitinen 
(1991) identified in a quantitative firm failure process study resembles the firms 
in this process. As such these firms have the ability to generate sales but for some 
reasons, potentially related to the management, they are not able to convert their 
sales to cash and as such they have relatively weak working capital and liquidity.   
 
The third firm failure process is characterized by the oldest firms in the sample 
that have a deteriorating ability to generate cash flows from their sales. This 
description resembles the old firm with a deteriorating performance (Argenti, 
1976). However the firms in this failure process do enjoy high and accelerating 
growth rates in the years prior to failure. Such behavior resembles the “dazzling 
growth” firm (Argenti, 1976) too.  
 
Finally, the fourth firm failure process is characterized by younger firms with weak 
finances. This firm failure process can be associated with the new firm that never 
succeeded from Argenti (1976) or the “Tadpole” firm from Richardson et al., 
(1994). These firms began as promising start-ups but did not manage to be 
converted to long term enterprises. SMEs of up to 10 years old are generally 
defined as new (Wagner, 2004; Davidsson and Klofsten, 2003).  Such firms are 
generally more prone to failure due to an inverse relationship between a firm’s age 
and failure propensity (Dunne et al., 1988) particularly after their first two years 
of existence which is often described as a “honeymoon period”  (Wilson et al., 
2014). Likewise, most new firms tend to be small and that has adverse 
consequences with regards to their failure propensity (Love, 1996).  
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One can therefore conclude that the key characteristics of the alternative firm 
failure processes identified in the UK regions are broadly in line with other parts of 
the literature, mainly in qualitative studies. Furthermore, it can also be concluded 
that directors’ characteristics allow for broader comparisons with the qualitative 
failure process literature. The results of the UK firms are not only comparable with 
the existing academic literature (that doesn’t include directors’ characteristics in 
quantitative firm failure process studies) but also with evidence from the previous 
chapter, that considered firm failure processes in a sample of EU countries. Table 
6.24 summarizes the comparison between the findings in these two empirical 
chapters. 
 
Table 6.24: Comparison of clusters in UK firms and all EU firms in the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Failure Process EU UK-only EU UK-only
First
Young firms (8 years old)
Negative Growth
Good liquidity and 
Working Capital
Young firms (7 years old)
Low ROI
High Growth rate (years:4-7)
Weak cash generation
Rapidly deteriorating liquidity
Young firms (8 years old)
3 female directors
14 direcotrs with av. Age of 49
Negative ROI
 High sales 
 deteriorating cash generation
Increasing liablities
Medium age firms (12 years old)
One female Director
10 Directors with av. Age of 51 
High  usage of Trade credit
Second
Older firms (18 years old)
Negative ROI and growth
Low sales generation
Weak liquidity and Working Capital
Increasing indebtedness
Older firms (17 years old)
Negative growth rates
Sales generation ability
but bad conversion to cash
Good/stable liquidity
Older firms (20 years old)
No Female Directors
5 Directors with av. Age of 48
Negative growth
Reducing Trade Credit
Medium age firms (11 years old)
2 Female Directors
11 Directors with av. Age of 51
Good Sales Generation
Weak conversion to cash
Third
Older firms (18 years old)
Negative  growth
Good Sales generation
Weak Cash generation
High Trade Credit usage
Medium age firms (14 years old)
High cash generating ability
Limited Trade Credit usage
Negative Growth
Relatively strong Working Capital
Medium age firms (11 years old)
No Female Directors
3 Directors owith av. Age of 48.
Deteriorating sales
Liquidity problems
Medium age firms (15 years old)
2 Female Directors
13 Directors owith av. Age of 51.
Deteriorating ROI and cash 
generation
Limited Trade Credit usage
High growth recent years
Fourth
Medium aged firms (10 years old)
Negative growth
Deteriorating cash generation ability
Increasing liabilities with
 limited Trade Credit
Good liquidity
Medium aged firms (13 years old)
Volatile growth
Deteriorating cash generation 
ability
Younger firms (9 years old)
2 female directors
10 Directors with av. Age of 47
High Debt
Weak cash generation
Weak liquidity, growth and ROI
Younger firms (9 years old)
2 female directors
10 Directors with av. Age of 47
High Debt
Weak cash generation
Weak liquidity and ROI
Rapid growth turns negative
No Directors Directors
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6.7.2 Discussion on Firms’ Transition to Failure 
 
This section discusses the results of the panel regressions that considered the 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure for all the UK firms and for each firm 
failure process. Since there is no evidence in the quantitative literature of firms’ 
failure processes on the determinants of firms’ transition to failure, the discussion 
is based on evidence from the wider firm failure literature. 
 
i. Financial ratios 
Financial ratios, the basic dimensions of firms’ liquidity, profitability, working 
capital and leverage (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011) are important contributors to the 
firm failure processes in UK firms. However, as discussed in earlier sections, 
financial ratios as determinants of transition to failure and their combinations differ 
between the alternative firm failure processes. This highlights two points. First, is 
the importance of having separate firm failure processes and not treating all firms 
that fail in the same way.  In this context the fundamental rationale of identifying 
the alternative firm failure processes is significant. This has been a fundamental 
motivator behind the firm failure process studies which argued that the different 
characteristics of firms should be considered carefully as different firm failure 
processes have different underlying reasons that drive the failure (Argenti, 1976; 
Argenti, 1976b; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008; Richardson et al., 1994).   
 
Second, the differences of the financial ratios as determinants of transition to 
liquidation supports evidence from the wider firm failure literature that has not 
managed historically to identify a specific combination of financial ratios that can 
be used universally to identify or to predict firms’ failure (Balcaen and Ooghe, 
2006). In fact, the results of this study support the argument of Argenti (1976) on 
the necessity of identifying firm failure processes offering a possible explanation 
for why there cannot be consistency in the financial ratios as predictors of failure. 
The ratios have always been regarded as symptoms of failure (Argenti, 1976). 
However, different firm failure processes have different causes of failure that 
predate the failure event for a number of years. As such the financial symptoms 
are also different. 
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In terms of the individual financial ratios, one can observe that ROI, NSTA and 
CFTS, representing the firms’ return on investment, the ability to generate sales 
from the total assets and the firms’ ability to generate cash from their total sales 
have been key differentiators between the firm failure processes in the UK firms. 
Low or deteriorating ROI is a key characteristic of the third and fourth firm failure 
process. NSTA and CFTS make an interesting combination as some failure 
processes are characterized from firms that have the ability to generate sales but 
not sufficient cash while other processes have simply deteriorating cash generation 
with low/stable sales as a percentage of their total assets. ROI is also significant 
determinant for the firms’ transition to failure in all but the third failure processes, 
in line with evidence from the wider firm failure literature (see for example Ciampi 
and Gordini, 2013; Pindado and Rodrigues, 2004) which identified these ratios as 
significant determinants of failure in SMEs in wider firm failure studies. NSTA has 
been another significant determinant of firms’ transition to failure in some of the 
firm failure processes (second) especially where firms are generally having a 
strong creation of sales compared to their total assets. Therefore, one can conclude 
that once firms experience a deterioration in their NSTA, they are likely to failure. 
This is in line with previous findings in the firm failure process context and the 
wider firm failure area (Altman, 1968; Laitinen, 1991). An additional characteristic 
of some firm failure processes has been the poor conversion of their sales activity 
to cash. As such, CFTS has been also a significant determinant of firms’ transition 
to failure in some failure processes (first and third), in line with observations for 
the firm failure literature (see for example Beaver 1966; Laitinen et al., 2014). 
This finding can also be further supported from the qualitative firm failure 
literature. Argenti (1976) pointed out that poor financial management skills can 
cause failure due to lack of funds. Therefore, cash flow generation from sales 
(CFTS) would be a prime financial symptom in such occasions. 
 
As far as issues relating to liquidity (quick ratio), leverage (TLTA), working capital 
(QACA) and the usage of trade credit as an alternative source of finance (TCTL) is 
concerned, one can observe that deteriorating liquidity, over indebtedness, 
reduced working capital and reduced access on (trade) credit are determinants of 
firms’ transition to failure in the alternative failure processes. The financial 
management characteristics that these financial ratios are capturing have been 
used in a number of firm failure studies as significant determinants of failure (eg. 
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Altman et al., 2010; Bastos and Pindado, 2013). Liquidity and firm financing 
constraints is indeed an issue in SME failure in general (Laitinen et al., 2014; 
Ooghe and De Prijcker 2006; Ropega, 2011) and more so for young firms that 
have limited access to financial resources (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). High 
leverage (TLTA) characterizes particularly the fourth firm failure process in UK 
firms and, whilst it is not a significant determinant for firms’ transition towards 
failure in all the UK firms sample (before considering the failure processes), it does 
drive firms towards failure in a number of the firm failure processes (first, second 
and fourth). This implies that over-indebtedness is a determinant of the transition 
to failure. This is in line with evidence from the qualitative firm failure process 
literature (Argenti, 1976) but also from wider firm failure studies (Altman et al, 
2010; Deakin, 1972; Shumway, 2001; Appiah, 2013).  
 
In addition, working capital (QACA) and the usage of trade credit as a percentage 
of the total liabilities (TCTL) play a part the first and third firm failure processes. 
Weak working capital (QACA) has also been a determinant of firms’ transition 
towards failure in a number of firm failure processes for the UK firms (all except 
the second failure process with directors’ characteristics) with the expected 
negative coefficient as the wider firm failure literature has suggested (Altman et 
al., 2010). The usage of trade credit on the other hand, affects the same firm 
failure processes with QACA but in different ways. Some firm failure processes are 
characterized by increased usage of trade credit compared to their total liabilities 
while others are the opposite. This implies that financially distressed small 
companies have higher levels of trade credit obtained from suppliers which is 
regarded as an alternative source of finance (Altman et al., 2010). Therefore SMEs 
may substitute bank credit with trade credit where possible, taking advantage of 
the fact that an individual supplier may be unaware of the total amount of trade 
credit that the company has received from other suppliers (Altman et al., 2010). 
Considering the above, one would expect TCTL to have a positive coefficient. 
Financially distressed firms would be unable to borrow from banks, especially since 
part of the period that this study covers is during the 2008 financial crisis, and 
they would utilize trade credit (Bastos and Pindado, 2013; McGuinness and Hogan, 
2016). However the results give a negative coefficient for all firm failure processes 
where TCTL is significant (first and fourth failure processes). A possible explanation 
is that the evidence from the literature considers studies where the independent 
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variables, the TCTL in this case, are used to discriminate between failed and non-
failed firms. This dataset, however covers firms that all eventually fail and the 
question is whether TCTL keeps increasing in the transition toward liquidation. The 
answer to this appears to be that Trade Credit as a percentage of the firms’ total 
liabilities is decreasing in the transition towards liquidation. It is therefore possible 
that trade creditors (who traditionally have close trading relationships with their 
debtors) at some point are becoming aware of the financial hardship of the firms 
and are starting to decrease their credit exposure (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
This is perhaps more pronounced in the first firm failure process of UK firms where 
Trade Credit usage is high (compared to the other processes) yet in the panel 
regression results of the determinants of firms’ transition to failure, the TCTL 
returns as highly significant and with negative coefficient. Table 6.25 shows the 
mean TCTL for all UK firms and their clusters 3 years prior to liquidation, showing 
that there is a declining trend in the trade credit usage.  
 
Table 6.25: TCTL in UK firms and their failure processes in the years prior to 
liquidation. 
 
 
Growth rates in the total assets (growth_rate) ratio have been used in firm failure 
process formation as well as in the regressions for the determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure.  The growth rate has been identified as a characteristic of 
alternative firm failure processes in quantitative firm failure process studies 
(Laitinen et al., 2014). The reason for this is an over-commitment from the firms 
to ambitious growth plans that lead to committing financial resources to expensive 
projects (Argenti, 1976b). In addition, the Sustainable Growth dummy variable 
(SGR) indicates whether firms exceeded their sustainable levels of (sales) growth 
as defined by  Higgins (1977 and Platt et. al, 1995). Previous literature on firm 
failure processes suggests that high growth rates are associated with a separate 
firm failure process (Argenti, 1976b). In addition, overtrading on sales has also 
been linked to firm failure (Argenti 1976b, Higgins, 1977). This is due to firms 
focusing on generating substantial turnover increases without having the ability to 
Years to liquidation ALL First Second Third Fourth
0 (liquidation year) 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.10 0.08
1 0.21 0.31 0.46 0.11 0.10
2 0.22 0.31 0.22 0.13 0.10
3 0.24 0.32 0.28 0.13 0.08
Firm Failure processes with Directors' Characteristics
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sustain them organically in the long term and without having the infrastructure to 
provide the necessary support for their products. However, there has been no 
evidence of its impact on firms’ transition to failure, especially in the context of 
alternative firm failure processes. The third firm failure process had elevated 
growth rates (in total assets) in the years prior to failure. The second, third and 
fourth firm failure processes had growth rates (of total assets) as significant 
determinants of transition to failure, similar to that Argenti (1976) had identified 
in his qualitative study. Increasing growth has been a determinant of firms’ 
transition towards failure with positive sign in most processes. At the same time 
the SGR dummy variable is a highly significant variable in the all UK firms sample 
and in the first and third firm failure processes, with the expected positive 
coefficient implying that the firms with unsustainably high levels of growth are 
positively associated with worsening failure conditions, consistent with Higgins 
(1977; 1981). As such, one can conclude that excessive sales growth is an 
additional determinant of firms’ transition to failure in a number of firm failure 
processes and therefore, the concept of overtrading and unsustainable growth 
(Higgins, 1977; Argenti, 1976; Argenti, 1976b; Platt and Platt, 1995) is relevant 
in firm failure process studies.  
 
ii. Age 
The regression results for the firms’ age show that the age of the firm has been a 
significant determinant of firms’ transition to failure in two of the firm failure 
processes, the first and the second (with the expected negative coefficient). The 
fourth failure process in particular presents and interesting example of a process 
that is characterized by young firms but with (firm) age itself not been a 
determinant of the transition towards liquidation.  As such one can conclude that 
whilst evidence from the qualitative firm failure process literature that firms with 
young age can form a separate firm failure process (Argenti, 1976; Richardson et 
al., 1994), the age of the firm is a significant determinant of firms’ transition to 
failure only in some of the firm failure processes. Nevertheless, in the full UK firms 
sample as well as in the first and second firm failure processes where the age of 
the firm is a significant determinant of firms’ transition to failure, the results 
suggest that the younger age of firms is associated with increased propensity 
towards failure. This is consistent with evidence from the wider firm failure 
literature where young firms are more prone to fail due to them not achieving 
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sustainable financial returns and market presence in the first few years of their 
operation (Cressy, 2006; Azoulay and Shane, 2001; Cromie, 1991). As the 
probability of failure is larger in new firms, the age distribution of firms’ population 
becomes an important determinant of failure with an impact in regions with a high 
percentage of new firms. As such regions that have high new business growth may 
have a higher percentage of exits or VAT de-registrations as well (Lane and Schary, 
1991; Keeble and Walker, 1994).   
 
iii. Economic and Business environment 
In terms of the economic and business environment conditions, evidence from the 
panel regressions suggest that as indicated from the literature on the effect of new 
business in an area (see for example Lane and Schary, 1991; Keeble and Walker, 
1994), the percentage of new business in a region (as a proportion of the existing 
ones) is a highly significant determinant of firms’ transition towards failure in all 
firm failure processes (with directors) as well as in the full UK sample. Therefore, 
the effects generated by intensifying competition are a significant determinant of 
transition to failure for most UK firms, regardless of the firm failure process they 
belong to.  
 
On the other hand, GDP growth is a significant determinant of all firms’ transition 
towards failure. Looking into the processes with directors characteristics GDP 
growth is (at Sig. <0.10) significant in the third and fourth processes and has the 
expected sign. As discussed in the previous section, a more localized metric of 
macroeconomic growth was tested in the form of GVA growth at regions. This was 
found to be a significant variable with the expected signs in most firm failure 
processes with two exceptions. First, the second process with directors’ 
characteristics; second, the fourth firm failure process without directors’ 
characteristics. In these processes GVA growth was not significant. The relative 
superiority of GVA (in terms of its significance in more firm failure processes) may 
be linked to Lane and Schary (1991) who demonstrated in a study of US firms that 
business failures are more affected by local as opposed to national economic 
conditions. Nevertheless, using either GDP growth or GVA growth as a proxy for 
the wider economic conditions in a country, the findings of this study demonstrate 
that the economic conditions are significant determinants of all firms’ transition to 
failure. On the other hand, the significance of the economic conditions does vary 
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between the alternative firm failure processes depending on the granularity of the 
proxy that is used (in this case the country-level GDP growth or the region-level 
GVA growth). Such results confirm evidence from the qualitative firm failure 
process literature which suggested that economic conditions may lead firms to 
failure. However, effects may vary in alternative firm failure processes as firm-
specific characteristics, (which also determine the classification of firm failure 
process) may exacerbate or reduce the impact of external factors in firms’ 
propensity to fail (Argenti, 1976). 
 
Considering credit availability (as a percentage of GDP growth)  as a determinant 
of firms’ transition to failure, the results suggest that it is a significant determinant 
in the full sample of  UK firms as well as in all firm failure processes (with directors). 
The metric has a negative coefficient implying that (in line with expectations arising 
from the literature) that reduced credit availability could lead firms to fail (Ma and 
Lin, 2010). This applies in all the processes with the exception of the second failure 
process for the reasons discussed in the previous section and which were related 
with the deterioration of the GDP in 2009-2010. However, even in that situation 
the underlying results still imply that a reduction in credit is associated with an 
increased propensity for firms to transition failure. This is in line with evidence 
from the literature that states that a reduction in credit availability can lead small 
firms to financial distress and eventually failure (Acosta-González et al., 2017; 
Kelly et al., 2015).   
 
iv. Directors’ characteristics 
Two of the most significant contributions of this study is the use of directors’ 
characteristics in identifying firm failure processes in a quantitative firm failure 
process study and the consideration of the directors’ characteristics as 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in these firm failure processes. Directors’ 
characteristics have been identified as key drivers of firm failure in the academic 
literature in both firm failure process studies as well as in the wider firm failure 
literature. In the qualitative firm failure process studies, Ooghe and DePrijcker 
(2008) argued that managerial inexperience was a key driver of management 
errors and problems in all failure processes and especially in the firm failure 
process that involves the failure of new firms. In the wider firm failure literature, 
the number of directors that a firm has been usually used as a proxy for the 
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management’s ability to direct and to control effectively the firm (Bennett and 
Robson, 2004; Daily et al., 2002). Zahra et al., (2009) suggested that director 
experience in new SMEs are particularly important since they develop and provide 
human and social capital in the early stages of the business development. 
  
The usage of directors’ characteristics in the clustering method enables the 
factor/cluster analysis to capture further latent characteristics from the firms and 
therefore the firm failure processes that result from this procedure are quite 
different. Lack of experience and contacts in directors may be determinants of firm 
failure. Additionally, older directors can bring greater stability to the board and can 
preserve founding values (Anderson et al, 2011), something observed in the third 
and fourth firm failure processes (with directors) when using the average directors’ 
age variable.  
 
In the firm failure processes that include directors’ characteristics, one can observe 
that the total number of directors was an additional significant determinant of 
firms’ transition towards liquidation only in the third firm failure process.  More 
directors generally bring more social contacts and experience on the board which 
are important determinants of small firms’ performance (Cope et al., 2007). 
However, in the case of the third firm failure process, the opposite appears to be 
suggested by the regression results. Other studies support this finding. Arosa et 
al., (2013) provided evidence that overly large boards can be counter-productive 
in SMEs because of poor coordination, limited flexibility and communication in such 
structures. Indeed, the third firm failure process has one of the highest average 
number of directors in any firm failure process and is a process which is otherwise 
characterized from relatively mature firms with weak financials. In these 
circumstances it is possible that a polyphony in the management may be 
problematic. The results support prior studies (De Andrés et al., 2005; Eisenberg 
et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996) and confirm that small boards of directors are more 
effective. Nevertheless, the results contrast with the earlier work of García-Olalla 
and García-Ramos (2010), Nicholson and Kiel (2007) and Van den Berghe and 
Levrau (2004) who find that increasing the number of directors improve firm 
performance. 
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A further determinant of firm failure has been the heterogeneity in the board of 
directors. This heterogeneity has been frequently expressed by the presence of 
gender heterogeneity and therefore by the presence of female directors. 
Management groups with gender diversity have been considered as more able in 
problem solving (Jehn et al. 1999). It has been shown that the presence of women 
on the board of directors is associated with reduced risk of insolvency (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Wilson et al., 2013). In firm failure clusters with directors 
characteristics two of the failure processes (first and third) have the number of 
female directors as a negative and significant determinant in the transition towards 
failure. This means that increased gender diversity in the board is associated with 
decreased propensity to transition to failure. 
 
Given the focus of this chapter on firms in the UK regions, one observes that not 
all regions are significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure. The 
significance of UK regions as determinants of failure is partly associated with 
London being the reference variable. As such the significance of the regions as a 
determinant of firms’ transition to failure should be compared with London.  A 
number of reasons can be associated with the difference in the regions as 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes. 
First, credit availability and banks proximity to firms in a given area have been 
identified as one such determinant in the UK regions, especially during and after 
the financial crisis (Degryse et al., 2018). Second, the UK has been associated with 
discrepancy in its regions’ economic performance and governance (McCann, 2016). 
However, further unobserved factors, associated with firms’ spatial location, may 
also contribute to firms’ transition to failure. This is discussed in chapter 7. 
 
6.8 Conclusion and Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter is has three objectives. First, to investigate the alternative firm failure 
processes in UK regions by considering financial ratios and the age of the firm . 
Second, to investigate the impact of firms’  management characteristics in the 
identification of failure processes and their transition to failure between firms in 
the UK regions. Third, to investigate the influence of business environment factors, 
management characteristics and excessive growth in firms’ transition to failure in 
the alternative failure processes in the UK regions. 
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The results show that there are 4 different failure processes for UK SMEs. When 
directors’ characteristics are used to determine the failure processes, these differ 
between regions (at Sig. <0.10). These processes are affected by directors’ 
characteristics but there is no standalone failure process that is solely defined by 
the directors’ characteristics. Instead, different directors’ characteristics are 
associated with each of the alternative firm failure processes. Moreover, the 
financial ratios and the age of the firm differ between the alternative firm failure 
processes. That is in line with evidence from the quantitative and qualitative firm 
failure process literature (Argenti, 1976, Laitinen, 1991, Laitinen et al., 2014). In 
addition, evidence for the UK firms confirms the evidence from the EU firms 
(chapter 5) and shows that whilst non firm-specific characteristics were not used 
in the identification of the alternative firm failure processed, they did differ 
between them. This implies that the alternative firm failure processes include firms 
whose business and economic environments differ. Such evidence was implied in 
the qualitative firm failure process literature (see for example Argenti, 1976) but 
there has been little such evidence in the quantitative failure process literature. 
On the other hand, firms’ transition to failure depends on the firm failure process 
they belong to. Financial ratios, directors’ characteristics, the economic and 
business environment can also be determinants of firms’ transition to failure but 
they generally differ between the alternative firm failure processes. As such, even 
at an intra-country or regional level, the identification of the alternative firm failure 
process to which a firm belongs is important in order to understand the 
determinants of failure. In addition to the above, the location of the firm (certain 
regions) appeared to be significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure in 
some firm failure processes. One could argue that this is down to the economic 
and business environment conditions in these regions as well as due to the 
agglomeration of economic activity in certain UK regions (including London) 
(Henderson, 1997).  Chapter 7 investigates the importance of spatial location in 
more detail. 
  
 
  
 265 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER 7:  SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF EU AND UK SMEs’ TRANSITION TO 
FAILURE 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
One of the objectives of this research is to investigate the influence of location at 
firm level and aggregate firm transitions towards failure in the alternative failure 
processes between EU countries and within the UK. To that end, Chapters 5 and 6 
investigated the influence of location at firm-level, and controlled for it by means 
of dummy variables. This chapter extends the investigation on the importance of 
geographical (spatial) location and considers aggregate firm transitions to financial 
distress and to liquidation, separately. Therefore, the aggregated number of firms 
in financial distress is calculated first for each firm failure process and for all the 
processes collectively. Subsequently, the aggregated number of firms in liquidation 
is calculated for each firm failure process and for all the processes collectively. In 
that way, one can asses the importance of spatial location for the two stages of 
firms’ failure, separately. In doing so, this chapter applies spatial data analysis, 
for first time in the quantitative firm failure process literature, and tests the 
hypotheses introduced in chapter 3. 
 
Wang et al. (2012) argued that spatial data are particularly relevant for economic-
related studies, especially when considering different geographical locations. In an 
increasingly inter-connected economy the cross-sectional independence 
assumption between a sample’s observations (eg. firms) is becoming difficult to 
identify (Wang et al., 2012). For SMEs this argument may  be stronger as they 
tend to do much of their business relatively locally and the experience in related 
geographic markets may affect not only the probability of exit from the market but 
also the mode of exit (including failure) (Dunee et al., 2005). Therefore, any spatial 
interactions may be due to competition between firms in given geographies, 
network issues, spill-overs, externalities, and regional issues (Kapoor et al., 2007).  
Likewise, Longhi et al., (2014) provided evidence that regional specialization is 
emerging in Europe pointing also that there are spatial patterns of agglomeration 
of the economic activity. In particular, some metropolitan areas appear to be more 
specialized in financial services while others appear to be more specialized in “other 
services”. It is worth noting that in the sense of Longhi et al (2014) the term 
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“regional” was used to denote areas in Europe constituted of countries or even 
larger geographical parts of Europe. For the purpose of this chapter, spatial effects 
will be tested against the European countries in an inter-country comparison and 
also within the UK countries/regions. Therefore there are two hypotheses to be 
tested in this chapter (as introduced in chapter 3): 
 
 Hypothesis 13a: There are statistically significant spatial effects associated 
with EU firm failures. 
 Hypothesis 13b: Spatial effects are the same between alternative firm 
failure processes in EU firms, in terms of statistical significance. 
 
 Hypothesis 14a: There are statistically significant spatial effects associated 
with the UK firm failures. 
 Hypothesis 14b: Spatial effects are the same between alternative firm 
failure processes in UK firms, in terms of statistical significance. 
 
In previous empirical chapters, the research question(s) of whether there is any 
association between the firm failure processes and the countries and regions has 
been assessed by means of statistical significance, using firm-level information, 
information for the economic and business environment and dummy variables for 
the EU countries or the UK regions. The results of the previous empirical chapters 
indicated that there is a statistically significant difference in firm failure processes 
across EU countries. In these countries, the non-firm-specific characteristics 
(related to the countries’ business and economic environment) provided evidence 
of wider differences between the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
On the other hand, in relation to UK geographical regions and whether firm failure 
processes differ between regions, the evidence is somewhat different. In that 
context, firm failure processes do differ significantly between regions when 
directors’ characteristics are used to determine the failure processes. In such 
cases, differences between regions are significant at the 10% level. As a result, in 
the firms’ transition to failure, the dummy variables controlling for the firms’ region 
were rarely significant determinants whilst the dummy variables controlling for the 
firms’ countries were more frequently significant determinants of the transition to 
failure in the alternative firm failure processes. Moreover, findings in previous 
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chapters indicated that a number of EU country-specific characteristics (legal 
tradition and economic environment) and UK region specific characteristics 
(economic environment and percentage of new firms in a region) are significant 
determinants of the transition towards failure in most firm failure processes. 
 
This chapter approaches the theme of firm failure process and particularly the 
transition towards liquidation from a different angle; it aims to test whether there 
is association between aggregated firm failures (financial distress and liquidations, 
separately) and their geography. In other words, this chapter investigates the 
effect of spatial (geographical) proximity on the alternative firm failure processes 
for a sample of EU countries and UK regions. As a result, the contribution of this 
chapter to the wider thesis is both from a purely technical perspective, that of 
introducing spatial econometrics in firm failure studies, and also conceptual, that 
of understanding the importance of geographical location as a potential 
determinant of the two stages of firm failure (financial distress and liquidation, 
separately) in alternative firm failure processes.  
 
The theoretical advantage of spatial panel data is that this specification considers 
disturbances that are correlated spatially (across European countries and UK 
countries/regions in this case) in addition to the normal time wise correlation 
(Arnold and Wied, 2014). The usage of spatial econometric techniques has seen 
growing interest within economic studies because these models take a different 
angle in the analysis of relationships between agents. In fact, the focus is shifted 
from the individual agent (in this case the firm) where decisions are made in 
isolation to an approach where the interaction between agents matters (Anselin, 
1999; Diggle, 2013).  At present there is no evidence of the application of spatial 
analysis to the area of firm failure process analysis. 
 
Using the same sample of SMEs, countries and regions, the attention will now 
switch to the geography (EU countries and UK regions) as opposed to the individual 
firms. To do so, this chapter emphasizes the spatial, as opposed to the firm-specific 
effects in previous chapters. The economic and business environment factors are 
still controlled variables. Investigating the importance of location has been one of 
the objectives of this study. The use of spatial data is one way to do so by focusing 
on the location of the firms. As a result, one can better understand the importance 
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of geographical location and geographical proximity to the firms’ failure and more 
specifically to the transition towards failure that the alternative firm failure 
processes have. The potential existence of spatial effects at country or regional 
level would imply that firms’ financial distress and liquidation (both stages of 
failure) are determined from a further non-observable non-firm specific influential 
element: the geographical location and, in particular, the geographical proximity. 
Geographical proximity could therefore be an influential determinant of firms’ 
failure. The results of this analysis suggest that there is evidence of spatial effects 
both at both EU country and UK region levels. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 describes the 
methodological tools and assumptions for the spatial analysis; Section 7.3 contains 
the analysis of the spatial effects in the firm failure processes of the EU countries 
in the sample. Section 7.4 presents the analysis for the spatial effects in the firm 
failure processes within the UK countries and regions; Section 7.5 explains the 
limitations and the robustness test results; Section 7.6 discusses the results; 
Section 7.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
7.2 Methodological Tools and Data  
 
7.2.1 Data Structure and Definition of Variables 
 
Testing for spatial effects at country and regional level requires a reorganized 
dataset. In this chapter, the focus shifts from the individual firms towards the 
countries and the regions. The new data structure for this chapter aggregates the 
firms at EU country and at UK regional level. For the EU country analysis, the data 
in this chapter is based on the initial sample of 5,195 firms. In this case, there are 
8 EU countries in the sample observed every year from 2004-2013, which gives a 
balanced panel of 80 country-year observations. 
 
For the UK regional analysis, the data in this chapter are based on the 979 firms 
that were used in Chapter 6. The 12 regions of the UK are observed each year 
from 2004 and to 2013, therefore producing a balanced panel of 120 UK region-
year observations.  
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The total number of firms in financial distress and the total number of firms in 
liquidation are aggregated to create the number of firms that enter financial 
distress or enter liquidation each year for each country or region.  In addition to 
the total aggregation at country or region per year, a further aggregation subset 
takes place for each firm failure process. That is, for each country or region, for 
each year, the total number of firms, the total number of firms in financial distress 
and the total number of firms into liquidation are calculated for each of the firm 
failure processes (as they are developed in chapters 5 & 6). This chapter uses the 
firm failure processes with directors’ characteristics both for the EU countries and 
for the UK regions’ analysis. This is because utilizing the directors’ characteristics 
creates a more complete profile of the firm-specific characteristics in the failure 
process formation. In addition, the results without directors’ characteristics are 
reported in the appendix (Tables C.1-C.14). 
 
The analysis in this chapter looks at the potential impact of spatial effects both for 
firms in financial distress (event_failure=1) and for firms in liquidation 
(event_failure=2). First, to investigate the potential influence of spatial weights on 
firms’ financial distress in EU countries and in UK regions, the dependent variable 
is the number of firms in financial distress (event_failure=1) in a given year for 
each EU country (EU countries’ level of analysis) or for each UK region (UK regions’ 
level of analysis). An additional dimension that aggregates the number of firms in 
financial distress and liquidation for each EU country/UK region and for each firm 
failure process also takes place. Second, the dependent variable that is used to 
investigate the potential influence of spatial weights on firms’ liquidation, is the 
number of firms in liquidation (event_failure=2) for each country (or UK region) 
per year and additionally in each firm failure process. This data structure gives the 
opportunity to use linear regression techniques, as opposed to ordered logit 
structures that have been used previously. Additionally, this econometric approach 
where the EU country or the UK region is the unit of reference, gives the 
opportunity to account for the unobserved heterogeneity on the EU countries and 
UK regions, as opposed to the individual firms in the previous chapters. Therefore, 
this chapter is established based on the developments of the previous chapters, 
while approaching the topic of location from a different perspective. Although the 
same firm failure processes are utilized and the same macroeconomic and business 
environment information is used, this chapter uses a different approach by utilizing 
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an alternative methodology for the first time in a firm failure process context. 
Instead of looking at the firm, it looks at the location, be it a country (EU) or a 
region (UK). 
 
The independent variables that are of interest in this chapter are the spatial 
weights associated with the dependent variable (W dependent variable) and the 
spatial weights associated with the error terms (W error term). Details about the 
spatial weights are given in section 7.2.2. In addition, a number of control 
variables are also used as independent variables, in order to control for the effects 
of the economic and business environment.  
 
For the part of the analysis that focuses on the EU countries, the control variables 
are the GDP growth and the credit availability as a percentage of the GDP of a 
country. Additionally the legal tradition (Leg_trad) dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 for countries associated to common law and 0 for countries associated to legal 
traditions of civil law tradition (French, Scandinavian or German law).  
 
For the part of the analysis that focuses on the UK regions, the control variables 
are the regional GVA growth (the GDP growth is also tested in section 7.5), the 
credit availability as a percentage of the GDP of a country and the percentage of 
new firms’ formation (New_Firms_perc.) in a region (per year). Table 7.1 
summarizes the independent variables that are used in this chapter. 
 
Table 7.1: List of Independent Variables. 
 
 
The use of the same independent control variables as in Chapters 5 and 6 is down 
to consistency reasons as well as the availability of the particular data. These 
Variable Symbol Variable meaning Usage
W_Dpd
Spatial effects (weights)
applied on the dependent variable
EU Countries &
 UK Regions
W_error
Spatial effects (weights)
applied on the dependent variable
EU Countries &
 UK Regions
GDP_gr GDP_growth for each country per year
EU Countries &
 UK Regions
GVA_gr GDP_growth for each region per year  UK Regions
Credit Credit availability as a % of GDP
EU Countries &
 UK Regions
Leg_Trad Dummy variable=1 for common law countries; 0 otherwise EU Countries
New_Firms_perc Percentage of new firms in a region (% of total firms)  UK Regions
M
ai
n
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
 271 | P a g e  
 
independent variables have been used in other studies (see for example Jones, 
2013) and have been identified as potential determinants of firms’ failure. It is 
possible that additional control variables can be determinants of firms’ failure at 
EU and UK basis in aggregated studies. GDP growth (GDP_gr), the credit 
availability (Credit), the new firms’ formation (used in the UK regions part) and 
the legal origins (Leg_trad) have been identified (together or separately) as key 
determinants of firm liquidations (including corporates and SMEs) in a number of 
aggregate firms and firm-specific failure studies, at country level (see for example 
Jones, 2013; Liu, 2004; Berger and Udell, 2006; Wehinger, 2014; LaPorta et al., 
2008). In any case, the focus of this chapter is on the two independent variables 
that are concerning the spatial weights and are included in the analysis of this 
chapter.  
 
As mentioned above, the data structure has been amended in order to match the 
requirements of this chapter. Table 7.2 shows the distribution of firms entering 
financial distress and liquidation, respectively, each year for all the EU countries in 
the sample. The tables demonstrate that the percentage of firms in financial 
distress peaks in 2009 and then it reduces. At the same time the number of firms 
in liquidation starts increasing and peaks in 2012. The distribution of firms in 
financial distress in Table 7.2 shows relatively small differences in the timing of 
the peak of financial distress rates in the alternative firm failure processes. The 
first and second firm failure process financial distress rates peaked in 2008. The 
third and the fourth firm failure process peak in year 2009. The differences in 
timing can reflect the distribution of firms in the alternative countries (and their 
associated economic environments). The first firm failure process is characterized 
by a majority of Irish and UK firms; the second by a majority of French and Italian 
firms. On the other hand, the third firm failure process is dominated by German, 
Spanish and Swedish firms and the fourth by Dutch firms. The timing of the peak 
in firms’ liquidations is more consistent across the alternative firm failure 
processes. The peak of liquidation rates in all firm failure processes is during 2012. 
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Table 7.2: Percentage of EU Firms in Financial Distress (left) and Liquidation (r ight): 
Total and by Firm Failure Process  
  
 
Similarly, Table 7.3 shows the distribution of firms entering financial distress and 
liquidation, respectively, each year for all the UK regions in the sample. The table 
demonstrates that the percentage of firms in financial distress peaks in 2010 and 
then it reduces. The percentage of firms in financial distress peak in 2012 for the 
first firm failure process that is a collection of a majority of London, Yorkshire and 
Midlands’ firms. The percentage of firms in financial distress for the second firm 
failure process peaks in 2010. That process is not dominated by any particular 
region but London and North West do have significant concentrations there. The 
financial distress rates for the third firm failure process peak in 2011 and for the 
fourth in 2008. The third firm failure process is dominated by N. Irish, Scottish and 
Welsh firms whilst the fourth failure process is not dominated by any region 
specifically but it is the process characterized by new firms. These appear to get 
into financial distress first, in this case. At the same time the percentage of UK 
firms in Liquidation starts increasing and peaks in 2013 for all firm failure 
processes, apart from the fourth failure process. 
 
Table 7.3: Percentage of UK Firms in Financial Distress (left) and Liquidation (right): 
Total and by Firm Failure Process 
 
Year All firms 1st Process 2nd Process 3rd Process 4th Process
2004 7.80% 5.03% 8.16% 9.87% 7.32%
2005 8.17% 6.23% 8.74% 9.69% 7.93%
2006 8.93% 8.74% 10.72% 11.80% 7.88%
2007 10.63% 13.19% 11.21% 15.80% 9.43%
2008 13.01% 13.45% 11.62% 18.74% 11.99%
2009 14.18% 12.64% 10.83% 19.07% 15.11%
2010 9.13% 12.91% 6.28% 14.04% 8.91%
2011 6.74% 7.89% 4.70% 10.22% 6.49%
2012 1.14% 1.23% 0.80% 3.09% 1.32%
2013 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Firms in all countries: % in Financial Distress per year
Year All firms 1st Process 2nd Process 3rd Process 4th Process
2004 0.05% 0.18% 0.00% 0.08% 0.10%
2005 0.09% 0.17% 0.03% 0.08% 0.09%
2006 0.08% 0.17% 0.02% 0.07% 0.09%
2007 0.10% 0.18% 0.02% 0.11% 0.09%
2008 1.17% 1.77% 1.30% 0.44% 1.01%
2009 10.22% 7.91% 8.81% 12.31% 9.94%
2010 37.67% 31.52% 34.13% 42.18% 38.31%
2011 63.23% 64.24% 62.31% 66.41% 65.44%
2012 93.54% 80.54% 94.23% 93.06% 94.23%
2013 75.00% 50.00% 62.50% 75.00% 50.00%
Firms in all countries: % in liquidaiton per year
Year All firms 1st Process 2nd Process 3rd Process 4th Process
2004 11.78% 4.01% 7.92% 7.54% 66.17%
2005 12.13% 6.37% 7.20% 6.55% 78.34%
2006 11.81% 5.40% 10.43% 7.87% 66.34%
2007 11.38% 7.57% 7.49% 16.79% 43.49%
2008 14.27% 13.23% 12.84% 17.36% 49.52%
2009 14.89% 16.20% 12.16% 15.66% 42.70%
2010 19.34% 20.25% 23.65% 18.08% 32.84%
2011 16.75% 18.83% 17.50% 18.37% 27.39%
2012 18.17% 22.18% 21.67% 9.21% 7.87%
2013 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Firms in UK Regions: % in Financial Distress per year
Year All firms 1st Process 2nd Process 3rd Process 4th Process
2004 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2005 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2006 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2007 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2008 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2009 0.45% 0.05% 1.08% 0.56% 0.00%
2010 2.78% 3.22% 2.62% 1.31% 11.55%
2011 11.52% 9.94% 0.00% 10.45% 20.04%
2012 26.78% 25.63% 0.00% 23.35% 47.22%
2013 83.33% 58.33% 16.67% 75.00% 25.00%
Firms in UK Regions: % in liquidation per year
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Once the data were amended as described above, the normality assumptions of 
the key variables (dependent variables and control variables) were tested again, 
using the same techniques employed in the previous chapters (Skewness/Kurtosis; 
Shapiro-Wilk). The results are shown in the Appendix, Tables C.5 and C.6. The null 
hypothesis that each of the explanatory variables is normally distributed at the 
Sig.<0.05 or Sig.<0.10 level is rejected for most variables. Nevertheless, 
deviations from normality are frequent in firm failure studies due to the nature of 
their data. In addition, robustness checks using robust and bootstrapped errors 
will be used to confirm the confidence intervals of the initial regressions. These are 
considered as options in occasions where the standard errors are of interest (Li et 
al., 2012).  
 
7.2.2 Spatial Weights 
 
The computation of the metrics for spatial association are based on values of 
spatial location. Spatial data analysis requires some form of spatial proximity in a 
metric. One way to do this is by constructing a spatial weights matrix W (Pisati, 
2012;  Anselin, 2002; Anselin and Bera, 1998; LeSage, 1999). The spatial weights 
matrix is an n-by-n matrix capturing for each location i (rows) the other locations 
j (columns) that belong to its neighborhood set (Anselin & Bera, 1998). Each 
location in the matrix will therefore have a location Wij, expressing the degree of 
spatial proximity between i and j (Pisati, 2012). Spatial proximity is measured by 
the inverse distance. The diagonal elements of the matrix (W) are zero because a 
given location cannot be a neighbor of itself and the matrix is spectral – 
normalised. In this case each entry in the matrix is divided by the largest 
eigenvalue in the matrix. This approach has the advantage of preserving symmetry 
without altering the model specification (Drukker et al., 2013; Plummer, 2010). 
Whilst there is no formal way to specify the spatial weights matrix (Anselin, 2002; 
Anselin & Bera, 1998), Pisati (2001; 2012) proposed using geographical 
coordinates (longitude and latitude) to do so and he has developed a STATA 
command that has been introduced in current STATA packages to support the 
construction of the weighting matrix based on geographical co-ordinates. LeSage 
and Pace (2014) provided evidence that although not all spatial weight matrices 
are performing equally, there is little evidence that over-specification of the spatial 
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weights matrix or broadly similar matrix constructions materially affect the spatial 
results. For these reasons, the Pisati (2001; 2012) approach of constructing the 
weights matrix with geographical coordinates based on the STATA software is used 
in this chapter.  
 
In order to compute the metrics discussed above the location of the countries and 
regions within the sample is required. To obtain this, data from the LatLong.net 
database were collected. LatLong.net is an online geographic database that 
provides the latitude and longitude of any country and/or city and region in the 
world. The data are based on GPS coordinates and comply with the World Geodetic 
System (WGS) standard and the data collected were verified on Google Maps.  
 
The location of each European country has been used in order to create the spatial 
weights matrix (Table 7.4). Similarly, the location of each UK region has been used 
for the creation of the spatial weights matrix (Table 7.5).  
 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present the Latitude and the Longitude of each country (EU) 
and region (UK), respectively. Based on these co-ordinates the spatial weights 
matrix is created. The matrixes are based on centroid (mid-point) distances 
between each pair of spatial units (countries or regions). Each weight that appears 
in the matrix expresses the weighted average of neighboring areas to a given 
country (Kondo, 2017). Table 7.4 presents the initial spatial weights for the EU 
countries. Table 7.5 presents the initial spatial weights matrix for the UK regions. 
 
Table 7.4: Spatial Weights Matrix for EU countries. 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Country LATITUDE LONGITUDE W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8
1 FRANCE 46.228 2.214 0.000 0.104 0.083 0.089 0.150 0.121 0.046 0.093
2 GERMANY 51.166 10.452 0.104 0.000 0.055 0.105 0.190 0.056 0.082 0.069
3 IRELAND 53.142 -7.692 0.083 0.055 0.000 0.043 0.077 0.075 0.037 0.208
4 ITALY 41.872 12.567 0.089 0.105 0.043 0.000 0.079 0.061 0.052 0.048
5 NETHERLANDS 52.133 5.291 0.150 0.190 0.077 0.079 0.000 0.068 0.064 0.107
6 SPAIN 40.464 -3.749 0.121 0.056 0.075 0.061 0.068 0.000 0.034 0.067
7 SWEDEN 60.128 18.644 0.046 0.082 0.037 0.052 0.064 0.034 0.000 0.044
8 U.K. 55.378 -3.436 0.093 0.069 0.208 0.048 0.107 0.067 0.044 0.000
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Table 7.5: Spatial Weights Matrix for UK Regions  
 
 
The spatial weight matrices in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present the spatial weights for 
each country and region. These weights effectively measure the intensity of the 
relationship between two countries or regions, in terms of distance. Higher weight 
is placed in closer locations and lower weights are associated with more distant 
locations. 
 
For example, considering Table 7.4, we can observe that for France the country 
with the lowest weight (and therefore the highest distance) is Sweden. Equally the 
country with the highest weight (and therefore the smallest distance) is the 
Netherlands, closely followed by Spain and Germany. Similarly in UK regions South 
East has the highest weight (lowest distance) to London whilst N. Ireland has the 
lowest weight (and the highest distance). Therefore, these matrices define the 
countries or the regions that are considered (according to the weights) to be the 
closest neighbors.  
 
Both matrices in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 are normalized prior to enter the panel 
regressions using the spectral normalization. Normalization is important in order 
for the maximum Eigenvalue of the matrix to be equal to 1 and the spectral 
normalization guarantees non singularity without changing the model specification 
(LeSage and Pace, 2009). In order to do so, all the entries in the matrix are divided 
by the absolute value of the largest eigenvalue of the matrix. 
 
 
Nr. Region LATITUDE LONGITUDE W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12
1 Yorkshire & H. 53.992 -1.541 0.000 0.596 0.674 0.350 0.199 1.010 0.884 0.274 0.293 0.247 0.343 0.648
2 East Anglia 52.356 -1.174 0.596 0.000 0.963 0.742 0.171 0.376 0.485 0.195 0.498 0.309 0.382 1.501
3 East Midlands 53.045 -0.398 0.674 0.963 0.000 0.640 0.158 0.438 0.421 0.195 0.502 0.235 0.285 0.649
4 London 51.507 -0.128 0.350 0.742 0.640 0.000 0.140 0.265 0.294 0.155 1.452 0.254 0.270 0.511
5 N.Ireland 54.788 -6.492 0.199 0.171 0.158 0.140 0.000 0.205 0.252 0.350 0.128 0.212 0.264 0.192
6 North East 54.978 -1.618 1.010 0.376 0.438 0.265 0.205 0.000 0.634 0.334 0.234 0.207 0.280 0.398
7 North West 53.790 -2.654 0.884 0.485 0.421 0.294 0.252 0.634 0.000 0.321 0.247 0.303 0.498 0.644
8 Scotland 56.491 -4.203 0.274 0.195 0.195 0.155 0.350 0.334 0.321 0.000 0.142 0.175 0.228 0.214
9 South East 51.279 0.522 0.293 0.498 0.502 1.452 0.128 0.234 0.247 0.142 0.000 0.220 0.228 0.379
10 South West 50.777 -3.999 0.247 0.309 0.235 0.254 0.212 0.207 0.303 0.175 0.220 0.000 0.730 0.363
11 Wales 52.131 -3.784 0.343 0.382 0.285 0.270 0.264 0.280 0.498 0.228 0.228 0.730 0.000 0.504
12 West Midlands 52.475 -1.830 0.648 1.501 0.649 0.511 0.192 0.398 0.644 0.214 0.379 0.363 0.504 0.000
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7.2.3 Econometric Methodology 
 
Spatial econometrics are defined as “a subfield of econometrics that deals with the 
treatment of spatial interaction (spatial autocorrelation) and spatial structure 
(spatial heterogeneity) in regression models for cross-sectional and panel data” 
(Anselin, 1999, p.1). There are alternative ways to introduce spatial effects in a 
regression model (panel or not). The most commonly used specifications in spatial 
econometrics are the Spatial Error Model (SEM), the spatial Durbin model (SDM) 
and the Spatial Autoregressive model (SAR) (LeSage and Pace, 2009; Cravo et al., 
2015). The chosen econometric specification for this part of the study is a SAR 
model (a more detailed discussion of Spatial Panel Regressions is given in section 
3.4.5). LeSage and Pace (2009) argue that SAR is the “hallmark of spatial 
econometrics” (Cravo et al., 2015, pp.13) whilst Elhorst (2014) argues that SAR 
and SEM as presented by Anselin (1988) and Anselin et al.,(1996) can be regarded 
as the main pillars in spatial econometric thinking. Given the above, and 
considering the fact that the SAR model has the advantage of having a fully 
supported and documented process within STATA 15, this analysis will utilize the 
SAR modelling methodology. However, as the structure of the dataset is different 
from those used in the regressions analyses of Chapters 5 and 6, we need to test 
again whether a fixed or random effects panel regression is appropriate for the 
current data structure. 
 
Given the processes applied in Chapters 5 and 6, the random effects model should 
in principle be the preferred specification. This is due to the inclusion of time 
invariant independent variables in the model specification (eg. legal origins and 
the spatial matrix itself). Nevertheless, the approach that this research 
undertakes, considers the likelihood ratio test as described in Chapters 5 and 6 
(following Greene and Hensher, 2010). 
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7.2.4 Model Specification and Panel Effects16 
 
The modelling approach first specifies a simple (non-spatial) panel model to be 
used as a benchmark against the results from the spatial panel model. This model 
uses the control variables that were introduced in section 7.2.1. 
 
Subsequently, a spatial panel model is employed with the same control variables 
as the non-spatial model, and the additional spatial weights. Therefore, there will 
be a spatial panel model at country (or UK region/countries) level and a traditional 
panel (non-spatial) model as well for robustness checks. 
 
The simple (non-spatial) model will have the following general specification 
(ignoring panel effects) for the EU countries: 
𝐷𝑉 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑔_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑 +  𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  (7.1a) 
And the following general specification (ignoring panel effects) for the UK regions: 
𝐷𝑉 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑤_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 +  𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  (7.1b) 
 
DV is the number of event_failure=1 or event_failure=2 (depending on whether it 
is applied on firms in financial distress or in liquidation) companies for each year 
in each country or regions and c is the constant.  
 
GDP_gr is the GDP growth rate in each country (each year); GVA is used for the 
UK regions. CR is the credit availability in each country, each year as a percentage 
of GDP. Leg_trad is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for countries that 
are associated to common law and 0 for firms associated to legal traditions of civil 
law tradition. New_Firms_perc is used for the UK regions’ analysis to measure the 
percentage of new firms in a given region in a given year.  
 
In addition to model (7.1) above, generic forms of two spatial model are specified 
in models (7.2a) and (7.2b) (ignoring panel effects in the representation) for the 
EU countries and the UK regions: 
                                                          
16 Panel models in this chapter do not consider unit root tests, in line with previous chapters, due to the large N 
compared to T structure of the dataset. Maddala and Wu (1999) questioned the validity of unit root tests in panel 
data applications and a sufficient body of the panel data literature (see for example Arellano and Bond, 1991) do 
not propose them in the panel model applications. Likewise, Barreira and Rodrigues (2005) point that unit root 
tests for panel data such as the IPS and Chang’s tests can be distorted under small samples, influencing the panel 
data results.  As such this study is not using them as the academic debate in that area remains separate and outside 
the scope of this study. 
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𝐷𝑉𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑊_𝐷𝑉𝑛𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡  (7.2a) 
 
𝐷𝑉𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑤_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊_𝐷𝑉𝑛𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡  (7.2b) 
In all cases: 
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊_𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝑣𝑛𝑡 
 
Where: 𝐷𝑉𝑛𝑡=(DV1t;DV2t….DVnt) is a vector (n*1) vector of observations for the 
dependent variable with a time period of t and with n number of panels. 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑡 is 
the spatially lagged error, v is a vector of disturbances that are independent and 
identically distributed between panels and with variance 𝜎2. W is the spatial matrix 
and c is the constant. The remaining variables are the independent variables for 
each part of the analysis as described above. Models also account for panel effects.  
Spatial dependence can be incorporated in at least two ways in a spatial model. 
The first is in the form of an additional independent variable that represents a 
spatially lagged dependent variable (Anselin, 1999). This specification is called the 
spatial lag model. The second approach is to incorporate the spatial effects in the 
error structure (combinations also can exist) in what is known as the spatial error 
model. The former specification deals with testing for the existence and strength 
of spatial interaction in the dependent variable. The latter deals with the 
identification of spatial correlation in the error terms and is appropriate when the 
concern is in correcting the potentially biasing effects of spatial autocorrelation 
(Anselin, 1999). In both cases a maximum likelihood estimator is utilised. 
 
Models (7.2a and 7.2b) test for spatial effects in the lag dependent variable as well 
as the error terms. The spatial lag in the dependent variable is referred to, in the 
text as W_DV and implies a spatially lagged dependent variable. The spatial lag in 
the error term is referred in the text as W_error and implies a spatially lagged 
error term. W_DV is introduced in models (7.2a and 7.2b) to denote the 
assumption that the number of companies that fail in each country each year is 
experiencing spillovers from other countries. W represents the spatial Weight 
matrix. In models (7.2a and 7.2b) the spatial Weights are both on the spatially 
lagged dependent variable and on the error term. This variable is effectively testing 
for the potential existence of spatial effects in firms’ liquidations between countries 
(EU) and regions (UK). The logic of this test is that in an open economy where 
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businesses are free to trade with each other and SMEs are known to operate in a 
relatively local manner, it is possible that financial hardship and liquidation in firms 
that operate in an area may be related to financial hardship and liquidations for 
firms that operate in nearby areas (Love, 1996). The exact definition of locality 
can be concluded when the spatial effects are tested in both EU countries level as 
well as UK country/regional level. Additionally, for similar reasons, the spatial 
Weights matrix is also introduced in the residuals. ρ is the autocorrelation 
parameter and can take values between -1 and 1. It shares some characteristics 
with a correlation coefficient but in contrast to that, it is not restricted to the (+/-
) 1 range (LeSage and Fischer, 2008). The idea is to capture spatially correlated 
errors that provide evidence of spatial effects. 
 
A two step approach will be used in this part of the analysis. First, regressions will 
be used in the general specification of model (7.1a and 7.1b) both for the number 
of firms in financial distress and subsequently for the number of firms in liquidation 
(representing the two stages of failure that were considered in he previous 
chapters). A test for the existence of fixed or random effects when the time 
invariant variables are excluded from the model will be used. This primarily affects 
the (non-spatial) panel models. For consistency with Chapters 5 and 6 the test 
that will be used is the one proposed by Greene and Hensher (2010). This is based 
on a likelihood ratio test and can be used in the place of the Hausman test, when 
ordered logistic regressions are considered (Greene and Hensher, 2010) but can 
also be applicable to linear cases. Howewer, the Hausman test is also applied. 
 
It is assumed that random effects will be the preferable option due to the existence 
of non-time varying variables such as the legal tradition for the EU firms. For the 
spatial panel models in particular, Elhorst (2014) observed that random spatial 
effects is generally the point of departure in spatial panel models because models 
with spatial fixed effects only utilize the time series component of the data whereas 
random effects are actually using both the time series and the cross sectional 
elements. Additionally, as already mentioned, the random effects specification 
avoids the problem that the coefficients of time-invariant variables or variables 
that only vary a little cannot be estimated (Elhorst, 2014). 
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The results of the above regressions will be then used as reference point for the 
spatial effects model. The second step uses the model (7.2a and 7.2b) which is 
the full representation of the SAR model (LeSage and Pace, 2008) that includes 
spatial error terms as well17. The spatial panel models will be tested in the full 
firms’ sample and the alternative firm failure processes that were identified in 
Chapters 5 and 6 for EU and UK firms, respectively. 
 
7.3 Spatial Effects in European Countries’ Firm Failure Processes 
 
7.3.1 Fixed or Random Effects 
 
This section will first examine the EU countries in a full sample and then at firm 
failure process (cluster) level. The first step, as described in the previous section, 
is to run non-spatial models, check for random or fixed effects when only the time 
varying covariates are used and then report the results of the selected 
specification. To do so we first check a fixed and a random effects model based on 
the general model (7.1a) (for firms in financial distress and firms in liquidation 
separately). Given the linear nature of these regressions both the Hausman test 
and the likelihood ratio-based methodology that was adopted in Chapters 5 and 6 
(from Greene and Hensher, 2010) can be applicable. For consistency reasons with 
the previous chapters the Likelihood Ratio approach has been undertaken as the 
primary methodology.  
 
Under the Likelihood Ratio Test, a random effects model with the time varying 
independent variables has been used to which we add the group means of the 
variables. The purpose of the means is to control for correlation between the 
individual effects and the independent variables. Therefore, the group mean of 
variables should account for the correlation between the individual effect and the 
regressors (Greene and Hensher, 2010). If this correlation is confirmed then the 
fixed effect approach should be undertaken. If such a correlation does not exist 
then the random effects model should be appropriate (Greene and Hensher, 2010). 
The model’s estimates (for each regression were financial distress or liquidation 
                                                          
17 Some parts of the literature may use different names for that model. For example Golgher and Voss, (2016) use 
the name Spatial Durbin Error Model in a similar specification; Belotti et al., (2017) use the term SAC (Spatial 
Autocorrelation Model) for a similar specification. 
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was considered) were then stored and a similar random effects model without the 
means was also run (and its estimates were also stored). Consequently, a 
likelihood ratio test is carried out as a variable addition test for joint significance 
of the group means. Specifically, the estimates of the two models with and without 
the group means of the time-varying variables were compared with the likelihood 
ratio, on the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the means are all zero, 
following Greene and Hensher (2010). 
 
The results did not reject the null hypothesis (at p=0.01 with 2 degrees of 
freedom) that the coefficients on the means are all zero. Therefore we conclude 
that this is a further reason why the random effects specification should be used. 
A Hausman test was also performed and confirmed the same results (Appendix C, 
Tables C.15 and C.16). In that case the null hypothesis that the random effects 
estimator is consistent is not rejected. The same process was then applied to the 
individual failure clusters which are essentially smaller subsets of the main dataset 
with no difference in the results.  
 
7.3.2 Analysis on EU Countries 
 
7.3.2.1 Non-Spatial Panel  
The next step after accepting the random effects specification is the panel 
regression that follows the general specification shown in model (7.1a) above. This 
panel regression aims to create a benchmark against which to compare the spatial 
panel results. 
 
Table 7.6 shows the result of the panel model regression where the dependent 
variable is the number of firms in financial distress (as the first stage of failure). 
In this aggregated data structure, the results suggest that (in the full firms’ 
sample) GDP growth and the credit availability are both significant determinants 
of the number of firms that enter financial distress each year. The signs of the 
coefficients are in line with what we observed in Chapter 5. The GDP growth has a 
negative sign implying that a reduction in the GDP growth is associates with an 
increase in the number of financially distressed firms. Credit availability has also a 
positive sign due to the reasons that were explained in Chapter 5. That is, it is 
measured as a percentage of GDP and therefore the credit availability declines in 
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absolute terms but its proportion as a percentage of GDP can still be positive, 
because GDP reduces more during the financial crisis years. Therefore, due to its 
specification being a percentage of GDP, the positive coefficient is possible because 
it is based on a decreasing GDP. Nevertheless, the point remains that credit 
availability (decreased in absolute levels) is a determinant of firms’ financial 
distress in the EU countries of this sample. The legal tradition dummy variable was 
not significant determinant of firms’ financial distress in this aggregation of the 
data. 
 
As shown in Table 7.6, the results for the alternative firm failure processes indicate 
a more significant reliance on credit availability than on GDP growth as the latter 
is not significant in all firm failure processes. In addition, in this specification of 
the model (without panel or spatial effects), the legal tradition is not a significant 
determinant of firms’ transition to financial distress. 
 
Table 7.6: Non-Spatial Panel regression on EU countries’ financially distressed firms  
 
 
Considering firms from EU countries that entered liquidation procedures (the 
terminal stage of failure) each year, a simple (non-spatial) panel is also run. The 
results are presented in Table 7.7. The results suggest that in contrast with the 
financial distress situation, the key business environment determinants of the 
firms’ liquidation is the GDP growth and not the credit availability. GDP growth has 
Firm Failure Process 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
c  -0.058* -0.011     -0.118**    -0.248** -0.021
GDP_gr  -0.008** -0.002  -0.005* 0.001 -0.002
Credit   0.002**       0.001**      0.002**      0.003**       0.001**
Leg_trad -0.022 -0.036 -0.044 -0.044 -0.012
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.089 / 0.009 0.029 / 0.015 0.068 / 0.020 0.081 / 0.024 0.037 / 0.012
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.099 / 0.004 0.089 / 0.007 0.059 / 0.005 0.071 / 0.006 0.049 / 0.004
Leg_trad.
GDP_gr
Glossary
Credit availability (% GDP)
GDP Growth (%)
Legal Tradition
Clusters with Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Credit
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the expected sign and it is significant in all firm failure processes with the exception 
of the fourth, where the legal tradition dummy variable is instead significant (at 
Sig<0.10). Decreased GDP growth is associated with increasing propensity for 
liquidation in the all firms sample and in the first, second and third firm failure 
process. These failure processes are associated with young firms, negative growth 
firms and firms with few directors and liquidity problems. In addition, the negative 
sign of the coefficient for the legal tradition dummy variable in the fourth firm 
failure process suggests that firms in countries under the common law system are 
less likely to enter liquidation. The fourth firm failure process has been associated 
with firms that have negative or low growth and increased usage of trade credit. 
 
Table 7.7: Non-Spatial Panel regression on EU countries’ liquidated firms  
 
The results above provide an indication of the significance of the variables that will 
be used as control variables in the spatial panel regressions and are meant to be 
used as the reference point for the spatial models. 
 
7.3.2.2 Spatial Panel  
After having a broad understanding of the expectations from the independent 
variables, the next step is to test spatial autocorrelation. There are 8 countries 
participating in the analysis: France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). France and Germany share borders and as 
such are neighbors to each other.  Netherlands shares borders with Germany and 
Spain and Italy share borders with France making them neighbors. The UK also 
Firm Failure Process:  1 3 4 5
Independent 
Variables All Firms
c   0.250**  0.359**    0.374**   0.386**   0.342**
GDP_gr  -0.029**  -0.021*  -0.024**  -0.029** -0.018
Credit -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Leg_trad -0.036 0.018 -0.410 -0.029  -0.083*
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u0.001 / 0.543 0.001 / 0.054 0.001 / 0.053 0.001 / 0.063 0.001 / 0.054
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e0.380 / 0.300 0.363 / 0.028 0.373 / 0.029 0.389 / 0.030 0.370 / 0.029
Leg_trad.
GDP_gr GDP Growth (%)
Legal Tradition
Clusters with Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary
Credit Credit availability (% GDP)
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shares (sea) borders with France, Netherlands and Ireland. Sweden on the other 
hand appears to be the most distanced country from the sample, sharing (sea) 
borders with Germany. 
 
First, the spatial panel regression is run with the number of firms entering financial 
distress as the dependent variable.  The results are shown in Table 7.8. For the 
number of firms in financial distress in all EU countries, there is statistical evidence 
of spatial effects in the (spatial) lag of the dependent variable in the full firms’ 
sample and in all the firm failure processes. The W_DV variable is significant at 
Sig<0.10 in the full sample and Sig.< 0.05 in the individual firm failure processes.  
 
The interpretation of the coefficients in spatially lagged dependent variables is 
complicated because spatial models expand the information set to include 
information from neighboring areas (LeSage and Pace, 2009). As such a change 
in an independent variable in a country could affect the dependent variable in 
another country (LeSage and Pace, 2009). In this context, directionally, the sign 
of the W_DV coefficient in the full sample of EU countries is negative, implying that 
a decrease in the spatial weights of countries whose firms enter financial distress 
is associated with increased levels of firms in financial distress. Considering the 
properties of the weighting matrix, a decreased weight in the matrix is associated 
with increased distance between countries. As such the interpretation of the 
coefficient is that firms entering financial distress in a given country can be 
associated with increased levels of firms entering financial distress in countries 
that are not neighboring.  This interpretation holds for the full sample and all the 
firm failure processes with the exception of the third. In the third firm failure 
process, increases in the levels of firms entering distress in a country is associated 
with increases in nearby countries. This is potentially due to the construction of 
the third firm failure process which is concentrated from German, Italian and 
Spanish firms, which are all close to each other. 
 
In addition, there is evidence of spatial effects in the error term in the full sample 
and in the majority of the firm failure processes because the W_error variable is 
significant at Sig<0.05 in the full sample of EU firms and in the individual firm 
failure processes (with the exception of the third firm failure process).  The fact 
that the spatial patterns in the error term are statistically significant implies that 
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a model that did not control for these effects would probably have spatial 
autocorrelation in its residuals, making that model mis-specified from a statistical 
perspective (LeSage and Peace, 2009).  
 
Table 7.8: Spatial panel Regression results on EU countries’ firms’ financial distress  
 
 
The rest of the control variables exhibit a similar behavior to the one that was 
presented in the models without spatial effects. GDP growth and credit availability 
are both significant (at Sig.< 0.10 and Sig.<0.05 levels accordingly) in the full 
sample. Their significance differs across the alternative firm failure processes. 
Similar variations have been observed in the standard panel models at country 
level as well as in the firm level ordered logistic regression panels employed in 
Chapter 5.  We can, however, observe that when including the spatial effects in 
the spatially lagged dependent variable and in the error term that the overall 
significance of GDP growth reduces from being significant at Sig.<0.05 in the panel 
regressions to being significant at Sig.<0.10 level in spatial panels, potentially due 
to the inclusion of the spatial weights in the error terms and in the spatially lagged 
dependent variable. Overall, one can conclude that the geographical location is a 
significant determinant that should be considered in financial distress studies 
across EU countries. Spatial effects and the importance of location also applies to 
the alternative firm failure processes. 
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
W_DV  -0.322*  -1.878***  -1.692** 0.633**  -1.162***
W_error 0.329***  0.881***  0.901*** -0.257  0.916**
c    0.081*    0.163** 0.026  -0.235** 0 .083*
GDP_gr  -0.018*   -0.013* -0.003 0.001 -0.001
Credit 0.002** 0.001     0.001** 0.002** 0.004
Leg_trad -0.032 -0.009 -0.028 -0.021 0.004
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.061/0.020 0.059/0.018 0.066/0.018 0.059/0.018 0.049/0.015
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.049/0.004 0.048/0.006 0.032/0.004 0.058/0.005 0.023/0.003
W_DV Spatially lagged Dependent Variable GDP_gr GDP Growth (%)
W_error Spattially lagged error term Leg_trad. Legal Tradition
Credit Credit availability (% GDP)
Clusters with Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary
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Second, the spatial panel regression is run with the number of liquidations as the 
dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 7.9. In contrast with the 
financial distress rates, in the case of the firms that are entering liquidation in the 
EU countries, there is limited evidence of statistically significant spatial effects in 
the dependent variable (with spatial lag) as the significance levels of the W_DV 
variable in Table 7.9 shows. That means for all the firms and for most firm failure 
processes, with the exception of the third firm failure process, the spatial location 
and the distance between countries is not directly related with liquidation rates in 
another country. The third firm failure process differs (some evidence of significant 
(Sig.< 0.10) spatial lags in the dependent variable) from the others in the 
significance of the W_DV variable. The results for the third firm failure process 
indicate, as in the case of financial distress, that decreased spatial weights (and 
therefore increasing distance between countries) is associated with increases in 
the levels of firms entering liquidation. However, some caution should be taken in 
the interpretation of the results in this firm failure process because it is 
characterized by a concentration of firms from countries that are relatively close 
to each other. 
 
On the other hand, there is evidence of spatial effects in the error term in the full 
sample and in all of the firm failure processes separately. This is evidenced by the 
significance levels (Sig.< 0.05) for all firm failure processes and in the all firms 
sample. The sign of the coefficient on the W_error variable, denoting spatial effects 
in the error term, is difficult to be interpreted directionally. However, the positive 
sign is associated with increased spatial weights and therefore with decreased 
distance. As in the case of the regressions above, which considered financial 
distress rates in EU countries, the presence of statistically significant spatial effects 
in the error term implies that the non-spatial model could be mis-specified. More 
importantly, the practical implication is that the spatial model provides information 
on some unobserved spatially correlated effects that are not observable to this 
research (this can be down to limited data availability or due to some effects that 
cannot be measured). 
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Table 7.9: Spatial panel Regression results on EU countries’ firms liquidations  
 
 
The rest of the control variables exhibit a similar behavior to the one that was 
presented in the models without spatial effects (although with reduced levels of 
significance:  Sig< 0.10). Comparing the panel regressions on liquidation rates 
across countries, one can observe that reducing GDP growth is a determinant of 
liquidation rates in both cases. However, consistent with the financial distress 
observations, it is significant at Sig.< 0.10 level when spatial effects are included 
in the model. Credit availability is not a key driver in any of the regressions when 
liquidation rates are concerned. Legal tradition is not a key determinant in the 
overall sample but it is a determinant in the fourth firm failure processes in both 
regressions. The sign of the coefficient suggests that firms in common law 
countries are less associated with entering the liquidation stage than firms in civil 
law countries. Overall, one can conclude that the geographical location is again a 
significant determinant that should be considered in financial distress studies 
across EU countries. 
 
 
 
 
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
W_DV -0.269 -0.246 -0.451  -0.486* -0.251
W_error 0.819***  0.734*** 0.832*** 0.841** 0.804***
c    0.453**   0.312** 0.402**  0.486**  0.332**
GDP_gr  -0.013*  -0.010* -0.001  -0.013* 0.008
Credit 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Leg_trad -0.032 0.022 -0.039 -0.024  -0.068*
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.001/0.049  -0.005/0.332  0.001/0.049  0.001/0.108  0.001/0.079
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.219/0.020 0.294/0.029 0.221/0.023 0.225/0.022 0.223/0.022
W_DV Spatially lagged Dependent Variable GDP_gr GDP Growth (%)
W_error Spattially lagged error term Leg_trad. Legal Tradition
Credit Credit availability (% GDP)
Clusters with Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary
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7.3.3 Conclusion on Spatial Effects in EU Countries 
 
The results from the above spatial panel regressions provided evidence of 
statistically significant spatial effects in the error terms (W_error) for both options 
of the dependent variable. However, evidence of statistically significant spatial 
effects in the spatially lagged dependent variable (W_DV) were only evidenced in 
the regressions against financial distress (and in the third firm failure process in 
the regression against liquidations).  
 
Therefore Hypothesis 13a is accepted. There is statistically significant evidence of 
spatial effects in EU firm failures, both in the case of firms’ financial distress and 
firms’ liquidations. What differs between firms in financial distress and firms in 
liquidation, is the type of the spatial effects that are identified, that is, the effect 
is found either in the spatially lagged dependent variable or in the error term. 
Hypothesis 13b, is rejected though. The spatial effects are not the same in terms 
of statistical significance across the alternative firm failure processes because the 
third firm failure process in the financially distressed EU firms has not significant 
spatial effects in the error terms. Likewise for firms in liquidation, only the third 
firm failure process has got statistically significant effects in the spatially lagged 
dependent variable. The existence of spatial effects in the error term implies spatial 
autocorrelation in the error term, possibly due to the usage of spatial data (Anselin, 
1999). Therefore the model residuals are experiencing a correlation which is 
directly associated with the geography of the countries. The neighbouring 
countries (for example Germany and France; France and Spain and Italy; Germany 
and Netherlands) have essentially spatially correlated residuals. In other words, 
as it has been explained in the previous section, the spatial patterns in the error 
term suggest that there are random determinants that influence the dependent 
variable that are not present in the model and that they exhibit spatial correlation. 
In other words, the statistically significant presence of spatial errors may be down 
to omitted random factors (Anselin, 2013). Table 7.10 provides a summary of the 
outcomes of the hypotheses tested in this section. 
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Table 7.10: Summary table for Chapter 7 Hypotheses on EU firms 
 
 
There are two conclusions that may be drawn from these findings. First, it is 
possible that additional, potentially observable, independent variables could be 
added in models to reduce or control for these spatial errors. Second, it is possible 
that these spatial error patterns are down to unobservable effects that cannot be 
measured and therefore the researcher or the policy maker should be aware that 
such effects exist between failed firms in the EU countries. For example, Buehler 
et al., (2012) suggests that culture affects firms’ bankruptcy rates but culture 
cannot be measured directly. Therefore, accounting for spatially correlated 
unobservable effects is a primary reason to use models that account for such 
effects, because the researcher cannot obtain the necessary variables to account 
for these effects and therefore a non-spatial error model would be misspecified. 
Glass et al., (2012) makes the economic case for spatial error models, noting that 
they should be used (when necessary) because they are able to capture spatial 
dependence beyond what non-spatial models can capture. In this case, such 
effects are applicable to financial distress and to liquidation rates of firms in the 
EU countries under consideration. 
 
In addition, the evidence from the previous section suggests that the spatial lag 
on the dependent variable (W_DV) is statistically significant determinant for 
financial distress rates (and in the case of the third firm failure process for 
liquidation rates too).  The spatial lag on the dependent variable (also known as 
spatial autoregression) element shows the existence and the strength of spatial 
autocorrelation (Anselin, 1999). The significance of that variable can be interpreted 
as substantive spatial dependence (Anselin, 1999). In other words, there is an 
association in the dependent variable (number of firms in financial distress in all 
firms and number of firms in liquidation for the third firm failure process) between 
neighboring countries. Therefore, the number of financially distressed firms in one 
country affects the number of firms’ financial distress in another nearby country 
Nr. Hypothesis Statement Accepted?
H13a There are statistically significant spatial effects associated with EU firm failures. Yes
H13b
Spatial effects are the same between alternative firm failure processes in EU firms, in terms of statistical 
significance.
No
Table of Hypotheses for Spatial Effects in EU Countries
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(a negative coefficient implies that financially distress rates increase as the 
distance decreases). 
 
7.4 Spatial Effects in UK Countries and Regions Firm Failure Processes 
 
7.4.1 Fixed or Random Effects 
 
Looking at the UK country-region level, the same principles of the research 
methodology are applied. The first step is to run the non-spatial panel models, and 
determine whether a random or fixed effects specification is more appropriate. 
Similar to the EU countries’ firms’ sample, the existence of time-invariant variables 
(in this case the spatial weights matrix) would suggest that the spatial panel model 
is better suited with a random effects specification. Nevertheless, adopting the 
same principles as in the EU countries’ firms, this section tests for fixed or random 
effects using only the time varying variables. This is additionally helpful due to the 
fact that initially a non-spatial panel model is considered as a benchmark to 
compare the spatial panel models against. 
 
Consistent with the EU sample, the first step is to check a fixed and a random 
effects model based on the general model (7.1b). Given the linear nature of these 
regressions both the Hausman test and the likelihood ratio-based methodology 
that was applied in Chapters 5 and 6 (Greene and Hensher, 2010) can be 
applicable. For consistency with the previous chapters, the Likelihood Ratio 
approach has been undertaken as a primary methodology. The results did not 
reject the null hypothesis (at p=0.01 with 3 degrees of freedom) that the 
coefficient of the means of the (time varying) independent variables are all zero 
and therefore the conclusion is the random effects specification should be used. A 
Hausman test was also performed and confirmed the same results (Appendix C 
tables C.17 and C.18). The same process was also applied to the individual failure 
clusters which are essentially smaller subsets of the main dataset, the results 
indicate that again, random effects specification should be used.  
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7.4.2 Analysis on UK Regions 
 
7.4.2.1 Non-Spatial Panel  
The first step after accepting the random effects specification is the panel 
regression that follows the general specification shown in model 7.1b.  This panel 
regression aims to create a benchmark against which to compare the spatial panel 
results. 
 
Table 7.11 shows the result of the panel model regression when the dependent 
variable is the number of UK firms in financial distress. In this aggregated data 
structure, the results suggest that, in the all UK firms sample, regional GVA growth 
is not a significant determinant of UK firms’ financial distress at aggregated UK 
level.  This is also the case with most firm failure processes, with the exception of 
the fourth. In the fourth firm failure process, GVA growth is a significant 
determinant of UK firms’ financial distress. The negative sign of the coefficient 
suggests that a decrease in regional GVA is associated with an increase in the 
number of firms entering financial distress.  
 
On the other hand, the credit availability is a significant (Sig.< 0.05) determinant 
of the number of firms that enter financial distress each year. The sign of the credit 
coefficient is positive and consistent with what has been reported in the previous 
section and chapters. The credit availability is expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Therefore, despite the positive sign of the credit coefficient which could be 
associated with increasing credit, credit availability is actually decreasing. 
Therefore, the relationship implies that a decline in credit availability is associated 
with increasing numbers of financially distressed UK firms. This relationship is also 
significant for the third firm failure process. 
 
The percentage of new firms in a region is also a significant determinant of firms’ 
financial distress (Sig.< 0.05). This evidence applies to the full sample and the 
first firm failure process. The sign of the coefficient supports the argument that 
the higher the percentage of new firms entering a region, the higher the number 
of firms entering financial distress, possibly down to increased competition at 
regional level.  
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The differences in the significance of the economic and business environment 
variables in the alternative firm failure processes are associated with the 
characteristics of the firms’ in these processes. The first firm failure process in UK 
firms (with directors) is associated with deteriorating growth and high trade credit 
firms; the second with firms that have strong sales but weak cash conversion; the 
third with old firms that have deteriorating cash conversion ability and the fourth 
with young firms that are highly indebted. Therefore, one can conclude that, in 
terms of the number of firms’ entering financial distress in the UK regions, those 
who are young are more affected by the economic environment, as in the case of 
the fourth firm failure process. On the other hand, firms that are unable to 
generate sufficient cash (third failure process) are more affected by a deterioration 
in credit availability and those that experience deteriorating growth (first failure 
process), are more affected by increased competition, caused from new businesses 
in the area. The second firm failure process did not have any statistically significant 
variables for financial distress in this occasion. 
 
Table 7.11: Non-Spatial Panel regression on UK regions’ financially distressed firms  
 
 
Considering firms from the UK regions that entered liquidation procedures each 
year, a simple (non-spatial) panel is also run. The results are presented in Table 
7.12. The results suggest that the key business environment determinants of the 
firms’ liquidation is the GVA growth (Sig. <0.05); the credit availability (Sig. 
<0.05) and the percentage of new firms in a region (Sig. <0.05).  
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
c 0.168 0.235 -0.080 -0.323 -0.694
GVA 0 .005 -0.005 0.005 -0.002  -0.039**
Credit  0.001** 0.001 0.002 0.002** 0.003
New_firms_perc.   0.018** 0.022** -0.010 0.002 0.034
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.035/0.018 0.037/0.001 0.072/0.028 0.109/0.027 0.096/0.049
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.061/0.004 0.086/0.006 0.186/0.012 0.162/0.011 0.367/0.024
New_firms_perc. Percentage of New firms in a region
Clusters with Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary
Credit Credit availability (% GDP)
GVA GVA Growth (%)
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Table 7.12: Non-Spatial Panel regression on UK regions’ firms that enter liquidation.  
 
 
The sign of the coefficient of the GVA is negative, implying that a decline in the 
regional GVA growth is associated with an increased number of firms entering 
liquidation in the UK. The coefficient of credit availability is negative when UK firms’ 
liquidation is considered, in contrast to the coefficient that was observed in the 
financial distress section. This negative credit availability coefficient was also 
observed in Chapter 6 and is associated with the timing of UK firms’ entering 
liquidation. UK firms mostly entered liquidation at a time when the UK GDP was 
growing (but the credit availability was still not recovering as credit started 
increasing after the UK GDP started increasing). In contrast with the EU countries 
average, where the decrease of the credit provision was less than the decrease in 
GDP growth (resulting in a positive coefficient for the credit availability 
independent variable), in the UK the credit availability as percentage of GDP 
decreased even further than the GDP. In addition the credit availability reduction 
continue happening even when GDP was increasing, resulting in the negative 
coefficient. In addition, the percentage of new firms entering a region has a 
positive sign, confirming that increased competition is associated with higher 
liquidation rates.  
 
 
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
c   1.015**   0.734** 0.181 0.954**  0.822*
GVA  -0.044**  -0.035** -0.009  -0.041** -0.015
Credit  -0.007**  -0.005** -0.002  -0.006**  -0.003*
New_firms_perc.  0.036** 0.029** 0.006  0.032** -0.010
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.223/0.035 0.326/0.035 0.123/0.041 0.133/0.038 0.020/0.001
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.253/0.016 0.023/0.013 0.127/0.008 0.247/0.159 0.279/0.017
New_firms_perc.
GVA GVA Growth (%)
Percentage of New firms in a region
Clusters with Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary
Credit Credit availability (% GDP)
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7.4.2.2 Spatial Panel  
Following the same approach as the EU countries’ analysis, and after having a 
broad understanding of the expectations from the independent variables, the next 
step is to test spatial autocorrelation. In order to be consistent with the selection 
of the generic model that applied for the EU countries’ firms’ analysis, UK regions’ 
also use the full general specification of the model 7.2b that considered potential 
spatial effects in the residuals and in the (spatial) lags of the dependent variable. 
 
The spatial panel regression is run with the number of firms entering financial 
distress being the dependent variable.  The results are shown in Table 7.13. For 
the number of firms in financial distress in all UK regions, there is statistical 
evidence of spatial effects in the (spatial) lag of the dependent variable in the full 
firms’ sample and in all firm failure processes, with the exception of the third firm 
failure process. The W_DV variable is significant at Sig<0.05 in the full sample as 
well as in the second and fourth firm failure process. Likewise the W_DV is 
significant at Sig.< 0.10 in the first firm failure process.  
 
Table 7.13: Spatial panel Regression results on UK country regions firms’ financial 
distress 
 
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
W_DV 0.587*** 0.290* 1.389*** -0.328  -0.813***
W_error -0.228 0.243  -1.658** 0.071 0.788**
c 0.123* 0.110  -0.547** -0.422 -0.574
GVA 0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.020
Credit 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.003** 0.003
New_firms_perc. 0.012**  -0.012* 0.034** 0.002 0.066**
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.038/0.011 0.030/0.012 0.108/0.026 0.107/0.026 0.129/0.040
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.052/0.005 0.082/0.005 0.153/0.012 0.160/0.011 0.292/0.026
W_DV Spatially lagged Dependent Variable GVA
W_error Spattially lagged error term  
Credit Credit availability (% GDP)
New_firms_perc. Percentage of new firms in a region
GVA Growth (%)
Clusters with Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary
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Overall, the existence of spatial effects in the dependent variable implies that the 
number of firms that are entering financial distress in a given UK country region is 
affected by, and affects, the number of firms entering financial distress in 
neighboring regions. This is called the simultaneous feedback effect (LeSage and 
Fischer, 2008). Spatial effects in the spatially lagged dependent variable can be 
observed in some of the firm failure processes. There are two potential 
interpretations of that. One is that certain firm failure processes have a significant 
number of firms from other UK regions that experience simultaneous feedback in 
their financial distress. The second interpretation is that certain firm failure 
processes are more open to the influence of other firms’ financial performance.  
 
The sign of the W_DV coefficient is positive in most firm failure processes (negative 
in the fourth), implying an increase in spatial weights (and therefore a decrease in 
distance) is positively associated with increased numbers of firms entering financial 
distress in a region. In other words, increases of firms entering financial distress 
in a region positively affect the number of firms entering financial distress in a 
close-by (neighbouring) region. The negative sign of the coefficient of the W_DV 
variable in the fourth firm failure process differs though and suggests that 
increases in firms entering financial distress in a region are affecting firms in 
regions that more distanced. A closer look at the composition of the fourth firm 
failure process, reveals that whilst no particular region has got high concentrations 
in this process, it has a relatively higher presence of London firms and of firms in 
Northern regions. Therefore one possible explanation for this firm failure process 
is that younger firms in Northern UK regions are affected from the business 
environment (in terms of financial distress) in London where they may have their 
first business interactions with. In order to further investigate the impact of 
London, the same spatial panel regression is applied to all UK regions’ firms but 
this time the firms in London are excluded from the analysis. The result suggested 
that, by excluding London, the W_DV becomes not significant. Therefore, a 
tentative conclusion can be drawn that London firms have an additional weight in 
influencing financial distress in firms across the UK regions. This is reflected in the 
spatial effects positive sign that suggests that the distance from other firms in 
London is effectively a determinant of increased numbers of financially distressed 
firms across the UK regions.   
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Finally, considering the spatial effects in the error terms (W_error), there is only 
significant statistical association with financially distressed firms in the second and 
fourth firm failure processes (Sig.< 0.05). As noted in the EU countries’ firms 
section, the sign of the coefficient on the W_error variable, denoting spatial effects 
in the error term, is difficult to interpret directionally. However, the fact that the 
spatial patterns in the error term are statistically significant, implies that a model 
that did not control for these effects would probably have spatial autocorrelation 
in its residuals, making that model mis-specified from a statistical perspective 
(LeSage and Peace, 2009).  
 
The rest of the control variables exhibit a similar behavior to the one that was 
presented in the models without spatial effects in the full UK sample. Credit 
availability and the percentage of new firms in a UK region are both significant (at 
Sig.< 0.10 and Sig.< 0.05 levels respectively) in the full sample. Their significance 
differs across the alternative firm failure processes. Similar variations have been 
observed in the standard panel models at country level as well as ordered logistic 
regression panels at firm level which were employed in Chapter 5.  It can be 
observed that when including the spatial effects in the spatially lagged dependent 
variable and in the error term, the overall significance of credit availability falls 
from being statistically significant at Sig.<0.05 in the panel regressions to being 
significant at Sig.<0.10 level in spatial panels. This may be potentially due to the 
inclusion of the spatial weights in the error terms and in the spatially lagged 
dependent variable. Overall, one can conclude that the geographical location is a 
significant determinant that should be considered in financial distress studies 
across UK regions. Spatial effects and the importance of location also applies to 
the alternative firm failure processes. 
 
In order to consider the number of UK firms entering liquidation, the spatial panel 
regression is run with the number of liquidations as the dependent variable. The 
results are presented in Table 7.14. In contrast with the firms entering financial 
distress, for firms that are entering liquidation in the UK regions, there is limited 
evidence of statistically significant spatial effects in the dependent variable (with 
spatial lag). The exception is the first and the fourth firm failure process where 
some evidence of significant (Sig.< 0.01 and Sig.< 0.10 respectively) spatial lags 
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in the depended variable (W_DV) exists. It indicates that for the full sample and 
for two of the firm failure processes, the spatial location and the distance between 
countries is not directly related with liquidation rates in another region. In addition, 
the observation related to the sign of the coefficient of the W_DV variable in the 
fourth firm failure process is consistent with what has been observed in the case 
of the financial distress; the sign is affected by the representation of regions and 
especially the presence of London within each firm failure process. On the other 
hand, the sign of the coefficient in the first firm failure process indicates that the 
number of firms entering liquidation in a region affects, is affected by, the number 
of firms entering liquidation in neighboring regions. 
 
Table 7.14: Spatial panel Regression results on UK regions firms’ liquidation  
 
 
On the other hand, there is evidence of spatial effects in the error term in the full 
sample and the third and fourth firm failure processes. As for the regressions above 
(considering financial distress rates in UK regions’ firms) the presence of 
statistically significant spatial effects in the error term implies that models applied 
in aggregate (as opposed to firm-specific) firm failure studies (for example studies 
analysing the macroconomic determinants of aggregate firm failures in a country) 
at the wider firm failure literature, should also test for the potential existence of 
spatial dependencies in the error terms. Failure to do so could lead to models being 
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
W_DV -0.263 0.658*** 0.155 -0.375  -0.549*
W_error 0.854*** 0.125 -0.157 0.817***  0.626**
c 0.839* 0.202 0.154 0.959* 0.584
GVA  -0.016* -0.016  -0.008*   -0.019*  -0.010*
Credit  -0.005** -0.001 -0.001  -0.006** -0.003
New_firms_perc. 0.021** 0.015 0.006  0.021* 0.009
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.010/0.002 0.059/0.018 4.070/0.038 0.059/0.018 2.570/0.062
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.143/0.011 0.048/0.006 0.127/0.008 0.058/0.005 0.257/0.019
W_DV Spatially lagged Dependent Variable GVA
W_error Spattially lagged error term  
Credit Credit availability (% GDP)
New_firms_perc.
Clusters with Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary
GVA Growth (%)
Percentage of new firms in a region
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mis-specified, if there is spatial correlation in their error terms. More importantly, 
the practical implication is that the spatial model is able to provide information 
about some unobserved spatially correlated effects that are not observable to this 
research. 
 
The remaining control variables experienced a similar behavior to that observed in 
the non-spatial panel regressions of the full sample, with a small variation in the 
levels of significance of the GVA variable (Sig.<0.10 in the spatial panel; Sig.<0.05 
in the non-spatial panel). The significance of the control variables in the alternative 
firm failure processes has changed. The most significant change is observed in the 
first firm failure process where none of the control variables remains significant 
when the W_DV effects are included in the spatial panel regression, potentially 
implying that the W_DV is in fact a key driver for firms’ liquidations in this failure 
process. 
 
7.4.3 Conclusion on Spatial Effects in UK Regions 
 
The results from the above spatial panel regressions provide evidence of 
statistically significant spatial effects in the error terms (W_error) for the number 
of firms entering liquidation procedures in the UK as well as significant spatial 
effects in the spatially lagged dependent variable (W_DV) for the number of firms 
in financial distress in the UK regions. Therefore, Hypothesis 14a is accepted. There 
is statistically significant evidence of spatial effects in UK firms’ firm failures. This 
holds for both UK firms in financial distress and for firms in liquidation. The 
difference between the failure stages (of financial distress and liquidation) exist in 
the type of spatial effects that are exhibited (being in the error term or the spatially 
lagged dependent variable). Typically, for the first stage of failure (that is, the 
financial distress), the spatial effects in the spatially lagged dependent variable 
were significant for all the firms and for the first and second  firm failure processes, 
where firms entering financial distress were positively correlated with firms 
entering financial distress in a neighboring region. In addition, these effects were 
significant in the fourth firm failure processes.  Spatial effects in the error terms 
of firms entering into financial distress were significant in the second and fourth 
firm failure process. 
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On the other hand, for firms entering the second stage of failure (that is, 
liquidation), the spatial effects in the error term were significant for all firms, the 
third and the fourth firm failure processes. Meanwhile the spatial effects in the 
lagged dependent variable were not significant in the full sample, the second and 
third firm failure processes. 
 
Hypothesis 14b, is rejected. The spatial effects are not the same in terms of 
statistical significance across the alternative firm failure processes because the 
first and the third firm failure process in the financially distressed UK firms do not 
have significant spatial effects in the error terms. Likewise the third firm failure 
process is the only one without statistically significant effects in the spatially lagged 
dependent variable for UK firms in financial distress. In addition, for firms in 
liquidation, only the third and fourth firm failure process got statistically significant 
effects in the error term, while only the first and fourth firm failure processes got 
statistically significant spatial effects in the spatially lagged dependent variable. 
Table 7.15 provides a summary of the hypotheses acceptance for this section. 
 
Table 7.15: Summary table for Chapter 7 Hypotheses on UK firms 
 
 
The results are broadly in line with the behavior that was observed in the EU firms 
and therefore similar conclusions apply. The existence of spatial patterns in the 
error term suggest that there are effects that influence the dependent variable, 
that are not present in the model, which are exhibiting spatial correlation. Failure 
to include them in an aggregate regression such as the one used in this chapter, 
may result in spatial autocorrelation in the residuals and therefore biased 
estimates. This result does not affect earlier chapters in this thesis where the 
analysis was based on firm-level data (and the location was captured with dummy 
variables). However, other studies for policy making that aim to investigate 
aggregated firm failures between multiple locations may be prone to this bias. 
Practically, there appears to be regional factors that may determine firms’ financial 
distress and liquidation that cannot be otherwise measured or observed, therefore 
the inclusion of spatial effects in the error term provides a further tool for analysis. 
Nr. Hypothesis Statement Accepted?
H14a There are statistically significant spatial effects associated with the UK firm failures. Yes
H14b
Spatial effects are the same between alternative firm failure processes in UK firms, in terms of statistical 
significance.
No
Table of Hypotheses for Spatial Effects in UK regions
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Likewise, the existence of a statistically significant spatial lag on the dependent 
variable (W_DV) demonstrates that there is a statistically significant spatial 
association in the dependent variable between UK regions. On that point, it 
appears that the presence of London does affect the spatial results, probably due 
to the significance of London in the UK economy and the concentration of firms 
(including financially distressed firms) there. Nevertheless, the point remains that 
the number of financially distressed firms in a region affects the number of firms’ 
financial distress in another region for a number of firm failure processes, and for 
all the firms collectively. The direction of the effect is mostly related to the 
interactions between businesses in different regions.  However, the results of the 
UK regions are broadly similar to those observed in the EU countries analysis were 
the spatial effects on the dependent variable affected the financial distress 
numbers and those in the error term affected the liquidations. 
 
7.5 Alternative Specifications and Limitations 
 
7.5.1  Limitations of the Control Variables and Alternative 
Definitions 
 
A number of alternative specifications for the above regressions could have been 
performed for both the EU countries and the UK regions.  
 
First, slightly different definitions of the control variables have been used. In line 
with specifications that have been used or tested in Chapters 5 and 6, the control 
variables that were used in this chapter are GDP growth; GVA and credit 
availability; legal tradition and new firms in a region. Choices of control variables 
were due to three main reasons. The first is that these variables have been widely 
referenced as determinants of aggregate firms’ liquidations. The second is that, it 
was practically necessary to keep the same variables that were used in Chapters 
5 and 6. In order to be consistent with Chapters 5 and 6, the same macroeconomic 
variables were used. Thirdly, the emphasis of this section is on the spatial effects, 
not so much on the control variables. However, this also represents a limitation of 
this analysis; there may be further metrics from the economic and business 
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environment that could provide a more accurate estimation on the number of firms 
that are entering financial distress and/or liquidation.  
 
To address the above issue, some slightly different definitions of these control 
variables have been used in the analysis, in line with what has been also tested in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Starting with the EU countries, an alternative specification of 
the panel models was also tested, using lag of one year for the control variables. 
This was motivated by evidence that the aggregate (time series) firm failure 
literature suggesting some time lag effects between macroeconomic effects and 
aggregate firm failure exist (see for example Jones, 2013; Liu, 2008). As this 
specification did not provide statistically different results in terms of the statistical 
significance of the control variables, the results are not reported. 
 
Second, in line with Chapter 5, the legal tradition control variable was used with a 
different specification. Instead of leg_trad taking the value of 1 for countries 
associated with the common law and 0 for countries associated to the legal 
traditions of the civil law, a further dummy variable for French, Scandinavian and 
German law origins was created. These dummy variables represent all the main 
legal traditions that have been recorded (for a discussion of legal traditions, see 
Chapter 2). With it the regression would account for further sub-divisions of the 
legal traditions, which are more detailed than the civil and common law split. 
However the results were statistically similar confirming a similar observation that 
was made in Chapter 5. The UK firms were tested with their control variables 
lagged for one year, in line with what was tried in the EU firms. Again, there are 
no statistically different results. As such, the results are not reported in this 
section.  
 
Third, the UK firms’ regressions were run using the UK GDP growth instead of the 
regional GVA. This approach is similar to the one adopted in Chapter 6. The results 
were marginally different due to the UK GDP being a more generic variable at 
regional level compared to the regional GVA. Nevertheless, this did not change the 
direction or the significance of the spatial weight variables. The results are 
discussed in section 7.5.2. 
 
 302 | P a g e  
 
Fourth, robustness checks on the regressions have been performed. These are 
discussed in the following sections. Moreover, checks for the direct and indirect 
impacts of the spatial effects are performed in Section 7.5.4. Finally, a further 
regression was run excluding year 2013, given that in 2013 there were no firms in 
financial distress as they had entered liquidation by then. This is also discussed 
the next sections. 
 
7.5.2 Controlling for Alternative Definitions of the Independent 
Variable for UK firms 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the UK firms’ have been tested by also using 
the GDP_growth as an alternative control variable to the GVA growth already 
discussed. Table 7.15 summarizes the results for the total UK firms’ sample for 
financial distress and liquidations. One can see that there is no significant 
difference in the signs or the statistical significance of the spatial effects. However, 
GDP growth fails to be a significant determinant in UK firms’ financial distress, 
whereas the GVA growth was (Sig.< 0.10). 
 
Table 7.15: All UK firms’ spatial panel regression with GDP growth instead of GVA 
growth. 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables Liquidation Financial Distress
W_DV -0.226 0.307***
W_error 0.850*** -0.729
c 0.857*  -0.255*
GDP_gr -0.023 0.009
Credit  -0.005* 0.002**
New_firms_perc. 0.018** 0.015**
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.001/0.003 0.022/0.003
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.145/0.011 0.128/0.008
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
All UK Firms Clusters with Directors characteristics
Coeff. Pr>|z|
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7.5.3 Bootstrapping for coefficients significance 
 
As observed in earlier parts of the chapter, the distribution of the independent 
variables has had a small deviation from normality. For this reason a bootstrapping 
approach has been used in order to check whether there is any material change in 
the signs of the coefficients or of their significance.  
 
The bootstrapping approach preserved the panel structure of the data and used 
the standard number of replications that STATA is using (100) with replacement. 
Tables 7.16 and 7.17 present the results. Whilst there have been some small scale 
changes from the coefficient reported in the previous sections, there was no 
difference in the significance of the spatial errors in the EU or UK firms full samples. 
Additionally there was minimal difference in the significance of the control 
variables. Table 7.16 shows that the key conclusion that, in the full firms’ sample 
for EU firms, W_error is significant for firms’ entering liquidation and W_error and 
W_DV are significant for firms entering financial distress, still holds. Likewise, 
Table 7.17 shows that W_error is significant for UK firms entering liquidation and 
W_DV and W_error are significant for those entering financial distress. The 
significance of the control variables remains directionally similar to the main 
analysis. There are only some variations in the levels of significance. For example, 
the GVA in UK firms entering liquidation is significant at Sig.<0.05 in the 
bootstrapped errors, compared to Sig.<0.10 when the standard errors were used. 
Therefore, one can conclude that the results reported in the previous sections hold. 
 
Table 7.16: Bootstrapping results in the full EU firms’ sample  
 
 
Independent 
Variables Liquidation Financial Distress
W_DV -0.226  -0.319*
W_error 0.830*** 0.333***
c 0.857**  -0.081**
GVA  -0.029** -0.014
Credit -0.001 0.002**
leg_trad -0.036 -0.020
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Bootstrap All EU Firms Clusters with Directors characteristics
Coeff. Pr>|z|
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Table 7.17: Bootstrapping results in the full UK firms’ sample  
 
 
7.5.4 Controlling for the Direct and Indirect Impact of the Spatial 
Effects 
 
The inclusion of spatial effects in the spatially lagged dependent variable and in 
the error term has added value to the spatial panel regressions. One can compare 
estimations for the standard deviations of the panel effects in the two types of 
regressions (sigma u is the standard deviation of the panel effects; sigma e is the 
standard deviation of the errors) which are broadly similar between the two types 
of regressions both for the financially distressed firms and the liquidated firms and 
both for the EU and UK firms. However, the coefficient estimates are not directly 
comparable because the inclusion of the spatially lagged dependent variable 
introduces direct and indirect effects in the covariates (Kondo, 2017). The 
estimation of these effects for the independent variables controlling for the 
economic and business environment is provided in this section. Tables 7.18-7.19 
show the direct and indirect effects of the control variables for financial distress 
and liquidations in the EU countries as well as the UK regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables Liquidation Financial Distress
W_DV -0.234 0.555**
W_error 0.844** -0.229
c 1.015** 0.069
GVA  -0.043** 0.005*
Credit  -0.007** 0.001**
new_firms_perc 0.035*  -0.013**
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Bootstrap All UK Firms Clusters with Directors characteristics
Coeff. Pr>|z|
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Table 7.18: EU Firms in Financial Distress and Liquidation: Control Variable Effects  
 
 
Table 7.19: UK Firms in Financial Distress and Liquidation: Control Variable Effects  
  
*** Sig<0.01; **Sig<0.05; *Sig<0.10 
 
The above tables show the impact that is implied in the spatial panel regressions 
when there are no (spatially) lagged dependent variables. These effects do not 
indicate spillover effects.  From the above one can observe that there is significant 
variation from the impact that the control variables have across the alternative 
firm failure processes in both the EU firms as well as the UK. 
 
Considering the EU countries first, one can observe (Tables 7.18 and 7.19) that 
the independent variables controlling for the business and economic environment 
EU Firms in Liquidation: Control Variable effects
dy/dx Full Sample1 2 3 4
direct
GDP_gr -0.013 -0.010 -0.001 -0.014 0.008
credit 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
leg_trad -0.032 0.022 -0.040 -0.025 -0.069
indirect 
GDP_gr 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.002
credit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
leg_trad 0.007 -0.004 0.013 0.008 0.014
total     
GDP_gr -0.011 -0.008 0.000 -0.009 0.007
credit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
leg_trad -0.025 0.017 -0.028 -0.016 -0.055
Firm Failure Processes
EU Firms in Financial Distress: Control Variable effects
dy/dx Full Sample 1 2 3 4
direct
GDP_gr  -0.004* 0.352 -0.075 -0.271 -0.002
credit 0.001** 0.330** -0.004 0.112 0.061
leg_trad -0.012 3.101 -1.019 -7.811 -6.234
indirect 
GDP_gr 0.002* 0.287 0.015 -0.396 -0.004
credit  -0.001** 0.270** 0.001 0.164 0.148
leg_trad 0.007 2.533 0.199 -11.428 -15.238
total     
GDP_gr  -0.002** 0.639 -0.060 -0.667 -0.006
credit 0.001** 0.600** -0.003 0.277 0.209
leg_trad -0.005 5.635 -0.821 -19.238 -21.473
Firm Failure Processes
UK Firms in Liquidation: Control Variable effects
dy/dx
Full 
Sample 1 2 3 4
direct      
GVA  -0.016*  -0.018* -0.008  -0.019* -0.010
credit  -0.005** -0.002 -0.001  -0.006** -0.003
new_firms_perc 0.021** 0.0175 0.006  0.021* 0.009
indirect
GVA 0.003 -0.027 -0.001 0.005 0.004
credit 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.001
new_firms_perc -0.004 0.026 0.001 -0.005 -0.003
total
GVA -0.0127 -0.044 -0.01 -0.014 -0.007
credit  -0.004* -0.005 -0.001  -0.004* -0.002
new_firms_perc 0.017* 0.044 0.007  0.015* 0.006
Firm Failure Processes
UK Firms in Financial Distress: Control Variable effects
dy/dx
Full 
Sample 1 2 3 4
direct      
GVA 0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.021
credit 0.000 0.001 0.000  0.003* 0.003
new_firms_perc  -0.012** -0.012 0.022** 0.002 0.069**
indirect
GVA 0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.009
credit 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
new_firms_perc -0.014 -0.004  -0.099** -0.001  -0.031*
total
GVA 0.007 -0.007 0.003 -0.001 0.012
credit 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002** 0.001
new_firms_perc -0.026 -0.017  -0.077** 0.002 0.038**
Firm Failure Processes
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are only significant for the case of financial distress. In that case GDP growth has 
statistically significant direct and indirect effects (of opposite directions) in the full 
sample of firms. A decrease in GDP growth (and credit availability, which in EU 
countries is presented as a percentage of GDP and therefore is affected by opposite 
signs despite a reduction in credit) is directly associated with an increase in the 
number of firms entering financial distress. However, there is also an indirect 
effect, suggesting that increases in GDP growth (and credit availability) in 
neighboring countries may result in increases in firms entering financial distress in 
one country. One possible explanation for that can be related to the sample of this 
research. Some countries experienced more pronounced GDP growth when 
neighboring countries were still suffering from the results of the financial crisis 
with increasing number of firms entering financial distress. Germany and Italy are 
two examples of that. 
 
Considering the UK regions, one can observe that there are very little indirect 
effects in any of the business and economic environment explanatory variables for 
firms entering liquidation. The results are mainly driven by direct effects. In these 
cases a reduction in GVA growth and credit availability, an increase in new firms 
in a region are directly associated with increased number of firms in liquidation in 
the full sample and in the third firm failure process. On the other hand the first 
firm failure process is only affected by direct effects in GVA growth. However, in 
the case of firms entering financial distress, the percentage of new firms in a region 
as a proportion of the business population in that region has both direct and 
indirect effects for the second and fourth firm failure process. For these firm failure 
processes, an increase in the percentage of new firms in a given region is 
associated with increased numbers of firms entering financial distress in these 
regions. In addition a reduction of new firms in neighboring regions is associated 
with increases in firms entering financial distress in a region. One possible 
explanation is that new firms in neighboring regions may not be direct competitors 
but instead may increase business transactions with firms in a region. As such a 
reduction of new firms in neighboring regions is not necessarily a positive 
development for firms in nearby areas. 
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7.5.5 Excluding 2013 from the Regression of Financial Distress 
 
As discussed in Section 7.2.1, there are no firms in financial distress in 2013. That 
is because any firms under financial distress in the previous years, has eventually 
failed in the final year of the data. Given that the number of firms in financial 
distress in 2013 is zero by construction and not by random, one can argue that 
the inclusion of 2013 could affect the results of the regression analysis, both for 
the EU countries and the UK regions. 
 
In order to check if any such bias could affect the results, additional spatial panel 
regressions were performed but excluding data for 2013 when testing for financial 
distress. The results are shown in Tables 7.20 (EU countries) and 7.21 (UK 
regions). 
 
Table 7.20: Spatial Panel Regression on EU countries’ firms in Financial Distress 
(Excluding 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
W_DV  -0.222*  -1.977***  -1.700** 0.666**  -1.149**
W_error 0.340***  0.805***  0.899*** -0.266  0.991**
c    0.084**    0.143** 0.022  -0.333** 0 .056**
GDP_gr  -0.020*   -0.033* -0.001 0.001 -0.001
Credit 0.002** 0.001     0.002** 0.002** 0.001
Leg_trad -0.016 -0.009 -0.008 -0.021 0.001
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.066/0.020 0.068/0.018 0.088/0.021 0.039/0.012 0.048/0.009
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.064/0.007 0.052/0.008 0.033/0.004 0.055/0.005 0.033/0.003
W_DV Spatially lagged Dependent Variable GDP_gr GDP Growth (%)
W_error Spattially lagged error term Leg_trad. Legal Tradition
Credit Credit availability (% GDP)
Clusters with Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary
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Table 7.21: Spatial Panel Regression on UK regions’ firms in Financial Distress 
(Excluding 2013). 
 
 
The results for both the EU countries and the UK firms remain practically the same 
as those in Section 7.3 and 7.4. There is a marginal change in the values of the 
coefficients. However, all the variables remain quantitatively similar both in terms 
of significance and the signs of their coefficients. As such one can conclude that 
the results reported in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 remain valid. 
 
7.6 Discussion on Spatial Effects 
 
7.6.1 Discussion on Spatial Effects 
 
Both the EU countries sample and the UK country regions sample provide evidence 
for the existence of spatial effects in the spatially lagged dependent variable be it 
liquidation rates or financial distress rates. Whilst there is no evidence of the 
application of spatial econometric models in the firm failure literature, there is 
some implied evidence from the wider literature that underlying business 
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
W_DV 0.544*** 0.338* 1.219*** -0.147  -0.833***
W_error -0.121 0.031  -1.118** 0.046 0.763**
c 0.241** 0.117  -0.412** -0.156 -0.420
GVA 0.003 -0.009 -0.001 -0.004 0.027
Credit 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.002** 0.005
New_firms_perc. 0.015**  -0.010* 0.214** 0.003 0.077**
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.045/0.012 0.035/0.012 0.132/0.033 0.108/0.027 0.133/0.041
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.067/0.004 0.088/0.004 0.158/0.014 0.172/0.015 0.293/0.028
W_DV Spatially lagged Dependent Variable GVA
W_error Spattially lagged error term  
Credit Credit availability (% GDP)
New_firms_perc.
*** Sig.<0.01; ** Sig. <0.05; *Sig.<0.10
Glossary
GVA Growth (%)
Percentage of new firms in a region
Clusters with Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
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conditions have some spatial characteristics. Therefore, the conclusion of this 
section is that these spatial characteristics actually affect firm failure as well. For 
example, the existence of spatial patterns of agglomeration of economic activity 
(Longhi et al., 2014) suggests that economic activity for services in metropolitan 
cities and manufacturing in medium sized cities could imply that shocks in the 
financial supply chain are transmitted in nearby areas. Likewise, considering local 
industries in Italy, Cainelli et al., (2013) stated that firms’ failure (as well as 
mergers and acquisitions) experience time (temporal) effects that are territorially 
bounded. 
 
Additionally, there is evidence shows that region-specific characteristics may be 
different and start-up costs may vary considerably between regions in a country 
(Gries and Naude, 2008). Therefore, neighbouring regions can be expected to 
experience spatial correlation that affects firms’ financial distress and/or 
liquidation in a given geographic area. This can be extended to the local 
competition between neighbouring areas. SMEs are firms that generally serve the 
local population (of other firms or individual customers) (Love, 1996).  Buenstorf 
and Klepper (2009) and Fotopoulos (2001) found evidence that firms located in 
regions with more concentrated economies have lower probabilities of exiting 
because most of the productive firms located in these regions are less vulnerable 
to economic shocks. However, the opposite can also be the case when a given 
region experiences a localized economic shock due to a decline in a major sector 
in the local economy (Keeble and Wever, 2016). Buehler et al (2012) also noted 
that culture could vary across regions or countries and that can affect the attitude 
towards failure rates. Glauben et al. (2006) found differences in firm exits in 
various regions of Germany. However, firm exits and their underlying reasons may 
be quite different from firm failures. They may not necessarily happen due to 
failure but for a variety of reasons that may include for example the retirement of 
the owner(s). 
 
The above provided some initial evidence that spatial effects are indeed significant 
enough that they should not be neglected in the firm failure literature in general 
and in firm failure process studies in particular. Focusing on the latter and 
reorganizing the data at EU country and UK regions’ level, the results reported in 
this chapter support Hypotheses 13a and 14a. In other words, they showed that 
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there is indeed significant statistical evidence of spatial effects in firms’ financial 
distress in EU countries and UK regions. In addition, the results rejected 
hypotheses 13b and 14b concluding that the spatial effects (although they exist) 
are not the same across different firm failure processes. Therefore, the concept of 
the alternative firm failure processes remains relevant in the context of 
(aggregated) spatial analysis. 
 
7.6.2 Discussion on EU Countries  
 
As discussed in the previous sections Hypothesis 13a was accepted whilst 
hypothesis 13b was rejected. Whilst there is statistically significant evidence of 
spatial effects in EU firms’ financial distress and liquidations, these effects are not 
the same across all firm failure processes. 
 
Considering the results of Section 7.3 from an EU firm failure process perspective, 
one can see that when the firms in financial distress across the EU countries was 
considered as the outcome of the model (dependent variable), the spatial effects 
in the spatially lagged dependent variable (W_DV) are significant at Sig.< 0.10 for 
the full sample and Sig.<0.05 or Sig.<0.01 for the firm failure processes. As it was 
already mentioned in Section 7.3, this indicates that firm financial distress in one 
country is associated with firms’ financial distress in other countries but, with the 
exception of the third firm failure process, those are not the closest neighbouring 
countries. Likewise there is statistically significant evidence of spatial effects in the 
error terms (W_error) variable, in the full sample and in the majority of the firm 
failure processes. It is significant at Sig<0.01 in the full sample of EU firms and in 
the individual firm failure processes (with the exception of the third firm failure 
process). The presence of the statistically significant spatially auto correlated 
W_error variable in the SAR model specification, implies that a (non-spatial) model 
that would not control for these effects would probably have spatial autocorrelation 
in its residuals, making that model mis-specified from a statistical perspective 
(LeSage and Peace, 2009).  
 
On the other hand when the firms’ liquidation rates in the EU countries were 
considered, there was evidence of spatial effects in the error term (W_error) 
variable in the full sample and all the firm failure processes (Sig.<0.01). From an 
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econometric perspective, the presence of statistically significant spatial effects in 
the error term implies that the non-spatial model could be mis-specified whilst 
from a practical perspective, the spatial model demonstrates that some 
unobserved spatially correlated effects are affecting the EU countries liquidation of 
firms. 
 
From a practical perspective, these results are in line with theoretical expectations 
from the firm demography literature that looks at the location of firms and which 
speculates on the behavior of firms as agents (Arbia et al, 2014; Lazear, 2005). 
The spatial effects in the spatially lagged depended variable of the third firm failure 
process, imply that SMEs’ financial distress in the EU countries affect each other. 
This is also a function of the distance. As such, increasing distances result in firms 
from countries in the EU periphery to be affected (by greater distance and as such) 
from firms in Northern Europe, when financial distress is considered. This pattern 
can be associated with structural considerations related to North versus South 
Europe that lead in an increase of SME formation and performance in the former 
(Wever and Keeble, 2016). Whilst there is no evidence in the literature using 
spatial regression methodologies in SMEs’ financial distress and liquidation across 
the EU countries, the findings of this chapter add to the wider literature by 
considering SMEs and SME failures in different geographical contexts. Soares and 
Pina (2017) and Serrano-Cinca et al., (2005) showed that clusters related to firm 
geography exist in Europe.   
 
With regards to EU countries’ firms entering financial distress, the alternative firm 
failure processes that have been identified exhibit different (although in most cases 
statistically significant) spatial patterns. The third firm failure process has different 
signs for the coefficient of the spatially lagged dependent variable when financial 
distress is considered. This result for the third firm failure process appears 
possible. Neighbouring firms’ characteristics have been identified as significant 
determinants of firms’ operations. This can be due to firms forming business 
clusters in geographically close areas where firms are connected with 
buyer/supplier relationships (Porter, 1990). Therefore, it sensible to assume that 
these relationships and the similarities remain relevant when firms’ financial 
distress and liquidations are concerned. On the other hand, firm failure processes 
in the EU countries experiencing negative coefficient in the spatially lagged 
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dependent variable can be linked with the interactions between Northern and 
Southern European SMEs in this case. Whilst spatial effects have been associated 
with firms’ operations and firm creation (Arbia et al., 2014), the evidence directly 
associated with firms’ failure is less clear.  Arbia et al. (2014) for example did not 
find any evidence of spatial effects in a sample of Italian retail stores’ growth and 
survival. On the other hand, Weterings and Marsili (2015) showed that spatial 
effects, and spatial concentration in particular decreases the propensity of firms to 
close down operations but pointed that these effects are industry specific. For 
these reasons, Weterings and Marsili (2015) argued that economic geography 
should be considered when researching the survival of new firms.  
 
Considering the alternative firm failure processes from a financial distress 
perspective and liquidation perspective they all have spatial autocorrelation in the 
error terms with the exception of the third firm failure process (in the case of the 
financial distress). As it has already been discussed, the existence of significant 
spatial effects in the error terms highlights the importance of allowing for spatial 
autocorrelation in the residuals of the econometric models to avoid model mis-
specification and also to account for unobservable effects for which the researcher 
or the policy maker cannot obtain information. For such occasions, the usage of 
spatial techniques is particularly relevant as controlling for the location, one can 
effectively control for a number of unobserved variables. 
 
Looking at the spatial effects on the spatially lagged dependent variable for 
financially distressed firms, all firm failure processes show evidence of statistically 
significant effects when financial distress is considered. However, the main 
difference appears to be with the sign of the coefficient. In the third firm failure 
process, the coefficient is positive, unlike the other failure processes. The sign of 
the coefficient implies that an increase in the distance is associated with firms’ 
financial distress in this firm failure process. This is slightly counter-intuitive, given 
that this firm failure process is associated with firms that have the opposite (and 
statistical significant) sign when liquidation rates are considered, and includes 
primarily firms from Germany, France and Spain. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that this sign is associated with temporal associations between firms’ financial 
distress that are located in more distant countries. 
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Looking at the spatial effects on the spatially lagged dependent variable for 
liquidated firms, the third firm failure process was associated with firms that have 
few and relatively young directors and severe liquidity problems and is dominated 
by firms in Germany and France, which are largely neighboring each other, and 
Spain. Therefore, the significance in the spatially lagged dependent variable maybe 
related to neighboring effects of the firms in this cluster, given that the statistical 
significance is associated with a reduction in the distance between the firms in this 
cluster. In other words, firms that are located closer are more likely to have a 
statistically significant association with increased liquidation rates. 
 
7.6.3 Discussion on UK Regions level 
 
Considering firms’ financial distress in the UK regions, the evidence of statistically 
significant effects in the error terms (W_error) of the second and fourth firm failure 
process shows that, as in the case of EU firms, spatial effects should be accounted 
for when one studies firms’ failure at regional level. The same principle applies to 
the third and fourth firm failure process when firms’ liquidations are concerned in 
the UK and its regions. Adding further explanatory variables could lead to a 
reduction of the need of controlling for spatial effects in the error terms, but that 
may not always be feasible and it may not be sufficient, either. In addition, it is 
clear from the results that these effects tend to be firm failure process specific, as 
not all firm failure processes have the same statistical behavior. 
 
For firms’ insolvency the first firm failure process experiences spatial effects on 
the spatially lagged dependent variable. The sign of the coefficient suggest that 
the liquidations are affected by shorter distances and therefore the association is 
between neighboring firms. This firm failure process is dominated by firms with 
low growth rates that are based in London and Yorkshire with some firms also in 
the South East/West of England. Therefore, there may be some impact from the 
distance between London and the Yorkshire regions is reflected in the sign of the 
coefficient.  
 
The second firm failure process does not show statistically significant spatial effects 
on either the spatially lagged dependent variable or the error term when firm 
liquidations are considered. These are firms whose transition towards liquidation 
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was influenced by the credit availability and the formation of new firms in a region 
and are almost equally spread between London, Yorkshire, South East and the 
Midlands.  
 
The third firm failure process shows spatial effects only in the error term for 
liquidation. These were mature firms with deteriorating financials mainly in the 
North of England and Scotland whose transition to liquidation was driven by low 
GDP (or GVA) growth, a lack of credit availability and the new firms’ formation in 
a region.  
 
Finally, the fourth firm failure process in UK country regions has significant spatial 
effects when liquidation (and financial distress) was considered, both at the spatial 
lag (Sig.<0.10) of the dependent variable and in the error terms (Sig.<0.05). 
These are firms whose transition to liquidation were affected form all the 
macroeconomic variables.  
 
Critically evaluating the results in the context of the (limited) literature that 
considers firm failures in a regional context, there is evidence of regional factors 
can determine firm aggregated firm failures. For instance, Moss and Hume (1983) 
states that there are local determinants which can affect firm failure at least at the 
aggregate level in Scotland. However, the determinants of firm failure and their 
inter-regional variations remained time-persistent (Fotopoulos, 2013). 
 
 These determinants included the local business population; potential overtrading; 
the local availability or lack of financing and the concentration of certain industries 
in certain cities. This study has accounted for some of the above drivers, but there 
is clearly little prospect that a model will accommodate every potential 
macroeconomic or social effect factors among regions or countries. In that context, 
the results of the previous section are line with evidence from the literature and 
add an alternative way of accounting for determinants of failure by using the 
spatial effects. 
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7.7 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate whether there are statistically significant 
spatial effects that affect the firms which enter financial distress or liquidation in 
the EU countries and the UK regions. In order to perform this investigation, the 
data were re-structured and aggregated at EU country and UK region level. Two 
spatial weights matrices were produced, one for the EU countries and one for the 
UK regions. These were then incorporated in a spatial autoregressive model that 
included, and controlled for, both spatial lag effects (in the dependent variable) 
and spatial error effects (in the error term).  
 
In addition, the country and region-specific macroeconomic and business 
environment variables that were used in Chapters 5 and 6 are again used to control 
for the economic and business environment. However, the main focus of this 
chapter is to investigate   whether spatial effects exist. This was tested both at full 
sample level as well as at firm failure process level, using aggregated firm 
liquidations and financial distress from the firms that participated in the alternative 
firm failure processes as established in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
For the first time in the firm failure literature, the results suggest that there is 
evidence of spatial effects for both EU countries and UK regions. Whilst different 
firm failure processes generate different results at the total level, there seems to 
be evidence that spatial effects for firms in financial distress are directly affected 
by the firms in financial distress in neighboring EU countries and UK regions. In 
other words, the geographical location of the firm does matter when it comes to 
financial distress. At country (EU) level, the geographical location appears to be 
more related to the proximity between (neighboring) countries. However, within 
the UK the spatial effects appear to be significant but not necessarily on a close 
proximity perspective.  
 
On the other hand, for firms’ liquidation rates, spatial effects mostly affect the 
error terms, implying that random omitted variables from the models are spatially 
correlated. Therefore, there are unobserved effects that are spatially correlated 
and are significant determinants of firms’ liquidations at both EU country level and 
UK regional level. It also implies that simple regressions that do not explicitly 
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account for spatial effects may produce inconsistent results because they will not 
account for the spatial autocorrelation on their residuals. 
 
For these reasons the Hypothesis 13a which stated that there are statistically 
significant spatial effects associated with EU firm failures is accepted and 
Hypothesis 13b stating that spatial effects are the same between alternative firm 
failure processes in EU firms, in terms of statistical significance is rejected. On the 
other hand, for UK firms, hypothesis 14a stating that there are statistically 
significant spatial effects associated with the UK firm failures is accepted and 
hypothesis 14b stating that spatial effects are the same between alternative firm 
failure processes in UK firms, in terms of statistical significance is rejected. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
As set out in Chapter one, the aim of this thesis is to enhance the quantitative firm 
failure process literature on SMEs, by incorporating elements from the qualitative 
failure process and the wider firm failure literature. Chapter 2 critically reviewed 
the literature and developed most of the hypotheses to enable this thesis to fulfil 
its aims. Chapter 3 presented the methodology that this thesis has used and 
introduced some further hypotheses, related to the (econometric) aspect of the 
spatial location of the firms’ transition to failure. Chapter 4 presented the data that 
this thesis has used.  Chapters 5, 6 and 7 analysed the data and critically discussed 
the results and the relevant hypotheses. This final chapter summarises the above 
and concludes the thesis. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 presents an overview of the findings 
and discussions of the three empirical chapters. It also presents the answer to the 
research aims and objectives and explains the contribution of this research to 
theory, practice and policy. Section 8.3 discusses the limitation of the research. 
Section 8.4 provides recommendations for further research. Section 8.5 concludes 
the thesis.   
 
8.2 Summary of Findings and Discussion 
 
In order for this thesis to achieve its aim, it explores four objectives: 
o To investigate the alternative firm failure processes between EU countries 
and within one country’s regions- the UK- by considering financial ratios and 
the age of the firm. 
o To investigate the impact of firms’ management characteristics, in addition 
to the financial ratios and the age of the firm, in the identification of failure 
processes and their transition to failure between EU countries and within 
one country’s regions- the UK. 
o To investigate the influence of business environment factors, management 
characteristics and excessive growth, in firms’ transition towards failure in 
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the alternative failure processes in EU countries and within one country’s 
regions - the UK. 
o To investigate the influence of location at firm level and aggregate firm 
transitions towards failure in the alternative failure processes between EU 
countries and within the UK. 
 
8.2.1 Alternative Firm Failure Processes 
 
The results indicate that there are four firm failure processes experienced by SMEs 
in 8 EU countries: Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom.  Similarly, the results of firms within the UK regions 
indicate that there are also four failure processes for the UK firms of the sample.  
 
This evidence from both the EU countries and the UK regions, is broadly in line 
with evidence from the literature where between 3 and 6 firm failure processes 
have been identified (see for example Argenti, 1976; Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen et 
al., 2014).  Whilst the total number of firm failure processes is the same, the 
addition of directors’ characteristics offers a further differentiating characteristic 
between firm failure processes. For example, in EU countries, the first firm failure 
process with directors’ characteristics includes firms that have female directors on 
the board, unlike the rest of the failure processes.  Similarly, the number of female 
directors, as well as the total number and age of directors, differs between the 
alternative firm failure processes in UK firms.  This supports, for the first time in 
the quantitative firm failure process literature, the evidence of qualitative studies 
which were supporting that the characteristics of a firms’ directors are particularly 
important characteristics of alternative failure processes in the SMEs (Argenti, 
1976; Richardson et al., 1994) and in business generally (Ooghe and De Prijcker, 
2008). For this reason, the discussion sections focus more on the firm failure 
processes with directors’ characteristics. 
 
In addition, the findings of this thesis support evidence from the qualitative firm 
failure process literature that the age of the firm, which is another non-financial 
firm–specific characteristic, differs between alternative firm failure processes in EU 
countries. As such the qualitative observation of Argenti (1976) and Richardson et 
al., (1994) that young firms have a different firm failure process is confirmed in 
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the quantitative context as well both for firms in the EU countries and for those 
within the UK. 
 
However, one should be wary of the alterative firm failure processes. For firms 
from the EU countries, the research found that there is a statistically significant 
difference in firm failure processes across countries regardless of whether or not 
directors’ characteristics were included in the identification of the failure processes. 
In contrast with the findings for the EU countries, the failure processes in UK firms 
differ significantly between regions when directors’ characteristics are used to 
determine the failure processes. In such cases, the differences between firm failure 
processes in UK regions are significant at the 10% level. This evidence further 
supports the argument that considering directors’ characteristics in the formulation 
of firm failure process provides an additional dimension that one should consider. 
This result is in line with evidence from the qualitative failure process studies that 
were mentioned above (see for example Argenti, 1976; Richardson et al., 1994; 
Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008).  
 
Critically evaluating these results, which are related with the first two objectives 
(excluding the transition to failure part of the second objective), it can be stated 
that directors’ characteristics add an additional dimension in the quantitative 
analysis of firm failure processes across (EU) and within (UK) countries, which has 
been indicated from the qualitative literature (Argenti, 1976; Argenti, 1976b; 
Richardson et al., 1994; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008). Whilst directors’ 
characteristics do not alter the number of firm failure processes, they do differ 
between the alternative processes and some processes are associated with certain 
characteristics in the board structure. For example, only the first firm failure 
process in EU firms is associated with gender diversity on the board, being the 
only process with female directors. This is related to the fact that the countries 
most associated with this firm failure processes (UK and Ireland) have got more 
gender diversity in their firms’ boards.  
 
The other firm-specific characteristics, driven mainly by the financial ratios, are 
still relevant in the identification of firm failure processes. Some key differentiating 
factors such as the rapid growth in assets, firms with liquidity constraints and 
negative cash flows are characteristics that were observed among different firm 
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failure processes both in the EU countries’ and the UK regions’ firms, which is in 
line with the literature (Laitinen, 1991; Laitinen and Lukason, 2014; Lukason et 
al., 2016; Lukason and Vissak, 2017).  
 
In addition, the age of the firm, a non-financial firm-specific characteristic is also 
different in the alternative failure processes. Young firms have separate firm failure 
processes, in both the firms in EU countries and the UK regions as do much older 
firms. Such findings are in line with qualitative firm failure process studies which 
mentioned that young firms and old firms form different firm failure processes 
(Argenti, 1976; Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008). It is also relevant to evidence from 
the wider failure literature which generally considers young firms as a separate 
and vulnerable business group (Wilson et al., 2014). 
 
Overall, the identified firm failure processes in both EU and UK firms, were shown 
to differ between each other. Certain firm failure processes were associated with 
young firms (EU: first process; UK: fourth process) whilst the remaining processes 
were associated with firms that faced particular financial (EU: fourth process; UK: 
first process), managerial and growth problems (EU third process; UK: first 
process). In this thesis’ view, such results confirm evidence from the qualitative 
firm failure process literature and, in addition, relate the wider firm failure 
literature with the firm failure process one. The failure processes of this analysis 
are in line with evidence from the qualitative and existing quantitative firm failure 
process literature (Laitinen, 1991; Argenti, 1976; Richardson et al., 1994; Ooghe 
and De Prijcker, 2008; Laitinen and Lukason, 2014; Laitinen et al., 2014; Lukason 
and Laitinen, 2018). As such, the former is broadly confirmed and extended on a 
quantitative, multi country and intra country analysis and the latter is extended 
with inclusion of the directors’ characteristics in addition to the multi and intra-
country elements. 
8.2.2 Firms’ Transition to Failure 
 
Considering the firms’ transition to failure among the different firm failure 
processes, the objectives were to identify the impact of firms’ management 
characteristics, in addition to the role of financial ratios and of the influence of 
business environment factors. 
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One can see that the alternative firm failure processes have different determinants 
given the different statistically significant variables. Starting from the financial 
variables, the statistically significant ratios differ between the alternative firm 
failure processes and also differ from the full sample. This holds true for firms in 
both the EU countries and in the UK regions.  
 
In relation to the EU failure processes, all the financial ratios are significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in the full sample.  There is a variation 
in the significant financial determinants of the alternative failure processes18. For 
example, the quick assets to current assets, a measure of working capital for the 
firms, is the only financial ratio that is not significant in the first firm failure 
process, which is characterized by young firms with gender diversity on the board. 
In the context of firm failure processes, this implies that young firms’ failure does 
not depend so much on liquidity and working capital characteristics, possibly due 
to the existence of the honeymoon period that young firms enjoy in their early 
years (Fichman and Levithal, 1991). 
 
On the other hand, the second firm failure process which is characterized by firms 
that on average have negative total asset growth and which are older, has as 
significant determinants the ratios measuring the total assets’ growth, the quick 
ratio, quick assets to total assets and the trade credit to total liabilities. Likewise 
the third firm failure process, which is characterized with firms that have very few 
directors (3 on average) and low returns on equity, have all the financial ratios as 
significant determinants, with the exception of the net sales to total assets  (NSTA) 
and the quick assets to current assets (QACA). Finally, the fourth failure process 
which is characterized by firms with  very high  and increasing net sales to total 
assets but with deteriorating cash flows  have all the financial ratios significant 
with the exception of trade credit to total liabilities (TCTL). As a result, one can 
argue that the financial ratios are generally significant determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure but they do differ across the alternative firm failure processes. 
Therefore attention should be given to an understanding of the failure process that 
an individual firm belongs to.  
 
                                                          
18 In this part, results with Directors’ Characteristics are considered. 
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The results for UK firms’ transition to failure are broadly similar with respect to the 
variability in the significance of financial ratios as determinants of firms’ transition 
to failure, in the alternative failure processes of EU firms. However, not all the 
financial ratios are identified as significant determinants in the full UK firms’ 
sample. Cash flow to total sales (CFTS), total assets growth (growth_rate), quick 
assets to total assets (QACA) and trade credit to total liabilities (TCTL) are 
significant determinants of transition to failure for all the UK firms. Looking at the 
separate failure processes, one can observe that in the first process, which is 
associated with firms that have deteriorating growth and high usage of trade 
credit, the ROI, CFTS, quick ratio, TLTA, QACA and TCTL are all significant. A 
critical evaluation to this combination would  suggest that firms’ transition to 
failure in this failure process of firms with small boards of directors is actually 
affected by declining returns on investment, cash flow from sales that are growing 
at unsustainable levels, liquidity and trade credit usage compared to total liabilities 
which are, however, increasing. These determinants are in addition to increased 
competition from new firms and decreased credit availability. This is different from 
the second failure process which is associated with firms that have weak cash 
flows, despite strong sales and in which ROI, NSTA, quick ratio, growth rate and 
TLTA are significant determinants of transition to failure.  
 
On the other hand the third firm failure process, associated with firms that have 
deteriorating cash flows, ROI and low usage of trade credit, have the CFTS, QACA 
and growth rate as the significant financial ratio determinants in the transition to 
failure. This means that reduced working capital and cash flow generation are 
prime reasons of failure and financial distress for these firms.  Finally, the fourth 
failure process included firms that were associated with weak growth and liquidity 
and also young age, has only ROI, growth rate, TLTA, QACA and TCTL as 
determinants of the transition to failure. Critically evaluating these characteristics, 
it can be argued that younger UK firms’ (in the fourth failure process) transition to 
failure is impacted by increased indebtedness and the potential inability to further 
finance themselves since credit availability is also a significant but negative 
determinant, of failure. Combined with increasing growth (in total assets), 
potentially financed with credit, this leads these firms into financial difficulties. 
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In addition to the above, the age of the firm, which is a further firm-specific non-
financial characteristic, has been identified as a determinant of firms’ transition 
towards failure in the full EU and UK firm samples. The significance of the firms’ 
age for the transition to failure differs across the alternative firm failure processes 
in both the EU and the UK areas. This implies that once the alternative firm failure 
processes have been identified and the firms are allocated to the alternative 
processes, the determinants are becoming less associated with the characteristics 
of the firm failure processes. In other words, some of the characteristics of the 
alternative firm failure processes are not necessarily determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure. In some failure processes (third for EU firms and third and 
fourth for UK firms) age is a characteristic of the failure process but not a 
determinant of the transition to failure. Therefore, firms in these failure processes 
appear to have solved the foundation difficulties associated with very young 
(Finchman and Levithal, 1991) or very old (Argenti, 1976) firms and their behavior 
with regards to failure is associated with the rest of the determinants.   
 
The directors’ characteristics as determinants of firms’ transition to failure are a 
further significant set of impact factors. Evidence from the wider failure studies’ 
literature suggests that directors’ characteristics are significant drivers of failure 
between failed and non-failed firms (see for example, Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 
1994; Watson, 2003; Wilson et al., 2014). The presence of more directors 
indicates extensive social capital and networks and is negatively associated with 
failure. In addition the age of directors’ is used as a proxy for the experience of 
directors and as such it is also negatively associated with failure. On the other 
hand, part of the literature suggests that gender diversity is negatively associated 
with firm failure because the presence of women on the board adds a different 
perspective to decision-making due to additional human capital and women’s 
reasoning methods (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Bart and McQueen, 2013). In 
addition increased diversity is associated with higher independence in the boards’ 
decision-making in the context of the agency theory (Carter et al., 2010). 
However, the dynamics on the board may be negatively affected too; women may 
be tougher when monitoring decision-making and that may in some cases reduce 
their role in the actual decision-making (Appiah, 2013).  
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In this analysis, directors’ characteristics are significant determinants of firms’ 
transition to failure in some failure processes both for EU countries and for UK 
regions with the expected negative signs of association with failure. One exception 
is the third firm failure process in UK firms were the number of directors is 
positively associated with firms’ transition to failure. However, this failure process 
has the highest number of directors, and as such, beyond a certain point, there is 
also evidence that too many directors are counter-productive for the firm’s decision 
making (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). As such, extending the current literature, this 
thesis provides further evidence that directors’ characteristics are significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure, even when only bankrupt firms are 
researched.  
 
Lukason and Hoffman (2015), argued that internal and/or external factors 
generally explain firms’ failures. Yet there is little evidence of the consideration of 
external factors in the context of the alternative firm failure processes in the firm 
failure process literature. This thesis examines the economic and business 
environment, the results indicate that these elements are significant both when 
firms from a variety of EU countries are analyzed and also when a country-specific 
analysis is taking place. At the level of both EU countries and UK regions’ firms, 
GDP growth and credit availability are significant determinants of firms’ transition 
to failure in some failure processes. A reduction in GDP growth and credit 
availability is a significant determinant of firms’ transition to failure for a number 
of failure processes. The key point is that there are variations of significance in the 
different processes. Based on the Lukason and Hoffman (2015) argument that firm 
failures in general, can be driven by external or internal factors or from a 
combination of both, this finding is intuitive. The external economic conditions 
affect differently the alternative firm failure processes depending on the firms’ 
financial and management characteristics in these processes.  
 
Likewise, the business and country-specific environment appeared to be significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure in a number of firm failure processes in 
the EU and UK firms.  For example, the legal tradition of EU countries was identified 
as a key determinant of firms’ transition to failure in all firm failure processes. 
Firms in common law countries had a negative association with transition to failure, 
due to the legal framework in these countries being more credit friendly (La Porta 
 325 | P a g e  
 
et al., 1998). In relation to the UK, firms operating in UK regions with increasing 
competition from new firm entrants were more likely to transition to failure. These 
results are in line with evidence from the wider firm failure literature (Wang 2012; 
Keeble and Walker, 1994) and are analyzed for the first time within the context of 
a quantitative firm failure process analysis. 
  
Such evidence is conceptually in line with evidence from the wider failure studies 
literature where the economic environment (proxied by GDP growth) and the credit 
availability have been found to be negatively associated with firms’ propensity to 
failure. This evidence appears both in firm-level and in aggregate studies in the 
SME and corporate world (see for example, Jones, 2013; Liu, 2009; Succurro, 
2010; Ma and Lin, 2010). This thesis not only adds that the economic environment 
remains particularly important in firm failure process studies, it also adds to the 
qualitative firm failure process literature that has made similar references (Argenti, 
1976). Likewise, the business environment at country level includes element of its 
legal tradition and the competition in the market within a country’s region from 
newly incorporated firms.  Both elements have been discussed as influential to the 
wider firm failure context. Common law countries have been identified as more 
forgiving to entrepreneurs and increased competition from firms has been 
associated with increased firms’ failures (see for example Venkataraman et al., 
1990; Hope, 2003; LaPorta et al., 1998; Wang, 2012). This is driven by common 
law countries having more efficient judicial systems which may result in more 
successful reorganization processes compared to countries with civil law origins 
(Wang, 2012).  This thesis identifies and highlights for first time, their significance 
in the context of firm failure process and transition to failure.   
  
8.2.3 Location and Spatial Effects 
 
The final objective of this thesis is to analyse the influence of location at firm level 
and aggregate firm transitions towards failure in the alternative failure processes 
between EU countries and within the UK. 
 
Evidence from the firm-level analysis of the EU firms and the UK regions indicate 
that, in a number of firm failure processes, certain locations (countries or regions) 
can be an important determinant of firms’ transition to failure. For example, Spain, 
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Sweden and Ireland were significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure for 
all processes with directors’ characteristics. Spanish and Irish firms’ propensity for 
transition to failure was higher than those in the full UK sample. In contrast, 
Swedish firms’ propensity for transition to failure was lower that the UK firms. 
Other countries, like Germany, Italy and the Netherlands were not determinants 
of firms’ transition to failure in the full sample. In addition, Italy has a different 
relationship with the transition to failure in the alternative firm failure processes, 
negative in the first and positive in the second and third firm failure processes. 
This implies that firm characteristics, associated with the firm failure processes do 
also affect the relationship with the transition to failure.  
 
Likewise, in UK regions, certain regions (North West, South West, East Anglia, 
Wales) were not significant determinants for the firms’ transition to failure in any 
firm failure process; whilst others (Scotland, West Midlands) were significant in all 
firm failure processes and the remaining (Yorkshire, East Midlands, N. Ireland, 
North East, South East) were significant only in some of the firm failure processes. 
Such result implies that some locations within the UK are associated with a 
“disadvantage” when the transition to failure is concerned for firms that have 
certain characteristics (as implied by the failure processes).  
 
Critical evaluation leads to a number of possible reasons for the influence of 
country and regional differences on a firm’s transition to failure. For example, Gries 
and Naude, 2008; Loghi et al., 2014; Bosma and Schutjens, 2009; Stulz and 
Williamson, 2003, find that cultural factors, proximity to banks, the presence of 
business networks within a particular area and the specialization of business 
districts affect business performance and hence by implication, business failure. 
 
For that reason and in addition to the firm-level analysis of location, using spatial 
data analysis, for first time in a firm failure process analysis, this thesis 
investigated the significance of location at the aggregate level for these firms, both 
for the firms in the EU countries and also for those in the UK (regions). Whilst 
there is no evidence of spatial data analysis in firm failure process studies, the 
evidence from the literature that firms’ location may affect their failure due to 
supplier-customer relationships and due to specialization of certain geographical 
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areas in specific type of businesses (Henderson, 2007) suggest that the tools of 
economic geography, by means of spatial analysis, are useful. 
 
The analysis results confirm that spatial location is important for firms in EU 
countries and for firms in the UK regions in their transition to failure (both for 
financial distress and for liquidation). In addition, the significance of spatial 
location is not (statistically) the same among the alternative firm failure processes. 
From a spatial analysis perspective, distance and by extension the effect of 
neighboring regions (or countries) can be important. In some firm failure processes 
increasing distance between firms was positively associated with failure whilst in 
others the opposite was true. To that end, at country (EU) level the geographical 
location appears to be more related to the proximity between (neighboring) 
countries. However, within the UK the spatial effects appear to be significant but 
not necessarily on a close proximity (distance-based) perspective but rather in 
association to key regions such as London. This is associated with London being a 
significant business centre of agglomeration of economic activity (Longhi et al., 
2014). 
 
Therefore, the importance of geographical location, as analyzed in the context of 
spatial analysis can be an area that needs further attention from policy and 
decision-makers where country level aggregate firm failures are analysed. This is 
because, this thesis shows that neighboring countries and firm relationships 
between regions affect each other’s firms’ failure. Such effects are usually 
unobserved and therefore are not accounted for, due to the lack of data, unless 
spatial analysis is undertaken. 
 
8.3  Contribution of the Research  
 
Given the above results, this thesis contributes to the academic literature in a 
number of ways.  
 
First, it investigates the existence of firm failure processes in 8 EU countries and, 
in addition, in regions of the UK. Second, it further develops the qualitative firm 
failure process literature by incorporating evidence from the qualitative firm failure 
process literature and from wider firm failure studies. In doing so, it demonstrates 
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that directors’ characteristics add further value when they are included in the 
identification of firm failure processes, across the EU countries and within the UK 
regions.   
 
Third, it investigates the determinants of firms’ transition to failure both in a cross 
country (EU countries) context and in an intra-country (the UK regions) context. 
In doing so, it examines firm-specific characteristics (those which were used to 
define the failure processes) together with a number of economic and business 
environment factors. The results indicate that these factors can be significant 
determinants of firms’ transition to failure; they also differ between the alternative 
firm failure processes. In addition, the transition to failure includes two steps: first, 
financial distress and second, liquidation. Bringing all these elements together, this 
thesis further links the limited firm failure process literature with the wider firm 
failure literature.  Moreover, this thesis provides evidence that excessive growth 
in firms can be associated with failure. Firms’ growth is regarded as a positive 
development because firms that are growing are seen as successful, they are 
employing more people and generating more income which is associated with 
contribution to taxes (Parker, 2004; Valliere, 2006). However, this thesis finds that 
excessive growth in sales is associated with failure if this growth is not 
accompanied by investment in assets. As such, this thesis extends the findings 
from Higgins (1977) Platt and Platt (1995) and Argenti (1976b) by confirming an 
association between excessive growth and failure in the context of a quantitative 
firm failure process analysis. 
 
Fourth, in relation to the business and economic environment as determinant of 
firms’ transition to failure, this study provides evidence, for first time in a 
quantitative firm failure process study, that the legal tradition of a country, and 
the competition that firms face from new businesses in a region can be significant 
determinants of  firms’ transition to failure.  
 
Fifth, the thesis examines the importance of firm location not only by using firm-
level information for the country or the region where a firm belong to but also by 
utilizing spatial panel data techniques on aggregated firm failure results in the 
alternative firm failure processes. By doing so, the thesis concludes that the 
location and the distance between firms can be a significant determinant of firms’ 
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failure in the alternative firm failure processes both in an EU countries context and 
in the context of the UK regions. 
 
Overall , the results support the theory (Section 1.2.2) that firm failure is a process 
that builds up over a period of time rather than being the result of a specific event. 
It also provides evidence that firm failure processes differ due to changing of 
significance level in some determinants.  
 
Given the above, a number of  implications arise from the results of this thesis 
which might be useful for policy makers, lending professionals and institutions, 
rating agencies and firm managers.   
 
First, policy makers should perhaps consider some key characteristics of the failure 
processes when planning support mechanisms to prevent SME failure. Such 
mechanisms and policies should be relevant to the failure process to which firms 
belong as it is unlikely that generic approaches will equally benefit firms that 
belong to different firm failure processes and as such share different 
characteristics. In addition, policy makers should also consider the location and 
the management of the firm as both contribute significantly to the firms’ propensity 
to fail. A firm’s location should be still considered within the context of the 
alternative firm failure processes where a firm belongs to. Likewise, management 
characteristics, including diversity and experience of the board, should be carefully 
considered. Policy interventions should focus not only on providing firms with 
financial support but also providing better education to firms’ stakeholders about 
the benefits of having an experienced and diversified board, depending on the firm 
failure process that a firm is associated with. At EU country level, policy makers 
need also to tailor SME’s support by considering the legal tradition of the country 
where the firms operate. At country/regional level, policy makers should consider 
diversifying policies to encourage new business growth and combine that with 
assistance for existing firms that are in a deteriorating trajectory. This is an 
important note, given that increased competition from new firms can result in 
failures of firms, in most firm failure processes. Finally, any policies at country or 
regional level should consider the geographical location of firms. This is important 
because increasing firm failures in regions or countries can be associated with firm 
failures in neighboring countries and regions. As such, policies that target a specific 
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area without considering the neighboring areas could be insufficient to reduce firm 
failures at aggregate level. Likewise, an identification of the firm failure process of 
a firm, and therefore the identification of the underlying causes of failure, can 
assist in designing more targeted solutions to support SMEs. 
 
Second, bank lending and restructuring professionals’ decisions can be influenced 
from the results of the study. Firms’ failure trajectories can be identified based on 
the underlying firm-specific characteristics that this thesis discussed. As such, any 
lending or restructuring decisions can be influenced depending on the firm failure 
process a firm is associated with and depending on the conditions of the economic 
and business environment. Certain firm failure processes are less dependent on 
the economic environment whilst others are more dependent on it. It is therefore 
unlikely that generic approaches and assessments of the likelihood of failure are 
equally applicable to all firms when the failure processes are not considered. In 
addition care should be taken in the interpretation of sales growth in firms. 
Evidence from this thesis shows that excessive levels of growth should be treated 
with caution. 
 
Third, agencies that analyse SME data for credit reports and risk assessments may 
need to consider the elements that this thesis has highlighted. It is unlikely that 
creditworthiness and risk of failure between firms that are associated with different 
firm failure processes can be assessed in the same way since the determinants of 
firms’ transition to failure differ among these processes.  
 
Fourth, firm managers can identify the firm failure process of their firms when 
things start deteriorating and before firms transition to failure. Depending on the 
firm failure process, a number of actions can be taken to increase the board’s 
experience, social capital and diversity as this can be associated with reduced 
propensity to transition towards failure. 
 
8.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
This thesis has a three types of limitations. The first is related to the data sample. 
The second is related to the inclusion of certain variables. The third is related to 
the limitations of software.    
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First, the data sample includes a number of firms from 8 EU countries (the UK 
regional data is included in these) covering a certain period of time. As a result 
inclusion of further EU countries or the inclusion of further years or a general 
increase in the number of firms could lead to bigger samples. These would lend 
further weight to the results and would enable enhanced generalization of these 
results at EU level. Nevertheless, a number of robustness checks and weightings 
to reflect the business population in the countries have been made returning 
consistent results. 
 
Second, the selection of financial ratios was based in a combination of literature 
review and a comparison with data availability in the sample. It is well documented 
that the wider firm failure literature is criticized for the arbitrary nature of the ratio 
selection (see for example Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). Nevertheless, the selected 
ratios reflect both the literature and also cover the basic dimension of a firm’s 
financial management (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011) and as such the results should 
be robust in this respect. 
 
Third, some additional quantitative techniques could have been employed to 
provide further insight- perhaps in the context of future research. However, 
limitations of the currently used statistical software prohibit usage of (for example) 
spatial panel data at firm-level. 
 
8.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
This thesis can be developed in a number of ways. First, independent analysis on 
the transition to financial distress or on the transition to liquidation can be made 
outside the context of the order panel model. Therefore, one can assess financial 
distress or liquidation independently in each occasion.   
 
Second, the results of the alternative firm failure processes can be applied to the 
context of firm failure prediction for alternative failure processes. Whilst additional 
data from non-failed firms would be required, it would be an area of interest to 
evaluate failure prediction techniques in alternative failure processes. 
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Third, further research can be made on the area of sustainable growth for SMEs. 
The particular metric has been proven to be a particularly strong determinant of 
firms’ transition to failure in a number of firm failure processes. As such further 
work can be made to link this metric with SMEs failure across the European 
countries. 
 
Fourth, the introduction of spatial data analysis for first time in the context of firm 
failure process and generally in the context of firm failure, opens significant 
opportunities to utilize such techniques to further research firms’ propensity to fail 
at a more granular (within country) or more aggregate (between countries) level. 
 
Fifth, one can extend the analysis of this thesis should further data become 
available. For example, data related to further directors’ characteristics and the 
ownership of the firm can add further dimensions to this area of research. Likewise, 
larger samples with additional countries could provide further insight into the 
quantitative aspect of firm failure processes. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has highlighted that the consideration of firm failure as a process is 
significant due to the differences that persist the determinants of firms’ transition 
to failure in the alternative firm failure processes.  
 
The analysis confirms the broader firm failure process literature that there are 
between 3-6 firm failure processes in any given country, by identifying 4 in a 
sample of EU countries and confirming this number within the UK. It also adds to 
the literature that the consideration of directors’ characteristics is important both 
for the identification of the failure processes and the analysis of the firms’ 
determinants for their transition towards failure. In addition, this quantitative 
analysis confirms a number of observations from qualitative studies. It confirms 
that firms’ management is an important determinant of firms’ failure processes, 
and adds that management characteristics, together with the financial ratios, are 
generally significant determinants of transition to liquidation, across a number of 
different failure processes. 
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Additionally, this thesis critically evaluated a number of wider characteristics 
(economic environment, legal tradition, new firms’ creation, sustainable growth 
level) that are significant determinants of firms’ transition to failure in a number 
of failure processes for EU and UK firms. As such it extends the firm failure process 
literature to this direction. 
 
Finally, this thesis provides a methodological contribution to the investigation and 
measurement of the importance of location for firms’ transition to failure in 
different failure processes. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of main continuous variables for firms that eventually 
failed per country 
 
 
Table A.2: Results of the Skewness/Kurtosis test of Normality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United Kingdom
Variable Mean    Std. Dev.     Mean    Std. Dev.     Mean    Std. Dev.     Mean    Std. Dev.     Mean    Std. Dev.     Mean    Std. Dev.     Mean    Std. Dev.     Mean    Std. Dev.     
roi -0.05 0.85 -0.46 1.96 -0.38 1.62 -0.06 0.40 -0.56 1.81 -0.04 2.07 -0.03 0.25 -0.23 13.11
growth_rate 1.82 13.37 1.05 23.60 28.28 27.55 0.18 1.82 1.26 29.12 0.27 4.78 0.15 1.46 6.30 172.68
nsta 2.27 2.21 4.35 10.82 2.08 1.29 1.56 2.41 2.85 3.20 1.44 3.09 2.74 2.73 3.00 26.03
cfts          0.02 33.07 -0.43 5.45 -0.71 1.43 -0.33 11.57 -0.37 0.88 -1.13 21.81 -0.08 0.53 -0.51 9.81
quick_ratio 2.12 8.65 21.70 202.94 11.08 74.99 1.22 10.74 1.40 4.20 2.58 36.26 2.15 9.32 12.08 179.71
tlta                       1.02 5.47 1.02 3.38 2.21 19.73 0.91 0.41 1.64 14.43 0.84 1.69 0.76 0.25 1.12 18.19
qaca                     0.88 0.29 0.95 0.44 0.95 0.40 0.75 0.34 0.94 0.68 0.69 0.42 0.90 0.41 0.96 0.30
tctl                           0.39 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.21
firmage   19.42 14.11 23.78 31.25 19.52 8.66 19.43 16.64 22.11 26.29 16.89 13.55 18.48 16.44 13.08 51.78
avg_dir_age      40.28 13.81 47.06 12.27 50.37 8.47 55.63 9.57 42.96 11.58 45.06 8.75 40.52 11.98 50.85 8.74
Nr_Female_Dir 0.86 1.35 0.19 0.45 2.64 2.86 0.64 1.28 0.28 0.78 0.68 1.12 0.46 0.91 2.50 2.15
Total_Dir_Nr   5.37 4.50 2.33 1.82 13.31 8.91 4.81 4.28 3.90 2.69 5.57 4.03 3.99 3.36 14.16 9.93
credit 89.76 7.09 95.59 6.58 134.42 23.79 83.67 9.12 115.37 1.99 157.42 18.49 115.55 12.10 171.83 19.34
GDP_gr 1.13 1.76 1.36 3.28 1.92 3.79 -0.12 2.46 1.35 2.30 1.24 2.70 1.91 3.46 1.30 2.05
Liq.Firms per country
Spain
979
Sweden
1,042 1201,245 185
France Germany Ireland Italy
774 736 114
Netherlands
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Table A.3 Results of the Shapiro-Wilk test of Normality 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4: Results of the Shapiro-Francia test of Normality 
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Table A.5: Correlation matrix of variables without lags.  
 
 
 
Table A.6: Partial Correlation matrix of variables without lags.  
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ROI -0.196 0.058 0.040 0.006 0.001 -0.017 0.018 -0.017 0.012 0.006 0.004
Growth_Rate -0.196 0.312 0.008 0.002 0.003 -0.016 -0.074 -0.058 -0.001 0.046 -0.015
NSTA 0.058 0.312 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.113 0.218 -0.010 -0.019 0.020 -0.084
CFTS 0.040 0.008 0.012 -0.009 0.000 -0.010 0.025 0.036 0.005 0.004 -0.004
Quick Ratio 0.006 0.002 0.007 -0.009 0.000 0.034 -0.037 0.045 -0.001 -0.001 -0.013
TLTA 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.054 0.003 0.007 0.018
QACA -0.017 -0.016 0.113 -0.010 0.034 -0.004 0.060 0.079 -0.085 0.013 0.014
TCTL 0.018 -0.074 0.218 0.025 -0.037 -0.005 0.060 -0.007 -0.015 -0.006 0.009
Firm Age -0.017 -0.058 -0.010 0.036 0.045 -0.054 0.079 -0.007 0.039 -0.010 0.096
Average Director Age 0.012 -0.001 -0.019 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.085 -0.015 0.039 -0.076 0.093
Female Director Nr. 0.006 0.046 0.020 0.004 -0.001 0.007 0.013 -0.006 -0.010 -0.076 0.615
Number of Directors 0.004 -0.015 -0.084 -0.004 -0.013 0.018 0.014 0.009 0.096 0.093 0.615
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Table A.7: Correlation matrix of variables with lags.  
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ROI 1.000
ROI t-1 -0.024 1.000
ROI t-2 -0.003 0.378 1.000
ROI t-3 -0.001 0.021 0.028 1.000
ROI t-4 -0.013 0.193 0.349 0.105 1.000
ROI t-5 -0.006 0.163 0.227 0.075 0.294 1.000
ROI t-6 -0.003 0.102 0.167 0.142 0.277 0.372 1.000
ROI t-7 0.000 0.051 0.090 0.146 0.144 0.187 0.415 1.000
Growth Rate -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 1.000
Growth Rate t-1 0.000 0.090 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.000 1.000
Growth Rate t-2 0.002 -0.007 0.074 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.011 0.000 0.003 1.000
Growth Rate t-3 0.002 0.002 -0.026 -0.017 -0.035 -0.018 -0.044 -0.031 0.001 0.001 0.022 1.000
Growth Rate t-4 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.004 -0.020 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.006 1.000
Growth Rate t-5 0.000 -0.005 -0.010 -0.007 -0.013 -0.059 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 1.000
Growth Rate t-6 0.002 -0.047 -0.073 -0.091 -0.128 -0.143 -0.436 -0.062 0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.029 0.000 0.001 1.000
Growth Rate t-7 0.008 0.002 -0.014 -0.099 -0.044 -0.038 -0.142 -0.323 0.009 0.008 0.015 0.025 -0.001 0.010 0.061 1.000
NSTA -0.407 -0.166 -0.104 -0.005 -0.066 -0.050 -0.057 -0.047 0.030 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.023 1.000
NSTA t-1 0.001 0.000 -0.109 -0.002 -0.027 -0.015 -0.006 0.004 -0.007 0.217 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.009 0.186 1.000
NSTA t-2 0.003 -0.022 -0.094 -0.003 -0.036 -0.029 -0.038 -0.035 -0.006 -0.002 0.207 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.013 0.190 0.304 1.000
NSTA t-3 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.910 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.007 0.029 0.040 0.044 1.000
NSTA t-4 0.004 -0.016 -0.096 -0.003 -0.037 -0.039 -0.052 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.004 0.034 0.052 0.146 0.660 0.245 0.078 1.000
NSTA t-5 0.003 -0.016 -0.056 -0.005 -0.054 -0.032 -0.028 -0.003 0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.038 0.114 0.093 0.155 0.188 0.096 0.570 1.000
NSTA t-6 -0.002 0.007 0.011 -0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.027 -0.015 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.011 0.001 0.045 0.151 0.065 0.100 0.125 0.093 0.490 0.813 1.000
NSTA t-7 0.000 0.020 0.019 -0.004 0.011 0.008 0.004 -0.018 0.010 0.005 0.009 0.013 -0.008 0.004 -0.054 0.202 0.021 0.025 0.053 0.088 0.443 0.722 0.849 1.000
CFtS 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.018 0.014 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.017 0.016 0.011 1.000
CFtS t-1 0.001 0.095 0.011 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.006 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.003 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.012 0.133 1.000
CFtS t-2 -0.001 0.011 0.046 0.002 0.025 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.002 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.030 1.000
CFtS t-3 -0.001 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.009 -0.019 -0.010 -0.005 -0.009 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.226 -0.007 0.006 1.000
CFtS t-4 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.026 0.020 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.012 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.004 -0.004 0.005 -0.016 -0.013 0.000 0.013 1.000
CFtS t-5 0.019 0.006 0.009 0.003 0.014 0.028 0.016 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.012 -0.005 -0.033 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.021 -0.012 -0.005 -0.302 0.632 1.000
CFtS t-6 -0.001 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.017 0.053 0.026 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.026 -0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.112 0.003 -0.021 1.000
CFtS t-7 -0.002 0.006 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.043 0.246 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.080 -0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.000 -0.154 -0.004 0.004 0.537 0.001 -0.191 0.233 1.000
Quick Ratio 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.067 -0.032 -0.054 -0.063 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.021 0.032 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.032 0.058 -0.004 -0.003 -0.035 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 1.000
Quick Ratio t-1 0.002 0.018 0.011 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.007 -0.013 0.003 0.023 0.023 0.009 0.005 0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.204 1.000
Quick Ratio t-2 0.001 0.002 0.007 -0.001 0.004 -0.031 0.008 0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.007 -0.012 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.015 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.104 0.078 1.000
Quick Ratio t-3 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.008 -0.008 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.024 0.054 0.238 1.000
Quick Ratio t-4 0.001 -0.020 -0.031 0.000 0.009 -0.003 0.010 0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.014 -0.011 0.002 0.001 0.017 0.101 0.070 0.672 1.000
Quick Ratio t-5 -0.002 -0.010 -0.007 0.004 -0.005 -0.006 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.008 -0.004 0.008 0.001 0.006 -0.004 0.001 0.026 0.008 0.001 0.026 0.019 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.029 -0.019 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.045 0.032 0.331 0.390 1.000
Quick Ratio t-6 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.010 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.010 0.015 0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.012 -0.007 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.020 0.016 0.026 0.017 0.141 1.000
Quick Ratio t-7 0.000 0.007 -0.003 0.001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.009 0.039 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.013 0.031 -0.025 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.028 0.031 0.388 1.000
TLTA -0.146 -0.127 -0.029 -0.002 -0.088 -0.014 -0.022 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.014 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.248 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.013 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 1.000
TLTA t-1 0.043 -0.384 -0.126 -0.008 -0.092 -0.103 -0.017 -0.013 0.000 -0.005 0.074 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.075 0.116 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.015 0.006 0.002 0.007 -0.007 -0.015 -0.006 0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.014 -0.020 -0.016 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.407 1.000
TLTA t-2 0.028 -0.148 -0.062 -0.026 -0.061 -0.073 -0.019 -0.025 0.001 -0.003 0.056 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.011 0.139 0.060 0.003 0.027 0.001 0.006 0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.011 -0.113 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.010 -0.012 -0.015 -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.002 0.004 0.252 0.592 1.000
TLTA t-3 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.996 -0.080 -0.065 -0.127 -0.143 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.017 0.005 0.007 0.088 0.099 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.014 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.014 0.009 0.025 1.000
TLTA t-4 0.002 -0.002 -0.033 -0.037 -0.150 -0.073 -0.175 -0.187 0.000 -0.002 0.005 0.022 0.005 0.009 0.053 0.146 0.001 -0.001 0.183 0.001 0.006 0.021 0.013 0.015 0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.013 -0.023 0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.045 0.016 0.017 0.040 1.000
TLTA t-5 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.033 0.001 0.171 -0.010 0.022 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.090 0.138 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.094 0.028 0.027 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.012 -0.021 0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.040 0.225 1.000
TLTA t-6 0.001 0.005 -0.021 -0.040 -0.090 -0.023 -0.176 -0.179 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.021 -0.002 0.007 0.076 0.175 -0.003 -0.004 0.172 0.001 0.005 0.039 0.030 0.028 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.015 -0.025 0.005 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.007 0.043 0.970 0.400 1.000
TLTA t-7 0.000 0.005 -0.027 -0.042 -0.095 -0.067 -0.168 -0.245 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.022 -0.002 0.007 0.021 0.189 -0.004 -0.005 0.179 0.002 0.001 0.017 0.022 0.043 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.013 -0.027 0.007 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.021 0.044 0.972 0.200 0.961 1.000
QACA 0.010 -0.058 -0.077 -0.004 -0.045 -0.020 -0.015 -0.007 0.065 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.011 0.023 0.000 0.083 0.100 0.066 0.013 0.064 0.045 0.033 0.018 -0.003 0.005 0.001 -0.022 -0.014 0.004 0.016 0.004 0.057 0.027 0.034 0.025 0.031 0.008 0.017 -0.005 0.018 0.026 0.014 0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.002 1.000
QACA t-1 0.035 -0.034 -0.081 -0.004 -0.073 -0.022 -0.008 0.003 0.015 0.047 0.015 0.021 0.030 0.012 0.029 -0.003 0.047 0.116 0.075 0.020 0.064 0.053 0.037 0.027 -0.028 -0.020 -0.010 0.017 -0.005 0.010 0.023 0.028 0.063 0.059 0.055 0.024 0.028 0.013 0.024 0.012 -0.030 0.012 0.012 0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.799 1.000
QACA t-2 0.031 -0.050 -0.077 -0.010 -0.065 -0.038 -0.031 -0.001 0.015 0.041 0.012 0.024 0.021 0.013 0.046 0.012 0.058 0.118 0.084 0.019 0.070 0.062 0.043 0.038 -0.031 0.001 -0.003 0.010 -0.009 0.004 0.020 0.028 0.084 0.053 0.057 0.027 0.036 0.015 0.029 0.016 -0.030 0.017 0.015 0.006 0.031 0.003 0.027 0.032 0.678 0.811 1.000
QACA t-3 0.028 -0.062 -0.078 -0.011 -0.060 -0.026 -0.013 0.014 0.016 0.008 0.011 0.018 0.017 0.011  0.0452  -0.0050 0.054 0.084 0.064 0.016 0.065 0.059 0.037 0.036 -0.012 -0.022 -0.006 0.002 -0.009 -0.001 0.020 0.030 0.096 0.063 0.053 0.035 0.041 0.034 0.018 0.013 -0.029 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.606 0.716 0.811 1.000
QACA t-4 0.015 -0.048 -0.052 -0.008 -0.069 -0.042 -0.030 -0.001 0.013 0.040 0.022 -0.024 0.019 0.014 0.064 0.032 0.022 0.068 0.052 0.014 0.098 0.095 0.083 0.065 -0.020 0.005 0.029 0.003 -0.028 -0.005 0.012 0.029 0.070 0.042 0.049 0.004 0.041 0.042 0.026 0.020 0.004 0.022 0.009 0.007 0.059 0.021 0.045 0.045 0.434 0.524 0.590 0.642 1.000
QACA t-5 0.008 0.012 -0.002 -0.006 -0.036 -0.034 -0.011 0.000 0.010 0.030 0.019 -0.018 0.007 0.014 0.076 0.061 -0.015 0.027 0.015 0.012 0.079 0.148 0.128 0.105 -0.013 0.012 0.018 0.008 -0.024 -0.011 -0.012 0.019 0.024 0.014 0.020 -0.001 0.013 0.038 0.025 0.027 -0.017 -0.006 0.001 0.007 0.027 0.039 0.031 0.326 0.273 0.346 0.390 0.415 0.692 1.000
QACA t-6 0.009 0.037    0.0345  -0.0067   0.0040  -0.0087  -0.0257  -0.0072   0.0139   0.0402   0.0319  -0.0032  -0.0359  -0.0009   0.1231   0.1173-0. 0 0. 04 - . 09 - .026 - .007 0.014 0. 40 .032 -0.003 -0.036 -0.001 . -0.040 -0.022 -0.009 0.011 0.026 0.121 0.215 0.179 -0.004 0.030 0.021 0.009 -0.034 -0.021 -0.015 0.013 0.015 0.002 -0.006 -0.012 0.002 0.019 0.049 0.045 0.003 -0.008 0.005 0.009 0.052 0.039 0.089 0.082 0.201 0.270 0.320 0.323 0.496 0.654 1.000
QACA t-7 0.002 0.058 0.054 -0.010 0.031 0.022 0.022 -0.032 0.020 0.042 0.047 0.026 -0.023 0.009 -0.173 0.204 -0.043 -0.026 -0.015 0.011 0.005 0.068 0.150 0.283 -0.005 0.014 0.003 0.018 0.012 0.003 -0.010 0.017 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.009 0.005 -0.005 0.012 0.076 -0.016 -0.006 0.011 0.013 0.055 0.047 0.083 0.120 0.112 0.172 0.215 0.222 0.314 0.409 0.646 1.000
TCTL 0.021 0.038 0.068 0.004 0.052 0.010 0.020 0.005 0.017 0.000 -0.004 -0.009 -0.032 -0.020 -0.002 -0.013 0.027 0.039 0.018 0.007 0.031 0.052 0.069 0.066 0.074 0.041 0.031 -0.014 -0.002 0.013 0.010 -0.006 -0.067 -0.042 -0.037 -0.026 -0.019 -0.035 -0.013 -0.019 -0.031 -0.025 -0.016 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 0.002 0.004 0.098 0.082 0.075 0.070 0.059 0.059 0.085 0.071 1.000
TCTL t-1 0.015 0.079 0.098 0.005 0.062 0.041 0.024 0.018 -0.023 -0.001 -0.016 -0.008 -0.030 -0.020  -0.0157 . -0.015 0.042 0.050 0.036 0.011 0.038 0.050 0.067 0.063 0.064 0.053 0.035 -0.008 0.001 0.007 0.012 -0.004 -0.057 -0.060 -0.041 -0.033 -0.037 -0.046 -0.028 -0.036 -0.028 -0.049 -0.031 -0.002 0.003 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.085 0.056 0.065 0.067 0.046 0.040 0.061 0.050 0.742 1.000
TCTL t-2 -0.008 0.066 0.129 0.003 0.062 0.058 0.041 0.030 -0.022 0.012 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.022 -0.033 -0.041 0.038 0.056 0.048 0.011 0.035 0.058 0.063 0.057 0.061 0.048 0.036 -0.005 0.017 0.026 0.025 -0.003 -0.046 -0.052 -0.063 -0.035 -0.041 -0.051 -0.027 -0.040 -0.023 -0.040 -0.043 0.000 -0.004 0.015 0.005 -0.003 0.079 0.049 0.037 0.047 0.024 0.020 0.041 0.030 0.617 0.763 1.000
TCTL t-3 0.008 0.067 0.108 0.015 0.075 0.056 0.068 0.045 -0.022 0.006 -0.027 -0.021 -0.029 -0.020 -0.043 -0.037 0.018 0.044 0.029 0.010 0.038 0.040 0.053 0.042 0.041 0.052 0.023 -0.003 0.002 0.007 0.026 0.005 -0.031 -0.033 -0.035 -0.053 -0.046 -0.053 -0.026 -0.043 -0.020 -0.027 -0.034 -0.011 -0.014 -0.022 -0.007 -0.007 0.064 0.039 0.029 0.029 0.022 0.017 0.039 0.012 0.536 0.650 0.753 1.000
TCTL t-4 0.004 0.049 0.094 0.020 0.097 0.063 0.074 0.046 -0.011 -0.015 -0.017 -0.055 -0.029 -0.019 -0.032 -0.026 -0.002 0.024 0.009 -0.009 0.059 0.074 0.074 0.062 0.048 0.037 0.028 -0.005 0.018 0.015 0.024 -0.007 -0.032 -0.035 -0.036 -0.042 -0.045 -0.042 -0.021 -0.042 -0.018 -0.004 -0.021 -0.017 -0.013 -0.012 -0.006 -0.009 0.051 0.024 0.007 -0.005 0.144 0.117 0.115 0.061 0.462 0.539 0.602 0.724 1.000
TCTL t-5 -0.001 0.053 0.894 0.256 0.854 0.246 0.525 0.342 -0.204 -0.032 -0.216 -0.241 -0.221 -0.225 -0.451 -0.231 -0.016 -0.012 -0.006 -0.012 0.041 0.111 0.110 0.101 0.049 0.043 0.031 -0.007 0.020 0.012 0.024 -0.001 -0.031 -0.034 -0.027 -0.042 -0.034 -0.046 -0.021 -0.034 -0.020 -0.023 -0.022 -0.008 -0.009 -0.003 0.006 0.005 0.013 -0.014 -0.027 -0.034 0.086 0.220 0.210 0.153 0.387 0.444 0.506 0.584 0.731 1.000
TCTL t-6 -0.001 0.064 0.088 0.010 0.063 0.032 0.064 0.022 0.007 -0.011 0.001 -0.033 -0.025 -0.022 -0.019 0.031 -0.033 -0.024 -0.009 -0.012 0.020 0.084 0.153 0.135 0.040 0.032 0.026 -0.005 0.016 0.010 0.018 -0.001 -0.030 -0.040 -0.037 -0.040 -0.032 -0.031 -0.033 -0.023 -0.018 -0.023 -0.020 -0.007 0.012 0.015 0.041 0.039 -0.002 -0.023 -0.035 -0.047 0.060 0.167 0.344 0.277 0.322 0.372 0.424 0.486 0.601 0.745 1.000
TCTL t-7 0.000 0.056 0.079 0.006 0.051 0.018 0.035 0.024 0.012 -0.001 0.009 -0.009 -0.018 -0.015 -0.121 0.077 -0.032 -0.019 -0.010 -0.010 0.018 0.077 0.138 0.228 0.024 0.023 0.019 -0.002 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.005 -0.033 -0.033 -0.031 -0.033 -0.025 -0.030 -0.019 -0.002 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.004 0.018 0.022 0.041 0.063 -0.010 -0.029 -0.031 -0.036 0.035 0.120 0.263 0.478 0.236 0.282 0.330 0.335 0.426 0.541 0.687 1.000
Firm Age 0.003 -0.016 0.004 0.031 0.008 0.020 0.017 0.032 0.001 -0.046 -0.065 -0.027 0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.012 -0.015 -0.021 -0.026 -0.037 -0.022 -0.077 -0.107 -0.173 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.014 0.007 0.004 0.026 -0.009 -0.004 -0.039 -0.027 -0.001 -0.013 -0.021 -0.021 -0.074 0.000 -0.009 -0.028 -0.033 0.006 0.005 -0.002 -0.023 -0.051 -0.157 -0.193 -0.189 -0.182 -0.187 -0.239 -0.353 -0.001 0.024 0.037 0.056 0.090 0.077 0.021 -0.064 1.000
Average Director Age -0.002 0.027 0.024 0.004 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.003 -0.009 -0.002 0.008 -0.002 0.039 -0.001 -0.031 -0.024 -0.010 0.000 -0.014 -0.008 0.011 0.015 0.006 0.020 -0.002 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.017 0.008 0.000 -0.002 -0.019 0.012 -0.014 0.014 0.020 0.006 0.007 -0.020 -0.013 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.009 -0.072 -0.081 -0.078 -0.064 -0.035 -0.003 0.018 0.060 0.003 -0.007 0.012 0.003 0.012 0.023 0.035 0.066 -0.070 1.000
Female Director Nr. 0.003 0.035 0.003 -0.005 0.004 0.020 0.011 -0.001 0.087 0.107 0.069 0.048 -0.010 -0.006 -0.001 0.031 -0.022 0.023 -0.008 0.025 -0.006 0.021 0.050 0.091 -0.003 0.007 0.013 0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.062 0.020 -0.003 0.023 0.034 0.008 0.006 0.014 0.013 0.049 0.024 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.019 0.004 0.017 0.032 0.037 0.095 0.113 0.100 0.123 0.141 0.203 0.280 -0.018 -0.035 -0.046 -0.059 -0.057 -0.017 0.025 0.082 -0.360 -0.021 1.000
Number of Directors -0.006 0.032 0.016 -0.002 0.028 0.030 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.087 0.070 0.034 -0.014 -0.006 -0.031 0.004 -0.047 -0.016 -0.022 0.005 -0.033 0.001 0.038 0.096 -0.038 0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.018 0.026 -0.009 0.030 0.027 0.006 0.002 0.029 0.037 0.055 0.056 0.017 0.018 0.007 0.003 -0.006 0.005 0.027 0.028 0.094 0.124 0.114 0.144 0.170 0.256 0.342 -0.017 -0.037 -0.040 -0.041 -0.036 0.002 0.056 0.118 -0.402 0.038 0.612 1.000
Credit -0.012 0.064 0.071 -0.009 0.056 0.028 0.029 -0.001 -0.007 0.022 0.029 -0.005 -0.030 -0.004 -0.030 0.034 -0.082 -0.072 -0.047 0.007 -0.038 -0.001 0.049 0.096 -0.024 -0.020 -0.034 -0.018 -0.018 0.001 -0.023 -0.002 -0.040 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 -0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.049 -0.013 -0.028 -0.006 0.013 -0.005 -0.007 0.004 0.013 -0.155 -0.101 -0.085 -0.082 0.015 0.091 0.191 0.223 -0.139 -0.158 -0.145 -0.125 -0.105 -0.101 -0.036 -0.001 -0.451 -0.060 0.244 0.325 1.000
Credit t-1 -0.012 0.051 0.053 -0.012 0.043 0.019 0.021 -0.006 -0.004 0.025 0.035 0.002 -0.026 -0.005 -0.026 0.034 -0.067 -0.055 -0.032 0.011 -0.025 0.012 0.058 0.106 -0.023 -0.021 -0.034 -0.018 -0.020 -0.003 -0.026 -0.002 -0.031 0.005 -0.004 -0.006 0.003 0.015 0.007 0.056 -0.010 -0.022 -0.001 0.015 -0.005 -0.006 0.003 0.015 -0.140 -0.071 -0.054 -0.049 0.043 0.108 0.206 0.250 -0.156 -0.174 -0.161 -0.144 -0.124 -0.116 -0.046 0.003 -0.498 -0.054 0.269 0.353 0.984 1.000
Credit t-2 -0.011 0.044 0.039 -0.014 0.034 0.010 0.013 -0.013 -0.002 0.028 0.041 0.007 -0.019 -0.004 -0.023 0.041 -0.054 -0.041 -0.020 0.015 -0.011 0.029 0.071 0.121 -0.022 -0.021 -0.033 -0.018 -0.020 -0.004 -0.028 -0.001 -0.024 0.018 0.004 0.000 0.008 0.021 0.013 0.062 -0.008 -0.017 0.004 0.017 -0.002 -0.005 0.006 0.020 -0.122 -0.049 -0.022 -0.016 0.072 0.132 0.231 0.284 -0.164 -0.185 -0.171 -0.157 -0.137 -0.124 -0.047 0.015 -0.548 -0.049 0.291 0.377 0.961 0.986 1.000
Credit t-3 -0.010 0.040 0.026 -0.018 0.019 -0.001 0.000 -0.022 0.008 0.033 0.053 0.022 -0.015 -0.001 -0.009 0.052 -0.041 -0.026 -0.007 0.021 0.004 0.050 0.093 0.147 -0.022 -0.020 -0.030 -0.018 -0.020 -0.006 -0.030 0.000 -0.014 0.026 0.013 0.006 0.017 0.027 0.020 0.073 0.000 -0.010 0.010 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.025 -0.089 -0.006 0.022 0.045 0.126 0.177 0.282 0.345 -0.154 -0.179 -0.171 -0.151 -0.133 -0.114 -0.032 0.039 -0.620 -0.032 0.335 0.426 0.905 0.943 0.970 1.000
Credit t-4 -0.013 0.033 0.029 -0.017 -0.012 -0.018 -0.018 -0.031 0.022 0.034 0.062 0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.026 0.090 -0.045 -0.020 -0.011 0.021 0.050 0.103 0.137 0.179 -0.018 0.002 0.012 -0.016 -0.019 -0.008 -0.028 0.001 0.000 0.034 0.022 -0.004 0.028 0.037 0.029 0.076 0.013 0.004 0.017 0.021 0.028 0.020 0.031 0.043 -0.080 0.000 0.018 0.024 0.328 0.324 0.410 0.443 -0.117 -0.151 -0.147 -0.134 -0.006 0.008 0.074 0.129 -0.580 0.011 0.353 0.437 0.746 0.793 0.827 0.877 1.000
Credit t-5 -0.018 0.048 0.038 -0.016 -0.008 -0.032 -0.031 -0.034 0.022 0.034 0.062 0.016 -0.005 0.006 0.049 0.107 -0.044 -0.020 -0.007 0.022 0.048 0.151 0.175 0.205 -0.014 0.004 0.010 -0.005 -0.020 -0.011 -0.028 0.002 -0.005 0.014 0.017 0.000 0.019 0.047 0.037 0.080 0.011 -0.002 0.016 0.020 0.027 0.034 0.045 0.055 -0.083 -0.009 0.007 0.007 0.239 0.450 0.518 0.520 -0.083 -0.120 -0.120 -0.114 -0.015 0.109 0.160 0.201 -0.573 0.049 0.355 0.439 0.658 0.704 0.745 0.804 0.904 1.000
Credit t-6 0.012 0.056 0.059 -0.015 0.010 -0.008 -0.047 -0.039 0.025 0.033 0.062 0.025 -0.035 -0.003 0.088 0.136 -0.064 -0.045 -0.020 0.019 0.014 0.117 0.225 0.233 -0.011 0.014 0.007 -0.002 -0.017 -0.010 -0.028 0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.014 0.004 0.016 0.046 0.082 0.007 -0.004 0.016 0.019 0.029 0.033 0.068 0.071 -0.073 -0.011 0.013 0.002 0.187 0.357 0.668 0.608 -0.043 -0.071 -0.076 -0.077 0.001 0.103 0.277 0.285 -0.533 0.053 0.349 0.432 0.576 0.616 0.657 0.722 0.809 0.889 1.000
Credit t-7 0.007 0.063 0.058 -0.016 0.027 0.009 0.004 -0.048 0.029 0.035 0.069 0.038 -0.022 0.009 -0.153 0.191 -0.050 -0.034 -0.015 0.019 0.001 0.077 0.161 0.300 -0.005 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.010 -0.002 -0.027 0.004 -0.009 0.008 0.007 -0.004 0.009 0.003 0.017 0.093 0.011 0.000 0.021 0.021 0.030 0.029 0.056 0.098 -0.046 0.015 0.037 0.030 0.145 0.259 0.480 0.801 -0.012 -0.038 -0.047 -0.063 -0.012 0.081 0.222 0.444 -0.577 0.084 0.381 0.460 0.467 0.514 0.563 0.638 0.708 0.768 0.828 1.000
GDP growth 0.041 -0.097 -0.129 -0.016 -0.085 -0.068 -0.048 -0.027 0.010 0.018 0.032 0.022 0.043 0.002 0.124 0.040 0.115 0.151 0.126 0.032 0.113 0.106 0.055 0.001 0.002 0.027 0.020 -0.008 0.017 0.015 0.004 0.009 0.068 0.082 0.063 0.060 0.057 0.067 0.044 0.016 0.012 0.040 0.027 0.012 0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.014 0.165 0.246 0.257 0.242 0.165 0.071 -0.021 -0.116 -0.011 -0.055 -0.043 -0.043 -0.072 -0.100 -0.135 -0.192 -0.303 -0.092 0.085 0.071 -0.138 -0.087 -0.035 0.041 0.074 0.066 0.015 -0.034 1.000
GDP growth t-1 -0.002 0.027 0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.020 -0.020 0.001 0.008 0.023 0.013 0.034 0.005 -0.085 0.117 0.001 0.022 -0.004 0.009 0.028 0.056 0.060 0.137 0.015 0.016 0.004 0.013 0.008 -0.009 0.000 0.011 -0.008 -0.013 -0.008 -0.016 -0.021 -0.015 0.007 0.025 -0.001 0.021 0.021 0.006 0.010 0.018 0.023 0.045 0.073 0.072 0.091 0.081 0.087 0.114 0.181 0.348 0.053 0.055 0.040 0.012 0.014 0.050 0.117 0.259 -0.152 -0.011 0.091 0.101 -0.124 -0.123 -0.050 -0.009 0.036 0.105 0.170 0.323 -0.033 1.000
GDP growth t-2 -0.003 0.014 0.024 -0.008 -0.012 -0.001 -0.017 -0.013 0.021 0.018 0.037 0.045 -0.038 0.011 0.021 -0.126 0.001 -0.008 0.016 0.010 0.003 0.021 0.053 0.085 -0.006 -0.011 0.013 0.005 -0.012 -0.008 -0.011 0.009 0.029 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.029 0.021 0.005 0.035 0.011 -0.013 -0.002 0.010 -0.004 0.015 -0.001 0.004 0.038 0.068 0.075 0.089 0.108 0.100 0.137 0.193 -0.010 0.011 0.003 -0.021 -0.020 0.004 0.034 0.090 -0.278 -0.002 0.208 0.251 0.176 0.203 0.196 0.249 0.263 0.248 0.237 0.259 -0.165 -0.220 1.000
GDP growth t-3 0.035 -0.054 -0.063 -0.010 -0.032 -0.034 -0.017 -0.005 0.006 0.015 0.025 0.005 0.016 -0.007 0.135 0.029 0.028 0.058 0.056 0.018 0.045 0.045 0.016 -0.051 -0.011 0.014 -0.003 -0.022 0.015 0.024 -0.001 0.001 0.014 0.036 0.041 0.035 0.030 0.048 0.018 0.005 0.002 0.018 0.011 0.008 0.005 -0.017 -0.011 -0.025 0.005 0.080 0.092 0.080 0.066 0.023 -0.054 -0.222 -0.078 -0.117 -0.084 -0.049 -0.068 -0.115 -0.156 -0.277 -0.256 -0.117 0.087 0.101 0.367 0.379 0.370 0.358 0.279 0.201 0.090 -0.086 0.684 -0.405 -0.173 1.000
GDP growth t-4 0.009 -0.050 -0.030 0.019 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.032 -0.046 -0.039 -0.080 -0.088 0.011 0.002 0.064 -0.012 0.013 0.006 -0.012 -0.022 0.016 -0.034 -0.093 -0.206 0.006 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.006 0.014 0.022 -0.009 0.003 -0.008 -0.017 -0.009 -0.011 -0.005 -0.011 -0.073 -0.029 -0.008 -0.025 -0.023 -0.001 -0.013 -0.014 -0.046 -0.065 -0.128 -0.152 -0.156 -0.091 -0.145 -0.272 -0.523 -0.068 -0.057 -0.034 0.005 0.052 -0.013 -0.103 -0.267 0.661 -0.176 -0.399 -0.475 -0.151 -0.204 -0.256 -0.363 -0.370 -0.446 -0.498 -0.678 -0.030 -0.284 -0.501 0.175 1.000
GDP growth t-5 -0.011 0.016 0.035 0.018 0.027 0.007 -0.007 0.020 -0.047 -0.031 -0.068 -0.092 0.011 0.009 0.023 0.043 -0.035 -0.044 -0.054 -0.022 0.010 0.029 -0.005 -0.067 0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.013 -0.008 -0.001 0.008 -0.007 -0.023 -0.055 -0.041 -0.033 -0.035 -0.014 -0.006 -0.038 -0.035 -0.026 -0.025 -0.019 0.008 0.018 0.020 -0.002 -0.125 -0.191 -0.210 -0.218 -0.054 0.111 0.066 -0.131 -0.072 -0.065 -0.049 -0.020 0.079 0.133 0.086 -0.005 0.526 -0.145 -0.273 -0.310 0.079 0.027 0.027 -0.003 -0.096 0.000 -0.056 -0.242 -0.349 0.054 -0.375 -0.155 0.730 1.000
GDP growth t-6 0.013 0.067 0.075 -0.002 0.010 0.006 -0.047 -0.043 0.051 0.014 0.043 0.046 -0.028 0.005 0.094 0.126 -0.090 -0.080 -0.059 -0.002 -0.015 0.059 0.163 0.171 -0.009 0.005 0.001 0.006 -0.024 -0.013 -0.022 -0.007 -0.016 -0.025 -0.019 -0.031 -0.013 -0.021 0.013 0.056 0.019 -0.014 0.000 0.006 0.035 0.034 0.068 0.063 -0.109 -0.097 -0.086 -0.089 0.105 0.285 0.585 0.490 -0.054 -0.061 -0.069 -0.065 0.031 0.133 0.283 0.260 -0.144 -0.031 0.212 0.265 0.482 0.488 0.493 0.523 0.608 0.674 0.800 0.614 -0.279 0.053 0.275 -0.116 -0.245 0.212 1.000
GDP growth t-7 0.011 0.058 0.057 -0.008 0.011 0.010 -0.007 -0.049 0.069 0.024 0.074 0.076 -0.010 0.006 -0.120 0.247 -0.054 -0.044 -0.032 0.007 -0.015 0.048 0.125 0.255 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.007 0.009 -0.003 -0.026 -0.009 -0.023 -0.002 0.007 -0.013 -0.005 -0.009 0.005 0.077 0.038 0.016 0.025 0.013 0.041 0.044 0.060 0.094 -0.071 -0.032 -0.015 -0.020 0.098 0.211 0.421 0.719 -0.023 -0.047 -0.057 -0.065 -0.003 0.082 0.204 0.411 -0.330 0.013 0.301 0.360 0.410 0.443 0.472 0.530 0.610 0.656 0.723 0.875 -0.087 0.256 0.127 -0.073 -0.499 -0.114 0.700 1.000
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Table A.8: Bartlett test of sphericity and KMO measure of sampling adequacy (incl. 
lags) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinant of the correlation matrix
Det                =     0.000
 
 
Bartlett test of sphericity
    
Chi-square     189000.0
p-value        0
H0: variables are not intercorrelated
 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
KMO             0.687
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Table A.9: Eigenvalues of un-rotated factors; financial ratios and firm age as variables.  
 
         Factor         Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
        Factor1           5.04401      0.93065            0.1625       0.1625
        Factor2           4.11335      0.83197            0.1325       0.2950
        Factor3           3.28139      0.54104            0.1057       0.4007
        Factor4           2.74034      0.60618            0.0883       0.4890
        Factor5           2.13416      0.17829            0.0688       0.5578
        Factor6           1.95587      0.21289            0.0630       0.6208
        Factor7           1.74298      0.11450            0.0562       0.6769
        Factor8           1.62849      0.21350            0.0525       0.7294
        Factor9           1.41498      0.05286            0.0456       0.7750
       Factor10         1.36213      0.15498            0.0439       0.8189
       Factor11         1.20715      0.18584            0.0389       0.8578
       Factor12         1.02132      0.10988            0.0329       0.8907
       Factor13         0.91144      0.10220            0.0294       0.9200
       Factor14         0.80923      0.07090            0.0261       0.9461
       Factor15         0.73834      0.06822            0.0238       0.9699
       Factor16         0.67012      0.02917            0.0216       0.9915
       Factor17         0.64094      0.08611            0.0206       1.0121
       Factor18         0.55483      0.00813            0.0179       1.0300
       Factor19         0.54670      0.16020            0.0176       1.0476
       Factor20         0.38650      0.06080            0.0125       1.0601
       Factor21         0.32570      0.03464            0.0105       1.0706
       Factor22         0.29106      0.08385            0.0094       1.0799
       Factor23         0.20721      0.01274            0.0067       1.0866
       Factor24         0.19447      0.03366            0.0063       1.0929
       Factor25         0.16081      0.02039            0.0052       1.0981
       Factor26         0.14042      0.02423            0.0045       1.1026
       Factor27         0.11619      0.00884            0.0037       1.1063
       Factor28         0.10735      0.02624            0.0035       1.1098
       Factor29         0.08111      0.01104            0.0026       1.1124
       Factor30         0.07007      0.02092            0.0023       1.1147
       Factor31         0.04915      0.00705            0.0016       1.1162
       Factor32         0.04210      0.01441            0.0014       1.1176
       Factor33         0.02769      0.01058            0.0009       1.1185
       Factor34         0.01712      0.00924            0.0006       1.1190
       Factor35         0.00788      0.00372            0.0003       1.1193
       Factor36         0.00416      0.00842            0.0001       1.1194
       Factor37       -0.00425      0.00262           -0.0001       1.1193
       Factor38       -0.00687      0.00586           -0.0002       1.1191
       Factor39       -0.01273      0.00772           -0.0004       1.1187
       Factor40       -0.02045      0.00982           -0.0007       1.1180
       Factor41       -0.03027      0.00543           -0.0010       1.1170
       Factor42       -0.03570      0.00226           -0.0012       1.1159
       Factor43       -0.03796      0.01582           -0.0012       1.1147
       Factor44       -0.05378      0.01815           -0.0017       1.1129
       Factor45       -0.07193      0.00233           -0.0023       1.1106
       Factor46       -0.07425      0.00447           -0.0024       1.1082
       Factor47       -0.07872      0.01002           -0.0025       1.1057
       Factor48       -0.08874      0.00495           -0.0029       1.1028
       Factor49       -0.09369      0.01633           -0.0030       1.0998
       Factor50       -0.11002      0.00752           -0.0035       1.0963
       Factor51       -0.11754      0.01326           -0.0038       1.0925
       Factor52       -0.13080      0.00378           -0.0042       1.0883
       Factor53       -0.13458      0.00448           -0.0043       1.0839
       Factor54       -0.13906      0.01651           -0.0045       1.0794
       Factor55       -0.15557      0.01267           -0.0050       1.0744
       Factor56       -0.16824      0.00653           -0.0054       1.0690
       Factor57       -0.17477      0.00979           -0.0056       1.0634
       Factor58       -0.18456      0.03000           -0.0059       1.0574
       Factor59       -0.21457      0.01657           -0.0069       1.0505
       Factor60       -0.23114      0.00389           -0.0074       1.0431
       Factor61       -0.23503      0.02214           -0.0076       1.0355
       Factor62       -0.25717      0.01257           -0.0083       1.0272
       Factor63       -0.26974      0.01313           -0.0087       1.0185
       Factor64       -0.28287      0.00927           -0.0091       1.0094
       Factor65        -0.29214   -0.00021          -0.0094       1.0000
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(2080)= 1.9e+05 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.10: Eigenvalues of VARIMAX- rotated factors (with Eigenvalues >1); financial 
ratios and firm age as variables.  
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Table A.11: Factor Loadings for factor analysis withou t directors’ characteristics (post 
VARIMAX rotation). 
 
 
 
        Variable                        Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6   Factor7   Factor8   Factor9  Factor10  Factor11  Factor12   
 
             roi                                 0.0025    0.0353   -0.0010    0.0202   -0.0053    0.0018   -0.0015   -0.0850   -0.0236    0.0000   -0.1097    0.0268    
           roiL1                              0.0651   -0.0647    0.0160    0.0086     0.0659   -0.0104    0.0061   -0.4341    0.2338   -0.0103   -0.0305    0.0293   
           roiL2                              0.1176   -0.0890   -0.0160    0.0021     0.0622   -0.0091   -0.0090   -0.2188    0.3521   -0.0046   -0.1510   0.0267   
           roiL3                              0.0066   -0.0047   -0.0183    0.0010   -0.0014    0.9931   -0.0053    -0.0065    0.0456     0.0005   -0.0045   0.0004  
           roiL4                              0.0825   -0.0748   -0.0954   -0.0006    0.0297    0.0675   -0.0150    -0.1597    0.4375    0.0114   -0.0572    0.0327    
           roiL5                              0.0499   -0.0263   -0.0241    0.0026   -0.0076    0.0479   -0.0089    -0.1044    0.4875   -0.0044   -0.0438   0.0309   
           roiL6                              0.0537   -0.0163   -0.1694   -0.0279    0.0202    0.1254   -0.0210     0.0114    0.6540    0.0188    0.0047   -0.0036  
           roiL7                              0.0348    0.0213   -0.2096   -0.0303    -0.0215   0.1425   -0.0151     0.0105    0.4505    0.0034    0.0418   -0.1158    
     growth_rate                   -0.0106    0.0253    -0.0009    0.0077    0.0139    0.0000   -0.0011    0.0071    0.0073     0.0004   -0.0065    0.0013    
    growth_rateL1                -0.0129    0.0293     0.0011    -0.0255   0.0503   -0.0082    0.0029   -0.0416    0.0283   -0.0068    0.1462    0.0069   
   growth_rateL2                -0.0228     0.0127     0.0174    0.0014    0.0465   -0.0038    0.0145    0.0627    0.0256   -0.0008     0.0427    0.0078    
    growth_rateL3               -0.0245      0.0071     0.0184   -0.0144    0.0025   -0.0117   0.9388    0.0048   -0.0265   -0.0039  -0.0182    0.0014    
    growth_rateL4               -0.0284     0.0209     0.0014   -0.0051   -0.0183   -0.0047    0.0019    0.0020    0.0010   -0.0025    0.0074    0.0017  
    growth_rateL5               -0.0264     0.0146     0.0068    0.0046     0.0027    -0.0054   0.0002    0.0072   -0.0195   -0.0016    0.0042  -0.0028 
    growth_rateL6               -0.0288     0.0641     0.0528    0.0209   -0.0455   -0.0839    0.0053   -0.0374   -0.3911   -0.0143  -0.0185  -0.0231 
    growth_rateL7               -0.0373    -0.0171     0.1906    0.1858    0.1389   -0.1092    0.0045    0.0816   -0.1416   -0.0089   -0.0800    0.0667    
   nsta                                       0.0241     0.0576     0.0073    0.0383    -0.0781   -0.0035    0.0181    0.2687   -0.0553    0.0016    0.2903   -0.0255   
   nsta_L1                                0.0267     0.0987     0.0057    0.0814    -0.0482   -0.0083    0.0168   -0.0193    0.0080    0.0025    0.7851    0.0096   
   nsta_L2                                0.0226     0.0745     0.1782    0.1024    -0.0545     0.0042    0.0208    0.0382   -0.0145    0.0062    0.3654    0.0037    
   nsta_L3                                0.0050     0.0122   -0.0056    0.0734    -0.0011    -0.0009    0.9347  -0.0027    0.0142    0.0031    0.0355   -0.0020    
   nsta_L4                                0.0229     0.0544   -0.0027    0.5236    -0.0387    -0.0018    0.0137  -0.0144   -0.0394    0.0047    0.6567    0.0059  
   nsta_L5                                0.0436     0.0520    0.0176    0.8428    -0.0028     0.0027    0.0181     0.0138   -0.0338    0.0095    0.1675  -0.0041   
   nsta_L6                                0.0573     0.0206    0.0042    0.9166     0.0742    0.0017    0.0211   -0.0025   -0.0156   -0.0041    0.0500   -0.0076   
   nsta_L7                                0.0440     0.0000    0.0121    0.8837     0.1400   -0.0043    0.0297    0.0051    0.0377   -0.0028   -0.0346     0.0084   
   cfts                                        0.0755   -0.0229   -0.0006    0.0166   -0.0137     0.0042    0.0011    0.0070  -0.0337    0.0129     0.0039     0.1699   
   cfts_L1                                 0.0582   -0.0100    0.0055    0.0140     0.0137   -0.0009   -0.0004   -0.0272   -0.0017    0.0014    0.0175     0.0106   
   cfts_L2                                 0.0377   -0.0005    0.0030    0.0059     0.0149   -0.0008   -0.0011   -0.0207     0.0123     0.0048   0.0096   -0.0043 
   cfts_L3                                -0.0134    0.0027    0.0084   -0.0055     0.0107   -0.0060    0.0010   -0.0437    0.0677   -0.0173    0.0130   -0.5762    
   cfts_L4                                  0.0043   -0.0086   -0.0013  -0.0126   -0.0026   -0.0064    0.0004    0.0100    0.1115   -0.0286    0.0431     0.4594   
   cfts_L5                                  0.0087    0.0109   -0.0082   -0.0123   -0.0064   0.0004   -0.0008   -0.0031    0.0834   -0.0177    0.0292     0.6724  
   cfts_L6                                  0.0272    0.0204   -0.0115   -0.0045   -0.0166    0.0014   -0.0003    0.0062    0.0753   -0.0007    0.0109   -0.1554    
   cfts_L7                                -0.0078    0.0341   -0.0276   -0.0136     0.0089    0.0069     0.0005    0.0035    0.1673   -0.0161    0.0302   -0.5385    
     quick_ratio                     -0.0602    0.0867     0.0059    0.0183     0.0006   -0.0010  -0.0015   -0.0304   -0.0713    0.0489    0.0133     0.0044    
     quick_ratioL1                 -0.0595    0.0621   -0.0010   -0.0041    0.0018     0.0015    0.0054   -0.0334    0.0120    0.1126    0.0246      0.0036    
     quick_ratioL2                 -0.0516    0.0595   -0.0075    0.0025   -0.0043   -0.0006    0.0008   -0.0232    0.0036    0.1907    0.0096      0.0030 
     quick_ratioL3                 -0.0355    0.0227   -0.0014   -0.0020   -0.0199   -0.0011    0.0012   -0.0074    0.0132    0.7614   -0.0019    0.0056    
     quick_ratioL4                 -0.0350    0.0314   -0.0037    0.0023    -0.0002    0.0004   -0.0020    0.0027    0.0012    0.7625    0.0028   -0.0065     
     quick_ratioL5                 -0.0535    0.0204   -0.0062    0.0093     0.0195    0.0031   -0.0035   -0.0059   -0.0013    0.4566    0.0261   -0.0199   
     quick_ratioL6                 -0.0443    0.0281   -0.0054    0.0160    0.0376     0.0013   -0.0022   -0.0115    0.0030    0.0953   -0.0130   -0.0102   
     quick_ratioL7                 -0.0622    0.0130   -0.0019    0.0257    0.0728   -0.0019    0.0022   -0.0030   -0.0008    0.0637   -0.0207   -0.0035  
            tlta                              -0.0204   -0.0212    0.0150  -0.0075   -0.0038   -0.0084    0.0005     0.4865    0.0189    0.0007     0.0388   -0.0096  
          tltaL1                            -0.0283    0.0169   -0.0008    0.0120   -0.0038   -0.0058    0.0005    0.7661   -0.0241   -0.0049   -0.0234    0.0011    
          tltaL2                            -0.0316    0.0097     0.0164    0.0139    0.0154   -0.0295    0.0065    0.6011     0.0037   -0.0076   -0.0366    0.0546    
          tltaL3                            -0.0031    0.0010    0.0223    0.0013     0.0050   -0.9950    0.0054    0.0034   -0.0183     0.0005    0.0000    0.0010   
          tltaL4                            -0.0039    0.0099    0.9716   -0.0081   -0.0017   -0.0071    0.0038    0.0166   -0.0517    0.0013    0.0195   -0.0073  
          tltaL5                            -0.0110    0.0324    0.3700    0.0959   -0.0199    -0.0627   -0.0011   0.0435     0.2068   -0.0158   -0.0865   0.0122  
          tltaL6                             0.0047    0.0070     0.9943    0.0209    0.0201   -0.0192    0.0025   -0.0055     0.0025   -0.0042   -0.0084   0.0003   
          tltaL7                             0.0021   -0.0015    0.9667    0.0050    0.0525    -0.0147    0.0058   -0.0073   -0.0482    0.0004    0.0057    0.0065   
            qaca                             0.0720    0.7656   -0.0080    0.0096   -0.0403   -0.0001    0.0037     0.0426     0.0010    0.0070    0.0248    0.0203    
          qacaL1                           0.0257    0.8757   -0.0049    0.0124    0.0149   -0.0011    0.0130     0.0033     0.0117    0.0020    0.0266    0.0024     
          qacaL2                           0.0047    0.8826    0.0208    0.0189     0.0717   -0.0050    0.0142     0.0016   -0.0087    0.0088    0.0321   -0.0021   
          qacaL3                         -0.0033    0.8431   -0.0051    0.0183    0.0961   -0.0052    0.0093    -0.0030   -0.0049    0.0237    0.0136   -0.0054     
          qacaL4                           0.0189    0.6758    0.0305    0.0346    0.3723     0.0032   -0.0215     0.0030   -0.0591    0.0191    0.0602   -0.0269    
          qacaL5                           0.0323    0.4628    0.0151    0.0800     0.5597    0.0026   -0.0184   -0.0338   -0.0588    0.0036    0.0295   -0.0265  
          qacaL6                           0.0630    0.3298    0.0557    0.1316     0.7224  -0.0034   -0.0027   -0.0284   -0.0497   -0.0091   -0.0535   -0.0251   
          qacaL7                           0.0356    0.1741    0.0813    0.1459     0.7287  -0.0186     0.0260     0.0072    0.0928   -0.0087   -0.0745    0.0196 
            tctl                                0.6850    0.1130    0.0042    0.0509    -0.0761  -0.0046    0.0112   -0.0216   -0.0249   -0.0035   -0.0385    0.0115    
          tctlL1                              0.7977    0.0991    0.0161    0.0470   -0.1102  -0.0071     0.0156   -0.0426   -0.0019   -0.0150   -0.0262    0.0042   
          tctlL2                              0.8297    0.0640    0.0073    0.0328   -0.0922  -0.0090     0.0097   -0.0303    0.0285   -0.0194     0.0044    0.0115   
          tctlL3                              0.8323    0.0312   -0.0103   0.0064   -0.0416    0.0071     0.0022   -0.0142    0.0316   -0.0234    0.0216   -0.0106    
          tctlL4                              0.7989  -0.0051   -0.0180    0.0144    0.1397    0.0189   -0.0340     0.0144    0.0252   -0.0120    0.0444     0.0018    
          tctlL5                              0.7314  -0.0780   -0.0130    0.0424    0.3284    0.0133   -0.0325     0.0106    0.0080   -0.0063    0.0303     0.0005    
          tctlL6                              0.6444  -0.1202    0.0174    0.0609    0.4744    0.0116   -0.0240     0.0159    0.0076   -0.0068    0.0076     0.0030    
          tctlL7                              0.4758  -0.1279    0.0332    0.1028    0.5123    0.0027   -0.0040     0.0345    0.0531   -0.0083   -0.0141    0.0101     
       firmage                            0.0966  -0.1775    0.0002  -0.1172  -0.2488     0.0346   -0.0382   -0.0033   -0.0133   -0.0075    0.0184   -0.0132    
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Table A.12: Failed Firm Clusters (without Directors’ Characteristics).  
 
 
 
 
Variable Median St. Dev Median St. Dev Median St. Dev Median St. Dev
             roi           -0.077 1.496 -0.054 5.803 -0.148 0.945 -0.198 0.498
           roiL1           0.001 1.606 -0.017 0.690 0.000 1.494 -0.012 1.036
           roiL2        0.008 1.474 -0.004 0.816 0.003 0.623 0.004 1.318
           roiL3       0.011 1.469 0.000 0.838 0.005 0.611 0.008 33.395
           roiL4       0.002 1.756 0.001 0.865 0.007 0.673 0.010 1.148
           roiL5     0.001 1.175 0.002 0.888 0.010 1.670 0.016 1.308
           roiL6         0.001 0.494 0.000 0.740 0.011 0.830 0.025 0.596
           roiL7      0.001 0.216 0.001 0.527 0.005 0.655 0.016 0.788
growth_rate    0.066 15.166 0.099 14.122 0.218 11.690 0.817 190.067
growth_rateL1 0.051 26.397 0.059 4.433 0.050 8.077 0.088 43.995
growth_rateL2    -0.118 2.669 0.020 2.974 0.005 6.002 0.030 44.076
growth_rateL3    -0.063 2.218 -0.079 2.543 -0.073 10.389 -0.036 3.162
growth_rateL4 -0.021 46.643 -0.149 1.500 -0.161 1.891 -0.077 2.461
growth_rateL5   -0.001 1.347 -0.057 1.150 -0.106 1.547 -0.057 27.194
growth_rateL6 0.014 0.949 -0.037 1.167 -0.005 1.165 0.054 1.214
growth_rateL7  0.001 0.437 -0.005 0.896 0.000 1.023 0.014 1.352
nsta              2.435 7.538 0.829 7.103 2.241 5.607 2.147 3.138
nsta_L1                  2.243 5.437 0.655 1.802 1.958 8.621 3.213 4.486
nsta_L2           2.114 7.867 0.688 1.716 1.913 4.977 1.717 10.440
nsta_L3                2.178 4.815 0.692 1.733 1.918 61.415 1.603 6.183
nsta_L4              1.510 5.041 0.673 1.629 1.995 8.351 1.665 6.029
nsta_L5         1.212 5.027 0.611 1.500 2.039 1.663 1.912 6.018
nsta_L6    1.114 3.416 0.507 1.517 2.006 1.817 2.014 6.141
nsta_L7              0.953 0.597 0.000 1.202 1.667 1.945 1.604 6.314
cfts                       -0.174 18.015 -0.305 16.393 -0.088 12.494 -1.624 32.153
cfts_L1         0.011 31.434 -0.006 18.924 0.008 0.604 0.004 7.202
cfts_L2       0.025 23.118 0.011 10.406 0.014 0.552 0.038 5.119
cfts_L3              0.035 5.650 0.022 7.788 0.014 1.000 0.040 11.700
cfts_L4          0.019 3.789 0.026 4.799 0.017 18.425 0.053 7.307
cfts_L5                0.016 1.250 0.026 10.119 0.019 12.243 0.087 10.929
cfts_L6              0.018 0.219 0.019 5.438 0.021 0.315 0.102 6.925
cfts_L7                    0.013 0.236 0.001 4.305 0.015 0.609 0.074 1.687
quick_ratio 0.936 35.417 0.368 14.429 0.832 7.446 3.469 21.453
quick_ratioL1    0.983 48.149 0.404 75.054 0.822 14.251 1.309 36.074
quick_ratioL2  1.001 12.402 0.405 9.642 0.813 18.983 1.071 97.589
quick_ratioL3    0.986 17.093 0.413 14.660 0.819 20.775 1.023 108.733
quick_ratioL4   0.798 59.923 0.429 11.059 0.822 14.853 1.031 48.720
quick_ratioL5  0.068 28.900 0.430 81.961 0.846 41.051 1.080 51.611
quick_ratioL6   0.077 3.342 0.373 47.133 0.850 6.285 1.084 164.970
quick_ratioL7      0.035 1.138 0.046 53.287 0.746 5.429 1.013 65.533
tlta                       0.944 4.169 0.958 4.706 1.015 14.978 1.270 0.828
tltaL1              0.889 1.435 0.911 0.360 0.884 3.536 0.897 0.854
tltaL2         0.873 0.697 0.886 0.290 0.846 3.102 0.826 3.667
tltaL3               0.859 1.661 0.881 0.554 0.839 0.703 0.808 46.309
tltaL4                   0.758 1.263 0.859 0.556 0.838 8.459 0.799 1.192
 tltaL5            0.009 10.672 0.842 0.551 0.841 2.714 0.785 0.879
tltaL6                    0.001 2.732 0.785 0.596 0.830 7.563 0.758 0.734
tltaL7                       0.001 0.762 0.153 0.457 0.758 7.473 0.632 1.500
qaca                     0.968 0.338 0.353 0.384 0.807 0.221 0.807 0.231
qacaL1           0.984 0.311 0.302 0.289 0.807 0.239 0.970 0.257
qacaL2                 0.998 0.328 0.316 0.248 0.807 0.245 1.000 0.270
qacaL3              1.000 0.381 0.316 0.258 0.810 0.265 1.003 0.278
qacaL4                  0.941 0.540 0.320 0.295 0.823 0.278 1.009 0.341
qacaL5              0.154 0.539 0.326 0.309 0.834 0.293 1.010 0.550
qacaL6           0.123 0.368 0.306 0.342 0.860 0.301 1.010 0.335
qacaL7                 0.087 0.134 0.038 0.332 0.746 0.431 0.970 0.474
tctl                           0.244 0.232 0.091 0.122 0.293 0.184 0.244 0.111
tctlL1                       0.274 0.243 0.082 0.112 0.361 0.187 0.171 0.128
tctlL2                      0.291 0.248 0.090 0.117 0.394 0.196 0.117 0.134
tlL3                          0.268 0.249 0.097 0.127 0.433 0.199 0.096 0.132
tctlL4                     0.125 0.242 0.078 0.143 0.459 0.201 0.094 0.134
tctlL5                      0.113 0.192 0.073 0.146 0.474 0.205 0.107 0.143
tctlL6                  0.095 0.084 0.027 0.148 0.460 0.223 0.120 0.151
tctlL7            0.053 0.023 0.001 0.134 0.369 0.274 0.070 0.152
finalfirmage   8.000 23.522 18.000 30.614 18.000 46.124 10.000 59.220
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
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Table A.13: Eigenvalues of un-rotated factors; factor analysis with directors’ 
characteristics. 
 
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
        Factor1          5.08467      0.89634            0.1585       0.1585
        Factor2          4.18833      0.90248            0.1306       0.2891
        Factor3          3.28585      0.54284            0.1024       0.3915
        Factor4          2.74300      0.50483            0.0855       0.4770
        Factor5          2.23818      0.17330            0.0698       0.5468
        Factor6          2.06488      0.31448            0.0644       0.6112
        Factor7          1.75041      0.10228            0.0546       0.6657
        Factor8          1.64812      0.23123            0.0514       0.7171
        Factor9          1.41690      0.05409            0.0442       0.7613
       Factor10         1.36281      0.13526            0.0425       0.8038
       Factor11         1.22755      0.11450            0.0383       0.8420
       Factor12         1.11304      0.13006            0.0347       0.8767
       Factor13         0.98298      0.08045            0.0306       0.9074
       Factor14         0.90253      0.11449            0.0281       0.9355
       Factor15         0.78804      0.11520            0.0246       0.9601
       Factor16         0.67284      0.01251            0.0210       0.9810
       Factor17         0.66033      0.06594            0.0206       1.0016
       Factor18         0.59439      0.04346            0.0185       1.0202
       Factor19         0.55094      0.02104            0.0172       1.0373
       Factor20         0.52990      0.15424            0.0165       1.0538
       Factor21         0.37566      0.07043            0.0117       1.0656
       Factor22         0.30523      0.01571            0.0095       1.0751
       Factor23         0.28952      0.08181            0.0090       1.0841
       Factor24         0.20771      0.02475            0.0065       1.0906
       Factor25         0.18296      0.01768            0.0057       1.0963
       Factor26         0.16528      0.02275            0.0052       1.1014
       Factor27         0.14253      0.02013            0.0044       1.1059
       Factor28         0.12240      0.01707            0.0038       1.1097
       Factor29         0.10533      0.01997            0.0033       1.1130
       Factor30         0.08536      0.00950            0.0027       1.1156
       Factor31         0.07585      0.00798            0.0024       1.1180
       Factor32         0.06788      0.01917            0.0021       1.1201
       Factor33         0.04871      0.02177            0.0015       1.1216
       Factor34         0.02695      0.00298            0.0008       1.1225
       Factor35         0.02396      0.01147            0.0007       1.1232
       Factor36         0.01250      0.00757            0.0004       1.1236
       Factor37         0.00493      0.00885            0.0002       1.1238
       Factor38        -0.00392      0.00592           -0.0001       1.1236
       Factor39        -0.00984      0.00260           -0.0003       1.1233
       Factor40        -0.01244      0.00581           -0.0004       1.1229
       Factor41        -0.01825      0.00847           -0.0006       1.1224
       Factor42        -0.02671      0.00353           -0.0008       1.1215
       Factor43        -0.03025      0.00663           -0.0009       1.1206
       Factor44        -0.03688      0.00869           -0.0011       1.1195
       Factor45        -0.04557      0.01685           -0.0014       1.1180
       Factor46        -0.06242      0.00770           -0.0019       1.1161
       Factor47        -0.07012      0.00464           -0.0022       1.1139
       Factor48        -0.07475      0.00550           -0.0023       1.1116
       Factor49        -0.08026      0.00736           -0.0025       1.1091
       Factor50        -0.08762      0.01404           -0.0027       1.1063
       Factor51        -0.10166      0.01001           -0.0032       1.1032
       Factor52        -0.11167      0.00408           -0.0035       1.0997
       Factor53        -0.11575      0.01532           -0.0036       1.0961
       Factor54        -0.13107      0.00376           -0.0041       1.0920
       Factor55        -0.13483      0.00272           -0.0042       1.0878
       Factor56        -0.13755      0.01837           -0.0043       1.0835
       Factor57        -0.15592      0.01412           -0.0049       1.0786
       Factor58       -0.17004      0.00280           -0.0053       1.0733
       Factor59        -0.17284      0.01204           -0.0054       1.0680
       Factor60        -0.18489      0.02422           -0.0058       1.0622
       Factor61        -0.20910      0.00413           -0.0065       1.0557
       Factor62        -0.21323      0.01807           -0.0066       1.0490
       Factor63        -0.23130      0.00996           -0.0072       1.0418
       Factor64        -0.24126      0.01501           -0.0075       1.0343
       Factor65        -0.25627      0.01234           -0.0080       1.0263
       Factor66        -0.26861      0.01500           -0.0084       1.0179
       Factor67        -0.28361      0.00784           -0.0088       1.0091
       Factor68        -0.29145            .           -0.0091       1.0000
 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(2278)= 1.9e+05 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.14: Eigenvalues of VARIMAX- rotated factors (with Eigenvalues >1); factor 
analysis with directors’ characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Factor        Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
 
        Factor1         4.52604      0.60516            0.1411       0.1411
        Factor2         3.92088      0.74195            0.1222       0.2633
        Factor3         3.17893      0.26806            0.0991       0.3624
        Factor4         2.91087      0.48134            0.0907       0.4532
        Factor5         2.42952      0.38039            0.0757       0.5289
        Factor6         2.04913      0.27927            0.0639       0.5928
        Factor7         1.76987      0.19490            0.0552       0.6480
        Factor8         1.57496      0.01262            0.0491       0.6970
        Factor9         1.56234      0.12115            0.0487       0.7458
       Factor10       1.44119      0.05266            0.0449       0.7907
       Factor11        1.38853      0.01706            0.0433       0.8340
       Factor12        1.37146            .                     0.0428       0.8767
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(2278)= 1.9e+05 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.15: Factor Loadings for factor analysis with directors’ characteristics (post 
VARIMAX rotation). 
 
        Variable    Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6   Factor7   Factor8   Factor9  Factor10  Factor11  Factor12  
 
             roi               -0.0027     0.0337   -0.0009    0.0041   -0.0116   -0.0018    0.0037   -0.0851   -0.0146   -0.0004   -0.0987    0.0305  
           roiL1              0.0713   -0.0691    0.0154    -0.0010    0.0926   -0.0086    0.0028    -0.4369    0.2272   -0.0112   -0.0019    0.0281  
           roiL2              0.1227   -0.0944   -0.0164   -0.0227    0.0766   -0.0096   -0.0094   -0.2236    0.3501   -0.0059   -0.1115    0.0281  
           roiL3              0.0062   -0.0062   -0.0185   -0.0034   -0.0009    0.9921   -0.0042   -0.0070    0.0452     0.0002    0.0013     0.0010  
           roiL4              0.0871   -0.0771   -0.0961   -0.0078     0.0469    0.0694   -0.0175   -0.1622    0.4326     0.0112   -0.0419    0.0318 
           roiL5              0.0497   -0.0283   -0.0249   -0.0005     0.0116    0.0493   -0.0095   -0.1046    0.4873    -0.0039   -0.0381    0.0306  
           roiL6              0.0607   -0.0123   -0.1699   -0.0135     0.0224    0.1302   -0.0262     0.0110    0.6443     0.0203   -0.0218   -0.0079 
           roiL7              0.0351     0.0272   -0.2100   -0.0102   -0.0271    0.1454   -0.0167     0.0148    0.4489     0.0056   -0.0003   -0.1188 
growth_rate        -0.0119     0.0225   -0.0011     0.0015     0.0366  -0.0007    0.0004     0.0075    0.0092    -0.0001    0.0092     0.0024  
growth_rateL1    -0.0073    0.0229     0.0000    -0.0184    0.1114   -0.0045   -0.0026   -0.0405    0.0193   -0.0076     0.1742    0.0038  
growth_rateL2    -0.0187    0.0065     0.0167    -0.0031    0.0897   -0.0025     0.0120    0.0625    0.0215    -0.0016    0.0704    0.0070  
growth_rateL3    -0.0251    0.0054     0.0182    -0.0155    0.0207   -0.0110    0.9382    0.0051    -0.0261   -0.0039   -0.0102    0.0015 
growth_rateL4    -0.0297    0.0209     0.0015    -0.0011   -0.0236   -0.0046    0.0020    0.0022     0.0018   -0.0018   -0.0012    0.0014  
growth_rateL5    -0.0257    0.0162     0.0070      0.0075   -0.0043   -0.0051  -0.0002    0.0072   -0.0203   -0.0014   -0.0043   -0.0033  
growth_rateL6    -0.0388    0.0682     0.0535      0.0198   -0.0719   -0.0882    0.0122  -0.0338   -0.3788   -0.0143   -0.0352   -0.0196  
growth_rateL7    -0.0245  -0.0109     0.1921      0.1773     0.1095   -0.1097    0.0033    0.0771   -0.1489   -0.0102   -0.1006    0.0663  
nsta                           0.0243    0.0570    0.0068      0.0716   -0.0701     0.0017    0.0110    0.2695   -0.0658     0.0024    0.2752   -0.0300  
nsta_L1                    0.0413    0.1128    0.0051      0.1965   -0.0382     0.0104   -0.0071   -0.0123   -0.0314    0.0064    0.6704   -0.0100  
nsta_L2                    0.0253    0.0777    0.1778      0.1487   -0.0478     0.0113    0.0115     0.0406   -0.0286    0.0075    0.3263   -0.0032  
nsta_L3                    0.0060    0.0158  -0.0054      0.0849   -0.0057     0.0011    0.9329    -0.0022    0.0117    0.0038    0.0115   -0.0034  
nsta_L4                    0.0325    0.0731  -0.0022      0.6217   -0.0718     0.0103  -0.0010    -0.0082   -0.0649    0.0085    0.4977   -0.0084  
nsta_L5                    0.0390    0.0566   0.0184      0.8531    -0.0310   -0.0010    0.0239     0.0148    -0.0253   0.0099    0.0828   -0.0018  
nsta_L6                    0.0571    0.0213    0.0051      0.9028     0.0582   -0.0042    0.0286   -0.0045    -0.0063  -0.0053  -0.0056   -0.0029  
nsta_L7                    0.0483   -0.0075    0.0125      0.8481    0.1604   -0.0111     0.0367    0.0006      0.0458   0.0054   -0.0431    0.0145  
cfts                            0.0748   -0.0255   -0.0007     0.0119   -0.0121     0.0041    0.0009    0.0044     -0.0348    0.0123    0.0208    0.1709  
cfts_L1                     0.0596   -0.0108     0.0055     0.0137     0.0163   -0.0005   -0.0013   -0.0282   -0.0038     0.0012    0.0229    0.0102  
cfts_L2                     0.0390     0.0004    0.0030      0.0073     0.0140   -0.0004   -0.0015   -0.0209    0.0110    0.0048    0.0076   -0.0048  
cfts_L3                   -0.0129     0.0076    0.0088      0.0017   -0.0070    -0.0065    0.0021   -0.0408   0.0692   -0.0164   -0.0114   -0.5770  
cfts_L4                     0.0063   -0.0004   -0.0011     0.0115   -0.0182   -0.0039    -0.0016    0.0162    0.1108   -0.0264   -0.0123    0.4556  
cfts_L5                     0.0100     0.0170   -0.0081     0.0072   -0.0165    0.0028   -0.0028     0.0016    0.0828   -0.0159   -0.0142    0.6691 
cfts_L6                     0.0272     0.0258   -0.0111     0.0061   -0.0473    0.0018   -0.0007     0.0074    0.0756     0.0005   -0.0191  -0.1572  
cfts_L7                   -0.0078     0.0386   -0.0276   -0.0028     0.0009    0.0070     0.0013     0.0080    0.1692   -0.0147     0.0018  -0.5400  
quick_ratio          -0.0608     0.0905     0.0063     0.0255   -0.0177   -0.0010   -0.0011   -0.0295   -0.0707    0.0494   -0.0094    0.0039  
quick_ratioL1      -0.0600     0.0609   -0.0012   -0.0021    0.0144     0.0019     0.0050   -0.0323     0.0120    0.1127    0.0259    0.0034  
quick_ratioL2      -0.0537     0.0578   -0.0078     0.0007    0.0104   -0.0011     0.0018   -0.0221     0.0056    0.1906    0.0162    0.0038 
quick_ratioL3     -0.0379      0.0206   -0.0015   -0.0048   -0.0114   -0.0020     0.0023   -0.0075     0.0149    0.7616    0.0051    0.0067  
quick_ratioL4     -0.0349     0.0326    -0.0036     0.0032   -0.0026    0.0001    -0.0017    0.0026     0.0006    0.7626   -0.0017  -0.0061  
quick_ratioL5     -0.0510     0.0212    -0.0062     0.0137     0.0248    0.0040   -0.0048   -0.0058   -0.0042    0.4569    0.0185   -0.0210  
quick_ratioL6     -0.0409     0.0237    -0.0056     0.0078     0.0554    0.0015   -0.0036   -0.0133     0.0005    0.0947    0.0071   -0.0102 
quick_ratioL7     -0.0558     0.0067    -0.0022     0.0127    0.1055   -0.0016     0.0001   -0.0052   -0.0053    0.0625    0.0110   -0.0035 
tlta                          -0.0191   -0.0262     0.0145    -0.0092    0.0276   -0.0078   -0.0006     0.4876    0.0182    0.0007    0.0552   -0.0098  
tltaL1                     -0.0275     0.0141   -0.0007      0.0049    0.0049   -0.0071     0.0019    0.7653   -0.0220   -0.0051   -0.0147    0.0028 
tltaL2                     -0.0287     0.0056     0.0164      0.0035    0.0282   -0.0301    0.0066    0.5986     0.0032   -0.0082   -0.0183    0.0559  
tltaL3                      -0.0024    0.0019     0.0223      0.0044    0.0079   -0.9940    0.0042    0.0036   -0.0182     0.0007   -0.0027    0.0005  
tltaL4                      -0.0053    0.0100     0.9716   -0.0075   -0.0029   -0.0073    0.0042     0.0169   -0.0494    0.0013    0.0226   -0.0069 
 tltaL5                     -0.0163    0.0387     0.3704     0.0970   -0.0482   -0.0650    0.0043     0.0463    0.2169   -0.0143   -0.1285    0.0142  
tltaL6                        0.0051    0.0105     0.9946      0.0233    0.0057   -0.0194    0.0032   -0.0049    0.0048   -0.0039   -0.0227    0.0004  
tltaL7                        0.0063   -0.0015    0.9668     0.0028     0.0549   -0.0141    0.0043   -0.0085   -0.0502   -0.0000    0.0128    0.0059  
qaca                          0.0566     0.7640  -0.0082     0.0036   -0.0728   -0.0040    0.0100    0.0423     0.0149     0.0066    0.0404    0.0259  
qacaL1                     0.0128      0.8706   -0.0056     0.0002    0.0074   -0.0050    0.0186    0.0034     0.0246    0.0009    0.0598    0.0081  
qacaL2                   -0.0023     0.8786     0.0204     0.0080    0.0665    -0.0077    0.0175    0.0012   -0.0006    0.0075    0.0618    0.0021  
qacaL3                   -0.0066     0.8429   -0.0052      0.0117    0.0756   -0.0073    0.0116   -0.0037    0.0004    0.0228    0.0252   -0.0025 
qacaL4                     0.0503     0.7103     0.0333     0.0822    0.2539    0.0102   -0.0310    0.0041   -0.0840    0.0211   -0.0854   -0.0381  
qacaL5                     0.0866     0.5141     0.0195     0.1471    0.3993    0.0143   -0.0348   -0.0333   -0.1018    0.0066   -0.1895   -0.0451 
qacaL6                     0.1323     0.3773     0.0601     0.1792    0.5924    0.0089   -0.0222   -0.0312   -0.1016  -0.0079   -0.2431   -0.0449  
qacaL7                     0.1049     0.1960     0.0837     0.1557    0.7162   -0.0073    0.0053     0.0006    0.0414   -0.0103   -0.1476     0.0032  
tctl                            0.6667     0.0875     0.0024   -0.0067   -0.0336   -0.0129    0.0202   -0.0286   -0.0063   -0.0078    0.1169     0.0231  
tctlL1                        0.7757     0.0720     0.0140   -0.0133   -0.0684   -0.0160    0.0257   -0.0499    0.0193   -0.0196    0.1418    0.0169  
tctlL2                        0.8112     0.0452     0.0057   -0.0096   -0.0757   -0.0160    0.0182   -0.0354    0.0462   -0.0225    0.1279    0.0212  
tlL3                            0.8209     0.0279   -0.0109   -0.0109   -0.0722     0.0027    0.0085   -0.0164    0.0431   -0.0247    0.0732   -0.0054  
tctlL4                        0.8104     0.0251   -0.0160     0.0493     0.0040     0.0211  -0.0348    0.0158    0.0174   -0.0098   -0.0625   -0.0039  
tctlL5                        0.7646   -0.0267   -0.0091     0.1060      0.1376    0.0203   -0.0396   0.0133   -0.0169   -0.0024   -0.1740   -0.0133  
tctlL6                        0.6938   -0.0631     0.0220     0.1298     0.2796    0.0217   -0.0365    0.0175   -0.0301   -0.0030   -0.2210   -0.0150 
tctlL7                        0.5290   -0.0873     0.0368     0.1472     0.3892    0.0127   -0.0188    0.0325    0.0126   -0.0064   -0.1734   -0.0064  
finalfirmage         0.0899   -0.1435     0.0041   -0.0576    -0.4685    0.0379   -0.0388   -0.0019   -0.0141   -0.0023   -0.1468   -0.0183  
avg_dir_age          0.0170   -0.0854     0.0017     0.0172      0.0767    0.0042   -0.0067   -0.0176    0.0152     0.0071    0.0013   -0.0069 
Nr_Female_Dir  -0.0767     0.0553    0.0115    -0.0311     0.5647    -0.0172    0.0477     0.0088    0.0522    0.0015    0.2171     0.0137 
Total_Dir_Nr       -0.0611     0.0604    -0.0019    -0.0437     0.6234   -0.0138    0.0309    0.0230    0.0767    0.0046    0.1786     0.0083  
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Table A.16: Failed Firm Clusters (Financial Ratios and Directors’ Characteristics).  
 
Variable Median St. Dev Median St. Dev Median St. Dev Median St. Dev
             roi           -0.198 0.502 -0.104 0.758 -0.056 4.795 -0.126 1.000
           roiL1           -0.036 1.623 0.000 0.670 -0.006 0.947 -0.003 1.777
           roiL2        0.003 1.455 0.003 0.613 0.002 1.101 0.004 1.233
           roiL3       0.008 2.884 0.004 33.593 0.002 1.701 0.010 1.459
           roiL4       0.008 0.803 0.007 0.593 0.002 0.909 0.013 1.861
           roiL5     0.011 0.993 0.010 1.645 0.001 0.882 0.017 1.599
           roiL6         0.018 0.741 0.010 0.763 0.001 0.741 0.008 0.449
           roiL7      0.021 1.014 0.004 0.408 0.002 0.477 0.000 0.537
growth_rate    6.615 12.591 0.161 10.397 0.086 2.995 0.089 10.228
growth_rateL1 0.356 50.829 0.042 6.692 0.048 3.724 0.053 6.928
growth_rateL2    0.041 54.986 0.019 5.764 -0.016 3.098 -0.013 4.110
growth_rateL3    -0.005 3.593 -0.087 1.854 -0.028 2.643 -0.116 11.434
growth_rateL4 0.022 2.616 -0.172 1.878 0.032 1.778 -0.140 43.590
growth_rateL5   0.007 1.184 -0.106 1.778 0.074 1.125 -0.037 28.559
growth_rateL6 0.004 1.107 -0.057 1.325 0.056 1.058 -0.102 1.008
growth_rateL7  0.121 1.215 -0.042 0.899 0.033 0.794 -0.154 1.215
nsta              2.430 1.389 1.935 3.027 1.650 8.141 2.358 7.072
nsta_L1                  2.430 4.616 1.782 8.691 1.380 4.109 1.971 5.124
nsta_L2           2.160 12.349 1.760 3.349 1.345 6.054 1.785 6.828
nsta_L3                1.859 7.085 1.778 2.645 1.246 3.161 1.802 67.888
nsta_L4              1.881 7.238 1.905 8.850 0.622 2.942 1.893 4.189
nsta_L5         2.123 8.000 1.938 1.714 0.085 1.694 1.876 3.808
nsta_L6    2.128 7.554 1.914 1.916 0.086 1.239 1.261 3.402
nsta_L7              2.116 7.690 1.512 1.885 0.077 1.202 0.046 1.861
cfts                       -1.624 26.840 -0.063 13.296 -0.215 13.620 -0.895 30.009
cfts_L1         -0.016 10.758 0.008 8.496 0.006 20.029 0.011 23.808
cfts_L2       0.029 2.412 0.013 1.666 0.016 21.781 0.031 5.237
cfts_L3              0.030 3.089 0.013 4.921 0.025 63.409 0.043 3.023
cfts_L4          0.033 1.283 0.016 19.553 0.016 3.234 0.057 8.660
cfts_L5                0.048 1.056 0.019 13.016 0.008 8.108 0.066 11.480
cfts_L6              0.054 8.599 0.019 0.297 0.005 4.361 0.046 0.891
cfts_L7                    0.067 1.969 0.013 0.607 0.002 2.768 0.141 2.304
quick_ratio 3.469 2.747 0.791 3.706 0.560 28.921 1.017 29.196
quick_ratioL1    3.308 28.080 0.818 4.534 0.606 72.478 1.022 35.675
quick_ratioL2  1.002 116.663 0.823 45.591 0.620 48.341 1.010 95.939
quick_ratioL3    0.946 130.710 0.813 212.772 0.603 152.605 1.024 61.380
quick_ratioL4   0.953 65.942 0.809 140.265 0.402 77.547 1.050 39.175
quick_ratioL5  0.989 61.113 0.834 37.422 0.174 66.186 1.067 38.717
quick_ratioL6   0.957 111.655 0.831 4.295 0.172 37.444 0.944 146.217
quick_ratioL7      0.922 80.971 0.699 4.047 0.162 42.342 0.260 13.401
tlta                       1.270 19.116 0.982 2.107 0.961 5.236 0.951 3.442
tltaL1              0.919 1.685 0.881 2.520 0.910 1.952 0.877 2.175
tltaL2         0.807 1.836 0.850 2.957 0.893 3.465 0.849 1.243
tltaL3               0.799 1.300 0.845 46.720 0.881 1.434 0.826 1.453
tltaL4                   0.796 1.075 0.843 2.980 0.811 0.674 0.814 8.915
 tltaL5            0.754 0.676 0.845 2.859 0.666 0.758 0.799 9.971
tltaL6                    0.697 0.696 0.833 2.909 0.562 0.767 0.724 8.190
tltaL7                       0.627 1.751 0.748 2.675 0.557 0.537 0.287 7.824
qaca                     0.807 0.191 0.807 0.251 0.605 0.460 0.973 0.315
qacaL1           0.874 0.260 0.807 0.257 0.557 0.425 1.000 0.306
qacaL2                 0.976 0.293 0.807 0.266 0.550 0.416 1.003 0.315
qacaL3              0.561 0.320 0.804 0.282 0.547 0.441 1.011 0.323
qacaL4                  0.976 0.311 0.805 0.277 0.337 0.420 1.029 0.379
qacaL5              0.563 0.346 0.812 0.283 0.114 0.300 1.024 0.602
qacaL6           0.800 0.393 0.825 0.307 0.174 0.288 1.003 0.528
qacaL7                 0.970 0.438 0.694 0.432 0.146 0.282 0.763 0.605
tctl                           0.243 0.122 0.289 0.197 0.171 0.197 0.228 0.173
tctlL1                       0.244 0.169 0.340 0.204 0.154 0.209 0.153 0.183
tctlL2                      0.221 0.200 0.362 0.212 0.150 0.217 0.125 0.184
tlL3                          0.213 0.213 0.409 0.216 0.144 0.218 0.125 0.181
tctlL4                     0.194 0.209 0.457 0.207 0.052 0.197 0.118 0.174
tctlL5                      0.201 0.202 0.489 0.196 0.012 0.139 0.088 0.159
tctlL6                  0.181 0.190 0.483 0.208 0.234 0.100 0.024 0.133
tctlL7            0.141 0.180 0.396 0.277 0.074 0.094 0.065 0.114
finalfirmage   8.000 5.216 20.000 37.429 11.000 26.613 13.000 42.917
avg_dir_age      49.513 10.292 48.134 13.161 48.134 11.484 48.134 11.431
Nr_Female_Dir 3.000 2.256 0.000 0.913 0.000 0.679 0.000 0.687
Total_Dir_Nr   14.000 9.810 5.000 3.475 3.000 2.988 3.000 3.239
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
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Chart A.1: Normality plots - Firms in EU Countries 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B.1: UK Firms- Correlation matrix of variables without lags.  
 
 
Table B.2: Partial Correlation matr ix of variables without lags. 
 
 
 
roi 
Growth
rate     nsta cfts
quick
ratio tlta qaca   tctl firmage
avg dir
age
Nr
Female
Dir
Total
dir_nr credit GDP_gr
roi 1
Growth Rate     0.0079 1
nsta -0.0069 0.0645 1.0000
cfts 0.0025 0.0021 0.0036 1.0000
quick ratio 0.0037 -0.0018 0.0110 -0.0287 1.0000
tlta -0.9961 -0.0016 0.0071 -0.0010 -0.0055 1.0000
qaca   -0.0013 0.0947 0.0049 0.0094 0.1279 0.0037 1.0000
tctl 0.0182 0.0005 0.0139 0.0467 -0.1137 -0.0196 -0.1458 1.0000
firmage 0.0311 -0.0010 -0.0218 -0.0089 -0.0013 -0.0334 -0.1394 0.1247 1.0000
avg_dir_age 0.0162 -0.0167 -0.0240 -0.0237 -0.0325 -0.0194 -0.0808 0.1071 0.3881 1.0000
Nr_Female_Dir 0.0095 0.1480 0.0249 0.0152 0.0194 -0.0103 0.1112 -0.1207 -0.0097 -0.2000 1.0000
Total_dir_nr 0.0133 0.0924 -0.0079 -0.0845 0.0166 -0.0152 0.0963 -0.1161 0.2503 0.2102 0.4760 1.0000
credit -0.0585 -0.0193 0.0624 0.0630 -0.0034 0.0585 -0.0305 0.1073 0.0515 0.0516 -0.0374 0.0018 1.0000
GDP_gr 0.0008 -0.0273 0.0007 -0.0365 -0.0484 -0.0006 -0.0346 0.0646 0.0151 0.0179 -0.0503 -0.0158 0.0007 1.0000
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C
A
TC
TL
Fi
rm
 a
ge
A
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 D
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A
ge
Fe
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D
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N
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N
u
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er
 o
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D
ir
.
ROI 0.057 -0.322 0.049 0.035 -0.201 0.020 0.221 0.039 -0.044 0.015 0.012
Growth Rate     0.057 0.163 0.030 -0.089 -0.035 -0.436 0.060 -0.042 0.019 -0.031 0.016
NSTA -0.322 0.163 0.016 -0.045 0.062 0.106 0.305 0.028 -0.017 0.005 -0.018
CFTS 0.049 0.030 0.016 -0.533 -0.069 0.047 -0.011 0.002 -0.026 0.049 -0.067
quick ratio 0.035 -0.089 -0.045 -0.533 -0.197 0.038 -0.131 -0.047 -0.029 -0.025 0.039
TLTA -0.201 -0.035 0.062 -0.069 -0.197 -0.044 -0.188 -0.031 -0.075 -0.041 0.019
QACA 0.020 -0.436 0.106 0.047 0.038 -0.044 0.152 -0.031 0.008 0.016 -0.003
TCTL 0.221 0.060 0.305 -0.011 -0.131 -0.188 0.152 -0.055 0.093 -0.001 -0.033
Firm age -0.042 -0.042 0.028 0.002 0.002 -0.031 -0.031 -0.055 0.323 -0.066 0.218
Average Director Age 0.019 0.019 -0.017 -0.026 -0.029 -0.075 0.008 0.093 0.323 -0.306 0.262
Female Director Nr. -0.031 -0.031 0.005 0.049 -0.025 -0.041 0.016 -0.001 -0.066 -0.306 0.550
Number of Dir. 0.016 0.016 -0.018 -0.067 0.039 0.019 -0.003 -0.033 0.218 0.262 0.550
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Table B.3: Correlation matrix of variables with lags (UK Firms).  
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ROI 1.000
ROI t-1 0.063 1.000
ROI t-2 0.141 0.184 1.000
ROI t-3 0.121 0.057 0.257 1.000
ROI t-4 0.205 0.180 0.333 0.360 1.000
ROI t-5 -0.003 0.034 0.139 0.123 0.263 1.000
ROI t-6 -0.001 0.068 0.187 0.166 0.330 0.401 1.000
ROI t-7 0.001 0.017 0.046 0.038 0.067 -0.104 0.146 1.000
Growth Rate 0.008 0.016 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.006 -0.002 1.000
Growth Rate t-1 -0.006 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.002 1.000
Growth Rate t-2 -0.107 -0.042 0.174 -0.007 -0.013 0.020 0.022 -0.013 -0.008 0.009 1.000
Growth Rate t-3 -0.126 -0.024 -0.037 -0.517 0.000 0.040 0.015 -0.006 -0.010 -0.007 0.217 1.000
Growth Rate t-4 -0.174 0.000 -0.076 -0.065 -0.148 -0.062 0.027 0.184 -0.020 -0.008 -0.012 0.046 1.000
Growth Rate t-5 -0.009 -0.065 0.023 -0.023 -0.011 -0.283 -0.012 0.163 -0.010 -0.005 -0.019 0.003 0.165 1.000
Growth Rate t-6 -0.012 -0.084 -0.101 -0.058 -0.124 -0.035 -0.273 -0.030 -0.017 -0.009 0.024 0.007 0.088 0.126 1.000
Growth Rate t-7 0.010 -0.030 -0.097 -0.056 -0.104 -0.076 -0.136 0.044 -0.010 -0.018 -0.032 -0.015 -0.020 0.008 -0.080 1.000
NSTA -0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.246 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.035 0.008 0.011 -0.017 1.000
NSTA t-1 -0.001 0.010 -0.010 -0.002 0.001 -0.020 -0.045 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 0.015 -0.005 -0.032 0.174 0.004 -0.022 0.029 1.000
NSTA t-2 0.000 0.007 0.069 0.000 0.008 0.006 -0.002 -0.010 -0.006 0.001 0.054 -0.003 -0.027 0.168 -0.018 -0.021 0.023 0.953 1.000
NSTA t-3 -0.001 0.009 0.000 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.006 -0.003 -0.007 -0.012 -0.009 -0.013 -0.030 0.169 -0.011 -0.011 0.020 0.895 0.916 1.000
NSTA t-4 -0.001 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.006 0.000 -0.008 -0.008 -0.023 0.198 -0.008 -0.018 0.018 0.913 0.939 0.958 1.000
NSTA t-5 0.000 0.010 0.006 0.002 0.015 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.011 -0.010 -0.005 0.214 -0.015 -0.009 0.008 0.895 0.893 0.892 0.954 1.000
NSTA t-6 -0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.033 -0.002 -0.041 -0.020 0.009 -0.026 0.005 -0.019 0.001 0.016 0.085 0.027 -0.054 0.031 0.602 0.550 0.461 0.433 0.457 1.000
NSTA t-7 0.041 0.004 -0.004 -0.023 0.055 -0.024 0.023 0.010 -0.019 0.012 -0.003 0.020 0.014 0.080 -0.171 0.025 -0.022 0.506 0.482 0.421 0.402 0.422 0.709 1.000
CFtS 0.003 0.030 0.032 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.024 0.002 -0.008 0.010 0.004 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.034 0.025 1.000
CFtS t-1 0.004 0.513 0.062 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.013 0.004 -0.163 -0.043 -0.008 -0.005 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 -0.003 -0.016 0.019 1.000
CFtS t-2 0.008 0.009 0.035 0.020 0.030 0.018 0.022 0.012 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.015 -0.011 -0.015 -0.027 0.004 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.013 -0.003 -0.018 0.005 0.028 1.000
CFtS t-3 0.042 0.029 0.072 0.214 0.157 0.054 0.061 -0.015 0.015 0.009 -0.029 -0.031 -0.033 -0.052 0.023 -0.105 0.011 0.040 0.029 0.041 0.026 0.017 0.015 -0.021 0.006 0.042 0.422 1.000
CFtS t-4 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.013 0.043 0.012 0.011 -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.006 0.021 -0.142 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.017 0.003 0.046 0.042 0.001 0.002 0.128 0.125 1.000
CFtS t-5 -0.002 0.006 0.102 0.091 0.169 0.550 0.242 -0.011 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.032 0.010 -0.070 -0.144 0.070 -0.009 -0.052 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.021 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.048 0.067 0.049 1.000
CFtS t-6 -0.002 0.004 0.011 0.008 0.021 0.057 0.110 -0.005 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.019 0.031 0.025 -0.071 -0.027 0.004 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.016 0.056 0.041 -0.002 -0.001 0.006 0.037 0.017 0.060 1.000
CFtS t-7 0.005 0.040 0.112 0.068 0.150 0.232 0.292 0.004 0.010 0.013 0.025 0.048 0.065 0.005 0.060 -0.544 0.002 0.028 0.033 0.030 0.031 0.023 0.038 0.091 -0.006 -0.003 0.037 0.229 0.095 0.029 0.079 1.000
Quick Ratio 0.004 0.064 0.057 0.043 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.005 0.011 0.005 0.036 0.004 0.006 -0.035 -0.015 0.023 0.011 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.016 -0.029 0.007 0.015 0.035 0.010 0.036 0.012 0.040 1.000
Quick Ratio t-1 0.003 0.012 0.011 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.010 -0.001 -0.017 -0.020 0.008 -0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.013 0.029 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.031 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.027 0.152 1.000
Quick Ratio t-2 0.003 0.040 0.015 0.007 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.012 -0.002 -0.017 -0.027 0.022 -0.005 0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.040 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.035 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.037 0.263 0.888 1.000
Quick Ratio t-3 0.003 0.065 -0.002 0.008 0.020 0.011 0.015 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.002 -0.010 -0.013 0.119 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.369 0.291 0.465 1.000
Quick Ratio t-4 0.003 0.036 0.001 -0.001 0.023 0.012 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.044 -0.007 0.025 0.001 0.015 -0.016 0.030 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.019 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.021 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.000 0.170 0.107 0.120 0.181 1.000
Quick Ratio t-5 -0.002 0.012 0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.007 0.011 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.020 0.014 0.012 0.006 0.008 0.001 -0.002 -0.011 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.025 0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.036 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.012 0.056 0.048 0.041 0.044 0.484 1.000
Quick Ratio t-6 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 0.001 -0.002 -0.013 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.017 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.015 -0.003 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.063 0.161 1.000
Quick Ratio t-7 0.006 -0.006 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.017 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.011 0.023 0.026 0.012 0.054 -0.008 -0.020 -0.015 -0.013 0.000 -0.004 0.010 0.058 0.002 -0.008 -0.009 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.045 0.113 0.096 0.084 0.107 0.049 0.034 0.041 1.000
TLTA -0.996 -0.094 -0.130 -0.121 -0.203 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.006 0.111 0.124 0.173 0.023 0.013 -0.011 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.039 -0.001 -0.076 -0.008 -0.043 -0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 1.000
TLTA t-1 -0.198 -0.426 0.146 -0.058 -0.087 -0.042 -0.036 -0.007 -0.016 -0.009 0.200 0.041 0.036 0.164 0.068 0.091 0.009 -0.025 0.035 -0.022 -0.023 -0.015 0.021 -0.001 0.000 -0.771 -0.017 -0.095 -0.014 -0.032 -0.004 -0.030 -0.057 -0.030 -0.039 -0.009 -0.027 0.008 -0.011 -0.007 0.265 1.000
TLTA t-2 -0.447 -0.095 0.045 -0.139 -0.194 -0.074 -0.079 -0.012 -0.028 -0.020 0.244 0.094 0.129 0.067 0.115 0.171 0.010 -0.019 0.040 -0.023 -0.027 -0.013 0.031 -0.030 0.003 -0.026 -0.034 -0.193 -0.032 -0.087 -0.020 -0.085 -0.106 -0.054 -0.075 -0.013 -0.045 0.024 -0.022 -0.031 0.460 0.584 1.000
TLTA t-3 -0.378 -0.054 -0.075 -0.278 -0.184 -0.066 -0.065 -0.004 -0.026 -0.020 0.044 0.146 0.114 0.066 0.090 0.096 0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.019 -0.021 -0.005 0.037 -0.006 0.010 -0.010 -0.003 -0.285 -0.023 -0.061 -0.015 -0.036 -0.073 -0.044 -0.058 -0.044 -0.044 0.014 -0.019 -0.028 0.385 0.264 0.526 1.000
TLTA t-4 -0.414 -0.055 -0.075 -0.083 -0.372 -0.234 -0.158 0.015 -0.027 -0.023 0.024 -0.011 0.365 0.206 0.157 0.093 0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.013 -0.001 0.029 -0.030 0.006 -0.013 -0.006 -0.095 -0.030 -0.074 -0.024 -0.047 -0.080 -0.054 -0.066 -0.052 -0.061 -0.026 -0.028 -0.036 0.419 0.227 0.433 0.420 1.000
TLTA t-5 0.002 -0.021 -0.039 -0.042 -0.104 -0.347 -0.196 0.212 -0.018 -0.011 -0.023 -0.034 0.101 0.197 0.104 0.175 -0.001 0.024 -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 0.032 0.117 0.039 0.005 -0.005 0.004 -0.037 -0.011 -0.086 -0.017 -0.079 -0.044 -0.032 -0.039 -0.030 -0.037 -0.022 -0.017 -0.025 0.009 0.208 0.316 0.285 0.503 1.000
TLTA t-6 0.001 -0.013 -0.021 -0.023 -0.055 0.282 -0.201 0.018 -0.013 -0.009 -0.015 -0.023 0.002 0.035 0.142 0.227 -0.003 0.015 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 0.023 0.059 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.003 -0.012 -0.005 0.480 -0.004 -0.058 -0.023 -0.023 -0.029 -0.024 -0.028 -0.020 -0.015 -0.027 0.005 0.127 0.195 0.182 0.260 0.571 1.000
TLTA t-7 0.009 -0.016 -0.025 -0.020 -0.025 0.149 -0.047 0.668 -0.010 -0.010 -0.023 -0.016 0.103 0.115 -0.049 0.283 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.005 -0.008 0.009 0.020 0.063 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.047 -0.010 0.374 -0.005 -0.190 -0.017 -0.016 -0.022 -0.018 -0.021 -0.011 -0.011 -0.020 -0.006 0.051 0.085 0.081 0.102 0.371 0.622 1.000
QACA -0.002 -0.009 0.085 -0.077 -0.001 0.050 0.073 0.022 -0.009 0.013 0.060 0.060 0.056 -0.021 0.019 -0.012 0.002 0.002 0.029 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.043 0.043 0.009 -0.025 0.010 -0.027 0.018 0.022 -0.056 0.043 0.129 0.035 0.025 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.097 0.008 0.004 0.043 0.027 0.032 0.002 0.012 0.006 0.017 1.000
QACA t-1 -0.006 -0.010 0.084 -0.007 0.042 0.056 0.077 0.026 -0.011 0.003 0.048 0.006 0.075 -0.004 0.061 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.024 0.016 0.016 0.008 0.023 0.038 -0.021 -0.031 -0.087 -0.047 0.008 -0.011 -0.056 0.058 0.075 0.038 0.033 0.044 0.018 0.016 0.103 0.017 0.004 0.039 0.033 0.022 0.021 0.016 0.006 0.010 0.786 1.000
QACA t-2 -0.004 0.012 0.073 -0.044 0.021 0.046 0.063 0.020 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.052 0.032 -0.008 0.029 0.000 -0.002 -0.019 -0.013 -0.010 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.068 -0.012 -0.011 -0.022 -0.050 0.042 0.092 0.035 0.024 0.033 0.012 0.014 0.088 0.008 0.002 -0.011 -0.032 -0.018 -0.026 0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.692 0.814 1.000
QACA t-3 -0.005 0.003 0.029 -0.048 0.041 0.063 0.088 0.019 -0.006 -0.003 -0.024 0.055 0.031 -0.052 0.012 0.019 -0.005 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.028 0.025 -0.014 -0.019 -0.005 0.009 -0.097 0.008 -0.060 0.019 0.097 0.023 0.014 0.006 0.018 0.013 0.100 0.004 0.002 -0.008 -0.029 -0.001 0.023 0.019 0.007 0.015 0.648 0.732 0.786 1.000
QACA t-4 -0.005 0.009 0.024 -0.065 0.049 0.063 0.042 0.048 0.007 -0.002 -0.017 0.053 0.027 -0.006 0.060 0.032 -0.005 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.003 0.029 0.054 -0.015 -0.011 -0.032 -0.038 -0.090 -0.022 -0.070 0.031 0.078 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.021 0.013 0.098 0.015 0.003 -0.005 -0.017 0.006 0.014 0.053 0.034 0.047 0.582 0.654 0.706 0.801 1.000
QACA t-5 -0.002 -0.007 0.006 0.013 0.036 0.052 0.082 0.016 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 0.003 0.008 -0.034 -0.026 0.012 -0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.024 -0.010 -0.004 0.027 0.039 -0.012 -0.015 -0.087 -0.034 -0.070 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.114 0.012 0.006 0.002 0.018 0.012 0.102 0.006 -0.001 -0.011 -0.031 -0.012 -0.021 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.557 0.600 0.641 0.708 0.742 1.000
QACA t-6 -0.003 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.027 0.047 0.063 0.084 -0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.011 0.002 -0.022 0.012 -0.002 -0.002 0.009 0.008 0.021 0.004 0.011 0.040 0.049 -0.009 0.000 -0.024 -0.029 -0.036 0.002 -0.088 -0.002 0.049 0.006 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.007 0.083 0.006 -0.001 -0.011 -0.014 0.003 0.000 0.041 0.027 0.066 0.508 0.539 0.594 0.642 0.651 0.774 1.000
QACA t-7 0.056 0.010 -0.008 0.012 0.078 0.040 0.071 0.017 0.006 0.007 0.023 0.045 -0.031 -0.019 -0.293 0.147 -0.060 -0.009 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.415 -0.022 -0.015 -0.025 -0.063 -0.087 0.049 0.056 0.001 -0.019 0.030 0.033 0.027 0.033 0.025 0.085 0.063 -0.058 -0.009 -0.042 -0.036 -0.071 -0.020 -0.016 0.097 0.243 0.262 0.277 0.311 0.348 0.410 0.453 1.000
TCTL 0.018 0.017 0.062 0.083 0.109 -0.008 -0.007 -0.023 0.006 -0.032 -0.066 -0.063 -0.094 -0.059 -0.028 -0.121 0.014 0.067 0.054 0.064 0.036 0.004 0.128 0.074 0.047 0.035 0.044 0.157 0.051 0.039 -0.031 0.078 -0.114 -0.035 -0.048 -0.075 -0.081 -0.066 -0.040 -0.064 -0.019 -0.081 -0.098 -0.083 -0.019 -0.001 0.008 -0.034 -0.146 -0.113 -0.120 -0.123 -0.133 -0.097 -0.082 -0.127 1.000
TCTL t-1 0.033 0.033 0.040 0.076 0.111 0.026 0.007 -0.015 -0.021 -0.031 -0.059 -0.054 -0.100 -0.076 -0.013 -0.135 -0.029 0.061 0.047 0.041 0.030 0.005 0.114 0.052 0.036 0.050 0.040 0.133 0.049 0.036 -0.019 0.084 -0.115 -0.073 -0.078 -0.073 -0.084 -0.064 -0.040 -0.064 -0.036 -0.095 -0.106 -0.083 -0.036 -0.019 0.001 -0.046 -0.153 -0.145 -0.136 -0.129 -0.153 -0.123 -0.111 -0.134 0.820 1.000
TCTL t-2 0.015 0.027 0.062 0.103 0.123 0.035 -0.002 -0.015 -0.009 -0.029 -0.014 -0.069 -0.092 -0.086 0.007 -0.150 -0.030 0.057 0.045 0.034 0.025 0.003 0.104 0.052 0.034 0.048 0.042 0.139 0.047 0.011 -0.026 0.091 -0.079 -0.069 -0.086 -0.077 -0.080 -0.063 -0.039 -0.060 -0.018 -0.088 -0.113 -0.088 -0.041 -0.018 -0.008 -0.063 -0.170 -0.155 -0.162 -0.156 -0.147 -0.101 -0.075 -0.132 0.718 0.787 1.000
TCTL t-3 0.014 0.007 0.030 0.107 0.124 0.028 0.011 0.004 0.000 -0.027 -0.017 -0.066 -0.083 -0.064 0.037 -0.139 -0.029 0.050 0.038 0.039 0.025 0.004 0.118 0.036 0.032 0.023 -0.014 0.122 0.039 0.009 -0.028 0.096 -0.080 -0.053 -0.053 -0.072 -0.062 -0.058 -0.038 -0.062 -0.016 -0.063 -0.091 -0.094 -0.017 0.011 0.000 -0.056 -0.144 -0.119 -0.135 -0.149 -0.141 -0.093 -0.081 -0.176 0.663 0.730 0.829 1.000
TCTL t-4 0.015 0.014 0.033 0.044 0.103 0.057 0.068 -0.013 0.010 -0.031 -0.014 0.029 -0.105 -0.084 -0.015 -0.113 -0.027 0.026 0.033 0.032 0.030 0.006 0.142 0.083 0.040 0.047 -0.005 0.107 0.036 0.020 0.000 0.084 -0.063 -0.056 -0.066 -0.042 -0.063 -0.059 -0.039 -0.013 -0.018 -0.077 -0.079 -0.060 -0.094 -0.049 -0.047 -0.060 -0.143 -0.112 -0.119 -0.136 -0.137 -0.068 -0.063 -0.111 0.618 0.638 0.719 0.802 1.000
TCTL t-5 -0.007 0.006 0.041 0.024 0.050 0.088 0.114 -0.019 0.006 -0.033 -0.002 0.022 0.023 -0.076 0.019 -0.139 0.014 0.038 0.057 0.034 0.043 0.052 0.145 0.092 0.031 0.037 -0.010 0.065 0.028 0.010 0.026 0.105 -0.078 -0.058 -0.072 -0.043 -0.068 -0.058 -0.040 -0.008 0.005 -0.050 -0.045 -0.029 -0.059 -0.072 -0.048 -0.068 -0.095 -0.073 -0.094 -0.104 -0.097 -0.087 -0.096 -0.121 0.496 0.524 0.582 0.657 0.766 1.000
TCTL t-6 -0.007 -0.015 0.031 0.031 0.027 0.039 0.125 -0.016 -0.001 -0.036 0.021 0.039 0.041 0.027 0.081 -0.142 0.012 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.162 0.074 0.031 -0.007 0.025 0.082 0.033 0.009 0.059 0.110 -0.076 -0.063 -0.073 -0.048 -0.035 -0.037 -0.042 -0.001 0.008 -0.011 -0.029 -0.037 -0.024 -0.049 -0.073 -0.090 -0.130 -0.118 -0.112 -0.127 -0.133 -0.122 -0.123 -0.153 0.483 0.532 0.525 0.613 0.682 0.748 1.000
TCTL t-7 0.033 -0.017 0.037 0.016 0.039 0.042 0.085 -0.003 0.001 -0.033 0.051 0.048 0.028 0.023 -0.078 -0.038 -0.028 0.006 0.006 0.014 0.009 0.000 0.142 0.391 0.023 -0.018 -0.007 0.038 0.014 0.002 0.037 0.174 -0.027 -0.043 -0.049 -0.020 -0.008 0.018 -0.028 0.159 -0.031 -0.010 -0.056 -0.048 -0.053 -0.029 -0.058 -0.030 -0.061 -0.051 -0.040 -0.082 -0.041 -0.059 -0.074 0.256 0.303 0.323 0.343 0.382 0.453 0.477 0.587 1.000
Firm Age 0.031 0.049 0.048 0.085 0.063 0.090 0.057 0.015 0.018 -0.001 0.005 -0.047 -0.164 -0.169 -0.124 -0.101 -0.022 -0.018 -0.023 -0.024 -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.056 -0.009 0.043 0.040 0.098 0.015 0.055 0.024 0.064 -0.001 0.059 0.035 -0.014 0.041 -0.002 -0.030 -0.057 -0.033 -0.088 -0.114 -0.107 -0.085 -0.046 0.004 0.005 -0.140 -0.119 -0.112 -0.110 -0.130 -0.109 -0.093 -0.068 0.124 0.138 0.169 0.193 0.172 0.177 0.178 0.141 1.000
Average Director Age 0.016 0.014 -0.002 0.062 0.019 0.060 0.047 -0.017 0.006 -0.007 -0.032 -0.036 -0.094 -0.086 -0.079 -0.174 -0.023 0.007 -0.010 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.034 -0.001 -0.024 0.015 0.010 0.081 0.067 0.050 0.033 0.106 -0.033 0.019 0.024 -0.027 0.001 0.006 -0.063 -0.041 -0.019 -0.102 -0.158 -0.096 -0.067 -0.031 0.018 0.001 -0.080 -0.078 -0.052 -0.110 -0.110 -0.065 -0.067 -0.062 0.107 0.124 0.173 0.192 0.177 0.207 0.182 0.077 0.386 1.000
Female Director Nr. 0.009 0.041 0.031 0.019 0.023 0.022 0.032 0.038 0.053 0.086 0.085 -0.039 0.026 0.025 -0.019 0.064 0.020 -0.031 -0.020 -0.035 -0.026 -0.015 -0.064 -0.062 0.015 0.040 0.024 0.020 -0.107 0.036 -0.024 -0.051 0.021 0.041 0.040 -0.011 0.022 0.012 0.054 0.039 -0.010 0.001 0.030 0.003 -0.013 0.002 0.005 0.035 0.099 0.079 0.057 0.055 0.054 0.070 0.020 0.035 -0.122 -0.117 -0.149 -0.148 -0.122 -0.145 -0.135 -0.075 -0.008 -0.199 1.000
Number of Directors 0.013 0.054 0.056 0.043 0.061 0.057 0.050 0.015 0.017 0.049 0.031 -0.053 -0.043 -0.028 -0.018 0.015 -0.011 -0.068 -0.061 -0.057 -0.044 -0.033 -0.083 -0.099 -0.085 0.025 0.020 0.040 0.003 0.057 -0.032 0.013 0.017 0.029 0.035 -0.020 0.084 0.050 0.011 0.003 -0.015 -0.041 -0.047 -0.039 -0.024 0.023 0.054 0.043 0.088 0.096 0.089 0.075 0.076 0.100 0.098 0.045 -0.117 -0.056 -0.081 -0.054 -0.063 -0.058 -0.039 -0.042 0.252 0.213 0.470 1.000
  
Table B.4: Eigenvalues of un-rotated factors for UK firms; financial ratios and firm age 
as variables. 
  
 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 6.194 0.876 0.164 0.164
Factor2 5.318 0.893 0.141 0.306
Factor3 4.425 0.803 0.118 0.423
Factor4 3.622 1.208 0.096 0.519
Factor5 2.414 0.297 0.064 0.583
Factor6 2.117 0.160 0.056 0.639
Factor7 1.957 0.113 0.052 0.691
Factor8 1.845 0.357 0.049 0.740
Factor9 1.487 0.162 0.040 0.780
Factor10 1.325 0.180 0.035 0.815
Factor11 1.145 0.049 0.030 0.845
Factor12 1.096 0.112 0.029 0.874
Factor13 0.984 0.175 0.026 0.901
Factor14 0.809 0.065 0.022 0.922
Factor15 0.743 0.091 0.020 0.942
Factor16 0.653 0.054 0.017 0.959
Factor17 0.598 0.100 0.016 0.975
Factor18 0.498 0.050 0.013 0.988
Factor19 0.448 0.014 0.012 1.000
Factor20 0.434 0.028 0.012 1.012
Factor21 0.407 0.039 0.011 1.022
Factor22 0.368 0.028 0.010 1.032
Factor23 0.340 0.039 0.009 1.041
Factor24 0.301 0.065 0.008 1.049
Factor25 0.236 0.062 0.006 1.055
Factor26 0.174 0.007 0.005 1.060
Factor27 0.167 0.052 0.004 1.064
Factor28 0.116 0.012 0.003 1.068
Factor29 0.104 0.038 0.003 1.070
Factor30 0.065 0.006 0.002 1.072
Factor31 0.059 0.006 0.002 1.074
Factor32 0.053 0.011 0.001 1.075
Factor33 0.042 0.001 0.001 1.076
Factor34 0.041 0.009 0.001 1.077
Factor35 0.032 0.008 0.001 1.078
Factor36 0.025 0.007 0.001 1.079
Factor37 0.017 0.011 0.001 1.079
Factor38 0.006 0.005 0.000 1.079
Factor39 0.001 0.003 0.000 1.079
Factor40 -0.001 0.015 0.000 1.079
Factor41 -0.016 0.007 0.000 1.079
Factor42 -0.023 0.001 -0.001 1.078
Factor43 -0.024 0.009 -0.001 1.078
Factor44 -0.033 0.015 -0.001 1.077
Factor45 -0.048 0.005 -0.001 1.076
Factor46 -0.053 0.008 -0.001 1.074
Factor47 -0.061 0.011 -0.002 1.073
Factor48 -0.072 0.007 -0.002 1.071
Factor49 -0.079 0.008 -0.002 1.069
Factor50 -0.087 0.007 -0.002 1.066
Factor51 -0.095 0.001 -0.003 1.064
Factor52 -0.096 0.012 -0.003 1.061
Factor53 -0.107 0.009 -0.003 1.058
Factor54 -0.116 0.004 -0.003 1.055
Factor55 -0.120 0.018 -0.003 1.052
Factor56 -0.139 0.005 -0.004 1.048
Factor57 -0.144 0.013 -0.004 1.045
Factor58 -0.157 0.005 -0.004 1.040
Factor59 -0.162 0.004 -0.004 1.036
Factor60 -0.167 0.031 -0.004 1.032
Factor61 -0.198 0.016 -0.005 1.026
Factor62 -0.214 0.034 -0.006 1.021
Factor63 -0.248 0.011 -0.007 1.014
Factor64 -0.260 0.012 -0.007 1.007
Factor65 -0.272 . -0.007 1.000
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(2080)= 4.6e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table B.5: Failed UK Firm Clusters (without Directors’ Characteristics).  
 
 
Variable Median St.Dev Median St.Dev Median St.Dev Median St.Dev
             roi           -0.006 2.012 0.006 74.190 0.006 2.221 0.012 1.271
           roiL1           0.002 0.944 0.017 0.421 0.019 4.748 0.016 4.545
           roiL2        0.000 2.383 0.023 0.557 0.021 0.972 0.021 2.095
           roiL3       0.000 3.060 0.030 0.541 0.026 1.097 0.022 0.964
           roiL4       0.019 1.070 0.040 1.033 0.030 0.756 0.038 1.073
           roiL5     0.125 0.768 0.050 0.745 0.035 1.456 0.044 0.735
           roiL6         0.125 0.092 0.064 0.597 0.037 1.089 0.050 1.077
           roiL7      0.125 7.534 0.078 0.656 0.036 1.301 0.000 0.025
growth_rate    0.026 1.587 0.012 84.965 0.002 77.403 0.009 31.852
growth_rateL1 0.002 0.734 0.000 2.340 -0.001 55.321 0.015 2.582
growth_rateL2    0.007 3.650 0.000 1.703 -0.120 0.840 -0.007 0.898
growth_rateL3    0.091 3.631 0.000 0.590 -0.003 0.824 -0.042 0.681
growth_rateL4 2.654 2.229 -0.035 0.628 -0.016 0.405 -0.006 1.334
growth_rateL5   4.245 1.966 -0.004 1.012 -0.043 0.788 0.028 1.571
growth_rateL6 1.985 0.911 -0.009 0.592 -0.058 0.551 0.203 1.964
growth_rateL7  1.214 0.608 -0.014 1.240 0.720 2.425 0.000 0.154
nsta              2.161 8.500 2.678 3.734 2.067 20.706 2.430 19.744
nsta_L1                  1.950 7.709 2.625 1.931 2.117 1.503 2.430 13.823
nsta_L2           2.397 7.241 2.709 2.351 2.262 1.642 2.850 14.896
nsta_L3                3.364 4.982 2.701 1.530 2.216 4.456 2.732 16.222
nsta_L4              4.321 3.861 2.234 1.378 2.635 1.660 2.742 17.532
nsta_L5         4.037 3.796 2.003 1.328 2.742 1.447 2.098 17.504
nsta_L6    2.988 2.893 3.513 1.551 2.954 1.443 2.299 1.674
nsta_L7              2.554 2.065 2.214 1.242 3.042 1.242 0.234 1.389
cfts                       0.006 4.932 0.013 0.416 0.020 44.615 0.013 5.344
cfts_L1         0.024 3.757 0.022 0.390 0.110 0.803 0.024 30.265
cfts_L2       0.031 5.448 0.023 10.826 0.145 1.850 0.051 0.456
cfts_L3              0.020 1.393 0.035 1.019 0.141 1.974 0.085 0.486
cfts_L4          0.220 0.744 0.053 2.044 0.231 14.893 0.108 0.665
cfts_L5                0.189 0.627 0.091 0.502 0.324 3.363 0.101 3.871
cfts_L6              0.141 2.200 0.165 0.299 0.203 0.825 0.210 9.993
cfts_L7                    0.166 0.165 0.190 0.341 0.149 0.733 0.054 0.086
quick_ratio 0.856 43.755 0.990 7.668 1.104 37.683 0.930 77.749
quick_ratioL1    0.943 73.569 1.046 19.290 1.053 43.910 0.969 6.004
quick_ratioL2  0.871 78.754 1.073 19.195 1.092 14.926 0.957 6.110
quick_ratioL3    0.869 111.053 1.054 47.236 1.061 16.259 0.995 9.339
quick_ratioL4   1.116 100.702 1.082 10.218 1.077 29.792 1.006 8.741
quick_ratioL5  1.779 237.042 1.063 10.965 1.008 23.498 1.081 8.694
quick_ratioL6   2.178 169.874 1.168 10.981 1.013 82.815 1.074 8.981
quick_ratioL7      1.931 120.269 1.260 12.911 1.008 16.249 0.000 4.108
tlta                       0.968 0.970 0.789 10.188 0.815 1.336 0.871 10.150
tltaL1              0.917 2.123 0.750 1.145 0.773 0.891 0.812 3.811
tltaL2         0.906 1.120 0.722 1.044 0.746 0.821 0.826 0.442
tltaL3               0.923 1.895 0.726 0.967 0.754 0.458 0.794 0.623
tltaL4                   0.747 1.335 0.722 0.941 0.748 0.387 0.762 1.331
 tltaL5            0.672 1.586 0.722 2.633 0.723 0.361 0.735 1.100
tltaL6                    0.623 0.334 0.668 2.450 0.758 3.036 0.686 1.451
tltaL7                       0.620 4.156 0.627 1.096 0.769 3.002 0.000 0.394
qaca                     1.006 0.384 0.977 0.254 0.998 0.357 0.838 0.369
qacaL1           1.001 0.385 0.962 0.253 0.971 0.320 0.830 0.360
qacaL2                 1.002 0.363 0.984 0.273 0.996 0.330 0.847 0.377
qacaL3              1.000 0.304 0.917 0.287 1.001 0.340 0.834 0.364
qacaL4                  0.767 0.315 0.763 0.282 1.000 0.355 0.842 0.373
qacaL5              0.662 0.231 0.697 0.268 1.000 0.369 0.828 0.358
qacaL6           0.817 0.200 0.995 0.255 1.000 0.362 0.833 0.363
qacaL7                 0.868 0.186 0.968 0.279 1.002 0.360 0.000 0.258
tctl                           0.039 0.140 0.428 0.226 0.030 0.177 0.230 0.257
tctlL1                       0.022 0.133 0.412 0.218 0.014 0.157 0.194 0.246
tctlL2                      0.028 0.109 0.409 0.217 0.013 0.117 0.229 0.244
tlL3                          0.018 0.126 0.378 0.216 0.005 0.099 0.234 0.251
tctlL4                     0.172 0.152 0.371 0.215 0.005 0.097 0.249 0.230
tctlL5                      0.246 0.155 0.346 0.216 0.001 0.111 0.289 0.219
tctlL6                  0.291 0.119 0.307 0.216 0.004 0.091 0.291 0.228
tctlL7            0.275 0.108 0.291 0.209 0.015 0.100 0.000 0.046
firmage   7.000 13.237 17.000 15.912 14.000 13.146 13.000 15.877
Cluster 4Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
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Table B.6: Eigenvalues of un-rotated factors for UK firms; factor analysis with 
directors’ characteristics.  
 
 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 6.296 0.974 0.161 0.161
Factor2 5.321 0.872 0.136 0.298
Factor3 4.450 0.816 0.114 0.412
Factor4 3.634 1.211 0.093 0.505
Factor5 2.423 0.287 0.062 0.567
Factor6 2.136 0.177 0.055 0.622
Factor7 1.959 0.107 0.050 0.672
Factor8 1.853 0.352 0.048 0.720
Factor9 1.500 0.171 0.039 0.758
Factor10 1.329 0.181 0.034 0.792
Factor11 1.148 0.024 0.029 0.822
Factor12 1.124 0.114 0.029 0.850
Factor13 1.010 0.033 0.026 0.876
Factor14 0.977 0.172 0.025 0.901
Factor15 0.805 0.057 0.021 0.922
Factor16 0.748 0.041 0.019 0.941
Factor17 0.707 0.098 0.018 0.959
Factor18 0.609 0.016 0.016 0.975
Factor19 0.593 0.116 0.015 0.990
Factor20 0.478 0.035 0.012 1.002
Factor21 0.442 0.007 0.011 1.014
Factor22 0.435 0.068 0.011 1.025
Factor23 0.367 0.014 0.009 1.034
Factor24 0.354 0.042 0.009 1.043
Factor25 0.312 0.068 0.008 1.051
Factor26 0.244 0.036 0.006 1.057
Factor27 0.208 0.039 0.005 1.063
Factor28 0.169 0.013 0.004 1.067
Factor29 0.156 0.041 0.004 1.071
Factor30 0.116 0.043 0.003 1.074
Factor31 0.072 0.006 0.002 1.076
Factor32 0.066 0.008 0.002 1.078
Factor33 0.058 0.003 0.002 1.079
Factor34 0.055 0.011 0.001 1.081
Factor35 0.045 0.009 0.001 1.082
Factor36 0.036 0.007 0.001 1.083
Factor37 0.029 0.008 0.001 1.083
Factor38 0.021 0.012 0.001 1.084
Factor39 0.009 0.004 0.000 1.084
Factor40 0.005 0.003 0.000 1.084
Factor41 0.002 0.003 0.000 1.084
Factor42 -0.001 0.016 0.000 1.084
Factor43 -0.017 0.005 0.000 1.084
Factor44 -0.021 0.004 -0.001 1.083
Factor45 -0.026 0.010 -0.001 1.083
Factor46 -0.036 0.014 -0.001 1.082
Factor47 -0.049 0.007 -0.001 1.080
Factor48 -0.056 0.008 -0.001 1.079
Factor49 -0.064 0.005 -0.002 1.077
Factor50 -0.069 0.017 -0.002 1.076
Factor51 -0.086 0.003 -0.002 1.073
Factor52 -0.089 0.002 -0.002 1.071
Factor53 -0.091 0.003 -0.002 1.069
Factor54 -0.094 0.015 -0.002 1.066
Factor55 -0.108 0.005 -0.003 1.064
Factor56 -0.114 0.014 -0.003 1.061
Factor57 -0.128 0.010 -0.003 1.057
Factor58 -0.138 0.002 -0.004 1.054
Factor59 -0.140 0.015 -0.004 1.050
Factor60 -0.155 0.010 -0.004 1.046
Factor61 -0.165 0.005 -0.004 1.042
Factor62 -0.169 0.027 -0.004 1.038
Factor63 -0.196 0.013 -0.005 1.033
Factor64 -0.209 0.037 -0.005 1.027
Factor65 -0.246 0.010 -0.006 1.021
Factor66 -0.256 0.011 -0.007 1.014
Factor67 -0.267 0.028 -0.007 1.008
Factor68 -0.295 . -0.008 1.000
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(2278)= 4.7e+04 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table B.7: UK Failed Firm Clusters (Financial Ratios and Directors’ Characteristics).  
 
Variable Median St.Dev Median St.Dev Median St.Dev Median St.Dev
             roi           0.003 1.732 0.011 0.872 0.008 72.600 -0.029 5.011
           roiL1           0.010 1.653 0.018 0.964 0.022 5.453 -0.034 1.802
           roiL2        0.015 1.379 0.021 1.559 0.035 0.795 -0.040 3.885
           roiL3       0.019 2.099 0.020 0.953 0.034 0.922 0.002 1.803
           roiL4       0.038 0.611 0.035 1.065 0.040 1.098 -0.006 1.796
           roiL5     0.081 0.447 0.040 0.727 0.045 1.378 -0.002 2.094
           roiL6         0.125 0.123 0.050 1.065 0.058 0.612 -0.014 2.340
           roiL7      0.125 5.107 0.000 0.025 0.072 0.371 -0.058 2.801
growth_rate    0.014 9.453 0.012 31.479 6.829 77.645 0.000 5.793
growth_rateL1 0.000 1.924 0.015 2.553 3.368 55.501 -0.002 0.365
growth_rateL2    0.008 2.014 -0.007 0.859 0.277 2.268 0.000 2.859
growth_rateL3    0.018 2.506 -0.041 0.871 0.061 0.827 -0.126 0.588
growth_rateL4 0.034 1.545 -0.123 1.322 0.058 0.872 -0.026 0.334
growth_rateL5   0.056 1.400 0.028 1.460 0.162 1.211 -0.057 1.456
growth_rateL6 0.188 0.796 0.720 1.840 0.039 0.708 -0.168 1.098
growth_rateL7  0.720 0.875 0.000 0.147 0.529 1.274 7.239 3.320
nsta              3.344 6.360 1.553 18.503 3.635 20.799 1.994 2.080
nsta_L1                  2.700 5.355 3.798 13.660 2.128 1.849 1.673 1.659
nsta_L2           2.732 5.041 3.769 14.725 2.132 1.827 2.391 4.069
nsta_L3                2.651 3.534 4.287 16.981 2.070 1.411 1.706 1.478
nsta_L4              2.775 2.795 4.175 17.382 2.083 1.267 1.695 1.377
nsta_L5         2.934 2.697 3.850 17.306 2.222 1.613 1.836 1.337
nsta_L6    3.000 2.278 2.477 1.692 2.191 1.482 1.942 1.385
nsta_L7              3.005 1.671 0.157 1.341 2.216 1.224 1.838 1.399
cfts                       0.012 4.695 -0.125 0.546 -2.787 44.765 -0.579 1.109
cfts_L1         0.022 3.913 -0.041 0.651 -1.294 22.060 -0.267 1.440
cfts_L2       0.025 4.166 -0.008 0.450 -0.033 0.932 -0.390 24.737
cfts_L3              0.033 1.005 -0.007 0.509 0.036 0.506 -0.272 4.703
cfts_L4          0.133 0.613 -0.040 0.655 0.026 1.027 -0.169 35.620
cfts_L5                0.219 0.510 -0.278 3.826 0.201 3.219 -0.107 2.501
cfts_L6              0.399 0.256 -0.725 9.876 0.011 1.794 -1.790 1.548
cfts_L7                    0.329 0.139 0.022 0.088 0.127 0.185 -1.994 1.038
quick_ratio 0.929 27.441 0.930 76.839 1.146 27.244 0.713 73.558
quick_ratioL1    0.995 170.045 0.969 6.120 1.087 23.187 0.841 93.230
quick_ratioL2  1.006 171.029 0.969 6.372 1.129 103.348 0.791 236.073
quick_ratioL3    1.004 84.486 1.000 9.436 1.033 20.363 0.876 391.232
quick_ratioL4   1.094 11.641 1.012 8.931 1.061 85.181 0.896 37.185
quick_ratioL5  1.303 139.659 1.081 8.625 1.037 99.677 0.873 28.625
quick_ratioL6   1.725 115.722 1.074 8.834 1.093 85.644 0.884 17.599
quick_ratioL7      21.779 82.430 0.000 3.728 1.138 16.402 0.715 10.690
tlta                       0.843 0.759 0.871 0.783 0.759 11.235 1.171 2.828
tltaL1              0.817 0.678 0.811 0.583 0.734 2.993 1.023 4.099
tltaL2         0.807 0.453 0.824 0.430 0.711 0.965 1.011 2.612
tltaL3               0.784 1.311 0.795 0.618 0.730 0.980 1.040 0.693
tltaL4                   0.711 0.335 0.762 1.316 0.729 1.404 1.011 0.473
 tltaL5            0.627 0.675 0.749 1.088 0.686 2.783 1.001 0.393
tltaL6                    0.627 0.304 0.693 1.434 0.693 3.788 1.022 1.808
tltaL7                       0.627 2.822 0.541 0.405 0.664 2.846 1.038 3.327
qaca                     0.684 0.315 0.598 0.371 0.999 0.356 0.906 0.350
qacaL1           0.678 0.308 0.893 0.351 0.817 0.327 1.000 0.366
qacaL2                 0.683 0.308 0.982 0.373 0.990 0.337 1.015 0.330
qacaL3              0.662 0.292 0.616 0.354 1.000 0.337 1.015 0.367
qacaL4                  0.666 0.296 0.604 0.365 1.000 0.342 1.015 0.397
qacaL5              0.611 0.240 0.665 0.353 1.000 0.368 1.011 0.362
qacaL6           0.588 0.219 0.687 0.361 0.970 0.352 1.015 0.395
qacaL7                 0.562 0.227 0.874 0.284 0.982 0.353 1.015 0.391
tctl                           0.653 0.255 0.230 0.258 0.054 0.190 0.004 0.201
tctlL1                       0.648 0.247 0.194 0.249 0.045 0.178 0.001 0.183
tctlL2                      0.621 0.247 0.245 0.245 0.026 0.151 0.011 0.174
tlL3                          0.642 0.240 0.243 0.253 0.016 0.117 0.001 0.180
tctlL4                     0.582 0.218 0.254 0.233 0.009 0.095 0.002 0.206
tctlL5                      0.741 0.200 0.284 0.225 0.005 0.118 0.038 0.170
tctlL6                  0.396 0.186 0.291 0.235 0.021 0.109 0.045 0.146
tctlL7            0.596 0.176 0.000 0.034 0.050 0.119 0.100 0.086
firmage   12.000 15.199 13.000 15.688 15.000 14.647 9.000 5.953
avg_dir_age 51.215 8.738 50.625 9.028 51.400 8.111 47.250 10.996
Nr_Female_Dir 1.000 0.734 2.000 2.182 2.000 2.263 2.000 3.163
Total_Dir_Nr 10.000 7.870 11.000 9.150 13.000 11.904 10.000 9.747
Cluster 4Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
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Chart B.1: Normality plots – Firms in UK Regions 
  
ROI Growth Ratio
Quick Ratio Total Liabilities to Total Assets
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C.1: Distribution of firms in liquidation: All countries; firm failure processes 
without directors’ characteristics.  
 
 
Table C.2: Distribution of firms in Financial Distress: All countries; firm failure 
processes without directors’ characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year All firms 1st Process 2nd Process 3rd Process 4th Process
2004 0.05% 0.00% 0.03% 0.04% 0.01%
2005 0.09% 0.00% 0.03% 0.05% 0.01%
2006 0.08% 0.00% 0.03% 0.05% 0.01%
2007 0.10% 0.00% 0.04% 0.04% 0.01%
2008 1.17% 0.15% 0.12% 0.64% 0.26%
2009 10.22% 2.27% 2.08% 2.33% 3.54%
2010 37.67% 12.21% 7.87% 8.20% 9.40%
2011 63.23% 14.94% 11.16% 16.89% 20.24%
2012 93.54% 14.16% 17.92% 28.33% 33.12%
2013 75.00% 5.37% 21.25% 24.26% 24.13%
Firms in all countries: % in liquidation per year
Year All firms 1st Process 2nd Process 3rd Process 4th Process
2004 7.80% 7.07% 8.67% 8.02% 8.05%
2005 8.17% 8.45% 8.60% 9.49% 7.63%
2006 8.93% 9.40% 10.14% 11.22% 7.78%
2007 10.63% 12.59% 14.50% 10.62% 10.12%
2008 13.01% 18.63% 17.86% 10.25% 11.74%
2009 14.18% 17.65% 17.52% 9.56% 15.26%
2010 9.13% 11.97% 14.14% 6.30% 11.66%
2011 6.74% 7.73% 13.21% 4.45% 7.04%
2012 1.14% 2.08% 2.12% 0.50% 1.32%
2013 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Firms in all countries: % in Financial Distress per year
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Table C.3: Distribution of firms in Liquidation: UK Regions; firm failure processes 
without directors’ characteristics.  
 
 
Table C.4: Distribution of firms in Financial Distress: UK Regions; firm failure processes 
without directors’ characteristics.  
 
 
Table C.5: Normality Tests for firms in EU Countries  
 
Table C.6: Normality Tests for firms in UK Regions  
 
 
 
Year All firms 1st Process 2nd Process 3rd Process 4th Process
2004 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2005 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2006 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2007 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2008 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2009 0.45% 0.86% 0.00% 0.00% 1.09%
2010 2.78% 6.70% 0.83% 2.58% 2.59%
2011 11.52% 11.96% 7.89% 14.63% 2.78%
2012 26.78% 30.97% 25.39% 25.60% 0.00%
2013 83.33% 66.67% 66.67% 75.00% 8.33%
Firms in UK Regions: % in liquidation per year
Year All firms 1st Process 2nd Process 3rd Process 4th Process
2004 11.78% 6.59% 3.53% 19.52% 8.12%
2005 12.13% 11.27% 5.19% 19.73% 8.20%
2006 11.81% 12.25% 5.11% 18.10% 11.14%
2007 11.38% 17.06% 5.12% 15.38% 8.14%
2008 14.27% 26.07% 5.57% 15.44% 13.66%
2009 14.89% 29.93% 6.12% 15.42% 11.55%
2010 19.34% 30.59% 10.34% 19.07% 22.83%
2011 16.75% 26.02% 10.80% 15.85% 17.36%
2012 18.17% 34.09% 9.07% 13.24% 11.90%
2013 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Firms in UK Regions: % in Financial Distress per year
Variable
Pr
(Skewness)
Pr
(Kurtosis)
Chi2(2) Prob>chi2
W V z Prob>z W' V' z Prob>z
Liquidated_Firms_Nr. 0.001 0.001 44.730 0.000 0.628 25.536 7.099 0.000 0.675 24.676 6.245 0.001
Liquidated_Firms % 0.001 0.071 11.900 0.003 0.803 13.498 5.702 0.000 0.823 13.451 5.063 0.000
Fin_Distress_firms_Nr 0.001 0.002 23.514 0.000 0.778 5.623 5.087 0.000 0.877 2.632 1.010 0.000
Fin_Distress_Firms % 0.026 0.368 5.540 0.063 0.942 3.969 3.021 0.001 0.979 1.557 0.863 0.104
GDP_gr 0.017 0.421 5.990 0.050 0.957 2.971 2.386 0.009 0.960 3.055 2.176 0.015
Credit 0.018 0.266 6.350 0.042 0.935 4.471 3.282 0.001 0.940 4.554 2.953 0.002
Skewness/Kurtosis Test Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Francia
Variable
Pr
(Skewness)
Pr
(Kurtosis)
Chi2(2) Prob>chi2
W V z Prob>z W' V' z Prob>z
Liquidated_Firms_Nr. 0.001 0.001 25.200 0.000 0.635 35.159 7.976 0.000 0.696 32.159 6.942 0.002
Liquidated Firms % 0.001 0.001 54.760 0.000 0.658 32.892 7.826 0.000 0.692 32.591 6.968 0.000
Fin_Distress_firms_Nr 0.001 0.001 67.480 0.000 0.609 37.626 8.128 0.000 0.626 39.605 7.358 0.002
Fin_Distress_Firms % 0.037 0.009 9.680 0.008 0.954 4.436 3.338 0.000 0.959 4.302 2.918 0.002
GDP_gr 0.000 0.002 35.350 0.000 0.723 26.650 7.355 0.000 0.722 29.431 6.764 0.000
GVA 0.009 0.330 7.130 0.028 0.968 3.084 2.523 0.006 0.970 3.219 2.338 0.010
Credit 0.315 0.000 54.670 0.000 0.946 5.172 3.682 0.000 0.949 5.425 3.382 0.000
New_Firms_perc 0.300 0.075 4.340 0.114 0.985 1.473 0.868 0.092 0.981 1.981 1.367 0.186
Skewness/Kurtosis Test Shapiro-Wilk Shapiro-Francia
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Table C.7: Panel regression on EU countries’ financially distressed firms (without 
directors’ characteristics) 
 
**Sig<0.05; *Sig<0.10 
 
Table C.8: Panel regression on EU countries’ liquidated firms (without directors’ 
characteristics) 
 
**Sig<0.05; *Sig<0.10 
 
Table C.9: Spatial Panel regression on EU countries’ financially distressed firms 
(without directors’ characteristics)  
 
**Sig<0.05; *Sig<0.10 
 
 
 
Firm Failure Process 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
c  -0.058* -0.046  -0.179**  -0.138** -0.044
GDP_gr  -0.008**  -0.007** -0.001  0.007** -0.001
Credit  0.002**   0.001** 0.003** 0.002** 0.001**
Leg_trad -0.022 -0.018 -0.051 -0.029 -0.020
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.089 / 0.009 0.046 / 0.016 0.071 / 0.021 0.072 / 0.020 0.042 / 0.013
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.099 / 0.004 0.075 / 0.006 0.066 / 0.005 0.056 / 0.004 0.051 / 0.004
Coeff. Pr>|z|
Clusters w/out Directors char.
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
c 0.250** 0.102*** 0.071 0.146** 0.130
GDP_gr  -0.285** -0.001  -0.12**  -0.009** -0.001
Credit -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Leg_trad -0.036  -0.571** 0.033 -0.19 0.024
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.001 / 0.543 0.001 / 0.010 0.021 / 0.029 0.021 / 0.051 0.001 / 0.031
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.380 / 0.300 0.079 / 0.006 0.135 / 0.011 0.134 / 0.011 0.152 / 0.013
Clusters w/out Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
W_DV  -0.322* -0.466 0.091  -1.523**  0.892**
W_error 0.329**  0.768** 0.658**  0.895**  -1.281**
c    0.081*   0.065* -0.102 -0.013  -0.049**
GDP_gr  -0.018*  -0.015**  -0.008* 0.001 0.001
Credit 0.002**   0.001*    0.002** 0.002*  0.001**
Leg_trad -0.032 0.002 -0.029 -0.016 -0.001
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.061/0.020 0.054/0.017 0.062/0.018 0.071/0.019 0.025/0.007
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.049/0.004 0.054/0.007 0.048/0.005 0.031/0.004 0.025/0.003
Clusters w/out Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
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Table C.10: Spatial Panel regression on EU countries’ liquidated firms (without 
directors’ characteristics)  
 
**Sig<0.05; *Sig<0.10 
 
Table C.11: Panel regression on UK Country regions’ financially di stressed firms 
(without directors’ characteristics)  
 
**Sig<0.05; *Sig<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
W_DV -0.269 0.444** -0.104   -0.775* 0.408
W_error 0.819** 0.459** 0.473**   0.825** 0.446
c    0.453** 0.089** 0.087  0.096*   0.135*
GDP_gr  -0.013* 0.001  -0.018** -0.002 -0.004
Credit 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001  -0.008*
Leg_trad -0.032  -0.057** 0.028  -0.043* 0.037
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.001/0.049 0.001/0.009 0.030/0.020 0.038/0.025 0.069/0.025
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.219/0.020 0.057/0.004 0.124/0.011 0.087/0.012 0.110/0.009
Clusters w/out Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
c 0.168 -0.070 0.299** 0.111 -0.137
GVA 0 .005 0.001 0.002  -0.009* 0.007
Credit  0.001**  0.003** -0.001 0.001   0.001**
New_firms_perc.   0.018**  0.024*  0.021** -0.010 -0.009
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.035/0.018 0.088/0.024 0.040/0.011 0.092/0.021 0.070/0.023
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.061/0.004 0.157/0.010 0.611/0.004 0.106/0.007 0.162/0.011
Coeff. Pr>|z|
Clusters w/out Directors char.
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Table C.12: Panel regression on UK Country regions’ liquidated firms (without directors’ 
characteristics) 
 
**Sig<0.05; *Sig<0.10 
Table C.13: Spatial Panel regression on UK Country regions’ financial ly distressed firms 
(without directors’ characteristics)  
 
**Sig<0.05; *Sig<0.10 
 
Table C.14: Spatial Panel regression on UK Country regions’ liquidated firms (without 
directors’ characteristics)  
 
**Sig<0.05; *Sig<0.10 
 
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
c   1.015** -13.439 17.345 -19.538 -20.482
GVA  -0.044** 0.414    -1.347**  -3.243**   -1.243**
Credit  -0.007**   0.211**  0.179**  0.853**  0.197**
New_firms_perc.  0.036**   -1.196*  -2.903**   4.364** -0.680
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.223/0.035 14.320/3.109 21.847/4.592 23.847/7.971 9.794/2.265
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.253/0.016 7.655/0.522 7.910/0.539 13.769/1.012 7.772/0.532
Clusters w/out Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
W_DV 0.587** -0.306 0.266* 0.579** 0.556**
W_error -0.228 0.547** -0.192 -0.451  -1.145**
c 0.123*  -0.766* 0.268** 0.081* 0.142
GVA 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006
Credit 0.001* 0.006** -0.001 0.001 0.001
New_firms_perc. 0.012** 0.001   0.018** -0.007  0.017**
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.038/0.011 0.080/0.022 0.037/0.010 0.097/0.022 0.089/0.023
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.052/0.005 0.151/0.011 0.060/0.004 0.098/0.009 0.142/0.012
Clusters w/out Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
Firm Failure Process: 1 2 3 4
Independent 
Variables All Firms
W_DV -0.263 0.252 0.519**  -0.587* -0.099
W_error 0.854** 0.718** 0.539** 0.843** -0.056
c 0.839* -0.283 0.385 0.974** 0.136*
GVA  -0.016* -0.008   -0.016* -0.015  -0.006*
Credit  -0.005** -0.001 -0.002  -0.006** -0.001
New_firms_perc. 0.021** 0.036** 0.016 0.018 0.001
/sigma_u/STD error sigma_u 0.010/0.002 0.054/0.017 0.327/0.024 2.009/0.024 3.500/0.020
/sigma_e/ STD error sigma_e 0.143/0.011 0.054/0.007 0.158/0.010 0.170/0.014 0.096/0.006
Clusters w/out Directors char.
Coeff. Pr>|z|
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Table C.15: Hausman Test results for the EU firms spatial regressions  (financially 
distress) 
 
 
  
Table C.16: Hausman Test results for the EU firms spatial regressions (liquidation) 
 
 
Table C.17: Hausman Test results for the UK firms spatial regressions (financially 
distress) 
 
 
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
fixed . Difference S.E.
GDP_gr -0.007 -0.008 0.001 0.001
credit 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                          =        3.86
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1452
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
fixed . Difference S.E.
GDP_gr -0.037 -0.029 -0.009 0.008
credit -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.003
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                          =        1.40
                Prob>chi2 =      0.4978
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
fixed . Difference S.E.
GVA -0.005 -0.005 0.000 0.001
credit 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
new_firms_~c 0.015 0.018 -0.003 0.007
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                          =        0.65
                Prob>chi2 =      0.7214
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Table C.18: Hausman Test results for the UK firms spatial regressions (liquidation)  
 
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
fixed . Difference S.E.
GVA -0.045 -0.044 -0.001 0.002
credit -0.006 -0.007 0.001 0.001
new_firms_~c 0.063 0.036 0.027 0.017
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                          =        2.58
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2759
